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Abstract 
Depending on who is asked, electronic cigarettes (e-cigarettes) are either the worst thing to 
happen to the fight against tobacco or a godsent technology that will dramatically improve public 
health. Unlike tobacco cigarettes, where the world has converged on common regulatory policies 
intent on shrinking the market for those deadly products, jurisdictions diverge immensely in their 
regulatory goals towards e-cigarettes.  
Illustratively, in March 2017, the government of New Zealand announced it would legalize the 
sale of e-cigarettes. In February 2017, Australia’s pharmaceutical regulator rejected a proposal to 
legalize the sale of nicotine for use in e-cigarettes because evidence of the product’s long-term 
safety was lacking. Previously, the medicines regulator in each country agreed the sale of e-
cigarettes with nicotine should not be legal. Within a month, two wealthy, democratic, 
neighboring former British colonies, with a history of being leaders in tobacco control policy, led 
by right-wing governments, parted company on this momentous policy issue. Why? 
Through a comparative study of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, this study addresses how 
the concerns of public health advocates, business, bureaucrats, and politicians around e-cigarettes 
are translated into regulatory policy. Political science has only begun to apply its theories to the 
study of public health policies, and most of what drives public health policy outcomes remains 
poorly understood. Here, a qualitative comparative approach of three most-similar country cases 
is used to determine what factors enabled e-cigarette regulatory policy change or stasis.  
To imbue meaning to the purpose of a regulatory framework, the study introduces an organizing 
framework called a regulatory stance, which describes the intent of a regulatory framework to 
alter the size of a market in the future relative to the present. All three case countries began with 
a prohibitionist regulatory stance towards e-cigarettes, which intended the market for e-cigarettes 
should make up none of their economies. New Zealand and Canada soon adopted expansionist 
regulatory stances, meaning that these countries intended on growing the size of their e-cigarette 
markets. Australia kept its original regulatory stance.  
  
 
xi 
 
Structured by John W. Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach to agenda-setting, the case studies 
examine how and why a country’s regulatory stance towards e-cigarettes, changed or did not. I 
employed qualitative techniques of document collection and key informant interviews to piece 
together a comparative study of e-cigarette regulatory policy and politics. In the Multiple 
Streams Approach, the problem and policy streams must become primed before they can merge 
with the politics stream and open a policy window. The problem stream became primed once the 
current regulatory policy was deemed a failure when it was rejected by the courts as illegal, 
rejected by bureaucracies as not worth enforcing, or it failed to advance the fight against 
smoking. Next, the policy stream became primed once the public health policy community 
agreed on a consensus alternative regulatory stance expanding the market for e-cigarettes. 
Finally, the politics stream was primed when conditions in the problem and policy stream 
granted left-wing politicians’ permission to support a regulatory stance change favored by 
business groups. This freed right-wing politicians to support regulatory stance change without 
facing a political penalty. Once all stakeholders agreed they would benefit more by adopting the 
alternative regulatory stance than by continuing with the failed policy, a policy window to 
change the failed e-cigarette regulatory stance opened.  
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 Introduction 
Depending on who is asked, electronic cigarettes (e-cigarettes) are either the worst thing to 
happen to the fight against tobacco or a godsent technology that will dramatically improve public 
health. Unlike tobacco cigarettes, where most countries of the world have coalesced around a 
series of regulatory policies meant to shrink the market for the products over time, the world has 
yet to arrive at a consensus best practice regulatory policy for e-cigarettes. As an example, in 
March 2017, the government of New Zealand announced it would formally legalize the sale of e-
cigarettes.1 In February 2017, Australia’s pharmaceutical regulator rejected a proposal to legalize 
the sale of liquid nicotine for use in e-cigarettes because evidence of the product's long-term 
safety was lacking.2 Previously, the medicines regulator in each country agreed the sale of e-
cigarettes with nicotine should not be legal. Within a month, two wealthy, democratic, 
neighboring former British colonies, with a history of being leaders in tobacco control policy, led 
by right-wing governments, parted company on this momentous policy issue. Why? 
This study addresses how the concerns of public health advocates, business, bureaucrats, and 
politicians around e-cigarettes are translated into regulatory policy. Political science has only 
begun to apply its theories to the study of health policies and politics, and most of what drives 
public health policy outcomes remains poorly understood.3 Here, a qualitative comparative 
approach of three most-similar country cases is used to determine what factors enabled e-
cigarette regulatory policy change or stasis. Structured by Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach 
to agenda-setting and policy change, the case studies examine how and why a country’s 
regulatory stance towards e-cigarettes, the intent to alter the size of a market in the future 
compared to the present, changed or did not.  
 
1 Nicholas Jones, “E-Cigarettes Will Be Legalised: Government,” New Zealand Herald, March 29, 2017, sec. National, 
https://bit.ly/2U7bK5o. 
2 AAP, “FED:Ban on Nicotine e-Cigarettes to Remain,” Australian Associated Press, February 2, 2017, sec. Domestic News. 
3 Eric Breton and Evelyne De Leeuw, “Theories of the Policy Process in Health Promotion Research: A Review,” Health 
Promotion International 26, no. 1 (March 2011): 82–90, https://doi.org/10.1093/heapro/daq051. 
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I find that e-cigarette regulatory policy change was precipitated by the rejection of an existing 
regulatory framework, followed by the reaching of a consensus alternative regulatory framework 
in the public health community, which was followed by the co-optation of left-wing political 
parties to favor regulatory policy change.  
How can the same product be treated so differently in different jurisdictions? We cannot expect a 
single explanation to account for all the variance that can be observed. Real-world governments 
are too messy and complex to say nothing of the countries that they govern. No pre-existing 
theories readily explain the diversity of approaches that are taken to regulate e-cigarettes. This 
study will employ a qualitative comparative case study technique to uncover key differences 
among a set of most-similar countries who started with identical e-cigarette regulatory policies 
but ended up in different places. This study attempts to explain a divergence in regulatory policy 
for e-cigarettes among the similarly situated countries of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.  
1.1 E-Cigarettes 
In 2003, the modern e-cigarette was invented by a Chinese pharmacist named Hon Lik.4 Lik 
would go on to found the first e-cigarette manufacturer, RuYan (meaning ‘like smoke’), in an 
effort to propagate the sale of what he thought was a life-saving intervention for tobacco 
cigarette smokers.5 Lik’s device, and those that followed in its wake, heat a liquid solution of 
tobacco-derived-nicotine, propylene glycol, vegetable glycerin, and flavorings until that liquid 
becomes a gaseous vapor that can be inhaled by a user.6 The nicotine in the liquid suspended in a 
gaseous vapor is inhaled deep into the lungs, absorbed, and expelled similarly to tobacco 
cigarette smoke.7  
A note on terminology: in this study, the device used to consume nicotine liquid will be referred 
to as an e-cigarette. Although some deride the use of the term e-cigarette as being imprecise or 
 
4 Hon Lik, Non-combustible electronic spray cigarette, China CN2648836Y, filed April 29, 2003, and issued October 20, 2004, 
https://patents.google.com/patent/CN2648836Y/en; Hon Lik, Flameless electronic atomizing cigarette, United States 
US20060196518A1, filed March 8, 2004, and issued September 7, 2006, 
https://patents.google.com/patent/US20060196518A1/en. 
5 Murray Laugesen, My Life in Public Health: A Memoir from the Frontlines of Global Disease Eradication, Children’s Health, 
and Ending Smoking (Christchurch, N.Z.: Health New Zealand, 2019), chap. 10. 
6 Jeffrey Drope et al., “Key Issues Surrounding the Health Impacts of Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems (ENDS) and Other 
Sources of Nicotine,” CA: A Cancer Journal for Clinicians 67, no. 6 (November 2017): 449–71, 
https://doi.org/10.3322/caac.21413. 
7 Thomas Eissenberg, “Electronic Nicotine Delivery Devices: Ineffective Nicotine Delivery and Craving Suppression after Acute 
Administration,” Tobacco Control 19, no. 1 (February 2010): 87–88, https://doi.org/10.1136/tc.2009.033498. 
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colloquial, it has a commonly understood meaning among the public and will not be confused for 
anything else.8 The verb describing the use of e-cigarettes will often be “vape” or “vaping”.9 The 
term used to refer to the users of e-cigarettes will often be “vaper”. These terms will be used 
interchangeably with their more formalized counterparts of “e-cigarette use” or “e-cigarette user” 
to reflect the language used in data sources collected throughout the study. The nicotine-laced 
liquid solution that is consumed in e-cigarettes will be referred to as “e-liquid” or “nicotine 
liquid”. 
Analyses of e-cigarette product constituents and cigarette smoke constituents suggest e-cigarettes 
will be less harmful to the individual user than tobacco cigarettes.10 The absolute long-term risk 
of e-cigarette use for human health remains uncertain for the time being.11 The most well-known 
estimate of the relative risk asserted that e-cigarettes are 95% safer than cigarettes.12 This figure 
originated from a Delphi process that compared the estimated harms of 12 nicotine products in a 
July 2013 London workshop.13 Evidence updates on e-cigarettes from Public Health England, a 
United Kingdom Executive Agency, served to amplify the 95% less harmful estimate to the point 
where this estimate of relative risk has become a core rationale, even evidence, for policy 
adoption.14 The accuracy of the 95% safer claim has been widely challenged on grounds that the 
evidence used is out of date, does not reflect the current market, and downplays the risks of a 
gateway effect into smoking for youth.15 The veracity of the 95% safer claim is not going to be 
resolved here or anywhere else soon, so it is best to consider what to do with the little contested 
claim that e-cigarettes are safer to use than cigarettes. 
 
8 Matthew Olonoff, Raymond Niaura, and Brian Hitsman, “‘Electronic Cigarettes’ Are Not Cigarettes, and Why That Matters,” 
Nicotine & Tobacco Research 21, no. 10 (September 19, 2019): 1441–44, https://doi.org/10.1093/ntr/nty205. 
9 Allison M. Glasser et al., “Overview of Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems: A Systematic Review,” American Journal of 
Preventive Medicine 52, no. 2 (February 2017): e33–66, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2016.10.036. 
10 Committee on the Review of the Health Effects of Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems et al., Public Health Consequences of 
E-Cigarettes, ed. Kathleen Stratton, Leslie Y. Kwan, and David L. Eaton (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2018), 
chap. 5, https://doi.org/10.17226/24952. 
11 Peter Hajek et al., “Electronic Cigarettes: Review of Use, Content, Safety, Effects on Smokers and Potential for Harm and 
Benefit,” Addiction 109, no. 11 (November 1, 2014): 1801–10, https://doi.org/10.1111/add.12659; Martinne Geller, “E-Cigs a 
‘consumer-Driven’ Revolution Born from a Bad Dream,” Reuters, June 9, 2015, sec. Lifestyle, http://reut.rs/1f0W6CP. 
12 A McNeill et al., “E-Cigarettes: An Evidence Update” (London: Public Health England, August 2015), http://bit.ly/1gWA2di. 
13 David J. Nutt et al., “Estimating the Harms of Nicotine-Containing Products Using the MCDA Approach,” European 
Addiction Research 20, no. 5 (2014): 218–25, https://doi.org/10.1159/000360220. 
14 Ann McNeill et al., “Evidence Review of E-Cigarettes and Heated Tobacco Products 2018: A Report Commissioned by Public 
Health England” (London: Public Health England, February 2018), https://www.politopedia.cl/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/Evidence_review_of_e-cigarettes_and_heated_tobacco_products_2018.pdf. 
15 Thomas Eissenberg et al., “Invalidity of an Oft-Cited Estimate of the Relative Harms of Electronic Cigarettes,” American 
Journal of Public Health 110, no. 2 (January 8, 2020): 161–62, https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2019.305424. 
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Modelers, those scientists who employ computer simulations to predict the future based on 
contingencies and learned behavior from the past have engaged in the debate over the safety of e-
cigarettes in a productive manner. Instead of relying on a single relative risk estimate or a single 
claim about the magnitude of gateway effects relative to smoking cessation effects, modelers 
have employed a range of estimates to produce simulations of population health outcomes. Most 
have found positive health effects will accrue to a population that shifts a tobacco cigarette 
market over to an e-cigarette market, even if relative risk assumptions are much less kind than 
the 95% figure.16 For example, a formal simulation of the health benefits that would accrue to the 
United States, if it were able to transition its tobacco cigarette smokers entirely over to e-
cigarettes, estimates that at minimum around 1.6 million premature deaths would be averted and 
20.8 million fewer life years would be lost.17 The stakes around whether a country can transition 
its population from tobacco cigarettes and onto less dangerous forms of nicotine are massive in 
its scale. Alternatively, countries might attempt to push to wean their populations from nicotine 
altogether.18  
These findings have not stopped a proliferating number of concerned scientists and advocates 
from publishing arguments that cast a skeptical eye towards beliefs that e-cigarettes are a public 
health panacea. A fissure in the epistemic tobacco control community has developed into two 
camps who view the usefulness of e-cigarettes as a public health tool from opposite sides of a 
spectrum.19 On one end are e-cigarette skeptics who advocate for applying the precautionary 
principle, which would keep products whose harm has not yet been established off the market 
until their long-term safety and efficacy are demonstrated.20 On the other end are persons who 
call themselves harm reduction advocates who say it would behoove society to provide easier 
access to and fewer restrictions on less harmful products and activities.21 In the case of e-
 
16 Committee on the Review of the Health Effects of Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems et al., Public Health Consequences of 
E-Cigarettes, chap. 19. 
17 An optimistic scenario places the benefits at 6.6 million fewer premature deaths and 86.7 million fewer life years lost. David T. 
Levy et al., “Potential Deaths Averted in USA by Replacing Cigarettes with E-Cigarettes,” Tobacco Control 27, no. 1 (January 1, 
2018): 18–25, https://doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2017-053759.  
18 Patricia A. McDaniel, Elizabeth A. Smith, and Ruth E. Malone, “The Tobacco Endgame: A Qualitative Review and 
Synthesis,” Tobacco Control 25, no. 5 (September 2016): 594–604, https://doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2015-052356. 
19 Amy Lauren Fairchild, Ronald Bayer, and Ju Sung Lee, “The E-Cigarette Debate: What Counts as Evidence?,” American 
Journal of Public Health, May 16, 2019, e1–7, https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2019.305107. 
20 Science and Environmental Health Network, “Wingspread Conference on the Precautionary Principle,” Science & 
Environmental Health Network, accessed February 18, 2016, http://www.sehn.org/wing.html. 
21 Amy L. Fairchild and Ronald Bayer, “Public Health. Smoke and Fire over e-Cigarettes,” Science (New York, N.Y.) 347, no. 
6220 (January 23, 2015): 375–76, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1260761. 
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cigarettes, these people call themselves tobacco harm reduction (THR) advocates, and they wish 
to replace all the tobacco cigarettes in the world with less hazardous products, like e-cigarettes. 
Skeptics have attempted to establish a link between e-cigarette use in adolescents and later 
cigarette smoking behavior, as well as the toxicity to the human body of inhaling vaporized e-
liquid.22 These e-cigarette-skeptical scientists have even offered their computer simulation 
models finding that e-cigarettes will harm public health.23  
Those who defend the e-cigarette’s potential as a tool public health have been steadily losing the 
battle of public opinion as less of the public believes e-cigarettes are less harmful than cigarettes 
every year.24 Figure 1 demonstrates that in the United States from 2012 to 2019, the ratio of 
persons who thought e-cigarettes were less harmful than tobacco cigarettes compared to those 
who thought they were more harmful fell from 14.9 to 1 to just 1.2 to 1.25 In the United 
Kingdom, the proportion of smokers who believe that e-cigarettes and cigarettes are equally 
harmful rose from 26.1% in 2014 to 41.8% in 2019, outpacing the proportion who thought e-
cigarettes were the less harmful product by that latter date (34.4%).26  
 
22 James C. Salamanca et al., “Formaldehyde Hemiacetal Sampling, Recovery, and Quantification from Electronic Cigarette 
Aerosols,” Scientific Reports 7, no. 1 (September 8, 2017): 11044, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-11499-0; Samir Soneji et 
al., “Association Between Initial Use of E-Cigarettes and Subsequent Cigarette Smoking Among Adolescents and Young Adults: 
A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis,” JAMA Pediatrics 171, no. 8 (August 1, 2017): 788–97, 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jamapediatrics.2017.1488; Committee on the Review of the Health Effects of Electronic Nicotine 
Delivery Systems et al., Public Health Consequences of E-Cigarettes. 
23 Crucially, this study assumed that youth e-cigarette use caused later smoking initiation. The assumption of a strong gateway 
effect into tobacco smoking yielded most of the power that drove a negative public health outcome. Samir S. Soneji et al., 
“Quantifying Population-Level Health Benefits and Harms of e-Cigarette Use in the United States,” PLOS ONE 13, no. 3 (March 
14, 2018): e0193328, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193328. 
24 Leonie S. Brose et al., “Perceived Relative Harm of Electronic Cigarettes over Time and Impact on Subsequent Use. A Survey 
with 1-Year and 2-Year Follow-Ups,” Drug and Alcohol Dependence 157 (December 1, 2015): 106–11, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2015.10.014; Scott R. Weaver et al., “Worldviews and Trust of Sources for Health 
Information on Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems: Effects on Risk Perceptions and Use,” SSM - Population Health, 
September 29, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmph.2017.09.003. 
25 Health Information National Trends Survey, “Compared to Smoking Cigarettes, Would You Say That Electronic Cigarettes 
Are…,” National Cancer Institute, March 4, 2020, https://hints.cancer.gov/view-questions-topics/question-details.aspx?qid=1282. 
26 In 2014, 45.2% of UK smokers thought e-cigarette were less harmful than tobacco cigarettes. Ann McNeill et al., “Vaping in 
England: An Evidence Update Including Mental Health and Pregnancy” (London: Public Health England, March 2020), 97, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/vaping-in-england-evidence-update-march-2020. 
   
6 
 
 
Figure 1: Public Opinion about the Relative Harm of Tobacco and e-Cigarettes in the US 
This loss of public faith in a relatively safer product (when compared to the most lethal consumer 
product of them all) is baffling to many observers. Thirty-year longitudinal studies of the effect 
of e-cigarettes on human health are twenty years away from being published. Without this 
information, skeptics advocate it is better to confine battle against tobacco-caused disease to 
tobacco cigarettes. THR advocates argue that e-cigarettes could be an overwhelmingly positive 
force for public health. No matter how one frames this debate, e-cigarettes are not a case of pure 
risk or pure opportunity.  
1.1.1 The Risks and Benefits of E-Cigarettes 
That risk and opportunity debate breaks down into several contested topics; safety, gateway 
effect, cessation, youth initiation, and dual use. Figure 2 illustrates a simplified relationship 
between each topic and how each contributes to eventual population harm. One of the primary 
purposes that public health entities are interested in e-cigarette regulatory policy is an effort to 
shape these forces so that they minimize population harm. If regulatory policy can reduce the 
safety risk of e-cigarette products, decrease rates of 
youth initiation, or decrease gateway effects into 
tobacco cigarette smoking, we might see less 
population harm. If regulatory policy can decrease 
dual use or increase tobacco cigarette cessation rates, 
then we might also see benefits to population health. 
Each of these risks requires distinct regulatory policy 
responses but outlining what each risk is and the 
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Compared to smoking cigarettes, would you say that electronic cigarettes are… 
(FDA HINTS, 2012-2019)
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Figure 2: Risk Concepts for E-Cigarette Regulatory 
Policy 
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evidence supporting the existence of such a risk will provide richer contextual meaning to 
scholars seeking to understand the topics that will be discussed in the chapters ahead.  
1.1.1.1 Health Risks from Use 
The direct harms of e-cigarette use are being studied in cell and animal models as well as in 
humans at an expanding pace. E-cigarettes have been found to replicate some, but not all, of the 
bodily harms caused by cigarette smoke. Animals exposed to e-cigarette aerosols have suffered 
decreased functioning of their lungs, liver, and heart as well as injuries to gestating offspring.27 
Immunological responses in human subjects raise concerns that e-cigarette use harms immune 
systems, damages the oral cavity, and raises the risk of developing cancer (relative to not using 
e-cigarettes).28 Some flavoring compounds used in e-cigarettes, including chemicals used to 
create butter, cherry, cinnamon, and vanilla flavors, have even been found to be more injurious 
to lung tissue than others.29 The rechargeable batteries in some lower-quality e-cigarettes have 
exploded which has maimed and even killed a small number of adult users.30 Children have 
swallowed the e-liquid their parents use to fill their e-cigarettes, leading to a large number of 
calls to poison centers, and several cases of fatal nicotine overdoses.31 
These findings have begun to solidify the conclusion that e-cigarettes are not safe consumer 
products in an absolute sense. The market can be subject to regulation to address some 
preventable harms, like requiring the use of child-proof caps on e-liquid or product standards that 
disallow the sale of butter-flavored products. However, these risks still pale in comparison to the 
risks to health posed by the tobacco cigarette. The bottom line on the safety of e-cigarettes 
should, therefore, evoke the logic of the Public Health England reports while disregarding the 
 
27 Anna Merecz-Sadowska et al., “A Summary of In Vitro and In Vivo Studies Evaluating the Impact of E-Cigarette Exposure on 
Living Organisms and the Environment,” International Journal of Molecular Sciences 21, no. 2 (January 19, 2020), 
https://doi.org/10.3390/ijms21020652. 
28 I.-Ling Chen, Ian Todd, and Lucy C. Fairclough, “Immunological and Pathological Effects of Electronic Cigarettes,” Basic & 
Clinical Pharmacology & Toxicology 125, no. 3 (2019): 237–52, https://doi.org/10.1111/bcpt.13225. 
29 Janice Gerloff et al., “Inflammatory Response and Barrier Dysfunction by Different E-Cigarette Flavoring Chemicals 
Identified by Gas Chromatography–Mass Spectrometry in e-Liquids and e-Vapors on Human Lung Epithelial Cells and 
Fibroblasts,” Applied in Vitro Toxicology 3, no. 1 (March 1, 2017): 28–40, https://doi.org/10.1089/aivt.2016.0030. 
30 John Cotter, “Exploding E-Cigarette ‘lit My Kid’s Face on Fire’ Warns Alberta Father,” CBC, January 28, 2016, 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/alberta-father-calls-for-ban-on-e-cigarettes-1.3423099; Andrew Russell, “Exploding E-
Cigarettes? Here’s What Canadians Need to Know,” Global News, January 27, 2016, 
https://globalnews.ca/news/2481734/exploding-e-cigarettes-heres-what-canadians-need-to-know/; E. Ackley et al., “Too Hot to 
Handle? When Vaporizers Explode,” Journal of Pediatrics 196 (2018): 320-320.e1, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpeds.2017.12.032. 
31 M. Quail, “Nicotine Toxicity: Protecting Children from e-Cigarette Exposure,” Nursing 50, no. 1 (January 2020): 44–48, 
https://doi.org/10.1097/01.NURSE.0000615084.47597.14. 
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specific figures around relative risk. E-cigarettes are safer than tobacco cigarettes but not 
absolutely safe.  
1.1.1.2 Initiation 
Arguably the most important subject of the e-cigarette policy debate has been the question of 
initiation, or more specifically, youth initiation of e-cigarette use. Young people are using e-
cigarettes at an increasing pace, even outstripping the use of tobacco cigarettes in 15 countries as 
of 2018.32 THR advocates view these statistics as a public health victory because, in most cases, 
tobacco cigarette smoking has fallen to historic lows while e-cigarette use has been rising in 
young people. E-cigarette skeptical scientists have tended to view the growth of e-cigarette use 
in young people as a new vector for nicotine addiction in a new generation. While e-cigarette 
skeptics persistently point to evidence that nicotine addiction is harmful to young brains, their 
largest concern over this rising tide of youth e-cigarette use is that it will one day transition to a 
rising tide of tobacco cigarette smoking.33 This potential transition into a more harmful activity is 
referred to as a gateway effect. 
1.1.1.3 Gateway 
The debate over whether the existence of an e-cigarette market spurs growth in the number of 
young smokers, a gateway effect, is one of the most controversial, important, and lively issues in 
this policy area. Gateway effects have been purported to exist between tobacco, alcohol, and 
cannabis to illicit ‘hard’ drugs for decades and progress towards proving their existence has been 
uneven at best.34 E-cigarette skeptics point to a raft of studies that find that young people who 
use e-cigarettes are more likely to progress to smoking tobacco cigarettes later in their young 
lives.35 This finding is often challenged by THR advocates who assert that vaping and smoking 
might share a common cause, like rebelliousness, anxiety, or parental tobacco use.36 
 
32 More young people vape than smoke in Canada, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Georgia, Iraq, Japan, Morocco, Panama, 
Poland, Saint Lucia, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, United Kingdom and the United States. World Health 
Organization, WHO REPORT ON THE GLOBAL TOBACCO EPIDEMIC, 2019: Offer Help to Quit Tobacco Use (Geneva: 
World Health Organization, 2019), figs. 11–4; 11–3. 
33 Michelle Ren and Shahrdad Lotfipour, “Nicotine Gateway Effects on Adolescent Substance Use,” Western Journal of 
Emergency Medicine 20, no. 5 (September 2019): 696–709, https://doi.org/10.5811/westjem.2019.7.41661. 
34 Louisa Degenhardt et al., “Evaluating the Drug Use ‘Gateway’ Theory Using Cross-National Data: Consistency and 
Associations of the Order of Initiation of Drug Use among Participants in the WHO World Mental Health Surveys,” Drug and 
Alcohol Dependence 108, no. 1–2 (April 1, 2010): 84–97, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2009.12.001. 
35 Jasmine N. Khouja et al., “Is E-Cigarette Use in Non-Smoking Young Adults Associated with Later Smoking? A Systematic 
Review and Meta-Analysis,” Tobacco Control, March 2, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2019-055433. 
36 Peter N. Lee, Katharine J. Coombs, and Esther F. Afolalu, “Considerations Related to Vaping as a Possible Gateway into 
Cigarette Smoking: An Analytical Review,” F1000Research 7 (July 22, 2019), https://doi.org/10.12688/f1000research.16928.3. 
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Disentangling the causal arrow between e-cigarette and tobacco cigarette usage in youth is a 
monumental task and may likely never be fully resolved.  
1.1.1.4 Cessation  
Determining whether e-cigarettes aid smoking cessation has been a key question surrounding the 
novel products since their introduction. The emphasis of this point comes from THR advocates 
who point to all manner of data ranging from the anecdotal to gold-standard randomized 
controlled trials to emphasize their preferred conclusion. In the author’s view of the body of 
scientific evidence, nicotine-containing e-cigarettes perform as well as or better than nicotine 
replacement therapies in aiding smoking cessation. To date at least six published randomized 
controlled trials evaluating whether nicotine-containing e-cigarettes increase smoking cessation 
success relative to placebos, financial incentives, behavioral therapy, or nicotine replacement 
therapy.37 None of the trials has found that e-cigarettes are inferior to their comparator treatments 
and four of the trials have found that e-cigarettes outperform their comparators in promoting 
smoking cessation.38 It seems that in a clinical setting, e-cigarettes aid smoking cessation. The 
rates of successful cessation are far lower than those typically claimed by THR advocates, but 
they are significant, nonetheless. 
These findings speak little to how e-cigarettes are used in more recreational settings. These 
findings must also be tempered by concerns about gateway effects potentially erasing whatever 
beneficial population effects e-cigarettes might have on the tobacco smoking rate. The concern is 
 
37 Pasquale Caponnetto et al., “EffiCiency and Safety of an ELectronic CigAreTte (ECLAT) as Tobacco Cigarettes Substitute: A 
Prospective 12-Month Randomized Control Design Study,” PLoS ONE 8, no. 6 (June 24, 2013), 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0066317; Christopher Bullen et al., “Electronic Cigarettes for Smoking Cessation: A 
Randomised Controlled Trial,” The Lancet 382, no. 9905 (November 16, 2013): 1629–37, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-
6736(13)61842-5; Scott D. Halpern et al., “A Pragmatic Trial of E-Cigarettes, Incentives, and Drugs for Smoking Cessation,” 
New England Journal of Medicine 378, no. 24 (June 14, 2018): 2302–10, https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMsa1715757; Peter Hajek 
et al., “A Randomized Trial of E-Cigarettes versus Nicotine-Replacement Therapy,” New England Journal of Medicine 380, no. 
7 (February 14, 2019): 629–37, https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1808779; Seung-Hwa Lee, Sang-Hyun Ahn, and Yoo-Seock 
Cheong, “Effect of Electronic Cigarettes on Smoking Reduction and Cessation in Korean Male Smokers: A Randomized 
Controlled Study,” The Journal of the American Board of Family Medicine 32, no. 4 (July 1, 2019): 567–74, 
https://doi.org/10.3122/jabfm.2019.04.180384; Natalie Walker et al., “Nicotine Patches Used in Combination with E-Cigarettes 
(with and without Nicotine) for Smoking Cessation: A Pragmatic, Randomised Trial,” The Lancet Respiratory Medicine 8, no. 1 
(January 1, 2020): 54–64, https://doi.org/10.1016/S2213-2600(19)30269-3. 
38 Bullen et al., “Electronic Cigarettes for Smoking Cessation”; Walker et al., “Nicotine Patches Used in Combination with E-
Cigarettes (with and without Nicotine) for Smoking Cessation”; Caponnetto et al., “EffiCiency and Safety of an ELectronic 
CigAreTte (ECLAT) as Tobacco Cigarettes Substitute”; Hajek et al., “A Randomized Trial of E-Cigarettes versus Nicotine-
Replacement Therapy.” 
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made even more complicated when considering the phenomenon of dual using both e-cigarettes 
and combustible tobacco products.  
1.1.1.5 Dual Use 
The issue of dual use concerns whether e-cigarette users will continue to use both tobacco 
cigarettes and e-cigarettes for an extended period. Whether e-cigarette users fully stop smoking 
is widely agreed to be the key to realizing any of the health benefits of vaping. A meaningfully 
harmful dose of tobacco cigarettes can be as small as smoking one to three sticks per day.39 It is 
exceedingly rare to find a daily smoker who smokes that little, so discussions of needing to avoid 
smoking to excess or to preach moderate cigarette smoking as a virtue are nearly meaningless in 
health terms.40 If e-cigarette users continue to smoke tobacco cigarettes, at any level of intensity, 
then much of the health benefits of e-cigarettes seem to vanish. Additional concern over whether 
the dual use of e-cigarettes and cigarettes may be more injurious to the human body than tobacco 
smoking alone concerns e-cigarette skeptics.  
1.1.1.5.1 Summary 
The scientific body of evidence around e-cigarettes is continually building. The evidence base 
does not point directly to inescapable policy conclusions that all governments must respond to. 
The establishment of safety evidence is a mixed bag that points to the potential benefits of 
regulation. But these benefits seem to be countered by the specter of rising youth initiation of e-
cigarette use. The findings that e-cigarettes are a successful cessation aid in a medical setting do 
little to speak to how the products should be regulated as typical consumer goods. Concerns 
about the dual use of hazardous and reduced hazard products complicate this picture further.  
The existence of evidence in this realm do less than we might hope to clear a path towards the 
adoption of evidence-informed policy. The work of creating regulatory frameworks will 
eventually confront these scientific evidence bases. The resultant regulations that are created 
may likely be informed by these findings while being filtered through other lenses and factors 
 
39 Julien Berthiller et al., “Low Frequency of Cigarette Smoking and the Risk of Head and Neck Cancer in the INHANCE 
Consortium Pooled Analysis,” International Journal of Epidemiology 45, no. 3 (June 1, 2016): 835–45, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ije/dyv146; Kenneth C. Johnson, “Just One Cigarette a Day Seriously Elevates Cardiovascular Risk,” 
BMJ 360 (January 24, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.k167. 
40 These data cast a dim light on the value of warning labels printed on cigarette packs as a result of gentleman’s agreements with 
tobacco companies in the 20th century imploring smokers to, for example, “For the sake of health, let’s be careful not to smoke 
too much”. Sarah Milov, “Smoke Ring: From American Tobacco to Japanese Data,” Osiris 33, no. 1 (October 2018): 337, 
https://doi.org/10.1086/699948. 
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that affect the creation of public policy. In order to tame this morass, an organizing concept must 
be offered to try to sort out what stakeholders are trying to accomplish by regulating this market.  
1.2 The Puzzle 
With respect to addressing cigarette use, almost every country in the world has decided to head 
in the same direction, towards achieving a world with less cigarette smoking. Tobacco control, 
when framed as cigarette control, over time has become a less polarizing policy issue in more 
and more countries around the world and a single epistemic community has pushed the effort 
along.41 The world’s first public health treaty, the World Health Organization Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC), has worked towards creating a global policy 
consensus around tobacco control policy. In a short time policymakers around the world have 
agreed that: (1) non-smokers shouldn’t be exposed to tobacco smoke in public places, (2) 
cigarettes should become more expensive over time, (3) consumers should be warned about the 
health risks of smoking, and (4) normatively, children should not smoke.42 Policy convergence 
on similar tools to combat cigarette smoking has occurred in tandem with this shift in attitudes.43 
However, amid the uptake of FCTC policies around the world that were written to address 
cigarettes, the introduction of the e-cigarette created a dramatic departure between country 
strategies towards these novel tobacco products. 
Global responses to the introduction of e-cigarettes to the global marketplace have been varied in 
a manner that belies easy explanation. Countries have adopted wildly disparate approaches to 
regulating e-cigarettes ranging from arresting persons who use e-cigarettes in the Philippines to 
opening e-cigarette shops in hospitals in England.44 These range from invoking laws prohibiting 
 
41 Dimiter Toshkov, “Policy-Making Beyond Political Ideology: The Adoption of Smoking Bans in Europe,” Public 
Administration 91, no. 2 (June 1, 2013): 448–68, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2012.02075.x; Paul Cairney, Donley T. 
Studlar, and Hadii M. Mamudu, Global Tobacco Control: Power, Policy, Governance and Transfer (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
42 David Hammond et al., “Tobacco Denormalization and Industry Beliefs Among Smokers from Four Countries,” American 
Journal of Preventive Medicine 31, no. 3 (September 1, 2006): 225–32, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2006.04.004; Ellen 
Peters et al., “The Impact and Acceptability of Canadian-Style Cigarette Warning Labels Among U.S. Smokers And 
Nonsmokers,” Nicotine & Tobacco Research 9, no. 4 (April 1, 2007): 473–81, https://doi.org/10.1080/14622200701239639; 
WHO TFI, WHO Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic. 2015, 2015, (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2015); Cairney, 
Studlar, and Mamudu, Global Tobacco Control. 
43 Donley T. Studlar, “Tobacco Control Policy Instruments in a Shrinking World: How Much Policy Learning?,” International 
Journal of Public Administration 29, no. 4–6 (April 1, 2006): 367–96, https://doi.org/10.1080/01900690500437006. 
44 Laura Donnelly, “Vape Shops Open on NHS Hospital Sites, in Bid to Stub out Smoking,” The Telegraph, July 9, 2019, 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/07/09/vape-shops-open-nhs-hospital-sites-bid-stub-smoking/; Christopher Lloyd 
Caliwan, “PNP Apprehends 243 for Vaping in Public,” Philippine News Agency, November 25, 2019, 
https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1086955. Ryan David Kennedy et al., “Global Approaches to Regulating Electronic Cigarettes,” 
Tobacco Control 26, no. 4 (July 2017): 440–45, https://doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2016-053179. 
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the sale of “imitation tobacco products” (banning e-cigarette sales in the process) to the actively 
promoting e-cigarettes as a harm reduction tool offering smokers a safer source of nicotine. In 
between are countries that only prohibit the sale of nicotine-containing e-cigarettes and e-liquid 
and those that offer a pathway to the legal sale of nicotine-containing e-cigarettes if the efficacy 
of these products as a smoking cessation tool can be proven. By the beginning of 2020, at least 
32 countries adopted some kind of ban on the sale of nicotine-containing e-cigarettes without 
prior authorization while at least 69 countries adopted policies that explicitly allowed the 
regulated sale of nicotine-containing e-cigarettes (Figure 3).45 Countries in gray in the figure are 
either excluded from the Policy Scan or do not have specific regulations that apply to e-
cigarettes. 
Figure 3: E-Cigarette Regulatory Regimes in 2020 
 
Examining the world map of these policies we can see that no European Union member bans the 
sale of nicotine-containing e-cigarettes while Latin America is dominated by bans on the sale of 
nicotine-containing e-cigarettes. Elsewhere, patterns are decidedly mixed. This study contends 
that this simple dichotomy is an inadequate method to describe the regulatory frameworks these 
jurisdictions have adopted. This dichotomy misses the nuance between statute and lived reality 
on the ground. It misses the nuanced interplay between regulations on the primary substitute 
 
45 Institute for Global Tobacco Control, “Country Laws Regulating E-Cigarettes: A Policy Scan” (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
Bloomberg School of Public Health, February 2020), https://www.globaltobaccocontrol.org/e-cigarette_policyscan. 
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products for e-cigarettes, tobacco cigarettes, and e-cigarette market regulations. There are deeper 
and more meaningful patterns to be gleaned when these regulations are examined more closely. 
Few scholars have attempted to answer why such e-cigarette regulatory policies diverge in such a 
dramatic manner. Feldman posited in 2016 that a lack of a scientific consensus, the differential 
influence of corporate interests in policymaking, and the influence of courts as policymaking 
bodies were responsible for divergence between the US, Japan, and China on this matter.46 
Newman and Nurfaiza propose that some countries, like Singapore, have intentionally designed 
their e-cigarette regulatory policies to achieve a particular pro-social outcome while others, like 
Indonesia, have employed what they call “anti-design” to write a policy that seemed guaranteed 
to achieve harmful results.47 McKee proposed that the THR-friendly approach of England is 
attributable to the dominance of respiratory physicians in quasi-public-sector Public Health 
England.48 Fairchild, Bayer, and Lee propose that the proof of safety demands by US 
policymakers were more stringent than those of fellow policymakers in the UK, leading to a US 
regulatory policy environment that has been rather unfriendly to THR efforts.49 While each of 
these may explain some divergence in policy results, none of these hypotheses derives from a 
rigorous systematic comparative study. The residual differences between the countries described 
are immense and diverging governmental, cultural, economic, political, and statutory reasons are 
not accounted for in these explanations. To shed light on these differences in an inductive, 
thoroughly documented manner, this study seeks to fill that gap. 
1.2.1 Research Questions 
Of interest to this study, in early 2017, two similar neighboring countries, New Zealand and 
Australia, with nicotine bans committed to part ways on their policies. Uncovering why these 
countries and Canada acted so differently when regulating the same product is the subject of this 
investigation. The official and unofficial reasons that countries have adopted their current 
policies vary. The same pieces of evidence are cited in justifying diametrically opposing 
conclusions. The methods used to arrive at those critical pieces of evidence are dramatically 
 
46 Eric A Feldman, “Regulating E-Cigarettes: Why Policies Diverge,” Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law, 2016, 51. 
47 Joshua Newman and Martha Widdi Nurfaiza, “Policy Design, Non-Design, and Anti-Design: The Regulation of e-Cigarettes in 
Indonesia,” Policy Studies 0, no. 0 (January 3, 2020): 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2019.1708887. 
48 Martin McKee, “Evidence and E-Cigarettes: Explaining English Exceptionalism,” American Journal of Public Health 109, no. 
7 (June 5, 2019): 965–66, https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2019.305132. 
49 Fairchild, Bayer, and Lee, “The E-Cigarette Debate.” 
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different, too. All that precedes is a prologue to asking the research questions that the rest of this 
study seeks to answer. 
1. How and why do countries move along the range of regulatory stances?  
2. Why do some countries change their regulatory stances towards e-cigarettes when others 
do not? 
1.3 Chapter Outline 
Over the course of the next seven chapters, this study will make the case that e-cigarette 
regulatory policy change is made possible through a confluence of factors that is precipitated by 
the rejection of an existing regulatory framework, followed by the reaching of a consensus 
alternative regulatory framework in the public health community, which is followed by the co-
optation of left-wing political parties to favor regulatory policy change. Chapter 2 lays out the 
theoretical foundations that underlie both the analytical framework, Kingdon’s Multiple Streams 
Approach, and the outcome variable of interest, a country’s regulatory stance towards the e-
cigarette market. Chapter 2 goes further to present the hypotheses of the variables that could 
drive the outcomes observed in the case studies and provides the rationale for why those 
variables would be important. Chapter 3 presents the methods used to collect qualitative and 
quantitative data, select cases, narrow the scope of the inquiry, and a guide to determining a 
country’s regulatory stance towards a given market.  
Chapters 4 through 6 present the core of the work, the case studies of e-cigarette regulatory 
policy and politics in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. In those chapters, the narrative of 
how each country’s regulatory stance towards e-cigarettes evolved is structured by and within 
each of the Multiple Streams consisting of problems, policies, and politics.  
Chapter 7 synthesizes the lessons that can be learned by carefully comparing the cases to each 
other and by reviewing the importance of the various explanatory variables put forward in 
Chapter 2. Chapter 7 concludes by examining how the important explanatory variables behind 
regulatory policy change were affected by a large and highly relevant case study that 
simultaneously impacted all three case countries after my fieldwork had concluded. Chapter 8 
summarizes how the findings of this study should inform scholarship in political science, public 
policy, and public health going forward, and it points to the questions that this study was unable 
   
15 
 
to address. Lastly, Chapter 8 demonstrates the utility of the regulatory stances concept and makes 
the case for applying it to studies of comparative regulation more broadly. 
1.4 Conclusion 
E-cigarettes are products sold on a market to various consumers and are subject to all the 
economic, policy, social, and political forces that shape their use and their proliferation; not 
independent agents possessing free will. Those agents who have the free will to shape the e-
cigarette market include the companies creating and hawking the products, the people who buy 
and use them, the organizations who try to shape that market, the politicians who pass the rules 
to shape the market and the bureaucracies who implement the policies passed by the politicians. 
These people have agency over the e-cigarette market. It is by studying the motives and choices 
of these actors and the systems in which they function that we might see how the e-cigarette 
market was shaped by local context. The use of a qualitative comparative case study that focuses 
its attention on the politics of regulatory policy change highlights the conditions that were 
necessary to create change or maintain the status quo. Drawing upon a large and rich qualitative 
data collection process grounded in a widely used theory explaining public policy change to 
propose detailed explanations of why regulatory policy change happens, this study seeks to fill 
large gaps in a literature that sits at the intersection of public health, political science, and 
comparative regulation. 
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 Theory 
Paul Sabatier, a prolific public policy scholar and creator of the advocacy-coalition framework, 
claims that “given the staggering complexity of the policy process, the analyst must find some 
way of simplifying the situation in order to have any chance of understanding it”.50 In this study, 
a strategic simplification of both the operation of the policy process and its outputs are employed 
to sharpen the presentation of the empirical data. John W. Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach 
(in place of Sabatier’s framework) is used to sharpen the description of how policy change does 
or does not occur in three case studies. The outputs of that policy change will be described using 
a novel classification concept, the regulatory stance. This chapter introduces these two major 
concepts which are employed to simplify and enable some understanding of the policy process 
described in the three case studies.  
First, the case for defining, studying, and utilizing the concept of the regulatory stance is 
advanced. Namely, the regulatory stance is the summation of a jurisdiction’s policies behind a 
regulatory framework concerning the effect of those policies that are designed to affect a 
market’s size. Here, the necessity of using such a concept is laid out and the way the concept will 
be employed is unpacked. Second, the case for utilizing the Multiple Streams Approach as the 
guiding framework of the chaotic public policymaking process is advanced. Primarily, the 
Multiple Streams Approach will be used to identify the development of independent streams of 
problem, policy, and politics in each case and trace the process by which the streams couple in a 
policy window. Third, the chapter introduces the explanatory variable that appears to precipitate 
or prevent policy change in the case studies. Each variable is situated within one of Kingdon’s 
streams and is advanced as being responsible for altering the likelihood that a change in the e-
cigarette regulatory stance will be achieved. The chapter concludes with a brief synthesis of the 
explanatory variables into a generalizable thesis about the conditions under which regulatory 
stances might change.  
 
50 Paul A. Sabatier, ed., Theories of the Policy Process, 2nd ed (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2007), 4. 
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2.1 Focusing on the Intent of Regulation for Classification 
Economists explain the reason that markets need to be regulated is that there is some sort of 
market failure that must be remedied through collective action.51 Stretching back to Ancient 
Egypt, scholars have tackled the subject. New work invoking the contributions of philosophy, 
political science, psychology, and sociology to the study of regulation continues growing all the 
time.52 Since John Stuart Mill and Henry Sidgwick began a formalized rejection of Adam 
Smith’s presumption that private enterprise usually maximizes welfare in the 19th century, 
scholars have identified umpteen kinds of market failures that lead to some form of sub-optimal 
welfare maximization.53  
Markets and the actors within them, when left to their own devices, will behave in ways that 
empower concentrated or already powerful interests.54 These actors will maximize short-run 
returns at the expense of long-run sustainability. They will fail to solve collective-action 
problems and leave vulnerable consumers out in the cold. This is not to say that markets are not 
sometimes a wonderful force, that stimulates innovation, that can solve some of the world’s most 
pressing problems or create the most perfect widget. But markets fail so often, that we have 
developed multitudinous governance systems at every level of society to try to address these 
failures.  
2.1.1 The Regulatory Stance  
The rationale behind creating regulations for a market is to resolve some form of market failure. 
Each form of market failure can be resolved by adopting policies intended to change the size of a 
market in the future relative to the present. The term for the intended effect of the collected 
policies applying to a market, however broadly or narrowly defined, is a regulatory stance.  
Table 1: Regulatory Stances Applied to the Common Rationales for Regulating Markets 
Rationale for Regulation Regulatory Stance to Remedy 
Negative Externalities Prohibitionist/Contractionist 
 
51 M. Korotana, “The Emergence of Regulation: Subversion of Justice or Inadequacy of Private Law,” 2017, 
http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/13599. 
52 David A. Warburton, “State and Economy in Ancient Egypt: Fiscal Vocabulary of the New Kingdom,” Orbis Biblicus et 
Orientalis 151 (1997), https://doi.org/info:doi/10.5167/uzh-153588. 
53 S. G. Medema, “The Hesitant Hand: Mill, Sidgwick, and the Evolution of the Theory of Market Failure,” History of Political 
Economy 39, no. 3 (September 1, 2007): 331–58, https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-2007-014. 
54 Bruce C. Greenwald and Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets,” 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 101, no. 2 (May 1, 1986): 229–64, https://doi.org/10.2307/1891114. 
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Unequal Bargaining Power Contractionist 
Scarcity and Rationing Contractionist 
Information Inadequacies Led to Over-provision Contractionist 
Planning for the Future to Fix Over-provision Contractionist  
Rationalization and Coordination Contractionist 
Windfall Profits Expansionist 
Anti-Competitive Behavior Expansionist 
Information Inadequacies Led to Under-provision Expansionist 
Planning for the Future to Fix Under-provision Expansionist 
Monopoly Expansionist/Universalist 
Positive Externalities Expansionist/Universalist 
Availability of Service Universalist/Expansionist 
Public Goods Universalist 
Table 1’s left column (which is modeled off Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge, 201255) lays out some of 
the most common rationales and market failures that regulation is designed to remedy. The 
corresponding column on the right lays out the regulatory stance that each market failure implies 
is needed to be resolved. For example, if a market is causing negative externalities, that is the 
market imposes indirect costs that are not priced into a market, leading to overconsumption. 
Depending on the severity of the negative externality, a regulatory stance that would remedy this 
overconsumption would either reduce the size of the market or bring the size to zero. This would 
be the adoption of a contractionist or a prohibitionist regulatory stance, respectively.  
On the other end of the spectrum, if a market is not large enough to maximize utility, e.g., in the 
case of monopoly, then the policies included in adopting a regulatory stance towards that market 
would seek to expand the size of the market, or grow it to a maximally large point. This would 
represent the adoption of an expansionist or a universalist regulatory stance, respectively. In 
cases where regulators have foregone setting a goal for the size of a market in the future, most 
theorists would argue that is because there is no extant market failure that must be resolved. This 
would be referred to as adopting a permissive regulatory stance. 
Conditions that are required to reach the neoclassical economists’ chalkboard model of a 
perfectly competitive free market (fully rational actors, full information, costless transactions, 
etc.) are rarely achieved in real life, but failures to satisfy the conditions of such a functioning 
market can cause either over- or under-provision of goods in a market. For example, failure to 
 
55 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, and Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice (Oxford, 
UNITED KINGDOM: Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2012), 24. 
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satisfy the criterion of full information can lead to over-provision of quack cures for diseases 
while under-provision of real disease cures may occur when false or incomplete information is 
available to a sick person or their health care provider. Implicit in the logic of why these market 
failures are real, is that the resolution of these failures lies in addressing the size of the market.  
If we come to accept that a perfectly competitive market is seldom achievable, then we can make 
the case that the regulatory stances jurisdictions adopt when regulating markets produce a market 
closer to the size that a perfectly competitive market would achieve. This is not to say that 
government interference can achieve perfect market conditions as government failures are a 
near-certainty in questions of regulation.56 This more perfectly sized market would be affected by 
all manner of policies causing distortions in prices, information, transaction costs, entry and exit, 
market power, and demand, but it should reap less of the harm caused by inadequate or excessive 
consumption. 
The concept of a regulatory stance, then, simplifies away this issue by focusing on the intent of a 
policy. Adopting a certain policy cannot guarantee a certain outcome. If this was not the case, 
then nothing bad would ever happen in the world after policymakers addressed an issue. In the 
drive to improve societal welfare, a regulatory policy that is designed to improve welfare is 
typically necessary, but not sufficient, to achieve selected goals. Studying the intent of 
government policy is a useful endpoint for the comparative politics of regulation because it 
focuses attention on the decision as it was made rather than focusing on whether an outcome was 
achieved. Focusing on outcomes sweeps the entire process of policy implementation to the 
forefront of comparative regulation, straying further from evaluating why a regulatory policy 
change happened in the first place. 
The gap between policies as passed and implemented can be wide. But, that existence of that gap 
does not invalidate the study of why policies were passed in the first place. That gap necessitates 
that further attention is paid to the implementation process and the factors that affect the width of 
said gap. 
 
56 Demsetz’s “nirvana fallacy” stated that when compared to imperfect contemporary conditions, intervention is often idealized 
in terms of what it purports to achieve. Harold Demsetz, “Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint,” The Journal of Law 
and Economics 12, no. 1 (April 1, 1969): 1–22, https://doi.org/10.1086/466657. 
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2.1.1.1 Why a Regulatory Stance?  
This study seeks to explain why institutionally and ideologically similar jurisdictions adopted 
different regulatory stances for the same product. Before entry, an identifiable default pathway to 
market through which all similarly situated products must follow is posited to exist. For example, 
after the FDA Act of 1938, all pharmaceuticals sold in the United States needed to prove they 
were safe to consume, while after the reforms of 1960, pharmaceutical manufacturers were 
required to included proof of efficacy in the premarket applications to regulators.57 Over time, 
the restrictions on the paths to market and sales growth for pharmaceuticals evolved in reaction 
to events like the Sulfanilamide Incidents of the 1930s, the Thalidomide tragedy of the early 
1960s, and the AIDS crisis of the 1980s. Some decisions caused profits to increase, like allowing 
for direct-to-consumer advertising, while others stymied sales, like increasing post-market safety 
surveillance standards.58 Developing a theory to describe the choices policymakers arrive at to 
grow or strangle markets is required to gain a more precise understanding of the way 
governments manage markets.  
The search for such a typology on which a theory could be based landed on Robert Paarlberg’s 
policy options continuum for the regulation of genetically modified (GM) crops as a starting 
point. Paarlberg sets up a typology of policy options available to policymakers for regulating a 
market for novel products; preventative, precautionary, permissive, and promotional (Figure 4).59 
Paarlberg’s essential research question was why some countries embraced GM as a promising 
new technology and tried to foster market growth while other countries sought to rid themselves 
of this foreboding, novel market.  
Figure 4: Paarlberg's Continuum of Policy Options  
 
 
57 Daniel Carpenter, Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical Regulation at the FDA (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2014). 
58 Barbara Mintzes, “Direct to Consumer Advertising Is Medicalising Normal Human Experience,” BMJ : British Medical 
Journal 324, no. 7342 (April 13, 2002): 908–11; Peter R. Mansfield and Barbara Mintzes, “Direct-to-Consumer Advertising Is 
More Profitable If It Is Misleading,” The New Zealand Medical Journal 116, no. 1182 (September 26, 2003): U610. 
59 Robert L. Paarlberg, The Politics of Precaution: Genetically Modified Crops in Developing Countries (Intl Food Policy Res 
Inst, 2001), chap. 2. 
Preventive
•Ban or block 
product
Precautionary
•Slow the spread 
of product
Permissive
•Neutral to spread 
of product
Promotional
•Speed the spread 
of product
   
21 
 
Paarlberg utilized his continuum to assess the regulatory choices made by countries as to whether 
they were designed to grow or stifle the market for GM crops. For example, Paarlberg 
considered whether a country afforded intellectual property rights to private actors who sought to 
patent a GM crop.60 If a country wanted to prevent or slow the spread of GM crops, they could 
rule that plants or animals do not deserve patent or other sorts of intellectual property protection. 
Further, the country could decide to allow farmers to plant seeds harvested from GM crops if 
they wanted to slow the rush of corporate investment to the market. Alternatively, if countries 
wanted to promote GM crops, they could decide to grant intellectual property rights to plants and 
animals or they could grant plant breeders the right to prevent farmers from planting seeds 
harvested from GM crops.  
Further, some countries wished to stop the spread of a market product altogether. While some 
would refer to this as the precautionary principle, as Figure 4 indicates, Paarlberg would term 
this sort of policy option is prevention. A large literature on the normative and comparative 
application of the precautionary principle in regulation also exists.61 The literature focuses on 
potentially existential threats to humanity like nuclear explosions, endocrine disruptions, prions 
in the food supply, and other low-probability, highly destructive occurrences.62 This literature 
considers ideas about whether the public’s perception of risk or hazard is more important than 
scientific assessment when setting policy.63 It largely justifies that caution outweighs the benefits 
of technological change moving faster when there is a lot of risk involved in the new 
technology.64  
The reason to avoid the rote application of the precautionary principle in the present study is that 
such literature is primarily concerned with products that are riskier than established potential 
substitute products already on the market. The case study of e-cigarette regulation does not fit 
 
60 Michael Howlett and Andrea Riccardo Migone, “The Canadian Biotechnology Regulatory Regime: The Role of Participation,” 
Technology in Society 32, no. 4 (November 2010): 280–87, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2010.10.004. 
61 Joakim Zander, The Application of the Precautionary Principle in Practice: Comparative Dimensions (Cambridge University 
Press, 2010); Brendon Swedlow et al., “Theorizing and Generalizing about Risk Assessment and Regulation through 
Comparative Nested Analysis of Representative Cases Research Methods and Approaches,” Law & Policy 31 (2009): 236–70; 
Cass R. Sunstein, “Irreversible and Catastrophic,” Cornell Law Review 91 (2005): 841. 
62 Cass R. Sunstein, “The Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle,” Issues in Legal Scholarship 6, no. 3 (2007), 
https://doi.org/10.2202/1539-8323.1091. 
63 Marco Martuzzi and Joel A Tickner, The Precautionary Principle: Protecting Public Health, the Environment and the Future 
of Our Children (Copenhagen: World Health Organization, 2004), http://www.asser.nl/media/2227/cms_eel_96_1_book-
precautionary-principle-protecting-public-health-the-environment.pdf. 
64 Kerry H. Whiteside, Precautionary Politics: Principle and Practice in Confronting Environmental Risk, Urban and Industrial 
Environments (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2006), chap. 2, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015066773386. 
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very well with this literature because e-cigarettes are widely agreed to be less harmful than the 
product they intend to replace. 
Paarlberg’s theory serves as an excellent point of departure for an updated range of regulatory 
stances. The word “range” used here intends to communicate that jurisdictions can jump from 
one edge to the range to another via major policy change. The word “continuum” implied that 
changes in regulatory stances might have to be incremental. Paarlberg’s original continuum of 
regulatory options is also found to be lacking in its ability to be applied to established markets or 
those that do not involve novel technology which invokes concerns about precautionary 
approaches. More fundamentally, Paarlberg’s continuum has no room for a regulatory stance that 
seeks to shrink or eliminate an already established market.  
Other scholars have proposed similar ranges of regulation. Van de Graaf, Haesebrouck, and 
Debaere classify European nation’s regulatory “attitudes” towards shale gas extraction along 
with a range that stretches from Opposition to Precaution to Tolerance to Support.65 MacCoun, 
Reuter, and Schelling classify drug control regimes on a classification scheme ranging from pure 
prohibition to regulatory prescription to a free market.66 Others are more reductive still, like 
Rogeberg, who contrasted regulatory policy options as ranging from Prohibition to Regulation to 
Laissez-Faire.67 These frameworks attempt to sort regulation into a typology on a range from 
restrictive to open. While these sorts of typologies seem like a straightforward way to evaluate a 
regulatory framework on its empirical content, they forego the important wrinkle provided by 
Paarlberg, a theory that speaks to the intent of regulation. 
To remedy shortcomings in Paarlberg’s continuum of regulatory stances, a proposed revision is 
advanced here (See Figure 5). In this revised range of regulatory stances, the concept of the 
intended share of the economy in the future has replaced Paarlberg’s concept of the rate of 
growth. This concept better addresses the classification process of established markets.  
 
65 Thijs Van de Graaf, Tim Haesebrouck, and Peter Debaere, “Fractured Politics? The Comparative Regulation of Shale Gas in 
Europe,” Journal of European Public Policy 25, no. 9 (September 2, 2018): 1276–93, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017.1301985. 
66 Robert MacCoun, Peter Reuter, and Thomas Schelling, “Assessing Alternative Drug Control Regimes,” Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management 15, no. 3 (1996): 330–52. 
67 Ole Rogeberg, “Prohibition, Regulation or Laissez Faire: The Policy Trade-Offs of Cannabis Policy,” International Journal of 
Drug Policy 56 (June 1, 2018): 153–61, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2018.03.024. 
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For example, it is unclear why a government that would seek to depress sales of vodka or coal 
would be applying a precautionary or preventive policy in Paarlberg’s continuum. No definition 
of the precautionary principle makes the case for applying precautionary logic to established 
sources of harm like alcoholic spirits or fossil fuel power plants. Instead, it makes more sense to 
broaden the useful logic and language of Paarlberg’s continuum to be able to apply equally well 
to novel and established markets by discussing the future share of the economy. To expand the 
application the useful concept of a regulatory stance to established markets, a reshuffling of the 
points on the range, and their meaning must be performed. The revised Range of Regulatory 
Stances functions as well as Paarlberg’s for the classification of regulatory stances towards novel 
product markets and improves on his work by addressing the classification of regulatory 
frameworks for established markets. By comparing present and future shares of the economy, the 
revised range of regulatory stances can conceptually handle policies meant to further grow 
established markets.68 
Figure 5: The Revised Range of Regulatory Stances 
 
The regulator's stated or implied preference for how much of the economy should be taken up by 
a particular market (defined as narrowly as is necessary) in the future relative to the present is 
bounded along the range summarized in Figure 5: prohibitionist, contractionist, permissive, 
expansionist, and universalist.69 Paarlberg’s precautionary stance is replaced with the new 
terminology of a contractionist stance. Paarlberg’s promotional stance is changed in name, but 
 
68 For example, up-zoning single-family residential areas to encourage townhome construction is setting an expansionist 
regulatory stance for an established product or market, the townhouse. Yonah Freemark, “Upzoning Chicago: Impacts of a 
Zoning Reform on Property Values and Housing Construction,” Urban Affairs Review, January 29, 2019, 1078087418824672, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1078087418824672. 
69 The symbols used in this figure will be echoed and repeatedly used throughout the study to refer to specific regulatory stances.  
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not in spirit, to an expansionist stance. Expansionist and contractionist should be thought of as 
antonyms or mirror-image stances. In a nod to symmetry, the universalist stance is added on the 
opposite end of the range as the prohibitionist stance. Universalist and prohibitionist stances 
should also be thought of as mirror images of one another. 
The regulatory framework for any chosen market in any jurisdiction at any time can be placed at 
some point along the range of regulatory stances.70 This stance will evolve in reaction to new 
political opportunities and perceived problems. The multitude of policy instruments that can be 
deployed to stymie or grow demand for a market ought to be applied to determining the extant 
regulatory stance towards a market. When assessing the overall regulatory stance of a 
jurisdiction towards a product, it will be necessary to determine how policy in different domains 
works in concert or cross purposes with one another. A single contractionist policy could make a 
regulatory stance on balance, contractionist, even if other domains are a mix of permissive and 
expansionist policies. A single expansionist policy in the presence of several permissive policies 
in other domains may be on balance, expansionist. The result is a system that interferes in the 
function of “free markets” while filtering policy design through the political process. Therefore, 
the overall regulatory stances must be considered holistically across all relevant policy domains. 
This framing enables us to discuss in concise terms why certain regulatory stances are considered 
within the realm of possibility for some markets but out of the realm of possibility for others. For 
example, it allows us to inquire about the differences between lead paint and cigarettes, or 
between lawn darts and diesel-powered cars, or between nuclear power plants and exotic 
derivative investment vehicles. It allows us to ask what force changed a regulatory stance in one 
country from seeking to grow a market and then to quash its growth years later. It also enables us 
to compare divergent or convergent regulatory behavior across jurisdictions and to question the 
mechanisms that underly such behavior. The regulatory stances concept can serve as a common 
reference point to describe policy choices large and small that advocates and opponents can 
wield with clarity. 
 
70 The process of determining the regulatory stance for a market is explained in detail in Section 3.3.4 Determine the Regulatory 
Stance for a Market on page 74. 
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2.1.1.2 The Regulatory Framework 
The regulatory framework assembles the disparate components of regulations placed on a market 
into an overarching organized fashion. In its broadest terms, similarly situated products are 
assumed to be subject to the same regulatory framework. A regulatory framework sorts these 
similarly situated products into pathways that are subject to policies across various domains that 
determine the regulatory stance towards products in said pathway. Figure 6 is a graphical 
example of such a regulatory framework.71
 
Figure 6: Example Regulatory Framework with Pathways for Similarly Situated Products  
The concept of product classification must be considered here too, as it shapes the sorting of 
products into pathways. Product classification can be performed either premarket or after a 
product introduction.72 Product classification processes may require a product’s producer to do 
as little as notifying the regulator of market entry and providing basic information about the 
product, or it could require the sponsor to prove a product meets safety, efficacy, and quality 
requirements. Those standards are typically codified by norms or by statute. 
One theoretical implication that flows from this concept is that if standards to receive one form 
of premarket approval are strict and the regulatory stance received in return for meeting those 
standards is not perceived as sufficiently beneficial compared to taking other routes to market, 
then we would not expect many sponsored products to attempt to meet those premarket approval 
 
71 Premarket approval is a sorting mechanism between similar products which places them in market sectors towards which the 
jurisdiction has adopted a regulatory stance. 
72 As an illustrative example, one could easily describe the regulatory stance towards cigarette brands already being sold on the 
market in the US as somewhere between permissive and contractionist, while the regulatory stance towards cigarette brands not 
already on the US market is prohibitionist. This is because the FDA requires premarket approval to sell new cigarette brands 
introduced after the passage of the 2009 Tobacco Control Act to prove that the brands will not harm the public health while pre-
existing brands did not have to traverse such premarket approval processes. Henry Waxman, “Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act,” Pub. L. No. HR 1256, § 31, 111 (2009), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr1256. 
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standards. If there is a sufficiently large gulf in regulatory stances that would apply to similar 
products if premarket approval were received, then we would expect more applications for 
premarket approval to be received if the cost of changing the regulatory framework is perceived 
to be sufficiently high. If the gulf in regulatory stances is low, then we would expect few 
applications to be received for premarket approval for the more stringent standard. 
The exercise of assembling pathways, policies, classifications, and stances into a single 
conceptual framework crystallizes the inputs, outputs, and implications that flow from a 
regulatory stance. We can understand how carving new pathways or changing the policies in 
each pathway alter incentives for both the supply and demand sides of markets. We see how 
governments can utilize their power to shape markets to their own goals. But the regulatory 
framework means little without understanding the constituent policy domains that pathways filter 
through on their way to becoming regulatory stances.   
2.2 The Multiple Streams Approach 
This study seeks to learn how the policymaking process differed in a single topic area in similar 
countries to produce different regulatory policy outcomes. Political scientist John Kingdon 
proposed the Multiple Streams Approach as a framework to understand the chaos and 
unpredictability of the policymaking process and to help us understand “when an idea’s time has 
come”.73 Policymaking activity around e-cigarette regulation is an excellent use of the Multiple 
Streams Approach as the subject is drenched in uncertainty and ambiguity.74 Scientific, business, 
and political uncertainty are all swept into a single series of cases here. An organizing framework 
that is sufficiently probabilistic and flexible to corral the potential explanations of what drives 
change and stasis in policy is required to parse the chaos. The Multiple Streams Approach 
provides that modicum of organization enabling us to draw systematized lessons out from the 
apparent ongoing chaos. 
The multiple streams framework is a key part of the theoretical literature on the public policy 
process, including such contributions as the garbage can model, advocacy coalition framework, 
 
73 John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, Updated 2. ed, Longman Classics in Political Science (Boston, 
Mass.: Longman, Pearson, 2011). 
74 Joshua Newman, “The Role of Uncertainty in Regulating E-Cigarettes: The Emergence of a Regulatory Regime, 2005-15,” 
Politics & Policy 47, no. 2 (2019): 407–29, https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12294; Nikolaos Zahariadis, “Ambiguity and Multiple 
Streams,” in Theories of the Policy Process, ed. Paul A. Sabatier and Christopher M. Weible, 3. ed. [new ed., new coll.] 
(Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2014), 25–58. 
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and punctuated equilibrium theory.75 While the Multiple Streams Approach was developed under 
close observation of the US Congress, the framework’s usage in international and comparative 
contexts has begun increasing over time.76 While the US federal government is bogged down by 
a surfeit of veto players whose unanimous assent to policy change is required for policy to 
migrate from being placed on the political agenda to enactment into reality, in this study I focus 
on systems of government where policy change is less surreptitious.77 In Westminster-style 
parliaments, the processes of agenda-setting and policy change can be theoretically merged 
because a lack of veto players ensures that policies the government puts on the agenda are almost 
guaranteed to become law.78 The Multiple Streams Approach still functions in these settings as a 
theory of the policy change process, and the study here will be used to draw lessons about the 
effects of these political institutions on the operation of the streams. 
The multiple streams in this approach are named for the parallel streams of problem, policy, and 
politics which contain actors and ideas that make up the milieu from which policies rise to 
prominence in the agenda-setting process. Occasionally, the three streams are coupled at a policy 
window at the behest of a policy entrepreneur who cleverly links the three streams to make 
agenda-setting possible. At some point before agenda-setting, a focusing event will occur, 
causing policymakers' attention to swing towards the issue at hand and look for a solution to a 
perceived problem. To better organize these potential explanatory variables, they are isolated to 
the stream where they are of influence.79 In the case studies at hand, we assume policy decisions 
occurred at the confluence of problem, politics, and policy streams. Tracing backward from those 
policy windows within the confines of each stream should uncover the conditions that led to 
changes (or lack thereof) in the regulatory stance for e-cigarettes. These concepts are explained 
in the remainder of this section along with their utility to this study. 
 
75 Paul Cairney and Michael D. Jones, “Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach: What Is the Empirical Impact of This Universal 
Theory?,” Policy Studies Journal 44, no. 1 (February 1, 2016): 37–58, https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12111. 
76 Daniel Béland and Michael Howlett, “The Role and Impact of the Multiple-Streams Approach in Comparative Policy 
Analysis,” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 18, no. 3 (May 26, 2016): 221–27, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2016.1174410. 
77 George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2002). 
78 R. A. W. Rhodes, John Wanna, and Patrick Weller, Comparing Westminster (OUP Oxford, 2009). 
79 Michael D. Jones et al., “A River Runs Through It: A Multiple Streams Meta-Review,” Policy Studies Journal 44, no. 1 
(February 1, 2016): 13–36, https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12115. 
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2.2.1 Why Use Kingdon? 
Kingdon’s description of the policymaking (or agenda-setting) process is one of two main 
options available to adequately explain the process being observed in this study (the other being 
the advocacy coalition framework). First, the theory is probabilistic instead of being 
deterministic. It only claims that putting together a problem, a policy, and politics will increase 
the likelihood of change, rather than guaranteeing change happens. Kingdon’s theory is 
comfortable with the ambiguity that defines much of how the world operates. The Multiple 
Streams Approach makes the case that only in passing moments of clarity do agenda-setting or 
policy change occur. Identifying the precursors to these passing moments is, therefore, the work 
of those seeking to operationalize the multiple streams approach to learn more generally how 
change happens. Second, the multiple streams approach recognizes a prominent role for 
knowledge in the policymaking process alongside more material interests. The multiple streams 
approach allows different actors to rationally act on different motives. Finally, the Multiple 
Streams Approach serves as an organizing lens to categorize and compare cases across place and 
time. We can look for a reoccurrence of one factor that appeared in the problem stream in one 
case to re-appear in an identical or analogical form in another case. Each stream in this study will 
contain potential explanatory variables that primarily operate within that stream. 
Being that serious scholars of public policy have rejected the stages heuristic, I must explain why 
the primary alternative to Kingdon, Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework, is not being used 
in the current study.80 While both Kingdon and Sabatier’s frameworks propose that policy 
change and agenda-setting are messier processes than the stages heuristic, I prefer to organize 
this study around the multiple streams approach for several reasons. First, the multiple streams 
approach is a superior tool to describe the interrelationship between governments, bureaucracies, 
and advocates as it focuses on more than just the process of advocacy. This study will pay 
attention to the role of bureaucrats in the policy process and does not exclude their contributions 
from the process of policy change. Second, the multiple streams approach may be superior in its 
application in settings where the preferences of actors are unclear or not stable over time, which 
may be the case in a test of regulation in a novel market with questionable impacts on health and 
 
80 Michael Howlett, Allan McConnell, and Anthony Perl, “Moving Policy Theory Forward: Connecting Multiple Stream and 
Advocacy Coalition Frameworks to Policy Cycle Models of Analysis,” Australian Journal of Public Administration 76, no. 1 
(March 1, 2017): 65–79, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8500.12191. 
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wellbeing.81 Third, the advocacy coalition framework can be tested at a later date using the data 
captured in this study, making further mention of it here, duplicative. Finally, while components 
of the advocacy coalition framework fit well into this study, the number of components that 
framework relies upon is far larger than the components of the multiple streams approach, which 
would further burden the completion of an already lengthy comparative study.82 
2.2.2 Problem Stream 
When one group of potential issues lacks a problem to solve, politicians and policymakers, in 
their limited capacity as human beings, will look to other pressing problems to solve. The 
problem stream is mostly made up of media figures, advocacy groups, and the events that focus 
attention on an issue thus serving those problems to actors looking for something to do.83  
The two main ways in which the problem stream can become primed to join with other streams 
is through a focusing event or changes to indicators of an underlying problem. Both these 
mechanisms sharpen the focus of policy actors and can transform an issue that was previously 
considered a condition of the world as it is into a problem. If a potential problem continues to be 
considered a condition of life and not a problem worthy of being addressed, no coupling of the 
streams will occur, and no policy change will happen. Additionally, more than one problem can 
precipitate a single instance of agenda-setting or policy change.  
A focusing event is a sudden shock to the policy system that causes an issue to rise onto the 
agenda and into the consciousness of policymakers or the public. A focusing event is sudden, 
uncommon, and unexpected.84 Be it a terrorist attack, an environmental disaster, or the 
publication of a gripping story in the media, a focusing event that is sufficiently unsettling is 
often necessary to set an agenda. 
An indicator is a less dramatic intervenor than a focusing event. Indicators are the voluminous 
points of data that are generated by governments, bureaucracy, civil society, business, and 
 
81 Nikolaos Zahariadis, “Comparing Three Lenses of Policy Choice,” Policy Studies Journal 26, no. 3 (1998): 434–48, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.1998.tb01911.x. 
82 Adam Wellstead, “Plus Ça Change, Plus C’est La Même Chose? A Review of Paul Sabatier’s ‘An Advocacy Coalition 
Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein,’” Policy Sciences 50, no. 4 (December 1, 2017): 
549–61, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-017-9307-z. 
83 Ishani Mukherjee and Michael Howlett, “Who Is a Stream? Epistemic Communities, Instrument Constituencies and Advocacy 
Coalitions in Public Policy-Making,” Politics and Governance 3, no. 2 (August 26, 2015): 65, 
https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v3i2.290. 
84 Thomas A. Birkland, “Focusing Events, Mobilization, and Agenda Setting,” Journal of Public Policy 18, no. 1 (1998): 53–74. 
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academia which describe how a situation is developing at any moment. Policymakers use all this 
information to monitor the progress of problems and conditions. Changes (or a lack of change) in 
these indicators of subsurface problems can trigger debates to start over whether a problem 
exists.  
Telling a good story about the policy problem can be key to advancing one’s preferred problem 
towards definition in the consciousness of policymakers.85 Stone argued that politicians employ 
‘causal stories’ that define a problem by attributing a problem’s cause and who or what is to 
blame for a problem, usually in the context of a potential focusing event.86 These causal stories 
are the backbone of the process of problem definition and serve the function of placing a 
problem in the context of a potential solution that will prevent the problem from reoccurring, a 
kind of policy learning.87  
Causal stories can be employed to prime the problem stream for coupling in the context of either 
a focusing event or an indicator. The determination of which problems were instrumental to 
creating policy change will be operationalized through an investigation into the sources of the 
problems that were recognized in the lead up to and the aftermath of a focusing event that 
brought e-cigarette regulatory policy onto the political agenda. Two interrelated problems were 
poised to lead to the problem stream becoming primed for coupling in the current study: the 
failure of a tobacco control policy, and the rejection of a regulatory framework.  
2.2.2.1 Failure of Tobacco Control 
The raison d’être of the e-cigarette is to wipe out demand for the tobacco cigarette. As 
policymakers have adopted stronger policy regimes to quash the tobacco market over the last 
half-century, a great deal of progress has been made towards the goal of wiping out demand for 
the tobacco cigarette.88 Cigarette consumption, smoking prevalence, and even rates of disease 
caused by smoking have all plummeted in countries with long-running, sustained, and successful 
tobacco control campaigns. 
 
85 Paul Cairney, “Three Habits of Successful Policy Entrepreneurs,” Policy & Politics 46, no. 2 (April 30, 2018): 199–215, 
https://doi.org/10.1332/030557318X15230056771696. 
86 Deborah A. Stone, “Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas,” Political Science Quarterly 104, no. 2 (1989): 281–
300, https://doi.org/10.2307/2151585. 
87 Peter J. May, “Policy Learning and Failure,” Journal of Public Policy 12, no. 4 (1992): 331–54. 
88 David T. Levy, Yameng Li, and Zhe Yuan, “Impact of Nations Meeting the MPOWER Targets between 2014 and 2016: An 
Update,” Tobacco Control 29, no. 2 (March 1, 2020): 231–33, https://doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2018-054837. 
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The introduction of the e-cigarette created a proverbial fork in the road for countries seeking to 
end their tobacco epidemics. Countries could choose to ignore the e-cigarette and keep it out of 
their markets if they believed that they were making adequate progress towards their tobacco 
control goals without its potentially disruptive presence. Alternatively, countries could embrace 
the e-cigarette and turn its disruptive potential towards achieving their tobacco control goals. 
Finally, countries could choose to do neither and simply allow the product onto the market 
without direction. 
Tobacco control progress has generally remained an amorphous concept that few countries have 
set targets on whether they are measuring up to par. One recent trend towards setting tobacco 
endgame goals has upset that dynamic. Broadly, tobacco endgame goals are targets that are set at 
a future date where the tobacco-using or cigarette smoking population of a country will be 
brought below a certain ambitious threshold. Tobacco endgame goals are distinct from tobacco 
prohibitions like Bhutan’s 21st-century tobacco cigarette sales and importation bans.89 Instead of 
setting a target to eliminate the entire tobacco market, an endgame sets a goal of what an 
acceptable tobacco product market would look like. Endgames clarify what tobacco control is 
trying to accomplish in a normative instead of a relative sense.   
Tobacco endgame goals have been adopted by many countries (listed in Table 2), all of whom 
have developed economies, strong tobacco control policy regimes, and had much higher smoking 
rates in the 20th century than at present.90 Typically, these endgame goals have sought to reduce 
tobacco smoking prevalence to a minimal level, defined as 5% of the adult population over the 
course of at least two decades.91 If one of these goals is not on track to be reached, a potential 
problem is created. 
 
89 S. Ugen, “Bhutan: The World’s Most Advanced Tobacco Control Nation?,” Tobacco Control 12, no. 4 (December 1, 2003): 
431–33, https://doi.org/10.1136/tc.12.4.431. 
90 Judith Mackay, “Designing the Tobacco End Game” (PowerPoint, Tobacco Control Office, Department of Health, Hong 
Kong, February 14, 2017), http://tobacco.cleartheair.org.hk/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/2017-02-Endgame.-TCO.-Mackay.pdf; 
McDaniel, Smith, and Malone, “The Tobacco Endgame”; Nick Triggle and Hugh Pym, “Pledge to End Smoking in England by 
2030,” BBC News, July 23, 2019, sec. Health, https://www.bbc.com/news/health-49079515; Elizabeth Eisenhauer, “A Tobacco 
Endgame for Canada” (Queen’s University, August 30, 2016), 
https://www.queensu.ca/gazette/sites/default/files/assets/attachments/EndgameSummit-Backgroundpaper%20.pdf. 
91 Graham Moon et al., “The Tobacco Endgame: The Neglected Role of Place and Environment,” Health & Place 53 (September 
1, 2018): 271–78, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthplace.2018.06.012. 
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Table 2: Tobacco Epidemic Endgame Goals of Various Countries 
Country Target Date Target Adoption Adult Smoking Prevalence at Adoption92 
New Zealand 2025 2010 16.4% 
Ireland 2025 2013 22.2% 
Denmark 2030 2016 17.5% 
Finland93 2030 2016 16.8% 
England 2030 2019 17.7% 
Scotland 2034 2013 20.7% 
Canada 2035 2017 13.8% 
Malaysia 2045 2015 17.1% 
This problem becomes salient under several further conditions. First, the public needs to be 
aware of the tobacco endgame target and believe that reaching such a goal is important enough to 
hold politicians accountable for failing to achieve it. Second, the country must be failing to 
tangibly reach its goal. If these conditions are met, then we might expect a failure to adequately 
progress in tobacco control to become a salient problem. In the absence of an endgame goal or 
the other conditions to achieve salience of a tobacco control progress problem, then we might 
expect the issue to not become salient. Failure of a tobacco control policy is not a sudden 
occurrence and it relies mostly on the changes or lack thereof in indicators of progress. But, the 
establishment of an endgame target, may intentionally, increase political pressure to act on 
tobacco policy that would not have otherwise existed. This target may become all the more 
salient if a subgroup of the population with political power sees that its members are not being 
served by the status quo policy.94 Dissatisfaction combined with power is a recipe for policy 
change through politics.95 If no endgame target is set or if the public and politicians are satisfied 
with the progress being made on tobacco control issues, then we might expect stasis to rule the 
policy stream and to revise the odds of large regulatory policy change downwards. With no 
problem to solve, no one will feel the need to change course. 
 
92 2015 or earlier. Marissa B Reitsma et al., “Smoking Prevalence and Attributable Disease Burden in 195 Countries and 
Territories, 1990–2015: A Systematic Analysis from the Global Burden of Disease Study 2015,” The Lancet 389, no. 10082 
(May 13, 2017): 1885–1906, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)30819-X. 
93 Originally, Finland set a goal in 2010 to achieve 5% smoking prevalence by 2040, but in 2016, they brought the goal’s target 
date forward by 10 years. 
94 Signild Vallgårda, “Social Inequality in Health: Dichotomy or Gradient?: A Comparative Study of Problematizations in 
National Public Health Programmes,” Health Policy 85, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 71–82, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2007.07.004. 
95 The example of the Māori in New Zealand will prove to be the test case for this proposition, as this politically empowered but 
socially disadvantaged indigenous people has not been well served by the tobacco control policy regime in New Zealand of the 
past and was positioned to dramatically miss the tobacco endgame goals set by that country. 
   
33 
 
2.2.2.2 Rejecting the Regulatory Stance 
The second way that a problem might become salient in the current study was that a rejection of 
the existing regulatory stance for e-cigarettes would serve as a focusing event on the issue of e-
cigarette regulation. This might occur through invalidation of policy via the courts or through 
effective invalidation of a policy by bureaucrats who give up enforcing a policy. The invalidation 
of a policy in the courts is a much more straightforward focusing event that could occur in a 
single day, out loud and in public, whereas bureaucrats may keep a non-enforcement decision 
quiet so as not to incur the wrath of oversight from elected officials.  
While it may seem tautological that the very regulatory framework turns into the problem that 
must be solved by adopting a new regulatory framework, this event likely has roots in other 
problems and is symptomatic of something else. If a court invalidates a policy, then that means 
that the legislature passed an ill-conceived law, the bureaucracy interpreted the law in a manner 
incommensurate with the purpose of the original statute, or perhaps the judicial branch has run 
amok. If bureaucrats stand down from enforcing a law, that implies that resource constraints 
have impinged them from doing their job, they believe the policy is of low priority or 
disagreeable, or institutions are too weak to support the rule of law.  
In all these instances, it becomes necessary for countries who wish to implement legally valid 
statute or for bureaucrats to faithfully execute their jobs to alter the rules under which they 
operate. Policy change becomes a necessity. If courts uphold policy and bureaucrats faithfully 
enforce the letter of the law, then we can assume that the regulatory stance is operating as 
intended. Unless a focusing event arrives to disrupt that conclusion, we can also expect stasis to 
rule a calm problem stream. 
2.2.3 Policy Stream  
Actors promoting policy ideas that may be applied to solve problems or appeal to a certain 
political environment occupy the policy stream in the Multiple Streams Approach. The 
progenitors of these ideas are referred to as the policy community and the ways these actors 
interact with scientific bodies, international advocacy networks, and governments shape what 
policy ideas float to the top of agendas when a policy window opens. Policy communities are 
constantly working to develop policy solutions to address problems, even before problems rise to 
the attention of the public. 
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In the current study, some actors might be described as occupying a portion of the policy stream 
that is drawn from the tobacco industry, the e-cigarette industry, and the community of e-
cigarette users, but they always advocated for the same policy positions regardless of where they 
live. They favored the establishment of an e-cigarette market governed by as few restrictions on 
the activities of manufacturers, retailers, and users as possible. They only conceded that 
restrictions establishing a minimum age of sale were necessary limits on this new market. Their 
influence extends to certain sympathetic politicians from right-wing parties and little further. 
Consequently, their viewpoints in each case seemed to have little bearing on the policy 
outcomes. If we are to explain the difference in outcomes, it makes sense to focus on where there 
are differences in the inputs to the policy stream. Here we focus on three possible explanations 
that would drive differences in the policy stream’s makeup in the cases at hand; the degree of 
policy community consensus, the role of policy learning, and the support for harm reduction. 
2.2.3.1 Policy Community Consensus 
When we refer to a policy community needing to seek consensus before the policy stream was 
primed to couple with other streams, we are referring to the portion of the policy stream that did 
not maintain a consistent policy position across all cases. In this case, consensus will be defined 
as the lack of a prominent disagreement over the intent of regulatory policy (regulatory stance), 
rather than all the smaller details that make up a regulatory framework. The actors in the relevant 
policy communities whose position on e-cigarette regulation was not constant in each case were 
broadly drawn from bureaucracies, non-governmental organizations, and academia. These 
communities are typically composed of highly educated professionals who pride themselves in 
contributing to or being absorbed in the scientific literature. Their views on the appropriate 
regulatory stance to adopt towards e-cigarettes varies across place and time while views in the 
tobacco and e-cigarette manufacturing sector as well as the THR advocacy community do not 
differ much along those same dimensions.  
In each case study, I observe whether the relevant policy community could achieve consensus 
around an alternative regulatory stance for e-cigarettes. Large policy changes are easier to 
achieve if the conflict between positions within a policy community is decreased and cooperation 
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increases.96 If a policy community comes together to identify a consensus alternative to the status 
quo regulatory framework for e-cigarettes, they will be able to present a united front to 
policymakers and politicians that will spur along with reforms to a regulatory stance. If a policy 
community remained fractured or was dominated by a contingent that favored the status quo 
regulatory framework, then there was little impetus to change. This all means that the policy 
community holds sway with political actors in this area of policy, largely because there does not 
seem to be an opportunity to gain large amounts of new voters by acting in this policy area.  
In the case studies where regulatory policy change happened, actors in the policy stream that 
could have fought a change in the regulatory stance towards e-cigarettes came to favor it. Here, it 
is most useful to conceptualize policy community consensus as a downstream reaction to 
problem definition or the priming of the problem stream. Without a problem that needed to be 
solved, the status quo bias of actors held sway and no policy community consensus could be 
reached.  Without a problem to fix, inertia will win out and no impetus to identify an alternative 
consensus policy will take hold.  
2.2.3.2 Policy Learning 
The second possible explanation of e-cigarette regulatory policy differences in the problem 
stream is the process of policy learning. Policy learning is the process by which stakeholder in 
the policymaking process acquire and understand information that reduces uncertainty about the 
effects of policy.97 The area of e-cigarette regulation is defined by contested scientific 
knowledge,  so the influence of expertise and credibility remains important to policy actors who 
are uncertain about the effects of the policies they are considering.98 Bureaucracies and 
politicians seeking to make decisions backed by “the evidence” have repeatedly turned to policy 
community experts seeking wisdom.99 The existence of a global epistemic community of tobacco 
control advocates and the importance of the knowledge transfers and policy learning it facilitates 
 
96 Manuel Fischer, “Coalition Structures and Policy Change in a Consensus Democracy,” Policy Studies Journal 42, no. 3 
(2014): 344–66, https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12064. 
97 Stéphane Moyson, Peter Scholten, and Christopher M. Weible, “Policy Learning and Policy Change: Theorizing Their 
Relations from Different Perspectives,” Policy and Society 36, no. 2 (April 3, 2017): 161–77, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14494035.2017.1331879. 
98 Newman, “The Role of Uncertainty in Regulating E-Cigarettes.” 
99 Jenny van der Arend, “Bridging the Research/Policy Gap: Policy Officials’ Perspectives on the Barriers and Facilitators to 
Effective Links between Academic and Policy Worlds,” Policy Studies 35, no. 6 (November 2, 2014): 611–30, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2014.971731. 
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has been well-demonstrated in past literature.100 However, evidence of the effects of e-cigarettes 
on human bodies is nascent, conflicting, and subject to disagreement between well-meaning 
experts. 
Claims about one’s preferred policy being “evidence-based” abound through the e-cigarette 
regulation policy literature on all sides of the debate.101 Persons asserting that e-cigarettes are not 
a safe product to use are likely correct. Those arguing that e-cigarettes are less toxic to human 
bodies than tobacco cigarettes are likely correct, too. Those arguing e-cigarettes were being used 
by young people were making evidence-based claims. Those pointing out that cigarettes smoking 
kept falling among these same people had evidence on their side as well. Credible evidence 
could be marshaled to make almost any normative case for or against e-cigarettes being a helpful 
or a harmful market. Not every view will bear out in time as entirely correct, but there is an 
extant scientific evidence base for most claims that I have run across in my research. 
If the process of policy learning is important in determining the pattern of regulatory stance 
change, a linear process of networks diffusing similar information across multiple venues 
through emulation or a more advanced form of learning may be evidence in the policies being 
adopted.102 Countries may adopt what they view as best practices or what international advocacy 
networks instruct them are best practices.103 No matter how it is defined, policy learning should 
result in policy convergence over time. 
2.2.3.3 Harm Reduction 
Debates around the meaning, importance, evidence, and application of harm reduction principles 
are tightly bound to the debate over e-cigarette regulatory policy. Harm reduction is not merely a 
framing device or a rhetorical tool to relevant policy communities, though its importance to 
 
100 Karen Farquharson, “Influencing Policy Transnationally: Pro-and Anti-Tobacco Global Advocacy Networks,” Australian 
Journal of Public Administration 62, no. 4 (December 1, 2003): 80–92, https://doi.org/10.1111/j..2003.00351.x. 
101 Fairchild, Bayer, and Lee, “The E-Cigarette Debate”; Riccardo Polosa and Pasquale Caponnetto, “Time for Evidence-Based 
e-Cigarette Regulation,” The Lancet Oncology 14, no. 13 (December 1, 2013): e582–83, https://doi.org/10.1016/S1470-
2045(13)70495-9; Maurice Swanson, “E-Cig Argument a Smokescreen,” The West Australian, August 18, 2017, First edition, 
sec. Opinion. 
102 Claudio M. Radaelli, “Measuring Policy Learning: Regulatory Impact Assessment in Europe,” Journal of European Public 
Policy 16, no. 8 (December 1, 2009): 1145–64, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760903332647; Claire A. Dunlop and Claudio M. 
Radaelli, “Systematising Policy Learning: From Monolith to Dimensions,” Political Studies 61, no. 3 (October 1, 2013): 599–
619, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00982.x. 
103 John Grin and Anne Loeber, “Theories of Policy Learning: Agency, Structure, and Change,” in Handbook of Public Policy 
Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods, by Frank Fischer and Gerald J. Miller (Baton Rouge, UNITED STATES: Taylor & 
Francis Group, 2006), 201–20, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/umichigan/detail.action?docID=283245. 
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political actors may be may rhetorical and less substantive. Harm reduction is a philosophy that 
appeals to the sentiments of advocates on all sides of the e-cigarette regulation issue. From its 
roots in fights against the spread of HIV/AIDS in the 1980s to battles over the safer use of 
injection drugs in the preceding decades, harm reduction has framed many of the most 
contentious topics that sit at the intersection between morality, health policy, and politics.  
Earlier sections in Chapter 1 explained how e-cigarettes have become wrapped up in a debate 
over whether the devices are or can be used as a tool for tobacco harm reduction.104 The 
remainder of the study will test whether the salience or importance of harm reduction as a policy 
or political tool affected the fortunes of those who sought to change e-cigarette regulatory policy. 
2.2.4 Politics Stream 
The politics stream is made up of those actors bound by institutions who try to sense and affect 
the body politic and determine whether they must address a problem. Usually, they look to the 
policy stream to see what politically acceptable available solution would fix the problem that has 
become the center of their attention. Parties seek policies that align with their internal ideologies. 
This serves as a mechanism of solidifying support from party members for a particular policy as 
well as sends a strong signal to electorates that parties share the voter’s values. If a policy is not 
judged to be congruent with ideology, then it will not be supported by a political party. 
Alternatively, I consider electorally focused models of politics wherein political parties choose 
courses of action based on what will be most advantageous to their electoral prospects. The 
problems raised in the policy stream will only matter if they are paired with a political 
environment that is conducive and sympathetic to their solution. 
2.2.4.1 Federalism 
The form of government could influence the decisions made regarding the regulatory stances 
towards e-cigarettes which countries could plausibly adopt. Typically, in both federal and unitary 
states, the central (or supranational) government is tasked with responsibility for regulating the 
entry of products onto a common market and for creating product standards.105 Powers to levy 
taxes and spend are often available to both central and regional governments, though usually in 
 
104 See pages 16 and 24. 
105 G Majone, “Regulatory Federalism in the European Community,” Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 10, 
no. 3 (September 1, 1992): 299–316, https://doi.org/10.1068/c100299. 
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differing forms.106 Questions about how business is conducted at the street level are often 
devolved to the regions. In the case of e-cigarettes, this means that responsibility for different 
policy domains (see 3.3.5 on page 64) will be the responsibility of different levels of 
government.  
Whether this split responsibility affects the likelihood that countries will change their regulatory 
stances is not immediately clear.  
Governmental forms with more centralized powers may be more likely to respond to change the 
regulatory stance towards a novel market because they carry the full responsibility of managing 
such policy. On the other hand, governmental forms with less centralized power may be 
prompted to respond to a problem sooner because one of the many regional venues has asked the 
center for assistance with a regulatory problem. In other words, the existence of more policy-
making venues might raise the likelihood that the center must react to an issue. Alternatively, the 
existence of those alternative policymaking venues might ease pressures on the center to respond 
to a problem.  
To further complicate this matter, there are a great variety of federalist systems that operate 
under a great variety of forms of government. However, this study focuses on two countries with 
fairly comparable macro-level federal structures, Australia and Canada.107 The countries operate 
under similar forms of federation designed by agents of the British Empire, although Canada’s 
reasons for federation included the need to hold together two different linguistic communities 
while Australia did not. The primary difference between the systems is that Australian states 
have more influence over the operations of the central government while Canadian provinces 
have more authority over those who live in their region.108 While this arrangement leaves 
Canadian provinces with more fiscal autonomy to, for example levy excise taxes, it provides 
intergovernmental meetings between Australian states and the federal government with binding 
legal authority. Determining whether differences in these multilevel governance power 
arrangements yields differences in outcomes merits attention during the study.  To assess the 
 
106 Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, and Arjan H. Schakel, The Rise of Regional Authority: A Comparitive Study of 42 Democracies 
(London ; New York: Routledge, 2010), 18–20. 
107 César Colino, “Varieties of Federalism and Propensities for Change,” in Federal Dynamics: Continuity, Change, and the 
Varieties of Federalism, by Arthur Benz and Jörg Broschek (Oxford: OUP Oxford, 2013), 48–69. 
108 Liesbet Hooghe et al., Measuring Regional Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance. Volume I, First edition, 
Transformations in Governance (Oxford, United Kingdom ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
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importance of federalism as a predictive variable, this study will pay attention to the order of 
events and the pressures created and relieved by alternative forms of regional governance. 
2.2.4.2 The Role of the Tobacco Industry 
The interest of the tobacco industry in shaping e-cigarette regulatory policy is well 
documented.109 The tobacco industry has invested heavily in buying out, researching and 
developing, and marketing e-cigarettes in places where such activity is permitted by law.110 The 
tobacco industry’s e-cigarette products are notably absent from markets with prohibitionist e-
cigarette regulatory stances. In those markets, sales are dominated by small businesses that 
import hardware from China and mix e-liquid on-premises.111 More than almost any other entity, 
these companies stand to gain financially from the opening of legal e-cigarette sales.112 Based on 
the tobacco industry’s track record developing and opening tobacco cigarette markets, we might 
expect their influence to be pivotal in a study of e-cigarette regulatory policy.113 
To evaluate the role of the tobacco industry to explain varying outcomes in regulatory stances, 
careful attention will be paid to the strategy of actors in the tobacco industry, and how those in 
policymaking roles and the public health policy community reacted to those strategies. Variance 
in tobacco industry positions and strategy will be identified and employed to determine whether 
such changes can aid explanations of varied regulatory policy outcomes.  
2.2.4.3 Left-Wing Party Support 
In an era and region where tobacco smoking is decidedly an activity concentrated among a 
minority of society, tobacco control policies and placing regulations on tobacco products would 
not be a large-scale vote-winning issue, we should not expect mainstream political parties to 
 
109 Marisa de Andrade, Gerard Hastings, and Kathryn Angus, “Promotion of Electronic Cigarettes: Tobacco Marketing 
Reinvented?,” BMJ (Clinical Research Ed.) 347 (2013): f7473; Marisa de Andrade et al., “Hostage to Fortune: An Empirical 
Study of the Tobacco Industry’s Business Strategies since the Advent of e-Cigarettes,” Critical Public Health 0, no. 0 (December 
18, 2018): 1–14, https://doi.org/10.1080/09581596.2018.1552778. 
110 Annalise Mathers, Ben Hawkins, and Kelley Lee, “Transnational Tobacco Companies and New Nicotine Delivery Systems,” 
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111 Emily Chivers et al., “Nicotine and Other Potentially Harmful Compounds in ‘Nicotine-Free’ e-Cigarette Liquids in 
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112 Euromonitor International, “Global Vapour Products Regulation” (Euromonitor International, December 13, 2017), 
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bank their election strategies on such a niche issue. Historically, tobacco control policy has 
advanced through a mix of cooperative agreements with tobacco companies, adversarial political 
campaigns led by public-health focused non-governmental organizations and the actions of well-
meaning bureaucrats and wily policy entrepreneurs.114 Instances, where tobacco control policy 
has been able to mobilize popular support, are most strongly associated with the proliferation of 
public smoking bans.115 Therefore, we should ask why lower salience issues like this are ever 
passed into law. 
By the mid-2010s, in developed democracies with populations of smokers making up a shrunken 
portion of the population than in prior decades, political actions that would defend smoker’s 
rights or the welfare of tobacco companies have not found a large audience of potential voters. 
Tobacco control has become less of an attack on the lifestyles of a group of voters and has turned 
into expressions of support for empowered public health interests. Passing tobacco control 
policies has become a currency for policymakers to signal their negative affect towards the 
tobacco industry.  
All of this speaks to an altered reward structure for politicians entering the realm of tobacco 
control policy, a realm to which e-cigarette regulation currently belongs. The reward structure to 
pursue expansionist regulatory stances for tobacco cigarettes seems incredibly limited, as very 
few voters hold a positive opinion of tobacco companies, as purveyors of a deadly product. 
Actions that can be portrayed as favoring tobacco company interests (at least in the realm of the 
tobacco cigarette market) and not business interests, in general, do little to aid a politician’s 
prospects. How then, could a politician vote in favor of an expansionist policy for e-cigarettes? 
Such a policy will certainly benefit the same disfavored tobacco companies. The reason lies in 
policy and political community consensus that must be achieved to shield politicians from blame. 
And this consensus is not formed by political parties meeting in the middle of a left-right 
ideological spectrum. This consensus comes from the co-optation of politicians from left-wing 
parties. 
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Left-wing parties in developed democracies have traditionally favored egalitarianism and 
building stronger social safety nets.116 Left-wing parties that developed from social democracy 
movements also tended to favor the interests of the working class. Over time, left-wing parties 
have proved to be the main agents of welfare state expansion, particularly in the realm of health 
expenditure.117 Left-wing parties favor implementing policies that will improve their 
population’s health more often than their right-wing counterparts.118 Right-wing or classically 
liberal parties have been skeptical of state intervention into the economy and have often been the 
source of welfare state retrenchment. Right-wing parties tend to show greater faith in free-market 
forces and are deferential to the preferences of business interests. In general, right-wing party 
rule has been found to lead to less development of public health policy, and in particular, much 
less policy progress on tobacco control.119  
The matter of where left-wing and right-wing parties might set their initial preferences on e-
cigarette regulation is determined by the interest group each side is most responsive to. Most 
saliently here, left-wing parties are responsive to the concerns of the public health community, 
while right-wing parties are responsive to business interests in the tobacco and e-cigarette 
industry. Right-wing parties whose ideology aligns with classical liberals are more inclined to 
favor business interests and have widely been willing to support tobacco harm reduction policies 
without prodding from public health groups.120 Determining where each of these interest groups 
begins on the matter of e-cigarette regulation is a country-specific and context-sensitive matter. 
However, I posit that left-wing parties must assent to a change in e-cigarette regulatory policy 
stance before a policy window opens. This can be attributed to the factors in the policy stream 
that create a permission structure that actors in the political stream follow. Without the expressed 
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https://doi.org/10.1093/eurpub/ckz133. 
118 Vicente Navarro et al., “Politics and Health Outcomes,” The Lancet 368, no. 9540 (September 16, 2006): 1033–37, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(06)69341-0. 
119 Johan P. MacKenbach and Martin McKee, “Social-Democratic Government and Health Policy in Europe: A Quantitative 
Analysis,” International Journal of Health Services 43, no. 3 (July 2013): 389–413, https://doi.org/10.2190/HS.43.3.b. 
120 Nicky Wagner and Maureen Pugh, “11. Smoking—Nicotine E-Cigarettes” (2017), https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/hansard-
debates/rhr/document/HansS_20170406_053925000/11-smoking-nicotine-e-cigarettes; Nuk Korako, Sam Lotu-Iiga, and David 
Seymour, “11. Smoking—Electronic Cigarettes and Cessation Services - New Zealand Parliament” (2016), 
https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/hansard-debates/rhr/document/HansS_20160823_054675000/11-smoking-electronic-cigarettes-
and-cessation-services; Colin Mendelsohn and David Leyonhjelm, “FW: Simon Chapman,” June 21, 2017, 
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/nicotinepolicy/LmKZOvWL7D0/U8VjmuL7AwAJ. 
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approval for policy change from groups trusted by left-wing allies (namely, public-health-
oriented non-governmental organizations), agenda-setting and policy change for e-cigarette 
regulatory stances do not proceed. Whether due to electoral calculation, permission structure, or 
both; these political conditions will be necessary to achieve a change in an e-cigarette regulatory 
stance.  
2.3 Conclusion 
The theoretical framework that structures this study, the range of regulatory stances, will enable 
the findings of the current study to be tested more widely to determine whether they are broadly 
generalizable. First, the explanatory factors that precipitate change or shore up the status quo in 
the cases at hand, which are generalizable in nature (left-wing party support and bureaucratic or 
legal rejection of the regulatory stance) may well apply in other jurisdictions and in other 
markets. Associated hypotheses stemming from such observations remain subject to further 
testing.  
Second, the regulatory stances concept is generalizable, testable, and can be subject to any 
number of alternative scoping conditions that would enable its use in other studies. The 
regulatory stances concept is a flexible outcome variable that can be determined across market, 
jurisdiction, and time. Any study of market regulation where the regulatory stance can be 
determined should be within the scope of its utility. If scholars use the process of determining a 
regulatory stance, they can employ their chosen framework describing the policy process to 
explain change, stasis, convergence, and divergence.121 By enabling comparisons around the 
fundamental purpose of regulation, the resolution of market failures, scholars can apply the 
variables they are familiar using in other arenas (ideology, demographics, government form, etc.) 
to answering questions that impact the operation of markets and the people, countries and 
institutions that markets affect.  
The simplifying concept of a regulatory stance has been introduced as the summed intended 
effect of a regulatory framework on the growth of a market. A regulatory stance should be 
thought of as the outcome variable that is being predicted in this study. The Multiple Streams 
Approach has been advanced as the analytical lens through which agenda-setting and policy 
 
121 See 3.3.4 Determine the Regulatory Stance for a Market on page 74. 
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change in this realm can be studied. Eight potentially important explanations of why changes to a 
regulatory stance occur were advanced as well. These should be thought of as probabilistic input 
variables. The alignment of input variables is predicted to alter the likelihood of agenda-setting 
and policy change. The following section illustrates how these variables could be isolated for 
study. Additionally, it explains how the information that will fill in the details of the Multiple 
Streams Approach and the regulatory stances was collected, analyzed, and reported. 
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 Methods 
This project consists of three qualitative comparative case studies of how a country changed or 
maintained its regulatory stance towards e-cigarettes over time. The three chosen case studies 
employ John Stuart Mill's method of most-similar cases to uncover how three seemingly similar 
countries behaved differently over time. Each case study will be divided substantively according 
to Kingdon’s streams to ensure that information is gathered to describe parallel streams of 
activity. After the case studies, the collected findings therein will be analyzed to draw 
generalizable lessons across the cases, and then beyond their substantive, theoretical, and 
geographic borders. 
This chapter explains why the study is limited in scope, how the cases were selected for study, 
and the methods by which those case studies were conducted. It reviews the data collection and 
interpretation processes that underly the construction of the subsequent case study chapters. 
Particular attention is paid to the methods used to rationalize the policymaking process as well as 
the assignment of a regulatory stance to the jurisdictions over time. 
3.1 Scoping Conditions 
This project focuses on explaining the regulatory stances adopted by study countries towards the 
nicotine-containing e-cigarette market. As laid out in the Introduction, variations in the 
regulation of this market across borders and time are not readily explained by theories that are 
already available to scholars of political science and public policy. Second, the regulation of this 
market is of intense interest to scholars and practitioners of public health. Focusing this 
comparative study of regulatory policy and politics on this matter enables an exploration of an 
issue that sits at the nexus of health and politics, with an added portion of general population 
interest.   
E-cigarettes are the class of products that consume liquids primarily containing four ingredients: 
nicotine, propylene glycol, vegetable glycerin, and flavorings through the heating of the liquid 
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into the gas phase before ingestion by a user.1 These products have taken many different forms 
over the last 15 years, but they are, in my eyes, a distinct market category worthy of study on its 
own. Nicotine-containing e-cigarettes represent a monumental shift in the regulatory landscape 
of tobacco products. E-cigarettes hold the unusual status as a reduced-risk substitute product for 
a lethal, legal consumer good. Many other products meet one or some of these criteria, but e-
cigarettes are an interesting case of meeting both. Studying e-cigarette regulation presents a case 
of high-risk and high-reward decision making. The choices made by policymakers to allow the 
growth of a market has uncertain consequences. These consequences can be tailored through 
regulatory decisions that limit the scope of growth or encourage responsible, controlled growth 
of the e-cigarette market. 
The tobacco industry has offered several classes of tobacco products at different points over the 
preceding decades in response to what they perceive as latent consumer demand for a product 
that delivers nicotine without the smoke and tar of tobacco cigarettes. Non-combusted tobacco 
products have primarily arrived in three relevant forms: carbon heated tobacco products, 
electronic heated tobacco products, and smokeless tobacco. Additionally, two non-tobacco 
products, new smoking material, and non-nicotine e-cigarettes have sought to be substitutes for 
the tobacco cigarette that deliver the hand-to-mouth experience of smoking without delivering 
nicotine. Each of these markets is worth studying, but for various reasons, none stands apart from 
nicotine-containing e-cigarettes as a better subject for a comparative study of regulatory 
frameworks. In this section, each product is introduced before an explanation of its exclusion 
from the scope of this project is advanced. 
3.1.1 Carbon Heated Tobacco Products 
Starting in the 1980s, American tobacco companies rolled out non-combusted tobacco products 
that were heated by a carbon rod in the middle of the product.2 These products – Accord, Eclipse, 
and Favor – never gained widespread popularity. This was partially due to the reticence of their 
manufacturers to admit that one tobacco product may have been more or less risky to the user’s 
 
1 Glasser et al., “Overview of Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems.” 
2 Stephan Risi, “On the Origins of the Electronic Cigarette: British American Tobacco’s Project Ariel (1962–1967),” American 
Journal of Public Health 107, no. 7 (May 18, 2017): 1060–67, https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2017.303806. 
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health than the next. This defensive mentality eventually led to these products being withdrawn 
from sale without ever gaining a substantial following outside of the commissary on the ground 
of RJ Reynold’s Headquarters.3 Their disappearance from the contemporary market and the lack 
of sales outside of the United States makes them less interesting subjects for a comparative case 
study. 
3.1.2 Electronic Heated Tobacco Products 
The earliest patented heated tobacco products developed in the 20th century used electricity to 
heat a tobacco stick.4 While this technology was not commercialized at the time, by the 21st 
century new electronic heated tobacco products reached commercial markets and by 2015, these 
markets finally gained sizeable market share in Japan.5 These electronic heated tobacco products 
share some traits in common with e-cigarettes. Both devices deliver nicotine in a vapor, created 
by electrically heating a tobacco derivative impregnated or mixed with propylene glycol. 
Transnational tobacco companies own brands in every nicotine market segment. The largest 
difference is that transnational tobacco companies control the entirety of the electronic heated 
tobacco products market while they only control between a minority and a plurality of e-cigarette 
markets worldwide.6 Electronic heated tobacco products are cross-branded with cigarettes to 
more closely link the brand identities between old products and new.7 The novel heated tobacco 
products have spread rapidly around the world and are expected to grow in market share as the 
transnational tobacco companies set goals to make the new products a profit center.8  
The decision in this study to not include these products as a focus except in the most limited 
circumstances (e.g. Philip Morris New Zealand v. Ministry of Health) was made for two 
 
3 Zachary Cahn and Lindsay Eckhaus, “Explaining the Discontinuation of a Non-Tobacco Nicotine Project at Philip Morris: 
Obstacles to Innovation,” Journal of Public Health Policy 39, no. 2 (May 1, 2018): 131–42, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41271-018-
0124-1. 
4 Herbert A. Gilbert, Smokeless non-tobacco cigarette, United States US3200819A, filed April 17, 1963, and issued August 17, 
1965, https://patents.google.com/patent/US3200819A/en; Ellis Charles Drummond et al., Smoking device, United States 
US3258015A, filed February 4, 1964, and issued June 28, 1966, https://patents.google.com/patent/US3258015A/en. 
5 Michal Stoklosa et al., “Effect of IQOS Introduction on Cigarette Sales: Evidence of Decline and Replacement,” Tobacco 
Control, June 12, 2019, tobaccocontrol-2019-054998, https://doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2019-054998. 
6 David T. Levy et al., “An Economic Analysis of the Pre-Deeming US Market for Nicotine Vaping Products,” Tobacco 
Regulatory Science 5, no. 2 (March 1, 2019): 169–81, https://doi.org/10.18001/TRS.5.2.8. 
7 Alex C. Liber, “Heated Tobacco Products and Combusted Cigarettes: Comparing Global Prices and Taxes,” Tobacco Control 
28, no. 6 (November 1, 2019): 689–91, https://doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2018-054602. 
8 Stoklosa et al., “Effect of IQOS Introduction on Cigarette Sales.” 
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reasons.9 First, the empirical evidence base around electrically heated tobacco products is much 
less developed than for e-cigarettes, leading to less consensus has developed among the global 
policy community.10 Second, the political structure of the regulatory battle is very different from 
the e-cigarette conflict because it is dominated entirely by transnational tobacco companies 
instead of consumers.11 It is likely the political considerations around adopting a regulatory 
stance towards electrically heated tobacco products are inextricable from the regulatory politics 
around tobacco cigarettes in a more fundamental manner than it is separable from e-cigarettes. 
The e-cigarette market is populated by dozens of small firms while the electrically heated 
tobacco market is dominated by the same companies that dominate global tobacco cigarette 
sales. Heated tobacco consumers have not mobilized into an identifiable community in the 
manner that e-cigarette users have.12 Pulling apart the differences between cigarette regulatory 
politics from e-cigarette regulatory politics was one of the goals of this research and focusing on 
electrically heated tobacco products will not advance that line of inquiry. 
3.1.3 Smokeless Tobacco 
Another commonly compared class of products to e-cigarettes are smokeless tobacco products. 
These products are made from the leaves of tobacco plants and processed to be ingested by 
sniffing, sucking, or chewing. Smokeless tobacco products are understood to be less deadly to 
use than cigarettes and other combusted tobacco products, but their relative harm is dependent on 
the manner of preparation and ingredients used in a product. Smokeless tobacco products have 
been around since tobacco has been cultivated, much longer than the ubiquitous cigarette. A rash 
of sales bans in the early 1990s (including bans in my primary case countries of New Zealand 
 
9 P J Butler, Ministry of Health v Phillip Morris (New Zealand) Ltd, NZDC (The District Court of New Zealand 2018). 
10 McNeill et al., “Evidence Review of E-Cigarettes and Heated Tobacco Products 2018: A Report Commissioned by Public 
Health England.” 
11 Stella A. Bialous and Stanton A. Glantz, “Heated Tobacco Products: Another Tobacco Industry Global Strategy to Slow 
Progress in Tobacco Control,” Tobacco Control 27, no. Suppl 1 (November 1, 2018): s111–17, 
https://doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2018-054340. 
12 Rikke Tokle and Willy Pedersen, “‘Cloud Chasers’ and ‘Substitutes’: E-Cigarettes, Vaping Subcultures and Vaper Identities,” 
Sociology of Health & Illness 41, no. 5 (2019): 917–32, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9566.12854; Tessa Langley et al., “‘I Felt 
Welcomed in Like They’Re a Little Family in There, I Felt Like I Was Joining a Team or Something’: Vape Shop Customers’ 
Experiences of E-Cigarette Use, Vape Shops and the Vaping Community,” International Journal of Environmental Research and 
Public Health 16, no. 13 (July 2, 2019): 2341, https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16132341. 
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and Australia) kept the products from growing in global market share.13  In those products 
without sales bans on smokeless tobacco, it is the exceptional case (Sweden and Norway) that 
have seen smokeless tobacco products take large swaths of market share away from tobacco 
cigarettes.14 
It might be argued that Sweden and Norway adopted permissive regulatory stances towards 
smokeless tobacco in contrast to their contractionist stances towards cigarettes.15 The 
consequence of replacing cigarette sales with smokeless tobacco in those countries, as well as 
elucidating the path that policy needed to traverse to be adopted, are cases worth explaining in 
detail. This policy development is unique to these Nordic countries as the product they have 
chosen to consume (known as Swedish snus) is indigenous to those countries and is produced 
domestically.16 Swedish snus, like most smokeless tobacco, is not a novel product and has been 
in production for decades and its health effects have been studied for nearly as long.17 
Unfortunately, such a study would produce fewer applicable policy lessons for other countries as 
relatively few countries have consumers who have demonstrated interest in consuming these 
products. 
3.1.4 New Smoking Material 
In 1973, New Smoking Material was introduced to the United Kingdom market as a tobacco 
substitute by the Imperial Tobacco Company.18 The product was a manufactured organic 
material comprised mostly of cellulose, the building blocks of plants, and was marketed under 
 
13 G. N. Connolly, “Smokeless Tobacco in Developed Countries: An Epidemic Prevented,” in The Global War (Proceedings of 
the Seventh World Conference on Tobacco and Health, Perth, Australia: Western Australian Health Department, 1991); G N 
Connolly et al., “The Reemergence of Smokeless Tobacco,” The New England Journal of Medicine 314, no. 16 (April 17, 1986): 
1020–27, https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJM198604173141605. 
14 Ingeborg Lund and Karl Erik Lund, “How Has the Availability of Snus Influenced Cigarette Smoking in Norway?,” 
International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 11, no. 11 (November 13, 2014): 11705–17, 
https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph111111705. 
15 Jessi Hietanen, “Knowledge, Attitudes and Behaviour towards Snus by Its Users in Finland, Norway and Sweden” (Masters, 
Högskolan i Halmstad, Sweden, Halmstad University, 2018), http://www.diva-
portal.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/smash/get/diva2:1223656/FULLTEXT02. 
16 Gunnar Sæbø, “Cigarettes, Snus and Status: Differences in Lifestyle of Different Tobacco User Groups in Norway,” Health 
Sociology Review 26, no. 2 (May 4, 2017): 175–89, https://doi.org/10.1080/14461242.2016.1197043. 
17 J. Foulds et al., “Effect of Smokeless Tobacco (Snus) on Smoking and Public Health in Sweden,” Tobacco Control 12, no. 4 
(December 1, 2003): 349–59, https://doi.org/10.1136/tc.12.4.349. 
18 “New Smoking Material,” The Lancet, Originally published as Volume 1, Issue 7814, 301, no. 7814 (June 2, 1973): 1226, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(73)90534-5. 
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brand names like, ‘Cytrel’.19 Plans were drawn up to blend New Smoking Material into tobacco 
cigarettes to decrease exposure to the toxicants inherent in burned tobacco leaf. UK based 
tobacco companies set out on a sustained campaign to shape tobacco policies that would 
encourage the growth of the market for New Smoking Material, but after initial test marketing of 
the product failed with consumers the push for expansionist regulatory policies were scrapped.20  
While the lessons from the New Smoking Material experience sound like a prologue for the 
regulatory battles over e-cigarettes that would take place 40 years later, the parallels between the 
development of the markets fall apart on closer scrutiny. New Smoking Material never built a 
substantial evidence base in favor of it being meaningfully less harmful to users than cigarettes.21 
Possibly, as a result, the product never gained a permanent user base that demanded access to the 
product be expanded.22  
3.1.5 Non-Nicotine E-Cigarettes 
It also must be noted that many e-cigarettes have been sold without any nicotine in their e-liquid. 
The regulation of this non-nicotine e-liquid does not pose the same potential risks to public 
health that nicotine-containing e-cigarettes do. Arguments that such e-liquids should be treated 
as tobacco products are not persuasive, as the products do not contain any derivatives of tobacco 
plants. Finally, it does not seem as though non-nicotine e-cigarettes are as potent a potential 
cessation aid or an addiction liability because they lack the key compound that creates a 
biochemical demand for tobacco products.23 Knowing this, the regulatory stances of countries 
towards this market are likely to be of little consequence to public health. Therefore, except in 
 
19 Kenneth M Friedman, “Editorial: Cigarette Smoking and Public Policy,” American Journal of Public Health 65, no. 9 
(September 1975): 979–80, https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.65.9.979. 
20 Virginia Berridge, Marketing Health: Smoking and the Discourse of Public Health in Britain, 1945-2000 (OUP Oxford, 2007), 
chap. 5. 
21 Virginia Berridge, “Histories of Harm Reduction: Illicit Drugs, Tobacco, and Nicotine,” Substance Use & Misuse 34, no. 1 
(January 1, 1999): 35–47, https://doi.org/10.3109/10826089909035634. 
22 Cr Green et al., “Comparisons of the Composition of Tobacco Smoke and the Smokes from Various Tobacco Substitutes,” 
Beiträge Zur Tabakforschung International/Contributions to Tobacco Research 22, no. 4 (January 1, 2007): 258–89, 
https://doi.org/10.2478/cttr-2013-0833. 
23 Regina El Dib et al., “Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems and/or Electronic Non-Nicotine Delivery Systems for Tobacco 
Smoking Cessation or Reduction: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis,” BMJ Open 7, no. 2 (February 1, 2017): e012680, 
https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2016-012680. 
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the cases where regulators struggled to differentiate these products from nicotine-containing e-
cigarettes, these products will be limited from further consideration. 
3.2 Case Selection 
This analysis will be centered around an examination of a most-similar set of country cases that 
have adopted different regulatory policy choices on a crucial topic in public health: the market 
for nicotine containing e-cigarettes. John Stuart Mill’s method of most-similar cases is employed 
to conduct this study as the primary interest is determining why such a wide range of policy 
exists.24 This method captures the causes of the variation in policy models, ideally over a set of 
cases that should represent the largest width of policy models among the most similar 
jurisdictions. A comparison of most similar cases attempts to determine why countries that are 
otherwise similar on a whole host of independent variables have produced different outcome 
variables on a measure of interest. Theoretically, residual differences between the cases will 
contain the explanation of why different outcomes were produced from such similar countries. 
For this study, the recent history of e-cigarette regulation in a country will be considered as a 
single case of regulatory action and will not be subdivided into separate cases. It is useful to 
arrange the country regulatory policies seen in Figure 3 (p. 12) along with the range of regulatory 
stances for e-cigarettes elaborated upon in Chapter 2.25 Therefore, when we must condense the 
universe of cases, we are looking at 32 countries with prohibitionist stances, while 62 have 
explicit permissive or expansionist stances.  
In a forward selection process, the original set of 183 countries for which data could be collected 
was winnowed down to the three country cases. The analysis was chosen to be conducted at the 
level of the nation-state to remove the influence of common national laws that might over-
determine regulatory stance or limit the choices available to jurisdictions.26 This analytical 
 
24 Charles C. Ragin and Howard S. Becker, eds., What Is a Case? Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry, 9. print 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005). 
25 See page 35. 
26 While interesting subnational variation in e-cigarette policy is taking place in federal countries including the United States and 
India, and that variation crosses the line between jurisdictions banning the sale of e-cigarettes and those allowing their sale. There 
is not enough variation in policies stances towards e-cigarettes in those same subnational jurisdictions than exists at the national 
level. Institute for Global Tobacco Control., “Subnational Laws Regulating E-Cigarettes: A Policy Scan” (Johns Hopkins 
Bloomberg School of Public Health, September 2015), http://bit.ly/2D1yy0s.  
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choice also necessitated removing European Union (EU) member countries from the study 
sample, to eliminate the influence of the EU’s Tobacco Products Directive. The Tobacco 
Products Directive was revised in 2014 and was required to come into effect in EU member 
states by 2016.27 The Tobacco Products Directive included set regulatory policy standards for e-
cigarettes for each member country and limited the regulatory options available to each country. 
These regulations removed the ability of countries to ban the sale of the products, to allow over-
the-air marketing, and they set product standards capping the size and nicotine concentration of 
e-liquid bottles. The revised Tobacco Products Directive required all EU member states to 
preserve a common market, eliminating previous prohibitionist policies in countries like Greece 
and France.28 The lack of latitude left to member states that wanted to avoid strangle their e-
cigarette markets makes EU member states who were not interested in expansionist policies poor 
case study choices because their compliance with the Tobacco Products Directive almost 
completely explains policy change. This left 156 countries in the potential sample pool. 
It is essential to limit the study to high-capacity countries with some degree of transparency and 
accountability. Therefore, countries that were not in the high or very high Human Development 
Index groups as well as the countries that did not have a reasonably open and predictable system 
of government according to the V-Dem dataset were eliminated from consideration.29 This 
ensures that similar countries in terms of wealth, health, and education are being compared and 
that access to candid officials and public records can be assured. 
Because cigarette smoking is the raison d'être for the e-cigarette, it follows that to compare 
policy development on e-cigarettes, we should only consider countries that are in the same stage 
of the tobacco epidemic. The stages of the tobacco epidemic are typically split out over time 
wherein early stages are characterized first by rising smoking prevalence, followed by a stage 
where smoking prevalence is rising along with smoking-caused death at a lag of about 30 
 
27 Jacob Hasselbalch, “Professional Disruption in Health Regulation: Electronic Cigarettes in the European Union,” Journal of 
Professions and Organization 3, no. 1 (March 1, 2016): 62–85, https://doi.org/10.1093/jpo/jov009. 
28 Kennedy et al., “Global Approaches to Regulating Electronic Cigarettes.” 
29 University of Gothenburg, Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, and University of Notre Dame, “V-Dem,” V-Dem 
Institute, 2016, https://www.v-dem.net/en/; Selima Jāhāna and United Nations Development Programme, Human Development 
Report 2016: Human Development for Everyone, 2016, 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf. 
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years.30 Later stages of the epidemic are characterized first, by falling smoking prevalence, and 
then by falling smoking-caused death.31 So-called Stage 4 countries are in the years where 
smoking prevalence and death seem to be on an inexorable decline. This group countries have 
seen success in their tobacco control policy and the introduction of the e-cigarette to their 
markets posed reasonably similar stakes for each. 
Table 3: Remaining Cases 
Country Population 
 (Millions) 
Smoking 
Prevalence 
Variety of 
Capitalism 
Regulatory 
Stance (2017) 
Regulatory 
Stance (2020) 
System of 
Government 
Form of 
Government 
Canada 37 13.4% Liberal Prohibitionist Expansionist Parliamentary Federal 
Australia 25 14.4% Liberal Prohibitionist Prohibitionist Parliamentary Federal 
New Zealand 4.8 15.6% Liberal Prohibitionist Expansionist Parliamentary Unitary 
Chile 18 25.2% Liberal Prohibitionist Permissive Presidential Unitary 
United States 323 13.0% Liberal Permissive Contractionist Presidential Federal 
Costa Rica 4.9 7.6% Liberal Permissive Permissive Presidential Unitary 
Switzerland 8.6 19.2% Coordinated Prohibitionist Prohibitionist Mixed Federal 
Japan 127 17.7% Coordinated Prohibitionist Prohibitionist Parliamentary Unitary 
Uruguay 3.4 19.0% Coordinated Prohibitionist Prohibitionist Presidential Unitary 
Iceland 0.4 14.4% Coordinated Permissive Permissive Parliamentary Unitary 
Norway 5.4 14.9% Coordinated Contractionist Contractionist Parliamentary Unitary 
South Korea 51 21.1% Coordinated Contractionist Contractionist Presidential Unitary 
At this stage, twelve countries met the requirements for being in the high development group or 
above, having declining rates of smoking and tobacco-caused death, not being EU member 
states, and having systems of laws and enforcement above the world average. They are listed in 
Table 3. Next, we stratify countries by their variety of capitalism into coordinated and liberal 
market economies.32 The range of e-cigarette regulatory policy choices among liberal economies 
was similar to coordinated economies in 2017 but by 2020 liberal economies had seen more 
changes in regulatory policy and represented a wider range of regulatory policy choices. This 
necessitated choosing to focus on liberal economies.  
Finally, when examining the final six choices, it became clear that three countries, Australia, 
New Zealand, and Canada, represented a tighter cluster of most-similar cases than the others. 
Chile, Costa Rica, and the United States utilize a Presidential system of government that differs 
considerably from the other three countries who use variants on a Westminster-style 
 
30 A. D. Lopez, N. E. Collishaw, and T. Piha, “A Descriptive Model of the Cigarette Epidemic in Developed Countries,” Tobacco 
Control 3, no. 3 (September 1994): 242–47. 
31 Michael Thun et al., “Stages of the Cigarette Epidemic on Entering Its Second Century,” Tobacco Control 21, no. 2 (March 1, 
2012): 96–101, https://doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2011-050294. 
32 Peter A. Hall and David W. Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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parliamentary system. While half the countries in this final group are federalized (United States, 
Canada, and Australia) in their form of government, that variable is a less germane factor to 
choose cases upon than system of government because it speaks less to the fashion in which 
national regulatory policy is created, the subject of this study.33  
This process of forward selection leaves us with three cases on which the rest of this study 
concentrates; Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Making the case that New Zealand and 
Australia are a good pair of countries to use in a public policy most-similar cases study design 
has been by many authors before.34 Many others, have added Canada as a triplet to the other two 
Commonwealth countries of similar age and development status.35 Further, the common link 
between these countries runs through the United Kingdom, which declared in the Balfour 
Declaration of 1926 that each country was a dominion, equal in status, to the imperial center. 
Canada, New Zealand, and Australia all began with nearly identical prohibitionist regulatory 
stances towards the nicotine-containing e-cigarette market. Over the course of the last seven 
years, Canada, and then likely New Zealand have moved towards adopting expansionist 
regulatory frameworks towards this market. This dissertation interrogates the policy process as 
viewed through a multiple streams approach lens to determine what factors enabled policy 
change to occur or not.  
These countries represent classic Westminster-style systems of Parliamentary government with 
highly professionalized bureaucracies that work closely with legislators to write policy.36 None 
of these countries suffer from a lack of technical capacity or resource allocation to their 
 
33 Rather, the form of government speaks to the size of the country, wherein those with larger populations and landmass are 
federal, while those which have smaller populations and land mass are unitary. 
34 Francis G. Castles, Jennifer Curtin, and Jack Vowles, “Public Policy in Australia and New Zealand: The New Global Context,” 
Australian Journal of Political Science 41, no. 2 (June 1, 2006): 131–43, https://doi.org/10.1080/10361140600672394; Donley T. 
Studlar, “The Political Dynamics of Tobacco Control in Australia and New Zealand: Explaining Policy Problems, Instruments, 
and Patterns of Adoption,” Australian Journal of Political Science 40, no. 2 (June 1, 2005): 255–74, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10361140500130063. 
35 Sharon Loane and Jim Bell, “Rapid Internationalisation among Entrepreneurial Firms in Australia, Canada, Ireland and New 
Zealand: An Extension to the Network Approach,” International Marketing Review 23, no. 5 (September 1, 2006): 467–85, 
https://doi.org/10.1108/02651330610703409; Philip Yetton, Jane Craig, and Jeremy Davis, “Are Diamonds a Country’s Best 
Friend? A Critique of Porter’s Theory of National Competition as Applied to Canada, New Zealand and Australia,” Australian 
Journal of Management 17, no. 1 (June 1, 1992): 89–119, https://doi.org/10.1177/031289629201700105; Studlar, “The Political 
Dynamics of Tobacco Control in Australia and New Zealand.” 
36 Rhodes, Wanna, and Weller, Comparing Westminster. 
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bureaucracies, and all have firmly established institutions that are not soon likely to radically 
change.37 Certain differences in federated structures, election rules, and demographics merit 
mention as potential sources of divergent policy outcomes, but each will be considered and will 
be ruled out as causes of such policy divergence.  
Importantly in our case, each country has a strong track record of tobacco control policy progress 
and have demonstrated the capacity for policy innovation in this area. Australia passed the 
world’s first plain packaging law for cigarettes.38 Canada has been a pathbreaker in tobacco 
control as well, as the country that implemented the world’s first graphic health warning labels 
on cigarette packs in 2001.39 New Zealand has included one of the most aggressive programs of 
annual tax-driven price increases in the world, making cigarettes dramatically less affordable to 
New Zealand smokers over the last decade.40 Additionally, in March 2011, the New Zealand 
government of the day was the first in the world to declare a public “tobacco endgame” target 
date for the country, aiming to reduce smoking prevalence to 5% of the adult population by 
2025.41 Each country has made progress innovating on policy grounds and in reducing their 
smoking prevalence rates and consumption (Figure 7). What follows here are short descriptions 
of the e-cigarette regulatory stances and the key events that brought about the set of rules in each 
case country. 
 
37 New Zealand adopted a new mixed-member proportional electoral system for Parliament in 1996 and Australia has changed 
their vote-counting procedures to improve the ranked-choice system. However, this point refers to the fact that no pharmaceutical 
company is going to try to start selling a cancer drug to hospitals without the medicines regulator approving first in any case 
countries because the rule of law is firmly established. 
38 This law mandated the removal of all logos and branding from the cigarette package beyond some white text in a standard size 
and font stating the brand name on a drab olive box that is mostly covered in ghastly health warning messages. Tobacco 
companies, in national and international courts, sued the country. Recently, the final judgments on the legality of the law were 
handed down, allowing Australia to continue its plain packaging law. Simon Chapman and Becky Freeman, Removing the 
Emperor’s Clothes: Australia and Tobacco Plain Packaging (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2014). 
39 Donley T Studlar, Tobacco Control Comparative Politics in the United States and Canada (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview 
Press, 2002). 
40 Alex Mason, “Government Burned over Smoking Tax Rise,” New Zealand Herald, January 1, 2016, sec. Business, 
https://bit.ly/2It0HfR. 
41 NZ MoH, “Smokefree 2025,” Ministry of Health NZ, July 21, 2015, http://bit.ly/2DBiF0P. 
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Figure 7: Manufactured cigarettes consumed per adult per day (1920-2015)42 
3.2.1 Australia 
Australia has maintained a prohibitionist regulatory stance for nicotine-containing e-cigarettes 
over the course of the study period. Nicotine, except in forms that are therapeutic or prepared for 
smoking, is regulated as a dangerous poison by the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) 
and banned from sale in the country without premarket approval from the TGA.43 When e-
cigarettes first turned up in 2010, the TGA emphasized that e-cigarettes were not “a safe 
alternative to normal cigarettes and not approved for therapeutic use”, while the Australia 
Medical Association stressed that the devices “could pose a serious health risk”.44 Law 
enforcement officers have only grudgingly tolerated the presence of an e-cigarette industry that 
attempts to skirt regulatory policies on a series of technicalities. 
Repeated efforts by THR advocates have been made to open a legal market for e-cigarettes at the 
Commonwealth level, but thus far all have been rebuffed.45 Understanding why this dynamic has 
persisted while the other cases have managed policy change is key to this study. 
 
42 Barbara Forey et al., “International Smoking Statistics: Web Edition” (P N Lee Statstics & Computing Ltd, December 20, 
2016), http://www.pnlee.co.uk/ISS.htm. 
43 Australian Government Department of Health Therapeutic Goods Administration, “2.1 Nicotine,” Text, Therapeutic Goods 
Administration (TGA), February 2, 2017, https://www.tga.gov.au/book-page/21-nicotine. 
44 Jill Stark, “Battery-Powered Cigarettes Pose Risks,” The Sun Herald, December 12, 2010, First edition, sec. News. 
45 Sarah Martin, “Greg Hunt Digs in on Opposition to E-Cigarettes after Vaping ‘Epidemic,’” The Guardian, September 3, 2019, 
sec. Australia news, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/sep/04/greg-hunt-digs-in-on-opposition-to-e-cigarettes-
after-vaping-epidemic; Katharine Murphy, “Vaping Inquiry: Coalition Agrees to Study Health Effects of e-Cigarettes,” The 
Guardian, September 18, 2018, sec. Society, https://bit.ly/2NQUdxT; Debbie Schipp, “Cigarette Smoking: MPs Split on Vaping 
Debate, e-Cigarette Ban Stays,” News.com.au, March 28, 2018, http://www.news.com.au/lifestyle/health/life-is-short-and-
shorter-for-smokers-just-legalise-vaping/news-story/8f1636e55e4be981732c3f69059ce977#.vuely. 
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3.2.2 Canada 
Over the course of the study period, Canada moved from holding a prohibitionist regulatory 
stance towards e-cigarettes to an expansionist stance. In 2009, Health Canada, the country’s 
omnibus health regulator determined that nicotine-containing e-cigarettes must be approved for 
sale by the regulator as a drug before they could be legally sold.46 Actors, namely small retailers, 
importers, and consumers, in the country’s e-cigarette market did not heed Health Canada’s 
instructions and carried on conducting business with little regard for federal regulations, and a 
thriving gray market arose in these products.47 This market was officially illegal, but it conducted 
business in proper brick-and-mortar storefronts across the country. Health Canada and law 
enforcement agents resorted to trying to enforce order by recommending shipments of e-cigarette 
parts to be refused entry into the country at its borders and by issuing cease-and-desist letters to 
retailers.48 
Provinces began proposing their own regulatory frameworks for controlling the sale and use of e-
cigarettes through 2014.49 Around the same time, Health Canada’s enforcement officers decided 
to no longer enforce the country’s restrictions on the sale of e-cigarettes because they wished to 
dedicate their resources elsewhere.50 This mix of provincial policy and federal enforcement 
inaction led provincial medical officers to call on their federal government to put together a 
proper federal regulatory policy for e-cigarette in September 2014.51 The federal government of 
the day took them up on the offer.52 
 
46 Health Canada, “Notice - To All Persons Interested in Importing, Advertising or Selling Electronic Smoking Products in 
Canada,” notices, aem, March 4, 2009, http://bit.ly/2n4YYoI; HESA Committee, “Vaping: Toward a Regulatory Framework for 
E-Cigarettes,” Committee Report (41-2) (Ottawa, Canada: House of Commons of Canada, March 2015), https://bit.ly/2E53GbD. 
47 HESA Committee, “Vaping: Toward a Regulatory Framework for E-Cigarettes.” 
48 Hilary Geller et al., “Evidence on E-Cigarettes,” § Standing Committee on Health (2014), 4, 
http://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/41-2/HESA/meeting-37/evidence. 
49 Derek From, Lauren Millar, and Russell Phillips, “Vaping and the Law: Comparing Legislation Across Canada,” Canadian 
Consitution Foundation, February 2017, http://bit.ly/2CUkl1T. 
50 Simon Kennedy and Nick Whalen, “Evidence - HESA (42-1) - No. 5 - House of Commons of Canada,” § Standing Committee 
on Health (2016), https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/HESA/meeting-5/evidence. 
51 Robert Strang et al., “Provincial/Territorial Chief Medical Officers of Health Position Statement on Electronic Nicotine 
Delivery Systems” (Council of Chief Medical Officers of Health, July 25, 2014). 
52 Lauren Vogel, “Provinces Press for E-Cigarette Crackdown,” CMAJ: Canadian Medical Association Journal = Journal de 
l’Association Medicale Canadienne 186, no. 16 (November 4, 2014): E593, https://doi.org/10.1503/cmaj.109-4914. 
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In early 2015, the ruling Federal Conservatives produced a unanimous committee report entitled 
“Vaping: Towards a Regulatory Framework” looking into creating a federal regulatory 
framework for e-cigarettes.53  Before bureaucrats had time to put together a bill that responded to 
the reports request for a regulatory framework, a change of government occurred, putting Justin 
Trudeau’s center-left government in charge of passing an e-cigarette regulatory framework.54 In 
November 2016, Bill S-5, created behind the scenes by Health Canada to regulate e-cigarettes at 
the federal level, appeared in the Senate.55 By May 2018, S-5 received Royal Assent and shifted 
Canada’s e-cigarette market into wholly legal channels.56 S-5 enshrined a regulatory framework 
for e-cigarettes that granted the product certain competitive advantages over the tobacco cigarette 
market while empowering health regulators to adequately police the new market. 
3.2.3 New Zealand 
Like Canada, New Zealand abandoned its previous prohibitionist regulatory stance towards e-
cigarettes and is in the process of replacing it with an expansionist stance. Nicotine-containing 
products are classified under the Medicines Act 1981 as medicines and, as such, could not be 
sold or supplied in New Zealand without approval from Medsafe, the country’s pharmaceutical 
regulatory agency.57 The country’s Smoke-Free Environments Act of 1990 has been interpreted 
by regulators to prohibit advertising selling supplying or distributing nicotine-containing e-
cigarettes.58 The country’s enforcement agencies did not pay much attention to implementing 
such policies, however. 
 
53 L. Vogel, “Health Canada E-Cigarette Response Delayed,” Canadian Medical Association Journal 187, no. 12 (September 8, 
2015): E374–E374, https://doi.org/10.1503/cmaj.109-5122; HESA Committee, “Vaping: Toward a Regulatory Framework for E-
Cigarettes.” 
54 Euan McKirdy, “Canada Election: Justin Trudeau, Liberals Win Clear Majority,” CNN, October 20, 2015, 
https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/19/world/canadian-election/index.html. 
55 Miglė Malinovskytė, “New Bill Signals Fresh Approach to Canada’s e-Cig Market,” ECigIntelligence (blog), August 16, 2017, 
https://ecigintelligence.com/new-bill-signals-fresh-approach-to-canada-e-cig-market/. 
56 Peter Harder, “An Act to Amend the Tobacco Act and the Non-Smokers’ Health Act and to Make Consequential Amendments 
to Other Acts,” Pub. L. No. S-5 (2018), https://bit.ly/2E7CfAo. 
57 Judy Li, Rhiannon Newcombe, and Darren Walton, “The Prevalence, Correlates and Reasons for Using Electronic Cigarettes 
among New Zealand Adults,” Addictive Behaviors 45 (June 2015): 245–51, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.addbeh.2015.02.006. 
58 Nick Wilson et al., “Potential New Regulatory Options for E-Cigarettes in New Zealand,” NZ Med J 128, no. 1425 (2015): 88–
96. 
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By mid-2016, center-right National Party Associate Minister of Health Peseta Sam Lotu-Iiga 
recommended the rules allowing the sale of e-cigarettes to be allowed to begin.59 By March 
2017, the reigning right-wing government announced its intentions to pass legislation in the 
coming year to formally legalize the sale of e-cigarettes containing nicotine.60 Before the new 
regulatory policy could be introduced to Parliament, a general election yielded a shift to a 
predominantly center-left coalition government led by Jacinda Adern in September 2017.61 
In March 2018, the sale of nicotine-containing e-cigarettes was unexpectedly legalized when the 
government lost a court case against the tobacco company Philip Morris over whether that 
company’s heated tobacco product could be sold in the country.62 The judge ruled that heated 
tobacco, along with e-cigarettes were legal to be sold but were subject to regulations like other 
tobacco products. 63  To clarify the application of regulations that were written for other tobacco 
products to e-cigarettes, the government set out on a long consultation to write a new e-cigarette 
regulatory policy that finally appeared before Parliament in early 2020.64 New Zealand had 
become poised to legalize the sale of e-cigarettes and apply an expansionist stance similar to 
Canada’s.  
3.3 Methodological Approach 
This study seeks to learn how the policymaking process differed in a single topic area in similar 
countries to produce different policy outcomes. The process of writing the selected comparative 
country case studies involved employing several interlocking qualitative methods to produce a 
narrative explanation of the cases informed by as rich a dataset as possible. This study employs 
the simplifying concept of the regulatory stance, to engage in a deeper exploration of the factors 
that lead to changes or stasis in the regulatory framework for e-cigarettes in three case countries. 
 
59 Nicholas Jones, “E-Cigarette Sales to Be Allowed under a New Government Proposal,” New Zealand Herald, August 2, 2016, 
sec. National, https://bit.ly/2Ji1Xnl. 
60 Jones, “E-Cigarettes Will Be Legalised.” 
61 Eleanor Ainge Roy, “New Zealand Labour Signs Coalition Deal and Makes Winston Peters Deputy PM,” The Guardian, 
October 24, 2017, sec. World news, https://bit.ly/2kqfim8. 
62 Marius Zaharia and Diane Craft, “New Zealand Court Gives Philip Morris Nod to Sell Heated Tobacco...,” Reuters, March 27, 
2018, https://reut.rs/2P5tJKD. 
63 Butler, Ministry of Health v Phillip Morris (New Zealand) Ltd, NZDC. 
64 Felix Walton, “Cheat Sheet: What’s the Deal with the New Vaping Law?,” The Spinoff (blog), February 25, 2020, 
https://thespinoff.co.nz/politics/25-02-2020/cheat-sheet-whats-the-deal-with-the-new-vaping-law/. 
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Bringing the goal of regulation forward sharpens the focus on why individual actors might 
support or oppose policy change. I use Kingdon’s framework to divide and organize events, 
actors, and forces in the cases into streams that are more easily compared across and within the 
cases. The documents and key informant interviews provide deeper color and explanation to 
explain why events progressed the way they did and to eventually explain what caused Australia 
to maintain a prohibitionist stance towards e-cigarettes while Canada and New Zealand 
abandoned their old stances for new expansionist policies. This section wraps up with an 
explanation of how a regulatory stance is determined for any market and an explanation of the 
policy domains that I used to assess the regulatory stances of case countries. 
3.3.1 Substantive Division of the Cases via Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach 
John Kingdon’s classic work, “Agendas and Alternatives” proposed the Multiple Streams 
Approach as a framework to understand the policymaking process and to describe “when an 
idea’s time has come”.65 The Multiple Streams Approach is a cornerstone of the broad 
theoretical literature on the public policy process.66 While it was not originally designed to 
enable comparative studies, it has been successfully argued that the Multiple Streams Approach 
implicitly lays out a plan of action for a researcher to look to describe several streams of inquiry 
when trying to determine the contours of an environment in which an idea rose to prominence.67 
The multiple streams approach is named after three streams of politics, problems, and policy that 
are constantly moving and flowing about, but that will occasionally converge into a policy 
window where change is possible. The previous chapter laid out the motivation for using the 
multiple streams as well as introduced the explanatory factors I will test to determine if they are 
significant predictors of policy change or stasis in the cases ahead. 
3.3.2 Document Collection 
A primary round of document collection from key policy and media sources enabled the creation 
of timelines of the events the shaped e-cigarette regulatory stances in case countries. A follow-on 
round of document collection identified key actors from each of Kingdon’s streams in the 
 
65 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. 
66 Cairney and Jones, “Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach.” 
67 Scott L. Greer, Territorial Politics and Health Policy: UK Health Policy in Comparative Perspective, Devolution Series 
(Manchester ; New York : New York: Manchester University Press, 2004), chap. 1. 
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important events on the timeline. These timelines were used as the outlines from which case 
studies grew into fully-formed narrative chapters. Policy-relevant documents from bureaucratic 
agencies and legislative bodies were collected as well. Media stories about the use, the effects, 
and the regulation of e-cigarettes in each country were collected from high-quality sources in 
NexisUni, Factiva, and the websites of leading local news agencies. This information was used 
to sketch a portrait of each substantive division in each case country. Hundreds of documents 
were collected in each case and the data drawn from these sources was weaved into the 
narratives that made up the backbone of each case study that can be checked against the public 
record. 
3.3.3 Key Informant Interviews 
The centerpiece of the data collection for this project were key informant interviews with 
participants in the policy process of each case country. In-person interviews with key 
stakeholders were conducted between August and November 2018 in Ottawa, Canada; Brisbane, 
Canberra, Melbourne and Sydney, Australia; and Auckland, Christchurch, and Wellington, New 
Zealand. The rest of the interviews were performed remotely via telephone or video conference. 
Memos were written by the author on a near-daily basis to track the thoughts and perspectives 
being developed during this time in country. Interviewees were asked at the end of a semi-
structured interview if they would recommend speaking to other key informants, in a snowball 
technique. The author interviewed subjects until practical saturation of the cases was reached.  
A semi-structured interview protocol (See Appendix A on page 243) was developed and utilized 
to collect as detailed a picture as possible of the policy process in the Multiple Streams 
Approach. The interviews and documents collected were employed to triangulate the events and 
rationales underlying key decisions in the regulatory process and to establish a detailed history of 
events that led up to policy change or a lack thereof.  
Table 4: Key Informant Interviews by Category of Respondent 
 Australia Canada New Zealand 
 Success Failure Success Rate Success Failure Success Rate Success Failure Success Rate 
Academic 4 4 50% 5 2 71% 4 2 67% 
Bureaucrat 6 8 43% 9 10 47% 4 6 40% 
Health NGO 12 1 92% 6 5 55% 9 8 53% 
Industry Advocate 1 4 20% 3 3 50% 3 2 60% 
Non-Health NGO 7 4 64% 1 1 50% 7 1 88% 
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Politician 3 9 25% 3 11 21% 5 5 50% 
Total 33 30 52% 27 32 46% 32 27 54% 
Interviews were sought from six types of key informants: Academics, Bureaucrats, Health Non-
Governmental Organizations, Tobacco and Vaping Industry Advocates, Non-Health Non-
Governmental Organizations, and Politicians. Table 4 displays the number of respondents who 
were interviewed for each type of informant in each case country. Interviews were conducted 
until saturation was reached in each case study. Overall, 50.8% (92 of 181) of persons who were 
contacted by e-mail, video chat, or phone calls were eventually granted an interview with the 
author, although that rate varied across informant type. Non-Health Non-Governmental 
Organizations and Health Non-Governmental Organizations were the most likely to grant 
interviews, at rates of 71.4% and 65.9%, respectively. Politicians and Tobacco and Vaping 
Industry Advocates were the least likely to grant interviews, doing so at rates of 30.6% and 
43.8% respectively. While these varied response rates may have lessened the depth of the 
contributions from these actors, it seems as though members of the policy community, rather 
than the political community played a pivotal role in determining the outcomes in each case 
study. This made that group’s deeper contribution to the interviewee pool that much more 
consequential to the findings.  
The interviews were transcribed using the aid of the artificial intelligence software Trint.68 The 
interviews stretched over 60 hours in length and produced transcripts that stretched beyond 
480,000 words over 850 pages of text. This project did not contain a goal of quantifying 
responses into thematic categories and the wide stratification across place and occupation would 
have made that process even less fruitful. Instead, the project intended to use information 
gathered from these interviews to fill in the gaps in stories gleaned from the public record. This 
required that the next step in data processing was to read and re-read the transcripts to become 
immersed and familiar with their extensive content. Initial reads focused on correcting the 
content for grammar and accuracy. Secondary reads focused on extracting interesting snippets 
that were highlighted and included in a database. Tertiary work examined some of the binary 
question options and logging those responses into a separate datafile. Although foregrounded 
 
68 Mark Boas, Mark Panaghiston, and Laurian Gridinoc, Trint (London, UK, 2017), https://trint.com/. 
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analyses of these binary questions were dropped due to concerns of representativeness, the issue 
of a perceived failure in tobacco control was highlighted in the problem stream in case study.  
Where referenced in this study, insights gathered from interviews are referenced by the first 
letter of the case country where the interviewee was based (A=Australia; C=Canada; N=New 
Zealand), by the second and third letters, which reflect the chronological order in which the 
interviews were conducted, and by the timestamp in minutes in the interview where the 
information in question was shared, preceded by the @ symbol. To protect the identity of 
respondents, additional identifying information was kept confidential.  
3.3.4 Determine the Regulatory Stance for a Market 
As the very concept of a regulatory stance is one of the more novel contributions of this study, I 
must explain how a regulatory stance for a market was assessed in this study. The process by 
which I would determine a jurisdiction’s regulatory stance for a selected market followed the 
nine steps of the guidelines illustrated here:  
1. Define the market being described, as widely or as narrowly as is necessary.  
Here, as explained in the scoping conditions (see 3.3.4 on page 62) and the case selection (see 
3.1 on page 44) we are examining nicotine-containing e-cigarettes in three case countries. 
Narrower definitions enable the sketching of more precise regulatory frameworks. Wider 
definitions are more likely to encompass subjects confronted by political actors. 
2. Determine alternative classifications that could be possible for similarly situated markets.  
These will likely be codified in statute. 
3. Determine how similarly situated markets are sorted into alternative classifications. 
Note which is the default classification (requires the least stringent standards to be met) and the 
process by which the sorting happens (premarket approval, notification, etc.).  
4. Determine the policies used to regulate the market in each alternative classification as 
extensively as possible. 
5. Group relevant policies into parsimonious domains. 
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A policy domain should cover a group of related policies and should be used to simplify the 
enormous complexity of the laws regarding an individual market. The policy domains for e-
cigarettes are elaborated upon in the following section on page 64.  
6. Identify the market that is a primary substitute for the one being studied. 
Regulators can consider more than one substitute product at a time when constructing a 
regulatory framework for a product. For example, if a regulator wishes to adopt a contractionist 
policy towards both tobacco cigarettes and nicotine-containing e-cigarettes, they could also be 
considering using nicotine replacement products that have been approved as therapeutics as a 
substitute of choice. However, in the current exercise, examining a single substitute product is 
parsimonious.  
We must note that there is always a substitute market to consider. Demand for any market, new 
or old, has some precursor or alternative.69 Utility curves and budget allocation problems always 
leave the option for gaining some utility by purchasing alternative products. In this sense, almost 
any product that is not a close complement can be thought of as a substitute. More importantly, 
we are considering close substitute products here. 
7. Determine the advantages or disadvantages granted to each market relative to its 
substitute within each policy domain and alternative classification. 
The relative importance of each advantage or disadvantage in terms of its effect on the ability for 
a market to grow or shrink should be considered and weighted in the final analysis.  
8. Determine where on the range of regulatory stances the balance of policy places the 
regulation of any market within each domain and alternative classification. 
If the market has lots of advantages relative to its substitute, its stance is on the expansionist end 
of the range. If the market has lots of disadvantages relative to its substitute, its stance is on the 
contractionist end of the range. If the market is on equal footing with its substitute, its stance 
should be placed in the middle of the range. As this is a range, certain markets will be subject to 
 
69 Christopher Chen, “Food and Drug Administration Food Standards of Identity: Consumer Protection through the Regulation of 
Product Information.,” Food & Drug Law Journal 47, no. 2 (1992): 185–206. 
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regulatory stances placed between points on the range to reflect the relative strength of such a 
stance.  
9. Assemble a regulatory framework with the resultant regulatory stance for the market, 
illustrating the connections between each alternative classification and the policy domains. 
The regulatory stance can only be determined within an alternative classification. The 
contribution of each policy domain to the final regulatory stance is likely unequal, but this 
proposition should be subject to empirical testing. 
This process was conducted in detail for e-cigarettes in the selected case countries at several 
points in time for the study, and those findings are reported in the case study chapters. A more 
informal version of the process was conducted to produce the regulatory stances towards e-
cigarettes of the countries listed in Table 3. The nine-step process described above is generic and 
flexible enough that it may be utilized to determine the regulatory stances of other markets in 
other jurisdictions.  
3.3.5 E-Cigarette Regulatory Policy Domains 
For this study, five parsimonious policy domains are assessed in the regulatory framework for 
nicotine-containing e-cigarettes; usage, marketing, retail, pricing, and product standards. Each 
domain may contain dozens of regulations, but for the sake of clarity, a regulatory stance can be 
adopted within each domain that can be described by its position on the range of regulatory 
stances. These domains arose as particularly relevant in the case at hand, as policymakers 
believed these policies shaped the nascent market being regulated.  
Table 5 lays out the broad range of policy options that countries can adopt when regulating the 
novel market of nicotine-containing e-cigarettes in parsimonious policy domains. The 
characterization of a country’s entire regulatory policy choices for a product pathway will not 
necessarily cleanly fit into a single column, but the process elucidated in 3.3.4enables a 
determination of the overall regulatory stance. The table can be read horizontally to understand 
how change within a policy domain varies across the range of regulatory stances. Alternatively, 
the table can be read vertically to determine what an ideal-type policy at a single point on the 
range of regulatory stances might resemble. 
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Table 5: Policy Domains Across the Range of Regulatory Stances 
Policy 
Domain 
Prohibitionist Contractionist Permissive Expansionist Universalist 
Usage May not use May not use where 
substitutes can 
Used where 
substitutes can 
Used where 
substitutes cannot 
Used anywhere 
Marketing  May not sell More restrictive than 
substitutes 
Parity with 
substitutes 
Less restrictive than 
substitutes 
Much less restrictive 
than substitutes 
Retail May not sell More restrictive than 
substitutes 
Parity with 
substitutes 
Less restrictive than 
substitutes 
Much less restrictive 
than substitutes 
Pricing May not sell More tax than 
substitutes 
Tax parity with 
substitutes 
Less tax than 
substitutes 
Subsidized to cost 
less than substitutes 
Product 
Standards 
May not sell Less appealing/ 
stricter than 
substitutes 
As appealing/ 
strict as 
substitutes 
More appealing/ less 
strict than substitutes 
Much more 
appealing/ less strict 
than substitutes 
The first policy domain listed in Table 5 refers to policies regulating where e-cigarettes may be 
used. The key issue here is whether e-cigarettes are included in pre-existing regulations over the 
use of substitute products (read, tobacco cigarettes). The scientific literature establishing the 
harms of secondhand tobacco smoke is conclusive and important public health gains have been 
made in the name of protecting bystanders from the harms of secondhand smoke.70 The evidence 
around the health effects of secondhand vapor is nascent, to say the least.71 But, concerns over 
the use of cigarette-like products in public space may genuinely confuse the implementation and 
enforcement of pre-existing smoking bans which rely on social pressure and cues to function.72 I 
assume giving people more places and times to use e-cigarettes relative to tobacco cigarettes 
encourages market growth while restricting those places and times of use may shrink the market. 
This policy domain, along with the retail policy domain, is often controlled by local 
governments, thereby introducing some heterogeneity to the measure within a country at points 
in time where localities have not reached a consensus policy position. 
The second policy domain considered is the broad concept of marketing regulation. This includes 
advertising, promotion, sponsorship, and the multitudinous other ways in which companies 
spend money to try to entice consumers to purchase their products. The relative strength of 
restrictions placed on e-cigarette marketing efforts relative to tobacco cigarettes will determine 
 
70 Office on Smoking and Health (US), The Health Consequences of Involuntary Exposure to Tobacco Smoke: A Report of the 
Surgeon General, Publications and Reports of the Surgeon General (Atlanta (GA): Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(US), 2006), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK44324/. 
71 Cheryl L. Marcham and John P. Springston, “Electronic Cigarettes in the Indoor Environment,” Reviews on Environmental 
Health 34, no. 2 (2019): 105–124, https://doi.org/10.1515/reveh-2019-0012. 
72 Allison W. Watts et al., “Do Students’ Perceptions of School Smoking Policies Influence Where Students Smoke?: Canada’s 
Youth Smoking Survey,” Cancer Causes & Control 21, no. 12 (2010): 2085–92. 
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the placement of a jurisdiction’s policy regime within this domain. If e-cigarettes are given 
significant marketing advantages, particularly in markets where cigarette advertising is heavily 
restricted, I expect that decision to redound to the growth of the e-cigarette market. 
Consequently, if the marketing of the novel products is strangled, then we would expect the 
growth of the market to be requisitely smaller than if all marketing forces were unleashed. 
Particular attention will be placed on examining the regulations around the messaging allowed in 
e-cigarette marketing materials. 
The third policy domain considered is that of retail policy. This refers to the question of who 
may sell e-cigarettes to whom and the way that sale is governed. Issues such as licensure and age 
restrictions will be included here. If the sale of e-cigarettes is regulated in a laxer manner than 
cigarettes or if the product is more widely available through retailers than cigarettes, that policy 
choice will cause the market for the products to grow relative to a baseline. If retail restrictions 
are tougher or if the availability of e-cigarettes at the retail level is less than substitute goods, the 
market size will be smaller. 
The fourth policy domain is that of pricing, which includes regulations on price as well as on 
taxation. It is well understood that such policies are the strongest available tools to reduce the use 
of tobacco products.73 Furthermore, scholars argue that excise tax rates for various tobacco 
products should be set in proportion to their health risks.74 Doing so may create a competitive 
advantage for less-risky products, provided differential tax rates translate into differentially 
lower product prices.75 A contractionist pricing policy would shrink a market by creating a 
competitive disadvantage relative to substitute products by taxing a product at a higher rate than 
substitutes. Conversely, an expansionist policy may seek to indirectly create a competitive 
advantage over a substitute product by providing a tax break. Finally, a universalist policy would 
 
73 WHO, WHO Technical Manual on Tobacco Tax Administration (Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, 2010), 
http://bit.ly/KmkoYi. 
74 Frank J. Chaloupka, David Sweanor, and Kenneth E. Warner, “Differential Taxes for Differential Risks--Toward Reduced 
Harm from Nicotine-Yielding Products,” The New England Journal of Medicine 373, no. 7 (August 13, 2015): 594–97, 
https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp1505710. 
75 Alex C Liber, Jeffrey M Drope, and Michal Stoklosa, “Combustible Cigarettes Cost Less to Use than E-Cigarettes: Global 
Evidence and Tax Policy Implications,” Tobacco Control 26, no. 2 (March 2017): 158–63, 
https://doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2015-052874. 
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subsidize one market sector to directly create an incentive for a market to grow as large as 
possible.  
The fifth policy domain to be considered is that of product standards, a broad category that 
outlines what a product can contain or what it must resemble if it is placed in a particular 
regulatory pathway. For nicotine-containing e-cigarettes, the product standards domain includes 
regulations on flavoring, ingredients, child safety requirements, nicotine concentration, as well as 
packaging and labeling. As before, if e-cigarettes are granted exemptions from policies that are 
applied to tobacco cigarettes like flavoring restrictions or plain packaging, we should expect the 
e-cigarette market to grow more quickly. If the products are subject to policies that tobacco 
cigarettes are not subject to, like nicotine concentration limits, then we should expect a slower 
rate of market growth. The most likely outcome for this policy domain is that both contractionist 
and expansionist policies will be applied to e-cigarettes, potentially negating one effect or the 
other.   
3.4 Ethical Considerations 
This project received a notice of exemption (HUM00128675) from the University of Michigan’s 
Health Sciences and Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board on May 10, 2018. The 
project involved only minimal risk human subjects research. Informed consent from key 
informant interviewees was sought before recorded interviews to express the risks that 
participating in this work may pose to the interviewee. Because this work took place in high-
resource countries, the risk of subjects being adversely influenced by a power imbalance in favor 
of the researcher was remote. This project did not involve working with vulnerable groups. To 
mitigate the risk of a power imbalance, interviewees were not compensated for their time, and 
interviews were mostly limited to an hour in length. The effort to publish and share the findings 
from this study is aimed at advancing the cause of employing regulation to lessen the harms of 
markets on human health. The findings can be taken into consideration by the communities that 
were studied and employed in manners that might enable them to reach their pro-social goals. 
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3.5 Generalizability 
Before moving on to the case studies themselves, it is useful to situate what is going to be 
studied in terms of how the findings here may be able to generalize elsewhere. In the strictest 
empirical sense, I am studying a case of the regulatory politics of nicotine-containing e-cigarettes 
in three very similar countries. My findings will highlight the explanatory factors that spurred 
along a change in the regulatory stance in New Zealand and Canada. These factors may be able 
to be exploited by those seeking to achieve similar policy change for e-cigarettes in Australia. 
They may also apply to one of the twenty-plus other countries that may seek to exit a 
prohibitionist stance for e-cigarettes. These factors could apply to other novel tobacco products 
like heated tobacco as well. Going further afield, these factors could be extrapolated for use into 
any market seeking to leave a prohibitionist regulatory stance. The utility of these explanations 
requires further testing. The story of e-cigarette regulation in Australia, Canada, and New 
Zealand, then, contains the bud of lessons that could run in a lot of diverse directions, but as 
always, more research is needed. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The methods laid out in this chapter enabled the comparative case study to proceed in an orderly 
and logical fashion from data gathering, to summary, to analysis, and finally, interpretation. 
Special care was taken to apply these methods to examine the influence of the factors laid out in 
Chapter 2 as being potentially important explanations of variance. The following chapters 
employ the methods described here to test those hypotheses in as rigorous a fashion as my 
methods will allow. The findings from those tests will be summarized in Chapter 7. 
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 Australia 
Stop Trying to Make “We’re Failing” Happen  
In January 1948, a seed merchant in Perth, Ross Edwin Symonds, was arrested and charged with 
the offense of selling a bottle of nicotine insecticide that was not labeled as a poison.1 Mr. 
Symonds pleaded not guilty to the charge, claiming that nicotine was not described as a poison in 
Western Australia’s Pharmacy and Poisons Act, while the Prosecution argued the contrary. Mr. 
Symonds had been warned two years prior by the area Pharmaceutical Council inspector that he 
needed to label the bottles of nicotine that he sold as poison to avoid repeating a mysterious 
“recent serious accident”. Symonds was ultimately let off with a warning, though it is unclear 
from the historical record why this happened.2  
Before Australia’s establishment as a federation in 1900, its progenitor colonies had already 
passed laws regulating and controlling the use of poisons within their borders.3 Australian 
newspapers of the era are littered with accounts of suicides and accidental poisonings of people 
drinking nicotine sulfate.4 In a period where the risk of acute poisonings from liquid nicotine 
insecticide seemed to be a much greater worry than the potential chronic harm from smoked 
tobacco,5 Australia set up a regulatory framework that strictly regulated access for consumers to 
liquid nicotine while preserving exemptions in poisons laws for the purportedly much safer 
nicotine source of tobacco prepared for smoking.  
At least as far back as the 1950s, nicotine was listed by the National Health and Medical 
Research Council (NHMRC), the peak medical agency in Australia, on the uniform schedule of 
 
1 “Court Argument:Is Nicotine Poison,” Daily News (Perth, WA : 1882 - 1950), February 25, 1948. 
2 “MERCHANT IS CAUTIONED,” Daily News (Perth, WA : 1882 - 1950), March 11, 1948. 
3 John McEwen, A History of Therapeutic Goods Regulation in Australia (Woden, ACT: Therapeutic Goods Administration, 
2007), 1, https://bit.ly/2Z1YaRC. 
4 “Dead Woman Drank Enough Poison To Kill Hundreds,” Daily News (Perth, WA : 1882 - 1950), July 15, 1948; “GOODBYE, 
MUM!,” Manjimup Mail and Jardee-Pemberton-Northcliffe Press (WA : 1927 - 1950), November 28, 1941; “POISONED SELF 
WITH NICOTINE,” Daily Telegraph (Sydney, NSW : 1931 - 1954), June 15, 1940. 
5 James M. Faulkner, “NICOTINE POISONING BY ABSORPTION THROUGH THE SKIN,” Journal of the American Medical 
Association 100, no. 21 (May 27, 1933): 1664–65, https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.1933.02740210012005. 
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poisons that was recommended to be adopted by all regional governments.6 In 1982, the 
NHMRC clarified that tobacco would be exempted from its poisons scheduling.7 This decision 
was later modified to only exempt tobacco prepared for smoking as Australia banned the sale of 
oral tobacco in 1986.8 Largely, this was seen as a matter of practicality, as it avoided creating 
conflicts between central and regional government regulations on cigarettes.9 By 1995, proposals 
were floated by the Western Australia chapter of the Australian Medical Association to remove 
the exemption from Schedule 7 for nicotine that was prepared for smoking.10 This action would 
have classified cigarettes as a dangerous poison and applied rules that regulated their 
manufacture, use, and sale, accordingly. Several Australian tobacco companies countered this 
effort by releasing a report detailing the lost consumer surplus that would be suffered from 
moving all cigarette sales to pharmacies and the requisite harms that would be suffered from 
labeling cigarettes as a poison.11 In the end, the proposal did not receive the endorsement of the 
government of the day, and the exemption for tobacco prepared for smoking from the poisons 
schedule remained.  
In the last decade, several Australian policy actors have examined the relative treatment of liquid 
nicotine and nicotine contained in tobacco prepared for smoking and concluded the regulatory 
framework has been set up backward.12 Tobacco cigarettes, a more lethal product than liquid 
nicotine used in e-cigarettes, are available at every corner store in Australia, albeit subject to one 
of the world’s most strongly contractionist regulatory stances. Meanwhile, nicotine-containing e-
cigarettes are not legally available for sale in the country. Would-be policy entrepreneurs have 
set out to change the country’s regulatory stance. But thus far they have failed to create any 
change.  
 
6 Wreidt and Anderson, “QUESTION — POISONS” (1971), https://bit.ly/2ktKm49.; AAA @ 11 
7Commonwealth Department of Health, “Tobacco Is Specifically Exempted from the Uniform Poisons Schedule, Standard as 
Adopted by the National Health and Medical Research Council” (94th Session, October 1982). 
8 Connolly, “Smokeless Tobacco in Developed Countries.” 
9 AAA @ 13 
10 Gabrielle Chan, “AMA in Bid to Put Nicotine on Poisons List,” The Australian, November 27, 1995, NexisUni. 
11 ACIL Economics and Policy, “A REVIEW OF THE ECONOMICS OF LISTING TOBACCO PRODUCTS ON THE 
POISONS SCHEDULE” (Tobacco Institute Australia, December 1995), xqbj0101, Truth Tobacco Industry Documents, 
https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/#id=xqbj0101. 
12 Coral Gartner and Marilyn Bromberg, “One Does Not Simply Sell E-Cigarettes in Australia: An Overview of Australian e-
Cigarette Regulations,” in The Regulation of E-Cigarettes, ed. Lukasz Gruszczynski, Elgar Studies in Health and the Law 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2019), 275, 
http://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781788970457/9781788970457.00021.xml. 
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In June 2018, a toddler in Victoria died after drinking nicotine-containing liquid from a bottle his 
mother was using to refill her e-cigarette13. The mother was not found to be negligent in the case. 
But, the echoes of the consequences of liquid nicotine being possessed in the home are 
unmistakable.  
This chapter shows why Australia’s regulatory stance towards the e-cigarette market has not 
changed. The reasons why change has not come to the Australian e-cigarette market are three-
fold. First, no significant problem with the country’s e-cigarette regulatory stance has been 
convincingly advanced in the media that could be solved by changing the prevailing e-cigarette 
regulatory framework. Second, lacking any impetus to find common ground, THR advocates and 
the broader Australian public health policy community, have failed to find a consensus 
alternative regulatory policy to the status quo that is acceptable to mainstream political parties. 
Finally, mainstream political parties have determined there was little political benefit and 
significant risk to changing the regulatory stance towards e-cigarettes. The confluence of these 
factors enabled Australia to maintain an e-cigarette regulatory stance that descended directly 
from a past era’s concerns regarding liquid nicotine’s reputation as a poison. 
4.1 Regulatory Stances Towards E-Cigarettes 
Australia does not have a legal market for nicotine-containing e-cigarettes, but some 120,000 
people claimed to have currently used e-cigarettes in 2016.14 THR advocates repeatedly claim 
(without citing data) that nearly double this figure were using e-cigarettes by 2018.15 Growth in 
the market has been anecdotally linked to rapidly rising tobacco taxes which have made 
Australian cigarettes the most expensive in the world.16 Regulators are aware that vapers have 
gained access to nicotine-containing e-cigarettes even though such products are prohibited under 
state and territory law.17 Figure 8 illustrates Australia’s current nicotine-containing e-cigarette 
regulatory framework in visual terms.  
 
13 Australian Associated Press, “Toddler Died after Consuming Liquid Nicotine While Mother’s Head Was Turned, Coroner 
Says,” The Guardian, July 8, 2019, sec. Australia news, https://bit.ly/3146iT7. 
14 It is not known what proportion of these people are using nicotine-containing e-cigarettes. Moira Hewitt, “National Drug 
Strategy Household Survey 2016” (ADA Dataverse, 2018), https://bit.ly/2lDIcPB. 
15 AT, AN, AR 
16 Jill Stark, “Banned E-Cigarettes May Be a Health Hazard, but Buying Them’s a Wheeze,” Sunday Age, December 12, 2010, 
First edition, sec. News, Lexis Nexis. 
17 AI @ 13 
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Figure 8: Australia's Regulatory Framework for Nicotine-Containing E-Cigarettes 
Australia maintains two product pathways for nicotine-containing e-cigarettes. The first pathway 
classifies all nicotine-containing products, that are not specifically exempt from poison 
regulations, to be dangerous poisons. As will be covered below, nicotine-containing e-liquids 
have not received such an exemption from the TGA and are thereby subjected to a default 
pathway that ends in a prohibitionist regulatory stance. E-cigarette skeptics point out that a 
separate pathway to market for the products does exist, wherein if the TGA receives and 
approves a premarket application to sell an e-cigarette as a therapeutic, that product would be 
granted the benefits of an expansionist regulatory stance. However, no manufacturer has yet 
proven the safety, quality, and performance of such a device as a smoking cessation product in 
an application to the TGA making the therapeutic pathway for e-cigarettes largely a theoretical 
exercise to date. However, it is worth detailing the policy domains that apply to the product in 
each pathway to understanding why they are assigned their respective regulatory stances. 
The use of e-cigarettes has been restricted to the same places as tobacco cigarettes in every 
Australian state and territory.18 This puts e-cigarettes on equal footing with tobacco cigarettes 
and is the only permissive policy domain afforded to the market in the country. Outside of this, 
every other policy for e-cigarettes should was prohibitionist. 
E-cigarette marketing is conducted in an informal manner in Australia. Such activities are not 
regulated by specialized rules from the Commonwealth government that do not apply equally to 
all consumer products (e.g., truth-in-advertising standards). Advertisements for a therapeutic 
 
18 Kyle Eu Soon Saw et al., “The Medium Is Not the Message: A Content Analysis of Public Information about Vaping Product 
Regulations in Australia,” Drug and Alcohol Review 38, no. 5 (2019): 569–78, https://doi.org/10.1111/dar.12961. 
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device would be more widespread than is allowed under the strict tobacco advertising ban in 
effect for cigarettes. Smoking cessation devices are marketed under relatively lax guidelines in 
the country, and a future therapeutic e-cigarette would be no exception to this standard.19 
E-cigarettes in Australia are not legally available for retail sale, which places them at a huge 
disadvantage compared to tobacco cigarettes, which are one of the most widely available 
consumer goods in the country.20 If an e-cigarette was approved for sale as a therapeutic, the 
product would have certain retail advantages over tobacco cigarettes, including being subject to a 
lower minimum age of purchase standards or not being subject to a retail display ban, and some 
disadvantages like not being as widely available for sale or requiring a doctor’s prescription to be 
able to purchase the product.  
Excise taxes have been solely collected by the Commonwealth government since state and 
territory tobacco retailer fees were invalidated by the courts in 1997.21 Due to the lack of legal 
products on the market, the Commonwealth government has no specific regulations that apply to 
e-cigarette taxation or pricing. If an e-cigarette were to be approved as a therapeutic good, that 
product like, other smoking cessation therapies could be subsidized by the Repatriation 
Pharmaceutical Benefits scheme which would substantially cut the cost of using the product.22 
As e-cigarettes are not yet legally available in Australia, no product standards have been created 
yet at the commonwealth level. If an e-cigarette were to be placed in the therapeutic pathway, it 
would gain distinct advantages boosting its growth potential. A therapeutic product would not be 
subject to flavoring restrictions if the manufacturer proved that a flavored product met safety, 
quality, and performance standards.23 Importantly, a therapeutic e-cigarette would not be subject 
to the plain packaging and graphic health warning regulations that apply to tobacco products, 
 
19 Alexandra Roach, “JWT Sydney Wins Johnson & Johnson’s Nicorette and Regaine,” AdNews, March 27, 2012, 
https://bit.ly/2m07jg1. 
20 AW; Generally; Joseph R. DiFranza, “Research Opportunities Concerning Youth and the Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act,” Nicotine & Tobacco Research 14, no. 1 (January 2012): 54–61, https://doi.org/10.1093/ntr/ntq149. 
21 M Scollo and M Bayly, “13.2 Tobacco Taxes in Australia,” in Tobacco in Australia: Facts and Issues, by MM Scollo and MH 
Winstanley (Melbourne: Cancer Council Victoria, 2019), https://www.tobaccoinaustralia.org.au/chapter-13-taxation/13-2-
tobacco-taxes-in-australia. 
22 EM Greenhalgh, S Stillman, and C Ford, “7.16 Pharmacotherapies,” in Tobacco in Australia: Facts and Issues, by MM Scollo 
and MH Winstanley (Melbourne: Cancer Council Victoria, 2018), https://www.tobaccoinaustralia.org.au/chapter-7-cessation/7-
16-pharmacotherapy. 
23 Johnson & Johnson Pacific, “QuickMist Cool Berry,” NICORETTE® Australia, November 24, 2016, 
https://www.nicorette.com.au/QuickMistBerry. 
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making them potentially more pleasant to own. These factors could combine to produce a 
therapeutic product that is more appealing to users than tobacco cigarettes. 
Law enforcement officers have viewed efforts to sell the devices as breaking state law if the 
liquid contains nicotine. But, because police do not carry nicotine testing kits on their person, 
they have only infrequently cracked down on retailers. Thus far, just one person in Australia has 
been prosecuted for possessing nicotine e-liquid.24  
The prohibitionist framework has kept transnational tobacco companies from entering the 
market, leaving small businesses as the only players. The requisite unprofessional nature of the 
Australian e-cigarette industry has enabled a narrative about its legal uncertainty and proclivity 
for spreading what was perceived to be misinformation about vaping to spread.25 Mislabeling has 
been a big problem wherein e-liquids labeled as containing no nicotine are consistently found to 
contain nicotine.26 Initial e-liquid testing efforts in New South Wales found 70% of all e-liquid 
sold in vape shops contained some nicotine.27 Legally evasive behavior on the part of small e-
cigarette companies about truth-in-advertising standards, decisions to relocate headquarters 
abroad, and to set up shops that only sell component pieces of e-cigarettes to skirt local 
prohibitions on sales of whole devices deepened this perception.28 
4.1.1 Institutional Actors 
Australian regulatory policy has been led by the development of strong institutions with a great 
deal of trust placed in their hands to protect the Australian people. These institutions had the 
authority to set initial policy regulating e-cigarettes to meet their preferences and have created 
the inertia that tobacco harm reduction (THR) advocates have struggled to overcome ever since. 
Commonwealth e-cigarette regulatory policy was formed over time as the product of consensus 
made among a policy community largely defined by the influence of peak health bodies as well 
as State and Commonwealth government health departments over politicians. Politicians across 
the political spectrum have been able to point to these institutional decisions as the basis for their 
 
24 Tim Clarke, “Court Ruling Keeps Ban on E-Cigarettes,” The West Australian, March 11, 2016, First edition, sec. News. 
25 AE; AN @40 
26 Chivers et al., “Nicotine and Other Potentially Harmful Compounds in ‘Nicotine-Free’ e-Cigarette Liquids in Australia.” 
27 AV @ 12  
28 AI @ 53-54; AT @ 36 
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policy positions and few actors believe that it is wise to overtly challenge the conclusions of 
institutions. 
The only Commonwealth agency that is currently tasked with regulating the e-cigarette market is 
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). The Therapeutic Goods 
Administration (TGA) and National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) have each 
weighed in on the matter of nicotine e-cigarettes several times each. The NHMRC and TGA 
have consistently concluded that maintaining Australia’s current e-cigarette regulatory 
framework is appropriate and is supported by the relevant scientific evidence. The combined 
influence of these regulatory agencies’ decisions about e-cigarettes over political decisionmakers 
has been palpable and serves to maintain regulatory policy stasis. 
4.1.1.1 ACCC 
The ACCC enforces truth in advertising standards, a set of rules stating companies cannot lie to 
consumers.29 in 2015, ACCC bureaucrats became upset when they discovered everyone from 7-
Eleven’s to pharmacies in the country were selling e-cigarettes with problematic claims of 
absolute safety.30 The agency confronted all sorts of claims being made by e-cigarette retailers 
claiming that their wares were ‘safe’ and ‘contained no carcinogens’, ‘expelled water vapor’, and 
‘contained no harmful chemicals’.31 The ACCC also concluded that cartoons and flavoring were 
being employed to market e-cigarettes to children.32 
By mid-2017, a federal court handed down a decision in a suit against three online e-cigarette 
retailers brought by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission which was likely the 
first to levy fines against retailers for making unfounded claims about the presence or lack 
thereof of carcinogens in e-cigarettes.33 All three companies later defaulted before the 
 
29 AM @ 8 
30 Frank Chung, “E-Cigarette Makers Facing Court over ‘No Toxic Chemicals’ Claims,” NewsComAu, June 20, 2016, 
https://bit.ly/2TveQQC. 
31 Amy Bainbridge, “Carcinogen Formaldehyde Found in Some E-Cigarettes, ACCC Alleges,” Text, ABC News, June 20, 2016, 
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-06-20/tests-allege-e-cigarettes-have-cancer-causing-ingredients/7526364. 
32 Product Safety Australia, “E-Cigarette Companies to Pay Penalties,” Text, Product Safety Australia, May 8, 2017, 
https://bit.ly/2ZV2cwl. 
33 A further challenge faced by the regulator was that no e-cigarette company had tested the chemicals in their devices or the 
vapor that their customers were inhaling in laboratories. Establishing the presence of formaldehyde, a carcinogen, in the products 
was particularly tricky because the heating of propylene glycol (a primary ingredient in e-liquid) produces formaldehyde. So, 
while formaldehyde may not be present in the e-liquid bottle, it is produced at sufficiently high temperatures in a high-power e-
cigarette. Product Safety Australia; Maciej Lukasz Goniewicz et al., “Levels of Selected Carcinogens and Toxicants in Vapor 
from Electronic Cigarettes,” Tobacco Control 23, no. 2 (March 2014): 133–39, https://doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2012-
050859. 
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Commonwealth government could collect monetary judgments.34 The ACCC saw absolute 
claims of safety and chemical contents disappear after their enforcement actions.  
4.1.1.2 NHMRC 
The NHMRC is the senior advisory body to the Commonwealth government on health and 
medical matters. The agency also serves as the largest funder of health and medical research in 
the country. NHMRC’s governance structure is made up of chief medical officers of the 
Commonwealth and regional governments states and territories who meet and make key 
decisions.  
In March of 2015, the NHMRC’s released its peer-reviewed CEO Statement on E-cigarettes 
which found insufficient evidence for the safety of the products. It concluded, “there is currently 
insufficient evidence to conclude whether e-cigarettes can benefit smokers in quitting, or about 
the extent of their potential harms”.35 The statement recommended health authorities utilize a 
precautionary approach to e-cigarettes until such evidence of their safety and efficacy was 
produced. It has not become public or even internal bureaucratic knowledge who wrote the CEO 
statement, although some interviewees claimed the NHMRC report reflects the combined 
decision of all the states.36 In 2017, NHMRC updated the CEO statement to add greater detail 
and more recent research.37 In sum, the expertise of the NHMRC has been leveraged to maintain 
regulatory policy stasis on e-cigarettes, as its reports have been repeatedly cited to justify support 
for the country’s prohibitionist regulatory stance.38 
4.1.1.3 TGA 
In 1989, the Commonwealth government passed the Therapeutic Goods Act which, along with 
creating the modern Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA), an institution that regulates the 
country’s supply of medicines and chemicals, shifted control of poisons scheduling from the 
states and territories to the Commonwealth government.39 Australians broadly perceive the TGA 
 
34 Gartner and Bromberg, “One Does Not Simply Sell E-Cigarettes in Australia,” 263. 
35 Australian Government Department of Health Therapeutic Goods Administration, “Electronic Cigarettes,” Text, Therapeutic 
Goods Administration (TGA), March 30, 2015, https://bit.ly/29lR7cS. 
36 AH @ 45, AI @ 8, AF2 @ 58-59 
37 Anne Kelso, “CEO Statement: Electronic Cigarettes,” NHMRC, April 3, 2017, https://bit.ly/2McnbrB. 
38 Martin, “Greg Hunt Digs in on Opposition to E-Cigarettes after Vaping ‘Epidemic.’” 
39 Heather Douglas, Wayne Hall, and Coral Gartner, “E-Cigarettes and the Law in Australia,” Australian Family Physician 44, 
no. 6 (June 2015): 415–18; McEwen, A History of Therapeutic Goods Regulation in Australia, 137. 
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as a point of pride in the country for ensuring the safety, affordability, and quality of their 
medications.40  
Currently, nicotine, except in forms that are not therapeutic or prepared for smoking, is regulated 
as a Schedule 7 Dangerous Poison by the TGA.41 To be in Schedule 7 a substance must be 1) 
highly toxic, 2) highly hazardous to health, 3) handled with special precaution during 
manufacture, 4) highly likely to cause harm at low exposure.42 When the standard is rigorously 
applied, it should include the nicotine liquid used in e-cigarettes, leading to the automatic 
decision to ban the retail sale of such devices in the country from the earliest appearances of the 
devices.43 Whether the consequence of such a decision was in the best interest of the public 
health was a matter up for debate. 
When the TGA was first confronted with the existence of nicotine-containing e-cigarettes in 
October 2008, the jurisdictional member of the National Drugs and Poisons Schedule Committee 
from Victoria had brought the issue forward to ask whether nicotine-containing e-cigarettes 
could be sold without a license. 44 The representative from Victoria was concerned that the 
devices posed a public health risk, were being marketed irresponsibly and that contemporary 
poisons scheduling might exempt the products from control.45 The TGA maintained its 
classification of nicotine as a dangerous poison. That committee decided that Victoria should 
change its laws to clarify that Schedule 7 drugs not prepared for therapeutic use should not be 
licensed for sale in the state.46 
In December 2010, the TGA emphasized in comments to the press that e-cigarettes were not “a 
safe alternative to normal cigarettes and not approved for therapeutic use”.47 Close observers 
explained that population health criteria are central to the TGA's considerations on the 
scheduling of chemicals and medicines and that these concerns were paramount in the case of 
 
40 AA@ 63; Australian Government Department of Health Therapeutic Goods Administration, “TGA Consumer Survey 2018,” 
Text, Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA), December 20, 2018, https://bit.ly/2MiiVqt.  
41 Gartner and Bromberg, “One Does Not Simply Sell E-Cigarettes in Australia,” 252. 
42 Douglas, Hall, and Gartner, “E-Cigarettes and the Law in Australia.” 
43 AP, “Electronic Cigarettes Contain Toxic Chemicals,” The Sydney Morning Herald, July 24, 2009, http://bit.ly/2ru4iFl. 
44 National Drugs and Poisons Schedule Committee, “Record of Reasons of Meeting 54” (National Drugs and Poisons Schedule 
Committee, October 2008), 128, https://bit.ly/2Z3ChRT. 
45 National Drugs and Poisons Schedule Committee, 129. 
46 National Drugs and Poisons Schedule Committee, 143. 
47 Stark, “Battery-Powered Cigarettes Pose Risks.” 
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scheduling e-cigarettes.48 This ruling clarified the regulatory pathway to commercial markets for 
a nicotine-containing e-cigarette would run through the therapeutic approval process. However, 
to date, no nicotine-containing e-cigarette has gained approval for sale as a therapeutic product in 
Australia.49 
This has not prevented several attempts at gaining such approval for an e-cigarette from taking 
place. Inquiries on the matter were made to the TGA very early on as a 2008 statement from a 
TGA spokeswoman indicated that at least one company had approached the agency to determine 
how to legally sell e-cigarettes in Australia. That inquiry was rebuffed, citing the agency's 
conclusion that they suspected the devices were going to be classified as a dangerous poison and 
following that, heavily regulated unless they could prove that they were therapeutics in which 
case, a different set of regulations would kick in.50 FOI requests to the TGA revealed British 
American Tobacco’s Nicoventures subsidiary met privately with TGA officials in late 2013, 
presumably in an effort to put an e-cigarette through the therapeutics pathway, but no such 
product approval ever materialized.51 In another case, three e-cigarettes were accidentally 
approved and subsequently rejected by the TGA in 2014 under an expedited existing “self-
listing” scheme typically used for low-risk medicines.52 A court case the following year pitted 
Nicovations, another subsidiary of British American Tobacco, against the TGA on a question 
that the Federal Court of Australia ultimately concluded that regulators would have to be the 
ones with the final say over how a product would be classified.53 The dispute was over whether 
Nicovations could apply to have their Voke inhaler sold over the counter, but the TGA’s 
reticence to allow this ultimately led to the withdrawal of the application for a final time. 
4.1.2 The Regulatory Stance 
The current regulatory stance towards nicotine-containing e-cigarettes in Australia has kept 
transnational e-cigarette and tobacco companies out of the market. There are currently two ways 
 
48 AI @ 31  
49 Gartner and Bromberg, “One Does Not Simply Sell E-Cigarettes in Australia.” 
50 Andrew Tillett, “Electronic Ciggies ‘Beat Smoke Bans,’” The West Australian, August 19, 2008, First edition, sec. Main, 
NexisUni. 
51 Conor Duffy, Big Tobacco Pushes E-Cigarettes as “Medicine,” 7.30 Report (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2014), 
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that Australians can legally purchase a nicotine-containing e-cigarette under the current 
regulatory framework; the personal importation scheme or through a compounding pharmacy.54 
Despite the legality of such a venture, no interviewee could name an Australian compounding 
pharmacy that was actively marketing nicotine-containing e-cigarettes. The personal importation 
scheme enables Australians to ask a medical doctor to apply to the TGA to allow the importation 
of medicines from abroad which are not approved for sale by the agency under a compassionate 
access rule. A company hawking personal importation scheme compliant products, Nicovape, 
arose in this regulatory gray area to facilitate obtaining such a prescription to purchase nicotine-
containing e-cigarettes from abroad Australia, in their case from New Zealand.55 Few healthcare 
providers are even aware of the personal importation scheme, and some providers have told 
patients there was no legal way to obtain nicotine-containing e-cigarettes in Australia.56 
Centralized records are not kept on the size of the market for personal importation scheme 
compliant e-cigarettes, but all indications point to its size being insubstantial.57 
The prohibitionist stance is successfully suppressing the market, keeping it dormant and 
immature.58 Overall, this regulatory framework will continue successfully suppressing the 
Australian market for nicotine-containing e-cigarettes until a company receives approval to sell 
an e-cigarette as a therapeutic product.59 Otherwise, to substantially grow the market, the 
regulatory framework itself must be altered.  
Over time, elite resistance (bureaucrats, government officials, and the mainstream public health 
community) to such change has been cultivated by a variety of actors who are skeptical of the 
role of e-cigarettes can play in public health in venues at Commonwealth as well as state and 
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territorial levels of government. A concerted attempt to change this framework led by THR 
advocates began ramping up in 2016 but has yet to see any success. The remainder of this 
chapter examines the creation, solidification, and successful defense of Australia’s regulatory 
framework for nicotine-containing e-cigarettes from attempts to have it changed.  
4.2 Problem Stream 
E-cigarette regulation does not occupy the Australian public’s attention as a significant problem. 
Public opinion surveys have found most Australians are not aware that nicotine-containing e-
cigarettes are not legally available for sale.60 But like most policy issues, the subject occupies 
much of the time and attention of the policy community whose jurisdiction includes e-cigarettes, 
even when they have other important responsibilities. 61  A series of public inquiries designed to 
upend the pre-existing regulatory framework began picking up focus and intensity around 2016. 
These efforts have, thus far, produced no policy change favoring THR advocates.  
Largely, this can be attributed to the fact that there has not been a focusing event that has 
transformed the matter of e-cigarette regulation from a condition into a problem. THR advocates 
seeking to change the country’s regulatory stance towards e-cigarettes have consistently failed to 
find a widely acknowledged public problem that changing e-cigarette regulation would solve. At 
best, they have leveraged the subject to serve as a hobbyhorse for the right-wing media to gripe 
about the Australian nanny state’s overreach into the lives of ordinary citizens. Less convincing, 
has been the effort to brand all of Australian tobacco control policy as a public health failure in 
need of dramatic revision. An interviewee put it more succinctly, “there was no crisis that needed 
to be solved”62. In the absence of such a problem, there has been little incentive for the streams 
to couple. Meanwhile, the Australian public remained rather unconcerned about the subject.  
4.2.1 Tobacco Control Progress and Skeptics’ Framing 
To date, tobacco use in Australia has followed the same pattern that many other wealthy 
democracies have through the stages of the tobacco epidemic, as smoking rose and then slowly 
fell over time.63 Initially, in the first half of the 20th century, tobacco usage (especially the 
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smoking of newfangled cigarettes) rose among men, reaching rates as high as 72% adult male 
smoking prevalence in 1945.64  From there, male smoking began a slow decline. Female 
smoking continued to rise through the early 1980s, peaking at around 35% of all adults.65 
Afterward, female smoking declined too. The most recent estimates of smoking prevalence, 
which were gathered in 2016 estimate that 17% of males and 13% of females over the age of 14 
in Australia are current smokers.66 Significant disparities in smoking rates still exist, with 
Australia’s indigenous peoples, Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, as well as those suffering 
from substance abuse or mental illness being disproportionately likely to remain as current 
smokers.67 However, this shortcoming is not seen as a failure by the public health community, 
but rather an opportunity to improve smoking cessation service delivery to these adversely 
impacted populations.68 
Throughout the 1980s, anti-tobacco sentiment continued to grow throughout the country. This 
was both a cause of the decision to implement public-sponsored educational campaigns about the 
dangers of tobacco use and a result of the public successfully receiving the messages these 
campaigns spread. Australia has explicitly stated in its National Tobacco Strategy that the goal of 
its tobacco control policy is to decrease cigarette smoking prevalence.69 The fundamental 
indicator of success in tobacco control policy under the National Tobacco Strategy continues to 
be cigarette smoking prevalence.70 Most policies that advance that goal have been viewed 
favorably by policymakers, while any policy that jeopardizes that goal has come to be viewed 
with skepticism. Australian institutions have felt no need to resort to risky measures like growing 
the e-cigarette market to decrease cigarette smoking prevalence when existing approaches to 
tobacco control are, in their judgment, working well.71 Additionally, the Commonwealth 
government has not yet put forward a tobacco endgame goal, even though the country would be 
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well-placed to do so. The lack of an ambitious target to be missed, combined with a general 
feeling of adequate progress having been made on issues of tobacco control did not increase the 
odds that the e-cigarette regulatory stance would be called not question as a problem. 
4.2.2 Freedom Framing 
Australian media, which has one of the most concentrated ownership structures in the world, is 
dominated by NewsCorp and the various entities owned by tycoon Rupert Murdoch.72 Rupert 
Murdoch himself was on the board of tobacco giant, Philip Morris from 1989 to 1998.73 
Murdoch might be one of the people most responsible for the rise of right-wing populist politics 
in English-speaking countries.74 Australia’s media is bifurcated between the Fairfax and 
Murdoch press, a phenomenon that is mirrored in the Labor/Coalition or left/right political 
split.75 The Murdoch press has been found before to play up frames favoring “personal 
responsibility” and downplaying the potential of political or policy solutions to public health 
issues like problem gambling76. By contrast, the Fairfax press has been more eager to place the 
fault at the hands of politicians for societal problems.77 
The first mentions of e-cigarettes in the Australia media occur in early 2007 in the Murdoch 
press.78 The articles highlight the reduced-risk potential of the novel products and then predicts 
that the products will not be widely available in Australia. By 2009, the TGA confirmed their 
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suspicion.79 Thereafter, news stories focused on trying to determine how e-cigarettes fit into 
Australia’s legal and public health landscape. Media attention to e-cigarettes increased rapidly 
between 2013 and 2014.80 Australian media did no favors to consumers who were trying to 
determine what the regulatory framework governing e-cigarettes in Australia truly was.81 Media 
reports regularly conflicted over basic issues like the legality of sales or using e-cigarettes in 
public places.82 Incidents of people violating smoking bans by using e-cigarettes percolated to 
the surface even as the rules over whether such behavior was illegal were still unclear.83 
The Murdoch media has directed public interest on the issue of e-cigarettes more than its 
competitors, largely within a freedom framing that posits the existence and ongoing tyranny of 
an overrun ‘nanny state’.84 THR advocates got traction in the Murdoch press through the 
publication of editorials advancing their point of view.85 The Murdoch press even went so far as 
to claim that 2 million Australians were using e-cigarettes in 2016, a figure that is at least ten 
times as large as reality.86 While the Murdoch press continued to push the narrative that e-
cigarettes were a matter concerning personal freedom, few other media outlets ran with this 
frame. Further diminishing the prospects of this frame catching hold of public attention was that 
the form of freedom that having access to an e-cigarette market entailed, was only appealing to 
libertarian sentiments on the right-wing of the Australian political spectrum. As less than 10% of 
Australian are thought to hold such ideological sentiments, the market for such ideas is not 
enormous, and this framing fell on many deaf ears.87  
 
79 Stephen Cauchi, “Close, but No Cigarette,” Sunday Age, March 8, 2009, First edition, sec. Extra. 
80 Saw et al., “The Medium Is Not the Message,” fig. S1. 
81 Saw et al., “The Medium Is Not the Message.” 
82 Joseph Catanzaro, “E-Cigarette a Hot Item to Beat Indoor Smoke Bans,” The West Australian, January 18, 2011, Second 
edition, sec. General; Saw et al., “The Medium Is Not the Message.” 
83 “Puff Justice Court Confusion over E-Cig Smoking Fine,” MX (Australia), November 4, 2013, 1-Melbourne edition, sec. 
GENERALNEW. 
84 AH @ 16-17; Josephine Chau et al., “Talking about a Nanny Nation: Investigating the Rhetoric Framing Public Health 
Debates in Australian News Media,” Public Health Research & Practice 29, no. 3 (September 25, 2019), 
https://doi.org/10.17061/phrp2931922. 
85 Terry Barnes, “Government Is Not Seeing the Light on Vaping,” Herald Sun, June 7, 2016, sec. OPED, NexisUni; Colin 
Mendelsohn, “BANNING E-CIGS COULD INCREASE CANCER,” Daily Telegraph, January 12, 2017, Telegraph edition, sec. 
OpEd; Colin Mendelsohn, “If Teens Are Going to Smoke, Better It Be an e-Cigarette,” Daily Telegraph, August 9, 2016, 
https://bit.ly/2R7x09Z. 
86 Miranda Devine, “Even Heroes Have No Chance with ICAC,” Daily Telegraph (blog), March 29, 2016, 
https://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/blogs/miranda-devine/even-heroes-have-no-chance-with-icac/news-
story/b6b50267b8f1c174df8d7ddda6780ab9. 
87 Sinclair Davidson, Tim Fry, and Breanna Pellegrini, “How Do Australian Classical Liberals Vote,” Policy, Summer 2007. 
   
84 
 
4.2.3 Health Framing 
Over time, the Murdoch press built a frame that e-cigarettes would be a boon to public health. 
They argued that tobacco control in Australia was a policy failure and that e-cigarettes are 
helping other countries make progress against cigarette smoking overseas.88 The indicator most 
often used to make the case for this supposed failure was the 2016 National Drug Strategy 
Household Survey saw a non-significant drop in the smoking prevalence compared to three years 
prior.89 THR advocates claimed that a stall in historic declines in smoking prevalence was 
attributable to traditional tobacco control policies reaching the end of their useful life.90 Some 
THR advocates made the case that vaping is needed in Australia because tobacco control had 
worked for a well-to-do population but that low socioeconomic status, indigenous, and persons 
with mental illness were being left behind by the current policy regime.91 They compared 
Australia’s lack of progress on smoking reduction relative to the UK and US and began to 
attribute blame to e-cigarette regulatory policy.92 
Skeptics effectively buried the attempt to brand Australian tobacco control as ‘failing’. They did 
this by appealing to policymaking elites with a consensus of expert organizations who all 
reassured politicians there was nothing to worry about.93 Skeptics retorted that the Australian 
government had become complacent because they thought they had finished handling tobacco 
issues and they made the case that two data points (2013 and 2016) do not make a trend. 94 In 
their minds, the two relevant national indicators were the adult cigarette smoking rate and the 
youth e-cigarette use rate. The youth e-cigarette use rate in Australia has risen, but not nearly as 
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much as comparator nations, like the US or Canada. The adult cigarette smoking rate has steadily 
declined for over two decades. The sole exception to this was the non-significant drop in 
cigarette smoking prevalence observed in 2016 compared to 2013.  
It did not hurt that the right-wing politicians like David Leyonhjelm and Tim Wilson who tried to 
claim they had an interest in promoting the public health had little credibility on the issue they 
could draw on as they had been opponents of traditional tobacco control efforts, like plain 
packaging in the past.95 Their claims to be concerned about stagnating smoking rates were not 
seen as generally credible. Outside of the context of peak health body lobbying, the lack of 
representation in political circles from communities that are still impacted by tobacco has caused 
the issue of tobacco use to fade away as an urgent problem altogether.96 Without a defined 
problem to solve, the process of opening a policy window was stunted from the start. 
4.3 Policy Stream  
The Australian e-cigarette regulatory policy stream was made up of two distinct groups of actors, 
the THR advocates, and the e-cigarette skeptics. Each group contained an assortment of 
academics while the skeptics also contained peak health bodies and bureaucrats and their home 
institutions. Expertise-based Australian institutions have not changed their prior positions on e-
cigarettes to accommodate political forces who disagree with their priors. Initial decisions to 
continue treating nicotine as a poison followed institutional protocols. Follow-on decisions did 
not change this framing and reinforced the choice to describe the precautionary policy approach 
to e-cigarettes.  
Over time, the e-cigarette regulatory policy stream was marked by several milestone events. 
Initially, bureaucrats follow the plain meaning of the poisons statute and prohibit the import of 
liquid nicotine. An incumbent public health community supports this decision and develops 
policy recommendations that regional governments should abide by. Then, some THR advocates 
advanced their policy solution, adopting an expansionist regulatory stance for nicotine-
containing e-cigarettes. Other THR advocates with more mainstream credibility, did not back up 
the most expansionist policies preferred by the most vociferous THR advocates. E-cigarettes 
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skeptics countered, defending the status quo prohibitionist stance as a policy success and not in 
need of reform. The result has been regulatory policy stasis. 
4.3.1 Skeptics Form a Consensus Health Frame 
The primary policy entrepreneurs in the Australian public health community have been 
consistent skeptics towards e-cigarettes. The public health community has remained united on 
the issue of e-cigarette regulation and sequestered any infighting amongst a small group of public 
health researchers. Nicola Roxon, the former Labor health minister who is credited with ushering 
the first in the world plain packaging legislation through the political process, once told an 
audience, “one of the strengths of the tobacco control sector is they always said the same thing. 
So, people who have worked in the obesity space or healthy eating would all come in and ask for 
different things. As a government it was too hard to work out, ‘What do we actually do?’”97 
Roxon keyed into the importance of consensus formation to the public health policy community 
in Australia. 
Over time, Australian tobacco control policy entrepreneurs have built up the country’s (and their 
own) reputation as a world leader in tobacco control policy. The track record of entrepreneurs 
who have successfully gained passage of a litany of creative and innovative tobacco control 
policies is extensive and impressive. An early example: tobacco companies began sponsoring 
arts and sporting events in the 1970s to fight off their declining fortunes, as a part of their well-
established “mass-and-class” strategy to position tobacco companies as essential participants in 
society.98 This strategy of becoming essential sponsors of public events eventually led to a 
masterstroke tobacco control policy idea in the late 1980s in the state of Victoria. There, the 
drive to eliminate tobacco advertising and sponsorship culminated in a ban on both activities at 
the state level. But to smooth over implementation concerns about lost sponsorship funds a 
hypothecated tobacco tax increase was set aside to provide public sponsorship as a bridge away 
from tobacco dollars for groups that had previously been sponsored by the tobacco industry.99 
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This led to the distinctive rebranding of the Winfield Socceroos as the Australian Quit Socceroos 
and the Sterling Manikato Stakes as the Diabetes Australia Manikato Stakes.100  
In 2011, Australia passed the world’s first plain packing regulation for tobacco products which 
had the effect of stripping tobacco logos from all product packaging the following year.101 Public 
health campaigners successfully convinced the reigning Labor government to keep discussions 
on the matter focused on issues of health rather than on tobacco industry threats of trade 
disputes.102 Australia battled with the tobacco industry to defend the policy from legal challenges 
in national and international courts and trade dispute settlement venues for six years after the 
policy was passed as well as through a change in government from Labor to Coalition until 
victory had been awarded to the Australian government in every venue.103 The policy has a large 
and sustained effect on reducing cigarette sales in the country.104  
The mainstream public health policy community has stayed organized through explicit 
knowledge exchange efforts intent on creating a consensus position. For the matter of e-
cigarettes, in July 2014 the public health community organized a 115-person “Tobacco Harm 
Reduction Forum” in Melbourne which attempted to air the discussion that was a prologue to 
reaching consensus.105 The meeting included the broad range of academic and peak health body 
voices but it excluded THR advocates who were perceived as interlopers.106 
In late 2014, the first step towards potentially altering the regulatory framework for e-cigarettes 
was taken when the Coalition government under PM Abbot approached the Intergovernmental 
Committee on Drugs (ICOD) to commission a discussion paper about the options available to 
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regulate e-cigarettes by the end of 2015.107 The ICOD tapped Dr. Becky Freeman of the 
University of Sydney to lead the team writing the paper.108 Freeman and her colleagues framed 
e-cigarettes as hazardous to health and existing in a murky area of business and lack of scientific 
evidence. Topics like hazards to breathing, explosions, a renormalization of smoking, 
secondhand vapor dangers dominate their report.  
The ICOD paper team was confident that Australia already had the correct regulatory framework 
for e-cigarettes, and it concluded there was no reason to change. From the beginning, they 
believed there was never a sense that their purpose was to justify softening Australia’s 
regulations towards e-cigarettes, even if that direction was never overtly given by ICOD or other 
public sector actors.109 The Coalition government heeded their advice.110 Instead of calling for 
Commonwealth policy changes, the ICOD report called for standardizing regulatory policy at the 
state and territory level, where a great deal of confusion had arisen about what activities 
regarding e-cigarette usage, marketing, and retailing were legal in which jurisdictions.111 The 
ICOD report ended up framing every report that proceeded it on the matter of e-cigarette 
regulation by starting from the assumption that regulatory stasis on e-cigarettes was the proper 
choice to make. 
4.3.1.1 Opinion Leaders 
Among THR advocates, a persistent theory of what drives Australian tobacco control policy was 
that one health advocate, Professor Simon Chapman, unduly influenced the actions of 
bureaucrats, politicians, and journalists. Chapman was viewed by THR advocates as bullying his 
way to create near-unanimity in peak health group’s opposition to changing e-cigarette 
regulatory policy. This conclusion overlooks the contributions of a united policy community 
beyond Chapman, especially the influence of the Cancer Councils and Chapman’s contemporary, 
Mike Daube. Daube is a politically well-connected skeptic, dating back to his days working as 
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the Director-General for the Western Australia Health Department. Mike Daube’s initial rhetoric 
on e-cigarettes echoed his work for ASH UK in the 1970s when he analogized smoking tobacco 
substitutes like Cytrel and New Smoking Material as “like jumping out the 36th floor of a 
building instead of the 39th”.112 In Daube’s first known comment to the media on e-cigarettes, he 
quipped “Smoking these is like saying jumping off the 10th floor of a building is healthier than 
jumping off the 40th floor".113 In Daube’s mind, the old and new product categories were 
intimately related. This message resonated inside of e-cigarette skeptical circles and served to 
unite the policy community behind the current precautionary policy approach. Daube’s extended 
history in Australian bureaucracy and politics has made him even more well-connected to 
decisionmakers than Chapman and has enabled him to have sway in pivotal circles. 
Cancer Council Victoria formed the backbone of peak health body e-cigarette messaging efforts 
as are much more heavily funded by research grants than the other cancer councils and provide 
much more technical capacity than other peak bodies.114 While the organization itself feels that 
e-cigarettes detract from what the organization wants to be focused on, they provide so much 
essential information to other actors in Australia on the subject that they end up framing 
discussions on their terms. 
These opinion leaders, led by Chapman, Daube, and Cancer Council Victoria, within the policy 
community have forged a consensus viewpoint on these matters that attempts to maintain a 
population-level approach to solving the matter of cigarette smoking. The skeptics have managed 
to make certain that the institutions governing the informational and regulatory environment 
around e-cigarettes, (NHMRC, ICOD, TGA, ACCC, and the Commonwealth Department of 
Health) consistently supported the position that the e-cigarette regulatory framework in Australia 
should not change. These reports and regulatory actions reinforced a consensus among 
policymaking elites in the country. This consensus consistently cited the evidence reviews and 
positions statements put out by e-cigarette skeptics, who were viewed by government officials 
and bureaucrats as credible arbiters of the scientific data and who would later act as the arbiters 
of whether Australia had a problem that needed fixing by changing the e-cigarette regulatory 
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framework. Their credibility has been built up over decades of policy fights and spans all levels 
of government and across most of the political spectrum. This has allowed them to be called to 
testify at every inquiry, to serve on every committee report, and to advise on political and 
bureaucratic decisions relevant to e-cigarette regulation. Consequently, they have been listened 
to. 
4.3.2 THR Advocates Dissent from the Consensus 
THR advocates tried to mobilize in response to this consensus, but they were primarily 
represented by a few smoking cessation specialists, tobacco and vaping retailer interests, 
libertarian think-tanks, stray academics, and two small health bodies. The varied motives of THR 
advocates never allowed them to converge on a single policy solution or even a single defined 
problem.  
The THR advocacy community is anchored by several nominal consumer groups including the 
Australian Tobacco Harm Reduction Association (ATHRA) and Legalize Vaping Australia.115 
ATHRA was founded in 2015, by Atilla Danko, an emergency department physician, who 
wanted to model a campaign on the work of a UK pressure group.116 Danko eventually recruited, 
Colin Mendelsohn, a Sydney-based general practitioner, to join his organization. Mendelsohn’s 
first mention of e-cigarettes in the media came in early 2016 coinciding with the publication of 
an op-ed in the Medical Journal of Australia.117 Mendelsohn rose to prominence to become the 
primary THR policy entrepreneur in Australia. For over two decades, Mendelsohn maintained a 
small public role emphasizing the importance of getting smoker’s cessation treatment in clinics 
with medication and nicotine replacement therapy.118 Mendelson has received financial support 
from pharmaceutical companies including Pfizer and GlaxoSmithKline for his research. 
Mendelsohn’s research credentials are not top-level, as his primary contribution to the scientific 
literature on smoking cessation since 2001 consists of review articles, perspectives, and letters to 
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the editor with just a single piece of evidence-producing research published to his name.119 Later 
in 2016, Mendelsohn began tacitly endorsing the heated tobacco product being offered by PMI 
as a potential solution to smoking in Australia by calling it, “a much safer alternative to 
smoking”.120 ATHRA eventually suffered severe reputational damage once it came to light that 
the group had accepted contributions from Knowledge Action Change, a UK-based, Philip 
Morris International-sponsored outfit.121  
Two peak health groups representing patients with mental illnesses or substance use disorders, 
the Royal Australia and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists and the Drug and Alcohol Nurses 
of Australasia also considered themselves to THR advocates.122 Finally, a few academics 
namely, Ron Borland of Cancer Council Victoria, as well as Wayne Hall and Coral Gartner of 
the University of Queensland identify publicly as THR advocates. 
The policy preferences of the consumer groups like ATHRA and Legalize Vaping Australia and 
the right-wing politicians aligned with them diverged radically from the THR health groups and 
academics. The former group of policy entrepreneurs sees e-cigarettes as a market-based solution 
that will cure Australia of the harms caused by smoking-related illness. THR-supporting 
academics and health groups strongly disagree with this view and favor the expansion of an e-
cigarette market being implemented in tandem with harsher, more contractionist regulatory 
policy for tobacco cigarettes.123 By contrast, THR-supporting consumer groups envisioned that 
very little regulatory intervention would be needed in the market for e-cigarettes or tobacco 
cigarettes.  
This market solution looked to be politically appropriate for the right flank of the Coalition 
government but has remained out-of-bounds for all others in the center or left of Australian 
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politics. This has left THR advocates to hawk policy solutions that are acceptable to a subset of 
the ruling Coalition government that receive little support from elsewhere in Australian civil 
society. Those health groups and academics who favored THR policies received even less 
support as colleagues and policymakers who were skeptical of e-cigarettes shunned their 
proposals. They were not able to find policymakers who agreed with their brand of THR policy 
and were willing to advance the cause. In the face of a unified community of skeptics backing 
the policy status quo, no coherent alternative was put forward to policymakers who might have 
sympathized with the cause of the THR advocates.  
4.4 Politics Stream 
During the 20th-century tobacco manufacturers slowed the process of regulating their products in 
Australia. During the 1950s when the medical and scientific communities began the collective 
process of realizing the health harms of tobacco smoking, the right-wing Country Party (later 
National Party) maintained a policy of protecting and promoting tobacco growing as an 
economic development engine in the northern parts of the country.124 Through the 1960s, the 
left-wing Australian Labor Party worked with partners across the Commonwealth to begin 
considering cracking down on advertising practices of the tobacco industry and to begin using 
tobacco tax rises to discourage smoking. This putative policy position eventually resulted in the 
banning of advertising on television and radio except after the left-wing won federal elections in 
1972, but the policy was not implemented until 1976.  
Australia continued to pass stronger tobacco control policies through the 1990s as more 
advertising restrictions were placed on print, billboard, radio, and film advertising (Tobacco 
Advertising and Prohibition Act of 1992) under the Keating-Labor government.125 The Howard-
Coalition government continued to strengthen a prior restriction on tobacco sponsorship 
(Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Amendment Act of 2000) while state and territory 
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governments of every political stripe continued passes evermore comprehensive bans on public 
smoking throughout the 2000s.126 
By the time that e-cigarettes arrived in Australia, the political positioning of the governing 
coalition Commonwealth government prevented the adoption of a potentially politically risky 
expansionist regulatory stance towards e-cigarettes. Instead, the Coalition government pursued 
uncontroversial, though still consequential, tobacco control policies like large annual cigarette 
excise tax increases.127 The Coalition government had no appetite to risk losing votes to the 
Labor party over a policy that would be easily characterized as serving the interests of tobacco 
companies.  
The leadership role on the issue that was taken by Senator David Leyonhjelm served as a signal 
to other political actors that e-cigarettes were the political purview of the far-right wing of 
Australian politics. THR advocates proposed policies that did not align with the values of the 
Australian or elite politicians. The policy solutions proposed in the form of potential regulatory 
frameworks proposed expansionist regulatory stances in a country that had little appetite for such 
a policy that would have clearly rewarded tobacco companies. Risk-averse Coalition government 
leadership decided that there was little upside to following Leyonhjelm and pursuing a change in 
the regulatory framework for e-cigarettes.  
4.4.1 Skeptics Push Regional Regulation into Effect 
The Australian states and territories consistently moved in the direction of a shared regulatory 
framework governing the usage and retailing and retailing while leaving the matter of setting 
product standards to the Commonwealth.128 This approach towards regional consensus took 
place in broad, nonpartisan fashion as state after state passed laws to regulate e-cigarette retailing 
and usage like tobacco products. 
Skeptic’s momentum continued to build as e-cigarette skeptics scored victory after victory in 
every Australian regional government through the passage of policies that strictly aligned e-
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cigarette regulations to existing rules applied to tobacco cigarettes. In 2009, Victoria lawmakers 
passed rules making it “illegal to manufacture, sell, supply, purchase or otherwise obtain, possess 
or use an electronic cigarette or cartridge containing nicotine”.129 In July 2014, before the 6th 
Conference of the Parties to the FCTC, the WHO released a report that derided e-cigarettes as a 
harm reduction tool and stated that young people and pregnant women should not use the 
devices.130 In September 2014, Queensland lawmakers cited the WHO report as they made their 
state the first to update its tobacco control policies to explicitly apply to e-cigarettes under a 
Liberal-National Party government.131 After Western Australia won a court case against an e-
cigarette retailer, public health groups decided that the legal case in New South Wales for 
enforcing their statutory ban on sales of e-cigarettes was weaker, so it necessitated passing a new 
law.132 New South Wales included e-cigarettes into their tobacco regulations in votes taken after 
a short delay in September 2015 (for retail and marketing regulations) and April 2018 (for usage 
regulations) under a Coalition government.133 New South Wales Labor had promised to take 
stricter action against e-cigarettes had they won the intervening election in mid-2015, singling 
out the fact that they would have banned e-cigarette advertising altogether while the Coalition 
mostly left the unprofessional marketing efforts of vape shops alone.134 In April 2016, the 
Australian Capital Territory passed laws regulating the retail, marketing and usage of e-cigarettes 
under a minority Labor government.135 In September 2016, Victoria regulated the retail, 
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marketing and usage of e-cigarettes under a Labor government.136 In September 2017, Tasmania 
regulated the retail and usage of e-cigarettes under a Liberal government.137  
By November 2017, all state and territory governments agreed on a national approach to 
regulating e-cigarettes at the level of regional government that tried to instill the Commonwealth 
government’s precautionary approach.138 In Western Australia, this has resulted in the de jure 
prohibition on sales of e-cigarettes, with or without nicotine.139 In 2019, the Northern Territory 
and South Australia became the last regional governments to update their policies to explicitly 
cover e-cigarettes, passing strict bills into law under majority Labor and Liberal governments, 
respectively.140  
In public opinion surveys, e-cigarette users favored the adoption of an e-cigarette regulatory 
framework that was vastly more expansionist than the status quo.141 This contrasted with the 
viewpoint expressed by Australians who did not use the products, who largely favored the 
current prohibitionist framework.142 60% of the Australian public in the National Drug Strategy 
Household Survey for 2016 said that they supported strong regulation on e-cigarettes.143 Smoke-
free public places are popular in the country and public vaping seemed to violate a tacit 
agreement to maintain clean air as evidenced by 70% of respondents to a 2015 poll in New South 
Wales said they wanted to keep vaping out of public places.144 These data point to the popularity 
of the legislation passed to regulate e-cigarettes with the Australian public. 
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The process of changing these state and territory laws was mostly cooperative and good-natured, 
with only occasional objections being levied by libertarians and vape shop owners.145 The fact 
that no regional government remained a holdout from this policy consensus, indicates how 
broad-based acceptance of the skeptics' view towards e-cigarettes is in the country. Regional 
governments of every ideological makeup set a tone that reflected and likely limited the latitude 
with which the Commonwealth government could approach the subject. 
4.4.2 THR Advocates Latch onto David Leyonhjelm 
The likelihood of changing the Commonwealth e-cigarette regulatory framework declined as 
leadership on the matter was taken up by Senator David Leyonhjelm, the lone member in 
Parliament of the Liberal Democratic Party. David Leyonhjelm served in the Australian Senate 
for New South Wales from 2013 to 2019 because of an “institutional fluke”.146 Leyonhjelm is 
ideologically a right-wing libertarian. He voted for gay marriage, favors major expansions in gun 
rights, wants to legalize the sale of marijuana, and has become an icon among men’s right’s 
activists for his near-defamatory comments against Greens senator, Sarah Hanson-Young.147 
Leyonhjelm is not widely perceived as credible on health issues.148 Making him an even less 
suitable figure to helm the cause of THR advocates, Leyonhjelm’s party, the Liberal Democrats, 
were one of only two political parties (Liberal Democrats and National) still accepting tobacco 
donations after 2014.149  
In 2015, as part of Senator Leyonhjelm’s agreement to vote with the Coalition government, he 
was granted an inquiry into what he termed “Nanny State” issues including bicycle helmets, 
pornography, computer game ratings, alcohol sales laws, and even swimming pool fencing.150 
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This inquiry also marked the first time that e-cigarette regulation was mentioned in the 
Commonwealth Parliament. Leyonhjelm’s goal was to help overburdened tobacco companies 
undo the sales ban on e-cigarettes and other novel tobacco products. The inquiry’s results were 
handed down in February 2017 in a report on a private member’s bill, entitled the Vaporized 
Nicotine Products Bill 2017. The bill’s proposed regulatory framework (Figure 9) would have 
abolished the therapeutic pathway for nicotine-containing e-cigarettes and de-scheduled EU 
Tobacco Products Directive-compliant nicotine-containing e-cigarettes like tobacco cigarettes.151 
The bill would have liberalized marketing of e-cigarettes and loosened controls on where the 
products could be used.152 It would continue exempting e-cigarettes from excise taxation. The 
bill was less clear on whether product standards that applied to tobacco products like limits on 
flavoring, graphic health warnings, age-of-sale restrictions, or plain packaging would be applied 
to the products. 
Figure 9: Proposed Regulatory Framework for Nicotine-Containing E-Cigarettes in the Vaporized Nicotine Products Bill of 
2017 
 
The Senate committee charged with evaluating the bill reported out with a recommendation not 
to pass Leyonhjelm’s bill.153 The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights noted that the 
proposed bill might infringe on Australian’s right to health because the risks of e-cigarettes were 
unknown.154 As would become clearer over time, the Coalition government had little interest in 
advancing such a bill that would be easily framed by the opposition as acting in the best interest 
of the tobacco industry. The most significant outcome then, of the Nanny State Inquiry and the 
Vaporized Nicotine Products bill it fomented, was the decision to bring together THR advocates 
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together for a hearing in Sydney in March 2016 where several policy advocates made the plan to 
push for legalization through a multitude of avenues that would be followed through in the next 
24 months.155 
Leyonhjelm’s interest in the policy and his close ties with the tobacco industry ended up 
backfiring on THR advocates. His leadership on the matter seems to have poisoned the well on 
future considerations over the country’s regulatory stance towards e-cigarettes. The founder of 
ATHRA, Atilla Danko, recognized the error of partnering with Leyonhjelm and far-right wingers 
early on. In forum posts, he vented his frustration with the lack of focus in Australia on selling e-
cigarettes as an innovative and disruptive technology idea to left-wing politicians. 156 Danko saw 
that the matter of e-cigarette regulations was being co-opted to push a libertarian point of view in 
policy, and was aware of the limited appeal that strategy would have with policy elites. The 
distrust of Leyonhjelm was not universal among THR advocates as Colin Mendelsohn, however, 
shared his frank communication with the Senator on a private message board for THR advocates 
which highlighted the pair’s shared dislike for tobacco control advocate Simon Chapman.157 
Adopting an expansionist regulatory stance on e-cigarettes came to be characterized as being 
explicitly favorable to tobacco companies, a rather unappetizing position for mainstream 
Australian politicians and voters. If nothing politically could be gained from changing the 
regulatory stance by the Coalition government in power, then the chances of regulatory policy 
change had fallen substantially. 
4.5 Failure to Couple the Streams 
By 2016, on the matter of e-cigarettes, it would have been difficult to point to any of the three 
streams as being ripe for coupling that would lead to policy change. The policy stream was 
bifurcated between a well-established public health policy community that was skeptical of e-
cigarettes and a THR advocate community that was relatively disempowered. The political 
stream was defined by a series of regional government actions made across all parties that 
consistently adopted strict regulations over the e-cigarette market. The problem stream was 
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muddled as well. Skeptics’ chosen framing of e-cigarettes as a poison that was threatening to 
both the health of children and the hard-won progress Australia had made fighting smoking 
dominated non-Murdoch outlets. The framing of e-cigarette regulations as an issue of nanny-
state overreach in the Murdoch press was not making much headway. 
THR advocates did not survey this landscape and choose to wait for the tide to change directions. 
They decided to try and repeal the lone Commonwealth policy keeping e-cigarettes out of 
Australia; by changing the TGA’s classification of liquid nicotine as a scheduled poison. This 
decision cascaded into a series of reviews and inquiries that have carried on through the end of 
2019 with little end in sight. Through it all, e-cigarette regulatory policy change has remained 
well out-of-reach of the THR advocates. 
4.5.1 TGA De-Scheduling Application 
In January 2016, THR advocates at Leyonhjelm’s Nanny State hearing in Sydney, went out for 
dinner after their testimony had been given, and decided their next project would be to attempt to 
get liquid nicotine rescheduled from being a poison under the TGA’s control.158 By the end of 
June 2016, an application that had been prepared by Colin Mendelsohn was submitted to the 
TGA.159 This effort continued a vein of the argument being made by THR advocates that the 
therapeutic pathway was inappropriate for e-cigarettes.160 Instead, they suggested the TGA 
remove nicotine liquid for e-cigarettes from the poisons schedule if they met basic product safety 
standards: limits on nicotine concentration and size, sold in child-resistant containers and labeled 
with selected safety and consumer information.161 This would have created a similar regulatory 
framework to Leyonhjelm’s proposal (See Figure 9). 
The TGA already had established the country’s regulatory framework for e-cigarettes by 
plugging the product into existing pathways (See Figure 8).162 Upon receipt of the de-scheduling 
application, the TGA was not immediately impressed with the case being made by THR 
 
158 AW @ 34 
159 “Scheduling Committees Meeting Dates and Decisions Timeframes,” Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA), November 
9, 2016, https://bit.ly/32EeKu5. 
160 In the eyes of the government and e-cigarette skeptics, this was a huge weakness of their argument. It conflates appeals to 
anecdotal evidence, clinical trial research, and the lack of capital that e-cigarette companies must submit premarket applications 
that would meet government safety and efficacy standards. 
161Belinda Merhab, “Health Dept ‘cautious’ over e-Cigarettes,” AAP Bulletins, October 19, 2016, 
http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AAPBLT0020161019ecaj000dz&cat=a&ep=ASE. 
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advocates. The application sought to de-schedule liquid nicotine on similar grounds that were 
used for nicotine replacement therapies, but the products would be used for the expressed 
purpose of “tobacco harm reduction” and not for the older product’s purpose of “smoking 
cessation”. Reviewers had no precedent to follow in this instance which immediately set up 
major roadblocks to the success of the proposal. Further, the application’s reviewers could not 
tell what the application was asking them to do once nicotine-containing e-liquid had been 
rescheduled; would it be an unscheduled therapeutic good, an ordinary consumer product, or an 
exempt tobacco product (like cigarettes)?163 
In February 2017, the interim decision on nicotine rescheduling was handed down. It confirmed 
that the committee thought the current scheduling of nicotine remained appropriate.164 54 
submissions to the committee on the matter supported the change while 17 opposed the 
change.165 The TGA cited the risk of nicotine dependence from the use of e-cigarettes and a lack 
of long-term safety data in its final decision on March 23, 2017.166 The TGA decision anchored 
skeptics thereafter by providing an official reference point for their perspective above and 
beyond the NHMRC CEO Statements.167  
4.5.2 House Inquiry  
One minute after the TGA’s final announcement that nicotine scheduling would not change, an 
inquiry into e-cigarettes to be led by the House’s Health, Aged Care and Sport Committee was 
announced to begin in May 2017.168 A public relations group called Palin Communications 
helped THR advocates parlay their lost opportunity at the TGA into the inquiry by lobbying 
perceived friendly MPs.169 The inquiry began with an apparent chance to result in legislative 
change because it was tasked with establishing the current law and evidence on e-cigarettes.170 
 
163 Australian Committee on Medicines Scheduling, “Public Submissions on Scheduling Matters Referred to the ACMS #19, 
November 2016, Part 3,” Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA), November 2016, https://bit.ly/2TvefOS. 
164 Australian Government Department of Health Therapeutic Goods Administration, “2.1 Nicotine.” 
165 1 consultant, 2 peak health bodies, 3 academic groups, 6 business owners, 7 medical professionals and 35 consumers favored 
the proposed change in scheduling. 1 Academic group, 4 Non-governmental Organizations, 5 peak health bodies and 7 
government health departments opposed the change. 
166 Australian Government Department of Health Therapeutic Goods Administration, “2.1 Nicotine.” See Note 35. 
167 AN2@ 4 
168 Joe Hildebrand, “Gone in 60 Seconds: Govt Backs Vaping Law Then Announces Inquiry One Minute Later,” NewsComAu, 
May 29, 2017, http://bit.ly/2qwzfFv. 
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However, it never progressed beyond consideration of the evidence of e-cigarette safety and 
ended up favoring the forces of policy inertia. Health Minister Greg Hunt was perceived to be 
doing his due diligence by allowing inquiry, but eventually, it turned out that there was no crisis 
he needed to solve by changing policy, and a majority of the committee was able to point 
towards safety concerns as a reason not to change policy.171 
The terms of reference for the House inquiry focused first on the safety of e-cigarettes and 
second on considerations of international and alternative regulatory frameworks. Legalization 
remained an ill-defined concept compared to the status quo policy, largely because skeptics 
preferred this and some bull politicians like Leyonhjelm were open to lax regulatory regimes. 
Several members of the Liberal Party who were former employees of a free-market think-tank 
called the Institute of Public Affairs, MPs Trent Zimmerman and Tim Wilson and Senator James 
Patterson, pushed for the House inquiry, all the while professing their belief in market solutions 
to social problems. In a mirrored reprisal to his role as public opponent number one to plain 
packaging during his time at the Institute of Public Affairs, Tim Wilson served as the most 
publicly vocal supportive inquiry member on the issue of e-cigarettes.172 
The inquiry held three public hearings, collected 352 submissions, and 45 exhibits from the 
public, conducted a fact-finding mission to New Zealand and received over a thousand form 
letters from the public.173 The inquiry collected testimony from THR advocates and skeptics 
alike, even gathering a series of dueling submissions between local Australian experts and Public 
Health England, who sought to advise the Australians to adopt a regulatory framework similar to 
the United Kingdom. The Australian public health policy community did not take kindly to this 
advice fearing that Public Health England did not understand the local political context and the 
role that the Institute of Public Affairs alumni, and hence the tobacco industry, were playing in 
the inquiry.174 
The most consequential development for the house inquiry occurred in October 2017, when 
Health Minister Greg Hunt stated to the media that e-cigarettes would not be legalized on his 
 
171 AJ @ 46, AZ @ 22 
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173 Standing Committee on Health, Aged Care and Sport, Report on the Inquiry into the Use and Marketing of Electronic 
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174 AZ @ 30; AS @ 56 
   
102 
 
watch.175 Hunt was described as someone who listened to his public servants, was properly 
briefed, motivated by a personal loss to tobacco caused-illness, and someone who believed there 
was no political advantage to the Coalition government to changing the e-cigarette regulatory 
framework.176 Hunt was determined to keep the focus of the house inquiry on concerns around 
product safety and youth usage, and not on considering alternative regulatory frameworks 
because he had been convinced that absolute product safety concerns were reason enough to 
continue the status quo policy. From Hunt’s public pronouncement on, it became clear that 
something would be done to prevent policy change. Therefore, unlike in Leyonhjelm’s efforts, 
no concrete alternative regulatory framework for e-cigarettes ever crystallized within the 
committee’s deliberations on the matter. 
When the inquiry reported out in March 2018, the committee’s reports split oddly. The 
committee chair, Trent Zimmerman wrote an unheard-of dissenting minority report joined by his 
fellow Institute of Public Affairs alumni Tim Wilson.177 A further concurring dissenting report 
was authored by Liberal MP Andrew Laming read in whole, “Life is short and shorter for 
smokers. Just legalise vaping.”178 The chair’s dissenting report claimed that Australia’s smoking 
rates had stabilized and sought to use international lesson drawing, particularly from the 
experiences of the United States, United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Canada, as his uppermost 
reason to change Australian e-cigarette regulatory policy.179 This was the highest-profile usage 
of THR advocates’ health framing of the issue. 
The majority report was written by all the Labor members on the committee and two Liberal 
members.180 The majority agreed with the Department of Health’s argument that the actions of 
other countries were not a sufficient justification for Australia to legalize nicotine-containing e-
cigarettes and they claimed that smoking was still decreasing.181 The majority provided 
recommendations for further action; the NHRMC should continue funding research into e-
 
175 “Health Minister Rules out Legalising E-Cigarettes,” ABC, October 16, 2017, https://ab.co/2yqVvHI. 
176 AL @ 25; AH @ 50, AZ @ 19; AG2 @ 14 
177 AO@ 3; No interviewee could recall this happening before in the Australian Parliament. My further searches of the literature 
failed to turn up another example. 
178 Standing Committee on Health, Aged Care and Sport, Report on the Inquiry into the Use and Marketing of Electronic 
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179 AQ @ 3-4; Standing Committee on Health, Aged Care and Sport, 141. 
180 Labour; Steve Georganas (Deputy Chair), Mike Freelander, Tony Zappia: Liberal; Lucy Wicks, Michelle Landry 
181 Standing Committee on Health, Aged Care and Sport, Report on the Inquiry into the Use and Marketing of Electronic 
Cigarettes and Personal Vaporisers in Australia, sec. 2.15. 
   
103 
 
cigarettes, the Department of Health should convene international consultations comparing e-
cigarette regulatory frameworks, a national approach to regulate non-nicotine e-cigarettes and the 
flavorings in e-liquid should be devised, and the TGA should continue overseeing nicotine 
scheduling.  
When e-cigarette liberalization could not find a majority on the committee, Coalition members 
derided the members of that majority as, “taking a political position, not a health-based 
decision”.182 They described their Labor opponents as being directed by their Shadow Minister 
for Health, Catherine King, to oppose changing regulatory policy, even if they privately had a 
different view.183 The outcome could be partially attributed to well-documented Labor and Green 
Party discipline and THR advocates’ failure to successfully gain support across party lines.184  
Notwithstanding that, what seemed to tip the balance against the THR advocates was the failure 
to co-opt Coalition party elites like Minister Hunt and the failure to persuade anyone outside the 
right-wing of the Coalition that tobacco control was failing in Australia.  
4.5.3 The Fight Continues 
The House Inquiry concluded more research into e-cigarette safety, efficacy, and population 
effects was needed.185 A spirited discussion of this “loose end” of a conclusion in the Coalition 
party room on September 18, 2018, began with Zimmerman, Paterson, Wilson, Andrew Laming, 
and Assistant Health Minister Bridget McKenzie pushing for another public inquiry into e-
cigarettes.186 The matter rose into a row of such consequence that party leadership, in the 
embodiment of Greg Hunt, protested by citing the position of US FDA commissioner, Scott 
Gottlieb, on the matter to push back.187 Hunt felt that Zimmerman and allies wanted another 
chance to obtain the result they wanted from an inquiry, a recommendation for e-cigarette 
legalization.188 Under pressure, Hunt offered a compromise wherein an independent evidence 
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review which would be ordered from the Australian National University.189 Ministers in related 
departments continued to toe the party elite line that Australia intends to utilize the inquiry to 
support its precautionary policy approach as it sought to learn from the experiences of other 
countries.190  
In April 2019, the 45th Parliament of Australia was dissolved, and an election campaign began 
with the Labor party in prime position to retake power.191 The Coalition government had been 
significantly weakened by the “World’s Most Ridiculous Constitutional Crisis” which rocked the 
Parliament causing fifteen parliamentarians to be ruled ineligible to sit in parliament because 
they were found to be dual citizens of another country besides Australia.192 E-cigarette regulation 
was not mentioned among issues under consideration by the voters during the campaign.  
Growing public dislike of Labor’s leader Bill Shorten and a preference for the Coalition’s 
policies on the economy and immigration swung public opinion against Labor over the course of 
the campaign.193 In May 2019, the Coalition government scored a surprise election victory over 
Labor, setting the stage for a continued political shift in Australia towards the right.194  
It remains uncertain whether the newly empowered Commonwealth Coalition government will 
shift its regulatory stance towards e-cigarettes. As of July 2019, the Australian National 
University inquiry was still being conducted and its terms of reference were not yet public.195 
There is no indication that Labor’s election loss has softened its position against considering the 
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legalization of e-cigarettes.196 We can conclude that the Coalition’s choice to not pursue e-
cigarette regulatory policy change did not harm their electoral prospects, as the upset victory 
seemed a handsome payoff for policy caution, at least in this one area of policy. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Australia’s regulatory framework towards nicotine-containing e-cigarettes has remained stable 
over time. Regional level policies served to cement the prohibitionist regulatory stance taken 
under commonwealth poisons regulations. Efforts to change the policy were blocked because 
policy entrepreneurs were unable to create the conditions to open a policy window. Inadequate 
ripening of the problem stream could not overwhelm the preferences of expertise-based 
policymaking institutions to maintain the status-quo policy. Above all, policy entrepreneurs 
failed to persuasively define a problem that e-cigarettes would solve. Divided THR advocates 
failed to entertain policy solutions that were acceptable to the values of a winning political 
coalition. Entrepreneurs hawked a solution that did not have value acceptability with an elite 
policymaker consensus. THR advocates hamstrung their proposal from being considered by all 
but the fringe of right-wing Australian politics and thus failed to change the regulatory 
framework.  
Australia is a useful case of regulatory framework stasis. The country’s experience with e-
cigarettes demonstrates the value of constructing a consensus position within a policy 
community. Skeptics had a consensus and THR advocates did not. Further, a consensus position 
is made stronger if it favors a policy solution that either has value acceptability to policymakers 
or it represents the status quo. Skeptics’ position satisfied both criteria, while THR advocates 
non-consensus views satisfied neither. If one is pursuing a change in a regulatory framework, it 
is advisable to cover these bases before setting out on a campaign. If one is trying to prevent a 
change in a regulatory framework, then stifling the process of problem definition could be an 
effective first-line strategy.  
 
196 See further evidence of this in the aftermath of the EVALI outbreak in section 7.3.3 on page 227. 
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 Canada 
From Unregulated to Business-Friendly Harm Reduction 
In January 2014 when Mitch Tarala, owner and proprietor of Vapor Jedi an e-cigarette retail 
shop in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, received a cease-and-desist letter from Health Canada’s 
Prairie Region and Programs Branch, the federal omnibus health regulator, that he cease selling 
nicotine-containing e-cigarettes out of his store.1 Mr. Tarala reacted peculiarly to the regulator’s 
request. He framed the letter, hung it up for his customers to see in his shop, and carried on 
selling e-cigarettes2. He claimed that the regulators were incorrectly interpreting federal law and 
that his products were exempt from their regulatory authority because they did not provide 
enough nicotine to users to qualify as drug delivery devices.3 Instead, of immediately serving 
Mr. Tarala with a notice to appear in court, regulators and enforcement officers did not follow up 
their letter with further action. In the interim, Mr. Tarala ended up participating in public 
consultations on the use of e-cigarettes in public spaces in his city, and his store was burgled and 
the crime was reported on the local news.4 But in 2019, after the e-cigarette market in Canada 
had been deemed legal, Mr. Tarala’s business folded due to business factors, like competition 
with the products of transnational tobacco companies, that had little to do with the cease-and-
desist letter he had received in 2014.5  
Mr. Tarala’s journey was not unique. His story is emblematic of the changing regulatory 
landscape of the Canadian e-cigarette market. Questionably legal retailers eventually became 
straightforwardly legal. Then, they suffered the consequences of competing in a legal market. 
 
1 Mitch Tarala, “R/Electronic_cigarette - Health Canada Asks Vapor Jedi To Shut Down!!,” reddit, January 20, 2014, 
https://bit.ly/2LVtoX5. 
2 Andrea Hill, “Vapour Shops Defy Ottawa’s Warning Letters over e-Cigarettes,” Vancouver Sun, April 25, 2014, sec. Canada & 
World, NexisUni. 
3 John Overall, “Health Canada Claims E-Juice with Nicotine Is a Drug,” Northern Vapers Victoria BC, November 27, 2013, 
https://bit.ly/2toNC58. 
4 “Surveillance Camera Catches Thief Filling Bag at Vapor Jedi,” CBC, February 4, 2016, 
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This chapter utilizes Kingdon’s Multiple Streams approach to explain how and why e-cigarette 
regulation changed in Canada.  
5.1.1 Governing Legislation 
E-cigarette regulation in Canada is governed by 3 primary pieces of legislation, the Food and 
Drugs Act, the Consumer Product Safety Act, and the Tobacco Products Act.6 These pieces of 
legislation work together to establish the regulatory stance of the Canadian government towards 
e-cigarettes.  
First passed in 1920, the Food and Drugs Act of Canada has evolved to empower the Canadian 
federal government with regulatory jurisdiction over most of the products that Canadians put into 
their bodies.7 The process for gaining premarket authorization for drugs began with a 1951 
requirement that manufacturers notify the Food and Drugs Directorate within Health Canada that 
they were releasing a product onto the market.8 In the aftermath of the thalidomide tragedy, 
further regulations were passed requiring manufacturers to prove the efficacy and safety of drugs 
before market entry.9 The Food and Drugs Act imbues regulators with gatekeeping authority 
over market entry for new drugs and it sets the standards for what chemicals Canadians can 
ingest as a food or a drug. 
The Canada Consumer Product Safety Act was passed into law in December 2010 by the 
Conservative Harper government.10 The Consumer Product Safety Act was designed to more 
effectively police commerce in consumer goods previously covered under the country’s 
Hazardous Products Act in response to an escalating rash of recalls of products found to be 
hazardous to children. The Consumer Product Safety Act governs all products without 
therapeutic claims and sets product standards governing the contents of consumer goods. Under 
the Consumer Product Safety Act, the Consumer Product Safety Directorate within Health 
 
6 Since May 2018, the Tobacco and Vaping Products Act. Health Canada, “Tobacco and Vaping Products Act,” guidance - 
legislative, aem, June 26, 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/health-concerns/tobacco/legislation/federal-
laws/tobacco-act.html. 
7 Neal D. Fortin and Bernd van der Meulen, “Development of Food Legislation Around the World,” in Ensuring Global Food 
Safety, ed. Christine E. Boisrobert et al. (San Diego: Academic Press, 2010), sec. 2.7.4.1, https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-
374845-4.00002-3. 
8 Joel Lexchin, Private Profits versus Public Policy: The Pharmaceutical Industry and the Canadian State (University of Toronto 
Press, 2016), 55. 
9 M. Herder et al., “Regulating Prescription Drugs for Patient Safety: Does Bill C-17 Go Far Enough?,” Canadian Medical 
Association Journal 186, no. 8 (May 13, 2014): E287–92, https://doi.org/10.1503/cmaj.131850. 
10 “Consumer Safety Bill Passes Parliament,” CBC, December 14, 2010, https://www.cbc.ca/news/consumer-safety-bill-passes-
parliament-1.927400. 
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Canada gained authority to deem which products are safe for consumption and can recall 
products found to be unsafe.11 
Canada’s history of regulating novel products is uneven and littered with examples where 
politics and economic interests shaped what was purported to be science-based regulation. The 
regulatory history of margarine in Canada, for example, is littered with prohibitionist and 
contractionist regulatory stances adopted at the behest of protecting the country’s dairy interests 
that were intent on crushing the market for butter substitutes.12 For health reasons, Canada has 
also prohibited the sale of baby-walkers and the use of Bisphenol A, a component of resins and 
plastics that are used elsewhere in baby bottles.13 However, Canada has adopted an expansionist 
regulatory stance towards genetically modified foods.14 The reasons for adopting these varied 
policies are not self-evidently consistent across different markets as foreign jurisdictions have 
adopted regulatory stances based on reasons that at times align with Canada’s reasoning and at 
times oppose their logic.15   
The main statute used to advance Canada’s tobacco control policy interests is the Tobacco 
Products Act, which governs the regulation of tobacco products in a functionally different 
manner than other substances that are ingested into the body (food, drugs, etc.). In terms of 
tobacco regulation, Canada has often been a global leader, eventually creating what is now a 
strongly contractionist framework for cigarettes. Liberal and New Democratic Party (NDP) 
lawmakers (respectively, the country’s center-left and left-wing political parties) from ridings 
outside the country’s tobacco producing regions steadily advanced policies intended to control 
cigarette smoking rates in the country through the 1960s and 1970, culminating in the passage of 
 
11 Claudia Irigoyen, “The Canada Consumer Product Safety Act (CCPSA),” Case Study (Arlington, VA: Centre for Public 
Impact, June 13, 2017), https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/canadian-consumer-product-safety-act-ccpsa/. 
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https://doi.org/10.2752/175174409X432049.  
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Evidence in the Regulation of Risks from Bisphenol A in Canada,” Health, Risk & Society 15, no. 5 (August 1, 2013): 432–48, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13698575.2013.802293; A. Murphy and A. J. Nicholson, “Baby Walkers in Europe--Time to Consider a 
Ban,” Irish Medical Journal 104, no. 3 (March 2011): 69.  
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in Regulation of Agricultural Biotechnology: The United States and Canada, ed. Chris A. Wozniak and Alan McHughen 
(Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2012), 15–34, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2156-2_2. 
15 For example, the US allows the sale of Bisphenol A and baby walkers and promotes the sale of genetically modified food on 
the grounds that none of these substances have been found by its regulatory agencies to be injurious to health. The European 
Union allows the sale of Bisphenol A and baby walkers but prohibits the sale of genetically modified foods for similar reasons. 
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the Tobacco Products Control Act of 1988 under a federal Conservative government.16 These 
efforts were pushed forward by public health activist groups led by the Canadian Cancer Society, 
the Non-Smokers Rights Association, Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada, and the Heart and 
Stroke Foundation.17 The 1988 law restricted tobacco advertising, sponsorship, and promotion 
and introduced the country’s first mandatory cigarette package health warnings. Through the 
early 1990s, Canada strengthened its tobacco control policy by increasing tobacco taxes, 
increasing its minimum age of sale of tobacco products to 18, and removing some cigarette 
vending machines.18  
However, Canadian federal policy has not proceeded monotonically towards tighter restrictions 
on tobacco products. In 1995, tobacco control advocates suffered several setbacks in the form of 
a Supreme Court ruling that overturned some of the provisions restricting the use of trademarks 
and advertising in the 1988 Tobacco Products Control Act and a rollback of tobacco tax levels in 
the face of persistent smuggling efforts from First Nations reservations and the United States.19 
The Tobacco Control Programme (today, Directorate) within Health Canada led a revision of the 
Tobacco Products Act that responded to the high court’s decision that was passed into law in 
1997 by a Liberal government and restored much of the 1988 Act in slightly adulterated and 
diminished form.20 These setbacks in policy were also accompanied by setbacks in the declining 
rate of smoking, particularly as surveys began to find that young adult smoking began to climb 
from a low of 28.3% in that age group to 1993 back to 32.3% in 1997.21  
Through the first half of the 2000s, Canada became a global tobacco control policy innovator. 
The country debuted the world’s first graphic health warnings on cigarette packages in 2000 and 
 
16 Rob Cunningham and Centre de recherches pour le développement international (Canada), Smoke & Mirrors the Canadian 
Tobacco War (Ottawa, Ont: International Development Research Centre, 1996), chap. 6,7, http://accesbib.uqam.ca/cgi-
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17 Studlar, Tobacco Control, chap. 5. 
18 Studlar, chap. 3. 
19 Max H. Kelton and Michael S. Givel, “Public Policy Implications of Tobacco Industry Smuggling through Native American 
Reservations into Canada,” International Journal of Health Services 38, no. 3 (July 1, 2008): 471–87, 
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New Directions for Tobacco Control in Canada : A National Strategy (Ontario: Health Canada, 1999), 
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played a leading role pushing the ratification of the WHO FCTC.22 By the end of the decade, 
Canadian policymakers had eliminated smoking from virtually all public places, with increasing 
assistance being provided by parties across the entire ideological spectrum.23 Dramatic 
reductions in smoking prevalence have followed, and have placed Canada among the world’s 
most effective countries in the implementation of a comprehensive tobacco control policy 
regime.24 These efforts have created a strongly contractionist regulatory framework for the 
tobacco cigarette market. 
5.1.2 Multiple Streams and Policy Change 
The fit of nicotine-containing e-cigarettes under each of these pieces of regulatory legislation has 
never been straightforward. Conditions eventually aligned, in the sense that Kingdon’s multiple 
streams eventually coupled, to bring forward legislation that clarified the place of e-cigarettes 
under the Food and Drugs Act, the Consumer Product Safety Act, and even the Tobacco 
Products Act, which would have to change its name to reflect the importance of e-cigarettes to 
the Canadian regulatory strategy. In 2018, Canada passed the Tobacco and Vaping Products Act 
(formerly bill S-5) as the Federal government’s primary regulatory response to the development 
of widespread demand for e-cigarettes.25  
This change in the regulatory stance can be explained by three factors that are well-represented 
by Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach.26 The sequential attainment of readiness in the 
problem, policy, and politics streams in Canada over the course of several years opened a policy 
window which resulted in the passage of a new federal e-cigarette regulatory framework in May 
2018. The e-cigarette market in Canada came to be framed by actors in the media and the 
provinces as unregulated and needing a revised federal regulatory approach. A strong policy 
 
22 Jidong Huang, Frank J. Chaloupka, and Geoffrey T. Fong, “Cigarette Graphic Warning Labels and Smoking Prevalence in 
Canada: A Critical Examination and Reformulation of the FDA Regulatory Impact Analysis,” Tobacco Control 23, no. suppl 1 
(March 1, 2014): i7–12, https://doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2013-051170; Donley T. Studlar, “Ideas, Institutions and 
Diffusion: What Explains Tobacco Control Policy in Australia, Canada and New Zealand?,” Commonwealth & Comparative 
Politics 45, no. 2 (April 1, 2007): 164–84, https://doi.org/10.1080/14662040701317493. 
23 Cathy A. Sabiston, “Canada: Second (Five Year) Implementation Report,” Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (World 
Health Organization, March 10, 2010), http://www.who.int/fctc/reporting/Canada_5y_report_v2_final.pdf. 
24 Jeffrey Drope et al., The Tobacco Atlas, 6th ed. (Atlanta, GA: American Cancer Society and Vital Strategies, 2018); JL Reid et 
al., “Tobacco Use in Canada: Patterns and Trends, 2017 Edition” (Propel Centre for Population Health Impact, University of 
Waterloo, 2017), https://uwaterloo.ca/tobacco-use-canada/sites/ca.tobacco-use-
canada/files/uploads/files/2017_tobaccouseincanada_final_0.pdf. 
25 Harder, An Act to amend the Tobacco Act and the Non-smokers’ Health Act and to make consequential amendments to other 
Acts. 
26 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. 
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preference for revising the e-cigarette regulatory framework to permit or encourage the 
expansion of the e-cigarette market was advanced by public health and consumer groups 
developed in the wake of a study in the House of Commons. Strong opposition to such policy 
changes never emerged from tobacco companies, as they stood to profit from the adoption of 
such a regulatory framework. Finally, the election of the Trudeau Liberal government in 2015 
solidified political momentum towards the application of a harm reductionist philosophy to this 
public health problem. A particularly business-friendly form of harm reduction policy was 
applied to e-cigarettes in the form of an expansionist regulatory stance.   
5.2 Regulatory Stances Towards E-Cigarettes 
Bill S-5 enabled federal regulators in the Tobacco Control Directorate of Health Canada to create 
product standards that were much more favorable to e-cigarettes than tobacco cigarettes. This 
represented a significant change from the prior prohibitionist regulatory stance of the Canadian 
government towards e-cigarettes. The details of the policies that comprised the regulatory stance 
are described in this section.  
5.2.1 Before Bill S-5 
When e-cigarettes began to enter the Canadian market, between 2007 and 2009, they were 
classified by Health Canada’s Therapeutic Products Directorate as ‘drug delivery devices’ if they 
contained nicotine or if marketers made a therapeutic claim about the products.27 A drug delivery 
device that did not receive premarket approval from the Therapeutic Products Directorate could 
not be legally sold, as it would be classified as a new drug.28 In effect, if a company wanted to 
sell a nicotine-containing e-cigarette, and they submitted the product for premarket approval, that 
product would have been subject to an expansionist regulatory stance (Figure 10) that granted 
marketing, retailing, subsidy, and product standards that would have placed the product at a 
competitive advantage over tobacco cigarettes. Such a product would have been granted pricing 
advantages such as being subject to provincial pharmaceutical reimbursement schemes, being 
 
27 Devices that did not contain nicotine were not delivering a drug that was regulated under the Food and Drugs Act. The same 
devices that could process e-liquid for consumption without nicotine could process nicotine-containing liquid just as easily. 
Matthew B. Stanbrook, “Regulate E-Cigarettes as Drug-Delivery Devices,” CMAJ 185, no. 16 (November 5, 2013): 1379–1379, 
https://doi.org/10.1503/cmaj.131469.  
28 E. Somers, M. Carman Kasparek, and J. Pound, “Drug Regulation—The Canadian Approach,” Regulatory Toxicology and 
Pharmacology 12, no. 3, Part 1 (December 1, 1990): 214–23, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0273-2300(05)80059-5. 
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exempt from bans on use in public places, and being subject to relatively lax marketing 
regulation.29 
Figure 10: Canada’s Regulatory Stance Towards Nicotine-Containing E-Cigarettes Before Bill S-5 
 
The regulatory stance of the Canadian federal government towards the nicotine-containing e-
cigarette market that had not gone through premarket approval processes was officially 
prohibitionist, but in effect, e-cigarettes were rapidly proliferating across the country. Ever use of 
e-cigarettes among adult smokers quintupled from 2010 to 2013, e-cigarette sales grew to over 
US $100 million by 2014, and the number of people using e-cigarettes in the country approached 
800,000 by 2016.30 
In contrast to the federal government’s approach that did not acknowledge the legality of the 
market in any way, the regulatory choices made by the provinces added to the confusion about 
Canadian law.31 As some provinces passed their own legislation designating certain public 
spaces as being unacceptable for use of e-cigarettes, e-cigarette users began to assume that other 
public spaces were legitimate places where e-cigarettes could be used.32 
As time passed and no nicotine-containing e-cigarette received premarket approval from the 
Therapeutic Products Directorate, e-cigarette retailers repeatedly and brazenly flouted the  
 
29 David M. Gardner, Barbara Mintzes, and Aleck Ostry, “Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising in Canada: 
Permission by Default?,” CMAJ: Canadian Medical Association Journal 169, no. 5 (September 2, 2003): 425–27. 
30 David Attwood and Daniel Irwin-Brown, “In Depth: Canadian e-Cigarette Market, December 2014,” ECigIntelligence (blog), 
December 5, 2014, https://ecigintelligence.com/in-depth-canada-e-cigarette-market-analysis-december-2014/; Barnaby Page, 
“Sharp Increase in Canadian Vaper Numbers and Sales,” ECigIntelligence (blog), June 27, 2016, 
https://ecigintelligence.com/sharp-increase-in-canadian-vaper-numbers-and-sales/. 
31 “What Does The Law Say? | A Canadian Guide to Electronic Cigarettes and Related Canadian Law,” February 28, 2014, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20140228183349/http://whatdoesthelawsay.ca/. 
32 CG @ 3; Angela Mulholland, “E-Cigarettes in Regulatory Grey Zone: Are They Banned or Aren’t They?,” CTV News, April 
22, 2014, https://bit.ly/2SRpliF. 
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prohibitionist regulatory stance in public spaces by setting up shops, marketing their products, 
and conducting normal business.33 A 2014 secret shopper investigation conducted by the Office 
of Research and Surveillance within the Tobacco Directorate found that 90% of retailers who 
refused to sell a minor a cigarette also refused to sell the same youths an e-cigarette, even though 
such a sale was not expressly prohibited under federal or provincial law.34 The behavior of 
retailers regarding youth access via retail to e-cigarettes reflected the vaguely defined legal 
position around whether anyone was allowed to buy these products.  
5.2.2 After Bill S-5 
Health Canada, led by its Tobacco Control Directorate, in conjunction with Parliament, sought to 
adopt an on-balance expansionist regulatory stance by providing the e-cigarette market with 
certain competitive advantages over the substitute cigarette market, even as they have sought 
greater control over both markets. The bill contains permissive elements that put e-cigarettes on 
parity with substitute products, namely including them in smoke-free policies and prohibiting 
sales to persons under 18 years old nationwide. Other measures were expansionist, such as 
allowing a limited amount of e-cigarette marketing activities, albeit through materials that make 
no health claims, allowing the sale of certain flavors that are deemed not to be appealing to 
children, and exempting e-cigarettes from the plain packaging regulations that apply to other 
tobacco products.35 The net effect of the policy is likely to be expansionist, but the bill empowers 
federal regulators, should they choose, to change that regulatory stance. 
The affirmative product standards that nicotine-containing e-cigarettes sold in Canada must 
follow mostly stem from requirements in the Consumer Product Safety Act that devices 
containing toxic liquid must be childproof.36 S-5 allows the sale of flavored products, with only a 
few exceptions (see note 128), but federal (and even provincial) regulators can narrow this 
 
33 Melodie L. Tilson, “Regulating E-Cigarettes as Drugs Is Not the Best Solution,” CMAJ : Canadian Medical Association 
Journal 186, no. 2 (February 4, 2014): 137–38, https://doi.org/10.1503/cmaj.114-0007. 
34 33% of all retailers in the country were found to display e-cigarettes in view of the point of sale, a practice that was prohibited 
under Federal law for cigarettes, but not e-cigarettes. A further third of these retailers kept the display of e-cigarettes within reach 
of youth. Health Canada, “Evaluation of Retailers’ Behaviour towards Certain Youth Access-to-Tobacco Restrictions – 2014,” 
research, aem, June 15, 2015, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/key-results-surveys-tobacco-retailers/evaluation-
retailers-behaviour-towards-certain-youth-access-tobacco-restrictions-2014.html. 
35 The Tobacco Control Directorate within Health Canada has the responsibility to interpret this language because the statute can 
be read to prohibit almost all e-cigarette flavors. If that were the case, then the provision would certainly be contractionist as 
unflavored nicotine liquid has an unpleasant taste. 
36 Public Works and Government Services Canada Government of Canada, “Vaping Products Labelling and Packaging 
Regulations,” Canada Gazette Part I 153, no. 25 (June 22, 2019): 3089–3131. 
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provision going forward.37 E-cigarettes are exempt from displaying a graphic health warning, 
being sold in plain packing like tobacco products, or even in the standardized packaging in which 
cannabis products must be sold. In contrast to the European Union, e-cigarettes may be sold in 
Canada at high nicotine concentrations and in large volume containers.38  
The agency ruled soon after S-5’s implementation that nicotine liquid with a concentration above 
6.6% would be classified as “very toxic” under the Consumer Product Safety Act and would be 
prohibited from being manufactured, imported, marketed, or sold in the country.39 Bill S-5 
designated all nicotine-containing e-cigarettes below that very toxic threshold as “vaping 
products” by default, and could be submitted for premarket approval as therapeutic devices, as 
had been possible before the passage of Bill S-5. The default regulatory pathway effectively 
changed from being that of a new drug that required premarket approval to be legally sold to a 
vaping product which only required manufacturers to meet certain product standards before a 
product’s release on the market (See Figure 1140). Premarket approval went from being 
obligatory to obtain access to a legal market to entirely optional, even obsolete. 
Figure 11: Canada’s Regulatory Stance Towards Nicotine-Containing E-Cigarettes After Bill S-5 
 
Bill S-5 aligned regulations on e-cigarette usage in areas controlled by the federal government to 
be equivalent to restrictions on tobacco cigarettes. Provincial restrictions have been similarly 
 
37 Health Canada, “Reducing Youth Access and Appeal of Vaping Products: Potential Regulatory Measures,” consultations, aem, 
April 11, 2019, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/programs/consultation-reducing-youth-access-appeal-vaping-products-
potential-regulatory-measures/document.html; John McPhee, “Nova Scotia to Ban Flavoured Vaping Products as of April 1,” 
The Chronicle Herald, December 5, 2019, http://www.thechronicleherald.ca/news/local/nova-scotia-to-ban-flavoured-vaping-
products-as-of-april-1-384666/. 
38 Hasselbalch, “Professional Disruption in Health Regulation.” 
39 Health Canada, “Guidance on Vaping Products Not Marketed for a Therapeutic Use,” guidance, aem, July 12, 2018, 
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/publications/product-safety/vaping-not-marketed-therapeutic-use.html. 
40 Only applies to those products with a nicotine concentration under 6.6%. 
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equivalent to tobacco cigarettes as each has come into effect. Additional permissive retail 
policies were adopted, as only persons who were of the minimum age to legally purchase 
cigarettes were permitted to purchase e-cigarettes. Additional regulations on the retail 
environment are permitted at the provincial level and while some provinces like Quebec and 
New Brunswick have attempted to create regulations that were on par with tobacco product 
retailing, others like Newfoundland and Ontario have exempted e-cigarettes from some retail 
regulations that apply to tobacco products.41 
Canada is regarded as a ‘dark market’ for tobacco product marketing, wherein the channels 
available to market those products are extremely limited.42 The only legal forms of marketing 
left for tobacco products are direct mail and brand-information-only ads in adult-only facilities. 
S-5 originally only was written to allow e-cigarettes to be marketed using lifestyle advertising 
(see Note 183), but after a round of lobbying from public health groups, that provision was 
diluted to only allow brand-preference advertising. E-cigarettes ended up being subject to fewer 
restrictions on advertising than tobacco cigarettes.43 
Pricing policy remains unchanged at the federal level as the budgets offered by the federal 
Liberal government since the passage of S-5 have not levied an excise tax on e-cigarettes.44 The 
task of establishing excise tax policy remains reserved for the provinces and the federal Ministry 
of Finance.45 Before the passage of Bill S-5, several provinces wanted to set up an excise tax 
framework for e-cigarettes, but if the products were not yet designated as legal by federal law, no 
such framework could be put into place.46 Bill S-5, itself, avoided the subject of tax policy by 
 
41 From, Millar, and Phillips, “Vaping and the Law: Comparing Legislation Across Canada.” 
42 CIG @ 27-28; Timothy Dewhirst, “Price and Tobacco Marketing Strategy: Lessons from ‘Dark’ Markets and Implications for 
the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control,” Tobacco Control 21, no. 6 (November 1, 2012): 519–23, 
https://doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2012-050693. 
43 However, the degree of difference between these restrictions is decreasing over time. By 2021, e-cigarette marketing rules will 
be nearly as strict as tobacco products with the sole exception being increased point-of-sale marketing opportunities. Public 
Works and Government Services Canada Government of Canada, “Vaping Products Promotion Regulations,” Canada Gazette 
Part I 153, no. 51 (December 21, 2019): 4463–4514. 
44 The 2018 budget introduces an excise tax regime for cannabis and reforms the tobacco products excise tax regime by 
increasing the level and adding inflationary adjustments to the rates thereafter. Because the budget was introduced in February of 
that year and cannabis legalization did not receive Royal Assent until June 2018, it is curious that vaping products were not 
included in the 2018 or even the 2019 Budget. Canada Revenue Agency, “EDRATES Excise Duty Rates,” aem, May 1, 2019, 
https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/forms-publications/publications/edrates/excise-duty-rates.html; Department 
of Finance Government of Canada, “Budget 2018,” Government of Canada, February 27, 2018, 
https://www.budget.gc.ca/2018/docs/tm-mf/si-rs-en.html#Toc507170873.  
45 CE @ 28; Health Canada, “Health Canada and Fontem Ventures Meeting: Proposed Vaping Products Regulations – June 15, 
2018,” decisions, aem, May 8, 2019, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/health-concerns/tobacco/meeting-
summaries-tobacco-vaping-industry/june-15-2018.html. 
46 CG @ 4-5 
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starting its legislative journey in the Senate, the chamber without revenue-raising powers in the 
Canadian system.47 Interest in imposing such excise taxes on e-cigarettes does seem to be 
gestating as both the Conservative Alberta government and the Liberal British Columbia 
government are likely to be among the first Canadian jurisdictions to impose such a tax in 
2020.48   
Fundamentally, bill S-5 clarified the regulatory pathway for e-cigarettes to ensure that the 
presence of nicotine-containing e-cigarettes on the Canadian market was legal. Determining 
whether the e-cigarette market would be a commercial success, or a failure, was never the point 
of codifying federal regulatory authority.49 The legislation empowered Health Canada staff to 
flexibly regulate the industry without proscribing regulatory outcomes. Instead, the bill allowed 
the regulatory agency to change the regulatory stance of the country to the market over a wide 
latitude while respecting the regulatory powers that have been reserved for the provinces. The 
statute allowed the agency to determine what it thought the appropriate regulatory stance towards 
the market would be. But that stance would not remain stable over time.50 
5.3 The Problem Stream 
In Canada, e-cigarettes were framed in the media, by bureaucrats, and by policymakers as an 
unregulated market that potentially could harm the public and were not being properly regulated. 
That is, the market was not subject to specialized provincial or federal laws ensuring the products 
were safe or of sufficient quality. To the market’s assumed federal regulators, most notably the 
Therapeutic Products Directorate and the Tobacco Control Directorate of Health Canada, the 
early Canadian e-cigarette market came to be defined by the label “unregulated”. This group of 
officials and their compatriots at the local and provincial levels tended to emphasize the threat 
posed by unregulated e-cigarette use and sales in their communication with the media. Official 
 
47 Henry S. Albinski, “The Canadian Senate: Politics and the Constitution,” The American Political Science Review 57, no. 2 
(1963): 382, https://doi.org/10.2307/1952829. 
48 Vaping Industry Trade Association, “Alberta Government Proposes First Vaping Tax in Budget,” 
markets.businessinsider.com, October 25, 2019, https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/alberta-government-proposes-
first-vaping-tax-in-budget-1028632186; Rob Shaw, “B.C. to Hike Taxes on Vaping Products but Not Ban Flavours,” Vancouver 
Sun (blog), November 15, 2019, https://vancouversun.com/news/politics/b-c-to-hike-taxes-on-vaping-products-but-not-ban-
flavours. The position of  
the Alberta Conservatives appears to have evolved since March 2019 when they claimed they had no plans to introduce a tax on 
e-cigarettes. Stephanie Dubois, “Here’s What Alberta’s Major Political Parties Say about a Tax on e-Cigarettes,” CBC, March 
29, 2019, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/alberta-vaping-products-tax-1.5076279. 
49 CH @ 48 
50 In the immediate period after S-5 became law, Health Canada was poised to write an expansionist regulatory stance towards e-
cigarettes into policy. More contractionist policies would soon follow. See Section 7.3.1 on page 224. 
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efforts to corral the growth of this market by enforcing a prohibition against the sale of nicotine-
containing e-cigarettes eventually became little more than bluster rather than a concerted effort 
to stamp out the e-cigarette market. As officials became convinced that enforcement efforts were 
better spent on enforcing policies against more dangerous products, they turned their actual 
enforcement efforts elsewhere.51  
In this case, the Canadian problem stream became defined more by the actions of bureaucrats 
than the media as the stream neared maturation. Federal regulators and provincial government 
officials came to agree that the federal regulatory framework for e-cigarettes was thoroughly 
lacking and that reform was necessary. E-cigarette retailers routinely violated the Food and 
Drugs Act. Health Canada’s leaders and their counterparts in the provinces, eventually concluded 
the remedy for this lack of regulation was to implore policymakers to alter the regulatory 
framework, so that more products flowed through the product pathways that regulators had 
intended them to. In effect, Canadian policymakers would address the problem of an illegal 
market by making that same market legal.52 The maturation of the problem stream reached its 
peak when provincial ministers of health persuaded the federal minister of health to form a 
committee tasked with studying the issue and determining the way forward for a federal 
regulatory framework for e-cigarettes.  
5.3.1 An Unregulated Market 
E-cigarettes first arrived in Canada in 2007.53 When they first gained attention in the media, the 
products were touted as a legal loophole for smokers to get their nicotine in public venues 
covered by smoking bans.54 The fact that the products contained no tobacco exempted their use 
from provincial smoking bans.55 While federal, provincial, and municipal health authorities were 
 
51 Efforts tended to focus on ensuring that drugs were produced in sterile environments or that blood products were being 
extracted and distributed with proper care. These activities were deemed of sufficient risk to the health and safety of Canadians to 
merit the attention of Health Canada inspectors. Health Canada, “Inspectorate Program Annual Inspection Summary Report 
2012-2013,” transparency - other, aem, March 25, 2014, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-
products/reports-publications/compliance-enforcement/inspectorate-program-annual-inspection-summary-report-2012-
2013.html#a11. 
52 CB @ 13 
53 HESA Committee, “Vaping: Toward a Regulatory Framework for E-Cigarettes.” 
54 Misty Harris, “E-Cigarettes Skirt Ban on Smoking; Nicotine Release Device Has No Smoke and No Tobacco,” The Calgary 
Herald, June 13, 2008, Final edition, sec. News, NexisUni; Nancy J. White, “Electric Stick Delivers Nicotine Hit, Has No 
Tobacco or Tar, Can Be Lit up inside and Ignites Controversy,” Toronto Star, March 12, 2009, sec. News. 
55 Dalson Chen, “Light up with E-Cigarettes,” The Calgary Herald, March 13, 2009, sec. News, NexisUni; Jenny Yuen, “E-Cig 
Users Don’t Have to Fear Smoking Police: Province,” Ottawa Sun (blog), July 5, 2015, https://ottawasun.com/2015/07/05/e-cig-
users-dont-have-to-fear-smoking-police-province/wcm/bf0645c3-2e01-46ac-ac36-5924429d4c00. 
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not pleased with this situation, they often accepted this as the plain meaning of the indoor 
smoking ban statutes.56 
Health Canada spokespeople said in official statements that the agency was "determining 
whether or not these products can be covered under existing legislation" to clear up the confusion 
about regulatory jurisdiction over e-cigarettes.57 These early media mentions were shot through 
with confusion and uncertainty. E-cigarettes were deemed to be “not a safe alternative to 
tobacco” and described as containing “a number of chemical additives in the product which 
could be very toxic”.58 Newspaper accounts vacillated between the hazard narrative and a 
narrative that the products were harmless.59 Few journalists were assigned to cover the e-
cigarette issue on a repeat basis, possibly making their accounts of the issues at hand more 
susceptible to the framing provided by their sources. Reports soon followed that other countries 
were considering banning the sale of e-cigarettes until their safety could be verified.60  
In March 2009, the Therapeutic Products Directorate within Health Canada determined that e-
cigarettes containing nicotine needed to be approved for sale by the agency before they could be 
legally sold in the country as they were determined to be drug delivery devices under the 
country’s Food and Drugs Act.61 Federal regulators were attempting to exercise their 
gatekeeping power to limit which products could be sold on the internal Canadian market.62 
Additional concern by the health regulator pointed to the practice of e-cigarettes being marketed 
with a health claim particularly; a) that they were safe to use and b) that they were smoking 
cessation aids.63 The Therapeutic Products Directorate roundly disapproved of such conduct. 64 
 
56 Keith Gerein, “The Rise of Electronic Cigarettes Is Posing Unfamiliar Challenges for Regulators,” Edmonton Journal, 
February 3, 2014, Early edition, sec. City & Region, PressReader. 
57 Harris, “E-Cigarettes Skirt Ban on Smoking; Nicotine Release Device Has No Smoke and No Tobacco.” 
58 CBC News, “Electronic Cigarettes No Safe Alternative to Tobacco, WHO Warns,” CBC News, September 19, 2008, Lexis 
Nexis Academic. 
59 E.g. They contained, “a microchip and a harmless liquid”. Diana Zlomislic, “Blowing Faux Smoke,” The Toronto Star, June 
27, 2008, sec. Life, Lexis Nexis Academic. 
60 CBC News, “U.S. Senator Seeks to Ban Electronic Cigarettes Pending More Research” (CBC News, March 24, 2009), Lexis 
Nexis Academic. 
61 Health Canada, “Notice - To All Persons Interested in Importing, Advertising or Selling Electronic Smoking Products in 
Canada.” 
62 Carpenter, Reputation and Power, chap. 2. 
63 Geller et al., Evidence on E-Cigarettes. 
64 Don Butler, “Health Canada Moves to Get Read on E-Cigarette Use,” Ottawa Citizen, March 18, 2014, sec. City. 
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The decision was interpreted by the media as the regulator signaling that the products were 
untrustworthy and likely dangerous.65  
Media articles in the following years vacillated from reminding readers that e-cigarettes were 
being sold illegally and should be avoided to agitations for regulatory liberalization.66 E-cigarette 
users consistently told media outlets they were hopeful that evidence supporting their assertions 
that e-cigarettes were smoking cessation devices would surface in the coming years and pave the 
way for the approval of their sale as legal therapeutic products.67 
E-cigarette retailers did not heed the Regulatory Operations and Enforcement Branch’s order to 
seek the regulators’ approval to sell their wares and carried on growing with little regard for 
federal regulations, expanding dramatically into a thriving gray market.68 These retailers did not 
help build their case for being responsible businesses when they routinely violated health 
marketing prohibitions. Notably, during the 2009 H1N1 influenza epidemic, retailers parroted a 
Texas-based e-cigarette brand’s press release claiming that vaping was “more effective than 
swine flu vaccine” citing a study from the 1940s that identified a protective effect of propylene 
glycol.69 
This e-cigarette market was officially illegal, but it conducted business in brick-and-mortar 
storefronts across the country.70 The density of e-cigarette retailers was high, with some 
 
65 The Canadian Press, “Health Canada Warns against Use of Smoking ‘Gadgets,’” The Times & Transcript, March 30, 2009, 
sec. Life, NexisUni; Corrinna Pole, “Butting Out Electronic Cigarettes,” Sherbrooke Record, March 30, 2009, sec. News, 
NexisUni; Herald News Services, “WHO Rejects Smoking Cessation Tube,” The Calgary Herald, September 20, 2008, Final 
edition, sec. World in Brief, NexisUni. 
66 CBC News, “Electronic Cigarettes Face Regulatory Wrath,” NexisUni, September 9, 2010; Kerri McCraig, “E-Cigarettes Not 
Approved in Canada,” Prince George Citizen, January 20, 2010, sec. Opinion, NexisUni; Tara Carman, “Breaking the Law to 
Quit Smoking,” Vancouver Sun, December 26, 2012, sec. West Coast News; Jesse Kline, “Not Your Father’s Cigarettes,” The 
National Post, February 4, 2013, National edition, sec. Editorials, NexisUni.  
67 Carman, “Breaking the Law to Quit Smoking.” 
68 CG @ 2; CBC News, “E-Cigarette Seller Told to Stop by Health Canada,” CBC, December 3, 2013, 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/e-cigarette-seller-told-to-stop-by-health-canada-1.2449127. 
69 Pat Hewitt, “Experts Say Don’t Fall for H1N1 ‘cures’ or Myths, Stick with Flu Shot,” Metro US, November 8, 2009, 
https://www.metro.us/news/experts-say-don-t-fall-for-h1n1-cures-or-myths-stick-with-flu-shot/tmWikh---115mEhkq228S6; No.7 
E Cigarettes, “E Cigarettes May Be More Effective Than Swine Flu Vaccine,” Reuters, November 31, 2009, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20100317122026/http://www.reuters.com/article/idUS91433+03-Nov-2009+PRN20091103. The 
study being referenced: O. H. Robertson et al., “The Protection of Mice against Infection with Air-Borne Influenza Virus by 
Means of Propylene Glycol Vapor.,” Science (Washington), 1941, 612–13. 
70 CBC News, “Banned E-Cigarettes on Sale in Regina Stores,” CBC, September 5, 2011, 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/banned-e-cigarettes-on-sale-in-regina-stores-1.1084264; Armina Ligaya, “How 
E-Cigarettes Have Become a ‘Very Wild West’ Industry in Canada,” Financial Post, November 16, 2013, 
http://financialpost.com/news/how-e-cigarettes-have-become-a-very-wild-west-industry-in-canada. 
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observers estimating there were more vape shops than libraries or post offices in some cities.71 
Health Canada’s Border Integrity and Emergency Preparedness Unit, the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police, and the Canadian Border Services Agency enforced some order by refusing 
entry to shipments of e-cigarette parts into the country at its border.72 Products without 
premarket authorization could be (and often were) refused entry by customs officials under 
Health Canada’s Import and Export Policy.73 Heavy reliance on internet sales enabled e-cigarette 
users to obtain constant supplies of nicotine-containing liquid, despite the efforts of Health 
Canada and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to shut down online retailers by asking third-
party payment providers to not work with e-cigarette retailers.74  
Through the early 2010s, e-cigarette sales growth did not slow down, a condition attributable to 
Health Canada’s choice to not actively shut down e-cigarette businesses.75 In one of the few 
instances where federal regulatory authority was tested in this matter, Zen E-cigarettes, an online 
e-cigarette retailer based in Quebec, sued Health Canada after the regulator refused to allow the 
retailer to import a package of 200 nicotine-containing e-cigarettes in 2011.76 Zen’s case, which 
was echoed by many other e-cigarette retailers, was that e-cigarettes should not be considered a 
drug under the Food and Drugs Act because they did not provide enough nicotine to the user.77 
Health Canada’s legal team countered that because the dosage of a regulated drug was written on 
the package,78 it was implied that a drug was being sold, and the product was, therefore, subject 
 
71 CJ @ 1; David Hammond et al., “Retail Availability and Marketing of Electronic Cigarettes in Canada,” Canadian Journal of 
Public Health 106, no. 6 (October 9, 2015): e408-412, https://doi.org/10.17269/cjph.106.5105. 
72 Geller et al., Evidence on E-Cigarettes, 4; Nick Waddell, “Ecig Battle: Canada’s Showdown with Vaping Is about to Reach 
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to their jurisdiction.79 The agency submitted evidence to the court alleging that the e-cigarettes in 
question delivered more nicotine per inhalation than the regulated and approved-for-sale 
Nicorette inhaler.80 The court sided with Health Canada and Zen’s operations were moved to 
Maine before their going-out-of-business in July 2014.81  
Over several years of site visits, Health Canada’s Regulatory Operations and Enforcement 
Branch seized several thousand units of products it deemed non-compliant with the Food and 
Drugs Act, but after 2012, these confiscations ceased.82 By late 2014, the Regulatory Operations 
and Enforcement Branch had undertaken at least 250 enforcement actions (written cease-and-
desist letters) against e-cigarette retailers, and most retailers ignored the agency’s demand.83 
Similar to the argument made by Zen E-cigarettes, the retailers argued that e-cigarettes should be 
exempt from the Food and Drugs Act because they did not provide sufficient quantities of 
nicotine to users, but they did not heed the court’s conclusion.84 But, by August 2014, 123 brick 
and mortar stores and 31 websites who had received cease-and-desist letters had not stopped 
selling non-compliant e-cigarettes.85 Tellingly, federal regulators never backed up these letters 
by laying charges against the retailers.86 
Health Canada’s enforcement program run from its Regulatory Operations and Enforcement 
Branch was described as “complaint-driven and risk-based”, and it was eventually toned down 
for e-cigarettes based on a calculation that the products were not high-risk and complaints were 
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not streaming in.87 The regulator believed that cracking down on e-cigarette retailers would be 
either counterproductive or useless in their hierarchy of assigned enforcement activities.88 This 
decision reflected a risk management approach adopted by the agency in the 1990s.89 As far as 
enforcement officers could see, e-cigarettes were not yet responsible for anyone’s death, and few 
serious injuries could be traced to the products.90 No one in Canada was seeking to ban the use of 
nicotine-containing e-cigarettes, like injected illicit drugs.91 No one intended that all Canadians 
should be forever blocked from accessing nicotine-containing e-cigarettes. Officers within the 
Regulatory Operations and Enforcement Branch decided that finite resources were better spent 
enforcing other issues under the Food and Drugs Act.92  
This state of de jure illegality and de facto availability cemented a reality where e-cigarette 
retailers were not incentivized to put their products through proper regulatory channels when 
their competitors would not do the same.93 The e-cigarette continued to grow as small businesses 
that were essentially left alone by federal regulators proliferated. In the end, the most significant 
consequence of this policy was that transnational tobacco companies stayed completely out of 
the e-cigarette market and that pressure to create a legal federal regulatory framework continued 
to build.  
5.3.2 Provinces Build Pressure for Federal Action 
The federal government was the last level of the Canadian government to create e-cigarette 
regulations. In 2013, provincial ministers of health worried that e-cigarettes could cause a 
backslide in the country’s progress in the fight to control smoking.94 Some provincial ministers 
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of health began declaring they would advance legislation to regulate e-cigarettes if the federal 
government did not begin to act to regulate the e-cigarette market.95 The provinces held the 
power to respond to these issues of public use, and the lack of federal action on the matter of 
product regulation did not stand in their way to create their own regulations.96 
Led by Dr. Robert Strang, the chief medical officer of Nova Scotia, who was serving as the chair 
of the Council of Chief Medical Officers of Health (CCMOH) at the time, on November 26, 
2013, the Federal/Provincial/Territorial Deputy Ministers of Health asked the CCMOH to 
provide advice to the federal government on how best to construct a regulatory approach for e-
cigarettes.97 The CCMOH is a mechanism to coordinate between the various Chief Medical 
Officers of Health of each province and senior federal public health officers on topics of mutual 
interest.98 The role of the provincial Chief Medical Officer is split between serving as an advisor 
to provincial governments on matters of health and as communicators with the public on matters 
of health of general concern.99 The topic of e-cigarette use and regulation was regarded as an 
appropriate topic for the CCMOH to advise upon.100 
Municipalities were the first mover jurisdictions pass regulations on e-cigarette use and retailing, 
as Red Deer, Alberta, and Hamilton, Ontario began to adopt policies to treat e-cigarette use like 
cigarette smoking in public places in mid-2014.101 Provinces followed and began discussing their 
regulatory frameworks for controlling the sale and use of e-cigarettes.102 By late 2014, the 
Liberal government of Nova Scotia led the country to include e-cigarettes in its smoke-free 
policies and banned sales to persons under 19 years of age.103  
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In June 2014, the CCMOH held a virtual symposium which solicited input from public health 
experts representing widely varying policy preferences from the contractionist regulations 
preferred by advocates of policy informed by the precautionary principle, Dr. Stanton Glantz, to 
the expansionist regulations advanced by tobacco harm reductionists, Dr. Peter Selby, to 
preferences somewhere in between, from figures like Dr. David Hammond.104 At the 
symposium, these experts were asked to present their view on the harms or benefits of e-
cigarettes, the policy goals of e-cigarette regulation, and the regulations they would recommend 
Canada put into practice.  
The CCMOH symposium coalesced into a consensus position statement from the officers that 
aimed to provide “common and consistent policy advice” to deputy ministers of health across the 
country.105 The position statement called for a “balanced approach” between allowing smokers to 
have access to a safer form of nicotine and preventing the creation of more nicotine dependence 
in the population at large, especially among youth. The medical officers wanted provinces and 
territories to pass legislation making sales to minors illegal, restrict advertising and promotion, 
and point of sale display, and extend clean indoor air policies to cover e-cigarettes. The medical 
officers also called for the federal government to pass legislation to give Health Canada 
regulatory authority over the products and a mandate to ensure the products were used to 
improve public health. Even e-cigarette manufacturers complained that operating in a market 
devoid of government oversight meant that, "anybody and their dog can make this stuff”.106 
From the perspective of all stakeholders, the situation was unsustainable. 
The provincial and territorial health ministers, led by Nova Scotia’s, used a meeting with Federal 
Minister of Health, Rona Ambrose, in September 2014 to call for the federal government to 
develop the regulatory framework for e-cigarettes in partnership with the provinces and 
territories their position statement had called for.107 A week later, the ruling Federal 
Conservatives formed an inquiry into creating a federal regulatory framework for e-cigarettes in 
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the Standing Committee on Health (HESA) in the House of Commons.108 This call-and-response 
between provincial and federal ministers of health represented the focusing event that opened a 
policy window that managed to stay open for nearly four years until changes to the federal e-
cigarette regulatory framework could be passed into law. 
In May 2015 the Liberal government in Ontario, Canada’s largest province, passed rules 
regulating the sale and use of e-cigarettes by a vote of 99-1 as a portion of an omnibus health 
bill.109 By November 2015, a Liberal-led Quebec government passed even stricter regulations on 
e-cigarettes, particularly limiting out almost all marketing activity.110 Across the country, using 
an e-cigarette in public had become recognized as a problem behavior as such behavior was seen 
to undermine the spirit of indoor smoking bans,111 and requisite rule changes to control such 
activity followed. Except for a few notable setbacks, like a decision to delay the implementation 
of a ban on using e-cigarettes in public spaces in Ontario, e-cigarette regulation proliferated 
across Canada at the sub-federal level with the approval of almost every political party.112 
Analyses conducted years later found that youth in provinces without bans on sales of e-
cigarettes to minors reported having much easier access to the products than those young people 
in provinces with such restrictions.113 
Provincial-level actions that regulated the retailing, marketing, and use of e-cigarettes created a 
policy vacuum at the federal level. The provinces acted to regulate the aspects of the e-cigarette 
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market that were within their spheres of control as enumerated under Section 92 of the 
Constitution Act, those matters that solely affected the province.114 But, the federal government 
was foremost in charge of regulating what products could enter the internal Canadian market.115 
As the source of e-cigarettes was almost exclusively international in nature, the Constitution 
placed the duty to decide which products were admissible into the country in the hands of the 
federal bureaucrats.116 
5.4 The Policy Stream 
The fall of 2014 was characterized by a widespread sense of dissatisfaction with the current 
regulatory framework for e-cigarettes. Officers of the Regulatory Operations and Enforcement 
Branch could not justify strictly enforcing the prohibitionist stance implied by current law. 
Provinces were looking to the federal government and its bureaucrats for direction on how they 
should regulate the market. 
The primordial soup of policy ideas for regulating e-cigarettes contained two basic camps at the 
time, and each is well characterized by their position on the range of regulatory stances. To those 
who were favorably disposed to expanding the e-cigarette market, a group led by THR advocates 
like David Sweanor, e-cigarette users, and e-cigarette retailers preferred to emphasize the 
potential health benefits of such a product.117 To some in this group, tobacco smoking was an 
ongoing public health crisis that required novel solutions to be adequately addressed. They did 
not perceive the current unregulated state of the e-cigarette market as a serious problem. Instead, 
they saw the e-cigarette as a vehicle to help Canada achieve its tobacco usage reduction goals. 
Tobacco harm reduction was a belief in the idea that regulation, especially of product standards, 
could raise the perceived quality of regulated products relative to unregulated products, and shift 
consumption into legal channels. One large portion of this philosophy in action is to regulate 
products in proportion to their risk.118 This group wanted federal regulators to adopt an 
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aggressively expansionist regulatory stance and direct the kinetic energy the e-cigarette market 
represented into solving a major public health problem. 
Public health groups did not uniformly agree with the harm reduction advocates. These groups 
primarily wanted the country to adopt a regulatory framework that suppressed the downsides of 
an expanded e-cigarette market to be balanced with a measured approach to reaping the upside 
benefits of growth.119 No public health group would defend the status quo, but there was a range 
of positions expressed from those who wanted to treat e-cigarettes just like tobacco cigarettes to 
those who wanted to give the market key advantages over tobacco cigarettes to direct newer, 
safer products to cannibalize the older, more dangerous products’ market share. Public health 
groups saw the continued existence of an unregulated e-cigarette market as the problem that 
regulation would address.120 They were open to using e-cigarettes as a potential solution to 
cigarette smoking and wanted to preserve some of the market’s potential to displace tobacco 
cigarette sales. But they were willing to sacrifice some of that disruptive energy to protect people 
who did not already use tobacco products from the harms posed by e-cigarette use. The belief 
that establishing a well-regulated market for e-cigarettes could address both these problems in 
one fell swoop came to dominate the discussion around the creation of the bill put forward to 
solve these matters.  
5.4.1 HESA Committee 
As had been called for a month earlier by Minister Ambrose, in October 2014 the HESA 
Committee, led by Conservative MP Ben Lobb, began calling fact witnesses in the committee’s 
inquiry into the benefits and challenges posed by e-cigarettes, the international regulatory 
approaches towards e-cigarettes, and the potential regulations the federal government could 
adopt for e-cigarettes.121 These areas of focus for the inquiry mirrored those of the CCMOH 
efforts undertaken the previous year. The HESA Committee questioned witnesses representing 
all sides of the e-cigarette market, regulatory apparatus, and health advocacy community. 
Members of all political parties joined in on questioning the witnesses who mostly coalesced 
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around the idea that, relative to the status quo, federal regulation would improve product quality, 
safety, and health outcomes of the e-cigarette market.122  
Ideas floated during these committee hearings included a legally questionable ban on tobacco 
company participation in the e-cigarette market.123 Nicotine concentration limits like those used 
in the European Union Tobacco Products Directive were also considered but never codified in 
recommendations.124 After eight meetings, where the committee interviewed 33 witnesses, the 
HESA committee produced a unanimous report entitled “Vaping: Towards a Regulatory 
Framework” in March 2015.125 Minister Ambrose reiterated months after that her government 
took the report seriously was proceeding with ordering a draft bill, as she was the one who asked 
for its production.126 The recommendations of the HESA report (see Table 6) were less 
prescriptive and more normative in nature. They suggested the outlines of a regulatory 
framework that would empower regulators to fill in details over time.  
Table 6: HESA Vaping Report vs Bill S-5 
# Recommendation S-5 Section 
1 Health Canada financially supports research into health effects, youth impacts of e-cigarettes - 
2 The government would develop a new legislative framework for regulating e-cigarettes Bill S-5 
3 Federal government consults with provinces with an eye on protecting the health of Canadians 3 
4 Framework will cover e-cigarettes with and without nicotine 3(3)(d) 
5 Framework should require that e-cigarettes look visually distinct from other tobacco products 7.8(a) 
6 Framework should establish maximum levels of nicotine in liquid or vapor Excluded
127
 
7a Establish safety standards for e-cigarette components 6 
7b Require manufacturers and importers to disclose ingredients 11(3)c 
8a Require all components be sold in child-resistant packaging 7.8(a) 
8b Require all products to display appropriate safety warnings 15(2)1.1 
8c Require all products to display nicotine content 15(1) 
9 Prohibit manufacturers from making unproven health claims 20(2) 
10 Prohibit sales to persons under 18 years of age 8(1) 
11 Prohibit use in federally regulated places 82 
12 Restrict advertising and promotion of these products 44 
13 Prohibit cross-branding practices 23 
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14 Prohibit the use of flavors that are specifically designed to appeal to youth Excluded
128 
 
As was standard procedure,129 the eventual regulator, the Tobacco Products Directorate in Health 
Canada, was instructed in the report to address the report’s 14 recommendations when writing a 
draft bill. Recommendation 2 from the report was the most consequential from the report, as it 
instructed the government, (whose agent was principally, in this case, Tobacco Products 
Directorate) to begin drafting a new legislative framework for the regulation of e-cigarettes. 
Recommendations 4 through 14 laid out guidelines that the legislative framework should try to 
follow. The report asserted Parliament’s control over the legislation drafting process and 
effectively required bureaucrats who put forward new legislation to justify any departures from 
the drafting guidelines. 
From this point on through the passage of Bill S-5, the path was paved towards passing a policy 
that expanded federal regulatory authority over the e-cigarette market and allowed the regulator 
to calibrate the exact regulatory stance towards the e-cigarette market. The consensus view 
seemed to favor adopting an expansionist stance that was short of what the harm reductionists 
had advocated for but exceeded the boundaries of the contractionist vision maintained by some 
in the public health community. A broad agreement to adopt a regulatory stance that would 
provide e-cigarettes with a large competitive advantage over tobacco cigarettes had emerged 
from the committee. 130 The next government would be tasked with seeing that vision through to 
the passage of implementing legislation. 
5.5 The Politics Stream 
Classically, Canadian political parties are described to behave in a brokerage model of political 
competition, wherein the largest parties compete for the same voters over a set of policies that 
are less ideological and more pragmatic.131 In general, political parties exist to organize 
competition between competing interests, primarily on matters of achieving consensus, on 
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130 CH @ 45 
131 Jared J. Wesley, “In Search of Brokerage and Responsibility: Party Politics in Manitoba,” Canadian Journal of Political 
Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 42, no. 1 (2009): 211–36; William Cross and Lisa Young, “Policy Attitudes of 
Party Members in Canada: Evidence of Ideological Politics,” Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne de 
Science Politique 35, no. 4 (2002): 859–80. 
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competing principles, or seeking something in between.132 E-cigarette regulation is a policy area 
that most concerns the interests of public health and the tobacco and e-cigarette business. In the 
case at hand, Canadian politicians sought to seek consensus between interest groups when 
creating a bill that aimed to garner widespread political support. 
As the politics stream became ready to couple, a middle-ground solution in e-cigarette regulation 
between the preferences of these major interest groups was advanced by Justin Trudeau’s Liberal 
government. The path to that middle ground wound through a change in government, the 
advancement of the Liberal party’s belief in harm reduction policy, and a policy that injured 
different parts of the fortunes of tobacco and e-cigarette companies. This process yielded a bill 
that almost every policymaker could vote for. 
5.5.1 A Change in Government 
Instead of making a political calculation to avoid the issue, the Canadian Conservatives simply 
ran out of time to introduce an e-cigarette regulation bill.133 The Harper government was 
originally given four months to respond to the HESA report. But the House broke session by the 
date the report was to be submitted, July 8, 2015, and a revised deadline of September 21 did not 
see the tabling of such a report by Minister Ambrose because that very day Parliament was 
dissolved.134 
A new election was set to be held on October 19.135 During the 2015 Federal Parliamentary 
election, mentions of e-cigarette regulation by political candidates or parties were essentially 
nonexistent. At the provincial level, the only party to mention e-cigarettes in its election 
manifesto were the British Columbia Liberals, who passed e-cigarette regulations while in 
government in 2016, cheered their accomplishment in the 2017 general election manifesto, and 
then lost their majority in that election. No provincial party promised further regulatory action on 
 
132 Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (Free Press, 
1967). 
133 CL2 @ 59; CK @ 5; CD @ 34. Some interviewees asserted the Conservatives would have introduced regulations for e-
cigarettes that were more restrictive than what the Liberal government offered in bill S-5, while other respondents asserted their 
pro-business instincts would have led to more lax regulations on e-cigarettes.  
134 Vogel, “Health Canada E-Cigarette Response Delayed.” 
135 “And They’re off! Party Leaders Make Their Pitches as 11-Week Campaign Begins,” CBC, August 2, 2015, 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-election-2015-stephen-harper-confirms-start-of-11-week-federal-campaign-1.3175136. 
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e-cigarettes in their election manifestos, a further indication of the lack of political salience of the 
issue.136  
The Canadian public’s opinion, or lack thereof, on the matter of e-cigarette regulation may have 
freed Trudeau and the bureaucracy’s hands when writing such a policy. Partisan sorting on the 
subject of e-cigarette regulation had not yet occurred possibly because of the uncertainty of 
political actors over which constituencies would benefit or lose out from regulation of the 
market.137 Before the passage of Bill S-5, in response to questions that seemed biased towards 
finding less support, saw 69% of Canadians agreed that the government should regulate e-
cigarettes like tobacco products and 60% of Canadians thought plain packaging would 
successfully cut down on smoking.138 What little partisan polling that was conducted on the 
issue, occurred after the passage of Bill S-5 and, did not reveal a large partisan divide on the 
matter of e-cigarette regulation. Canadians supporting all political parties are sympathetic to the 
goal of preventing youth access to e-cigarettes.139 Perceptions of relative risk from using e-
cigarettes versus cigarettes are lower among NDP voters than among Liberal or Conservative 
Party voters.140 But overall, no party possessed a distinctly different policy preference on the 
 
136 I conducted a search of all the English language general election manifestos posted on Poltext from 2012 through 2019 
(n=58) for the terms: “nicotine”, “vaping”, “vapour”, “tobacco”, “smoking” and “e-cigarette”. 2012 (n=7); 2013 (n=6); 2014 
(n=3); 2015 (n=8); 2016 (n=8); 2017 (n=6); 2018 (n=9); 2019 (n=11). Christy Clark, “Strong BC Bright Future: Platform 
2017” (BC Liberals, 2017), 106, https://www.poltext.org/sites/poltext.org/files/plateformesV2/Colombie-
Britannique/BC_PL_2017_LIB_en.pdf; “Electronic Manifestos Canadian Provinces,” POLTEXT, 2019, 
https://www.poltext.org/en/part-1-electronic-political-texts/electronic-manifestos-canadian-provinces.  
137 CD @ 28 
138 The question; “Do you agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or disagree with each of the following statements? The 
government should regulate vaping products like tobacco products even though vaping is considered 95% safer than cigarettes.” 
should have biased the responses towards zero. Consumer Choice Center, “Opinions of Canadians on Consumer Issues: 
Consumer Choice Center Survey Summary,” Nanos, July 2017, 
https://secureservercdn.net/198.71.233.47/823.910.myftpupload.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2017-1041-consumer-choice-
populated-report-final-with-tabs-r.pdf?time=1575920703. 
139 A poll from April 2019 found that 86% of Canadians supported applying the same advertising restrictions to e-cigarettes that 
were in place for other tobacco products. There were small differences by geography, age, socioeconomic status, cigarette 
smoking status and language but nothing that neatly tracked with party. Quebec Coalition for Tobacco Control, “Canadians 
Support Urgent Government Action to Address Youth Vaping: Leger Poll,” Newswire, May 9, 2019, 
https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/canadians-support-urgent-government-action-to-address-youth-vaping-leger-poll-
834485134.html.  
140 The Angus Reid Institute conducted a survey in August 2018 which examined the feelings of Canadians towards e-cigarette 
regulation segmented by party vote in the 2015 federal elections. Reflecting a similar divide on smoking status, the survey found 
that 20% of NDP voters had ever vaped compared to 17% of Liberal and 10% Conservative voters. In terms of net percentage 
point support agreeing with whether switching from smoking to vaping is good for your health Conservatives were +1, Liberals 
were +8 and NDP voters were +24. While all parties thought vaping did more harm than good, NDP voters (-8 percentage points 
net support) were less likely than Liberals (-23) or Conservatives (-30) to support that notion. 69% of Canadians supported 
restricting the promotion and marketing of e-cigarettes, a position that was slightly more supported by Liberals (75%). Dave 
Korzinski and Shachi Kurl, “Vexed over Vaping: Kids Are Top Concern amid Canadian Uncertainty about Effects of e-
Cigarettes,” Angus Reid Institute (blog), September 18, 2018, http://angusreid.org/vaping/.  
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issue of e-cigarette regulation outright. This situation likely provided political parties with the 
latitude to broker a policy compromise that satisfied most stakeholders.  
The Conservative 2015 federal election manifesto made no mention of tobacco or plain 
packaging, but it does disparage proposals for harm reduction efforts around illicit drug 
treatment and cannabis legalization made by its left-wing rivals.141 The NDP and Liberal parties 
promised to pass plain packaging and legalize recreational cannabis sales in their election 
manifestos in 2015 but made no mention of e-cigarette regulation.142 By far the dominant voting 
issue of concern to Canadians was the economy, distantly followed by health care.143 The 
election ended up yielding a change in government and brought Justin Trudeau’s Liberal Party to 
power as a majority party.144 
5.5.2 Harm Reduction 
The Liberal government professed and acted on their belief in harm reduction as a health 
promotion strategy. They even renamed the government's drug control strategy from the 
“National Anti-Drug Strategy” to the less punitive-sounding “Canadian Drugs and Substances 
Strategy”.145 The renewed Federal Tobacco Control Strategy touted employing the principles of 
harm reduction to tobacco use, especially through the passage of e-cigarette regulations.146 When 
Liberal Minister of Health Ginette Petitpas-Taylor invoked the importance of harm reduction in 
defense of the government’s response to the opioid crisis, the illness spread through needle 
sharing, and vaping.147 Even cannabis legalization and regulation were framed as a harm 
 
141 Stephen Harper, “Protect Our Economy: Our Conservative Plan to Protect the Economy” (Conservative Party of Canada, 
2015), 119, Poltext, https://www.poltext.org/sites/poltext.org/files/plateformesV2/Canada/CAN_PL_2015_PC_en.pdf. 
142 CD @ 41; Justin Trudeau, “Real Change: A New Plan for a Strong Middle Class” (Liberal Party of Canada, 2015), Poltext, 
https://www.poltext.org/sites/poltext.org/files/plateformesV2/Canada/CAN_PL_2015_LIB_en.pdf; Tom Mulcair, “Building the 
Country of Our Dreams: Tom Mulcair’s Plan to Bring Change to Ottawa” (New Democratic Party, 2015), Poltext, 
https://www.poltext.org/sites/poltext.org/files/plateformesV2/Canada/CAN_PL_2015_NDP_en.pdf. 
143 “Economy the No. 1 Issue, but Environment a Growing Concern: Vote Compass,” CBC, September 10, 2015, 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/vote-compass-canada-election-2015-issues-canadians-1.3222945. 
144 McKirdy, “Canada Election.” 
145 Health Canada, “Pillars of the Canadian Drugs and Substances Strategy,” education and awareness, aem, December 12, 2016, 
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/publications/healthy-living/pillars-canadian-drugs-substances-strategy.html. 
146 Health Canada, “Seizing the Opportunity: The Future of Tobacco Control in Canada,” consultations, aem, February 22, 2017, 
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/programs/future-tobacco-control/future-tobacco-control.html; Diane Finley, “Tobacco 
Act- Government Orders,” § Canada House of Commons (2017), https://openparliament.ca/debates/2017/11/3/diane-finley-2/. 
147 Peter Luongo, “Health Committee on Feb. 12th, 2018 | Openparliament.Ca,” § Health Standing Committee (2018), 
https://openparliament.ca/committees/health/42-1/90/peter-luongo-1/; Ginette Petitpas Taylor, “Debates of Oct. 5th, 2018,” § 
House of Commons (2018), https://openparliament.ca/debates/2018/10/5/ginette-petitpas-taylor-1/; Ginette Petitpas Taylor, 
“Debates of June 14th, 2019,” § House of Commons (2019), https://openparliament.ca/debates/2019/6/14/ginette-petitpas-taylor-
4/.  
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reduction initiative that would lessen the power of black-market actors and protect young 
people.148 Justin Trudeau repeatedly defended cannabis legalization as an initiative informed by 
a “public health approach” that his government was not planning on extending to other drugs 
(namely, opioids).149 This talking point conveniently disregarded e-cigarette regulatory efforts. 
NDP and Liberal MPs have a much more extensive record of bringing the topic of harm 
reduction into the Canadian political debate than their Conservative Party counterparts.150 
However, the NDP has been historically much more open to traditional harm reduction initiatives 
in the area of gambling and illicit drug usage than their Liberal counterparts.151 This party split in 
the perception of a lesser threat from a reduced harm product has been found before in public 
opinion surveys.152  
Public health groups, particularly those most closely involved in tobacco control (Non-Smoker’s 
Rights Association and Canadian Cancer Society) also saw the threat and promise of e-cigarettes 
and calculated that a regulated marketplace was more likely to produce their desired outcome of 
a country with less smoking and disease than an unregulated one.153 They theorized that a 
regulated market would be responsive to the rulings of a regulator and the worst actions of 
market participants could be curbed. Other public health groups, like the Canadian Medical 
Association, Heart and Stroke, and Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada, were more skeptical 
 
148 The major difference between the politics of cannabis and e-cigarettes was that while, conservatives were opposed to the 
expansion of immoral markets like cannabis, there was no similar feeling that expanding the market for nicotine-containing e-
cigarettes was immoral. The support of business entities operating outside of a moralistic framework also likely eased the 
political calculations of Conservatives with regard to e-cigarette regulation. CO @ 34-35; Health Canada, “Harm Reduction: 
Canadian Drugs and Substances Strategy,” transparency - other, aem, October 20, 2017, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-
canada/services/substance-use/canadian-drugs-substances-strategy/harm-reduction.html. 
149 Paul Webster, “Debate over Recreational Cannabis Use Legalisation in Canada,” The Lancet 391, no. 10122 (February 24, 
2018): 725–26, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(18)30430-6; Travis Lupick, “Trudeau Government Maintains Its War on 
Hard Drugs as Greens and NDP Consider Alternatives,” The Georgia Straight, March 14, 2018, 
https://www.straight.com/news/1044336/trudeau-government-maintains-its-war-hard-drugs-greens-and-ndp-consider-
alternatives. 
150 CJ @ 6; “Search: ‘Harm Reduction,’” OpenParliament.ca, December 10, 2019, 
https://openparliament.ca/search/?q=%22harm%20reduction%22. 
151 Steven Hayle, “The Politics of Harm Reduction: Comparing the Historical Development of Needle Exchange Policy in 
Canada and the UK between 1985 and 1995,” The Social History of Alcohol and Drugs 32 (December 1, 2018): 81–103, 
https://doi.org/10.1086/SHAD3201081; Justin Rex and David J. Jackson, “Window of Opportunity? Internet Gambling in 
Canada,” Canadian Public Policy 35, no. 1 (April 8, 2009): 121–37, https://doi.org/10.3138/cpp.35.1.121. 
152
 Shachi Kurl and Ian Holliday, “Opioids in Canada: One-in-Eight Have Family or Close Friends Who Faced Addiction,” 
Angus Reid Institute (blog), January 11, 2018, http://angusreid.org/opioid-crisis/. The Angus Reid Institute also asked Canadians 
for their opinion in August 2018 about the use of harm reduction when confronting the country’s opioid crisis. They found that 
net support for the use of supervised injection sites was above +58 points for Liberal and NDP voters while Conservative net 
support was at -8 points. 
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that there was an upside to growing the e-cigarette, but they agreed that an unregulated market 
was likely to produce worse outcomes than a regulated market.154 Harm reduction logic ended up 
proliferating through Liberal government decision-making and messaging. This logic was well 
suited to the e-cigarette regulation discussion and provided momentum to carry the issue beyond 
the election. 
5.5.3 Issue Linkage with Plain Packaging 
When political actors in Canada engaged the debate over changing the e-cigarette regulatory 
framework, the policy was also packaged with characteristics that increased its appeal to the left-
wing of Canadian politics. The “issue linkage” employed in bill S-5 primarily refers to the 
combination of the plain packaging legislation, which at the time, was the strictest such provision 
in the world as it empowered the regulator to shape the appearance of tobacco products 
themselves, going deeper than the outside packaging.  
Plain packaging was a major milestone that public health groups wanted the Liberal government 
to adopt.155 Its inclusion in a bill that altered the regulatory framework for e-cigarettes, seemed to 
quiet objections to overly expansionist e-cigarette regulatory policies from public health 
groups.156 Fulfilling a campaign promise for strong tobacco control policy from both the Liberals 
and the NDP was too strong a force to raise significant protests from public health groups on the 
conceptually and practically linked subject of e-cigarette regulation. Oddly, the linkage of harm 
reduction with plain packaging policy ended up persuading tobacco companies to stand down 
from making significant protests over the contents of the final form of the e-cigarette regulatory 
bill (See 5.6.1). 
5.6 Coupling the Streams 
The problem, policy, and politics streams had all become ready to couple following the 2015 
federal election. The election delayed the government’s reply to the HESA report. Health 
 
154 Action on Smoking & Health et al., “Tobacco and Vaping Products Act: New Developments Lead Some Health Groups to 
Reconsider Their,” February 12, 2018, https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/tobacco-and-vaping-products-act-new-
developments-lead-some-health-groups-to-reconsider-their-support-for-bill-s-5-673813903.html; Véronique Morin, “Federal 
Report Calls for Regulation of E-Cigarettes,” CMAJ : Canadian Medical Association Journal 187, no. 7 (April 21, 2015): 487, 
https://doi.org/10.1503/cmaj.109-5020; Canadian Medical Association, “Submission to the House of Commons Study on E-
Cigarettes” (Canadian Medical Association, November 27, 2014), 
https://policybase.cma.ca/en/viewer?file=%2fdocuments%2fBriefpdf%2fBR2015-05.pdf#phrase=false. 
155 Rob Cunningham, “Society Praises Federal Action on Tobacco Plain Packaging,” Canadian Cancer Society, May 31, 2016, 
https://www.cancer.ca:443/en/about-us/for-media/media-releases/national/2016/tobacco-plain-packaging/?region=on. 
156 CIG @ 42-43; CD @ 28-29 
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Canada’s public relations staff stated that its bureaucrats were working on translating the report’s 
recommendations into policy options while the campaign was being conducted.157 Before the 
introduction of the new bill, Health Canada remained silent on these matters – indicating only 
that they were looking into writing a new policy.158 This period between the HESA report and 
the introduction of Bill S-5 marked the point where the agency’s perspective changed became 
more open to an expansionist regulatory policy stance towards e-cigarettes.159  
The Tobacco Control Directorate spent the time gathering information on e-cigarette health 
effects, market size and shape, and international regulatory practices.160 The Tobacco Control 
Directorate consulted with e-cigarette users, tobacco companies, law enforcement, as well as 
public health groups in the process of determining their strategy going forward.161 The scientific 
publications that marked the interregnum were the 2016 US Surgeon General’s Report on e-
cigarettes and youth, the 2015 Public Health England Report, and myriad studies on biomarkers, 
toxicity, cessation, initiation, and gateway effects of e-cigarettes.162 While these studies made 
opposing conclusions about the threat or opportunity posed by the e-cigarette market, Tobacco 
Control Directorate staff proceeded to cite both strains of thought when justifying their positions 
on e-cigarette regulation.163 Those staff eventually concluded that they believed they could write 
 
157 Kennedy and Whalen, Evidence - HESA (42-1) - No. 5 - House of Commons of Canada; Jane Philpott, “Health Canada 2016-
17 Report on Plans and Priorities,” report on plans and priorities, Health Canada, March 7, 2016, 
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/corporate/transparency/corporate-management-reporting/report-plans-priorities/2016-
2017-report-plans-priorities.html#ii_2.5.1; Branswell, “Health Canada Slow to Regulate E-Cigarettes.” 
158 Lucas Richert, “Why Aren’t We Regulating e-Cigs?,” Regina Leader Post, May 16, 2016, Early edition, sec. Opinion. 
159 CE @ 11; CM @ 30; CG @ 5 
160 Public Works and Government Services Canada, “ARCHIVED Study of the Market Size and Growth Trends of the Nicotine-
Based Vaping Products Market in Canada (1000174110),” Government of Canada, March 23, 2016, 
https://buyandsell.gc.ca/procurement-data/tender-notice/PW-16-00727553; Camille Bains, “Teens Use E-Cigarettes Because 
They Are ‘Cool, Fun and New’: Study,” Times Colonist, July 19, 2016, sec. News, NexisUni; Tom Blackwell, “Scientific Studies 
on E-Cigarettes Stuck in Limbo; Ottawa Dragging out Approval Process: Scientist,” National Post, February 17, 2015, 
All_but_Toronto edition, sec. News. 
161 CO @ 25; Health Canada, “Consultation Summary: Proposals for the Regulation of Vaping Products,” guidance, aem, April 
9, 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/publications/healthy-living/consultation-summary-proposals-
regulation-vaping-products.html; Regulator Watch, GROUND WAR | REGULATORY INSIGHTS ON BILL S-5, 2017, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0xQsmG-TqhQ. 
162 US Department of Health and Human Services, “E-Cigarette Use Among Youth and Young Adults: A Report of the Surgeon 
General” (Atlanta, GA: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National 
Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Office on Smoking and Health, December 8, 2016), http://e-
cigarettes.surgeongeneral.gov/documents/2016_SGR_Full_Report_non-508.pdf; McNeill et al., “E-Cigarettes: An Evidence 
Update”; Goniewicz et al., “Levels of Selected Carcinogens and Toxicants in Vapor from Electronic Cigarettes.” 
163 Health Canada, “Overview of Canada’s Tobacco Strategy,” education and awareness, aem, May 31, 2018, 
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/publications/healthy-living/canada-tobacco-strategy/overview-canada-tobacco-
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a regulatory framework that balanced concerns about youth initiation with providing access to 
reduced-harm products for adults. 164    
When Parliament resumed sitting, the government response to the previous session’s HESA 
report on e-cigarettes was the first matter discussed by that committee in the new session.165 The 
response promised that the Trudeau government would deliver legislation to regulate the e-
cigarette market by the fall of 2016, a promise that was ultimately, kept. The Liberal Party was 
tasked with creating a regulatory framework for e-cigarettes in response to ongoing pressure 
from provincial ministers of health, federal bureaucrats, and public health groups to act. This 
moment of pressure and political opportunity represented the coupling of the streams into a 
policy window. The eventual federal bill that was introduced to change the regulatory framework 
engendered little formal opposition from cross-party policymakers during its creation and the 
policy process leading up to its passage can be described as amicable, even cooperative.  
It is difficult to peer inside the thinking of those who were tasked with writing a new regulatory 
policy for e-cigarettes after the 2015 election. The communications between ministers and 
bureaucrats are privileged and interviewees uniformly reserved that information from our 
conversations. We can only compare the HESA report to the Bill that was produced to evaluate 
which recommendations were agreed to (See Table 6). Only recommendations about nicotine 
concentration and e-liquid flavors (6 and 14, respectively) were not directly transposed into the 
implementing legislation. Instead, these potential subjects of future product standards were 
placed under the statutory authority of Health Canada’s Tobacco Control Directorate under the 
new regulatory framework.166 The parties swapping drafts eventually settled on a policy that 
linked harm reduction which appealed to business interests to a public health strategy and 
produced a piece of legislation that few empowered interests found objectionable. 
No single person acted as a policy entrepreneur from start to finish on the issue of e-cigarette 
regulation. The Trudeau government utilized Minister of Health Jane Philpott and former 
Paralympic champion Senator Chantal Petitclerc as the nominal public faces leading the push for 
 
164 After January of 2018 they most often cite Committee on the Review of the Health Effects of Electronic Nicotine Delivery 
Systems et al., Public Health Consequences of E-Cigarettes.  
165 Jane Philpott, “Government Response to Vaping: Toward a Regulatory Framework for E-Cigarettes,” Government Response 
(Ottawa, Canada: Standing Committee on Health, September 26, 2016), http://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-
1/HESA/report-1/response-8512-421-77. 
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e-cigarette regulation in each chamber of Parliament. Philpott and Petitclerc (and later, Philpott’s 
predecessor as Minister of Health Ginette Petitpas-Taylor) worked in tandem to promote the 
changing the e-cigarette regulatory framework as a public health measure that would advance the 
interests of both smokers and youth.167  
The civil servants in the Tobacco Control Directorate had been instructed, first by the Harper 
government, and second by the Trudeau government to write a bill that would clarify federal 
regulatory authority over e-cigarettes and fulfill a Liberal Party campaign promise concerning 
plain packaging. These bureaucrats served as the connective tissue that bridged the change in 
government and ensured continuity in the effort to expand federal regulatory authority over the 
e-cigarette market. While the Directorate resisted the idea at first, by the time bill S-5 was being 
drafted, the belief in the harm reduction potential of e-cigarettes had taken hold inside the 
agency, motivated by what was perceived by the directorate staff as an unfolding scientific 
consensus on the matter.168 Directorate staff engaged in a wide-ranging process of consultation 
with a wide variety of stakeholders in the process of drafting an e-cigarette regulations bill.169 
Drafts were passed back and forth between the Prime Minister’s Office, Privy Council Office, 
Health Canada’s Director-General, and the Tobacco Control Directorate during this process.170  
The lack of widespread political controversy around the belief that e-cigarettes could improve 
the health of cigarette smokers ended up aiding the promulgation of a bill that created a 
regulatory framework in which regulatory agencies could utilize harm reduction impulses if they 
saw fit. The resulting legislation, Bill S-5, was written, promoted, and shepherded through to 
royal assent by the civil servants who would later be tasked with implementing and enforcing the 
bill’s provisions. The development of Bill S-5 proceeded in an orderly fashion as streams were 
coupled and the opportunity to consider a fully formed e-cigarette regulatory bill arrived in 
November 2016. 
 
167 Minister Philpott and Senator Petitclerc Discuss Bill S-5, the Proposed Tobacco and Vaping Products Act (Facebook Live, 
2016), https://www.facebook.com/janepaulinephilpott/videos/668128886691529/. 
168 Health Canada repeatedly testified after the introduction of Bill S-5 that e-cigarettes were less harmful than cigarettes, citing 
an “emerging global consensus of science”. James Van Loon, “Health Committee on Feb. 28th, 2018 | Openparliament.Ca,” § 
Health Standing Committee (2018), https://openparliament.ca/committees/health/42-1/94/james-van-loon-5/. 
169 CE @ 12; Health Canada, “Health Canada Tobacco Control Directorate and Tobacco and Vaping Industry Meetings,” 
navigation page, aem, June 10, 2019, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/health-concerns/tobacco/meeting-
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170 These drafts and consultations are protected from public information requests by ministerial advice privileges. No interviewee 
was comfortable speaking with me about their contents.  
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5.6.1 Business-Friendly Harm Reduction 
In their e-cigarette regulatory efforts, the Liberals employed a business-friendly harm-
reductionist strategy that enticed the support of most policymakers, notably those on the right-
wing of Canadian politics. Their chosen policy was business-friendly because it had the effect of 
opening a legal market to large companies where there was not one previously. Their policy was 
also harm-reductionist because this legal market was purported to be less dangerous than the 
market it was meant to be displacing. In 2016, business-friendly harm reduction was an idea with 
widespread appeal in Canadian politics.  
The business-friendly nature of this form of harm reduction found a base of support among 
Conservatives. If no moral lines are crossed by commercializing the sale of a product, then we 
might expect right-wing parties to warm to the idea of harm reduction as right-wing resistance to 
such policies usually rests on morality issues. Canadian Conservatives have demonstrated their 
comfort with expanding access to alcohol and even standing up to protect the interests of tobacco 
companies.171 During consultations on the contents of Bill S-5, tobacco companies generally 
approved of the regulatory measures on e-cigarettes, likely because the regulations would permit 
their entry into the Canadian market receiving a more favorable regulatory stance than the one 
the existed for their core product, tobacco cigarettes.172 E-cigarettes as a product category do not 
violate the Conservative party’s moral reservations about sex or mind-warping illicit drugs, and 
their partiality to business interests further softened their resistance to this form of harm 
reduction. 
Rather than the issue of the establishment of federal regulatory powers over e-cigarettes, 
Conservative party objections to Bill S-5 primarily stemmed from the imposition of plain 
packaging on tobacco products.173 Tobacco companies expressed public frustration over the way 
that tobacco cigarettes were being subject to plain packaging in bill S-5 while, combusted 
cannabis cigarettes were being treated much more gently in companion bill C-45.174 Tobacco 
 
171 Lisa Xing, “The 10 Biggest Things Doug Ford Has Done in His First 100 Days in Office,” CBC, October 6, 2018, 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/doug-ford-first-100-days-1.4851341. 
172 Health Canada, “Consultation Summary,” April 9, 2018.; CG @ 2 
173 Diane Finley, “Health Committee on March 19th, 2018 | Openparliament.Ca,” § Health Standing Committee (2018), 
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companies made the same arguments against plain packaging in Canada that they made 
everywhere else; the policy won’t improve health, contraband markets will boom, and this is 
government appropriation of intellectual property.175 The argument over e-cigarettes never 
invoked these criticisms, and the creation of a regulatory framework for e-cigarettes aimed to 
eliminate an unregulated, contraband-like market. In the end, tobacco company protests against 
the plain packaging policy were ignored by policymakers. The inclusion of plain packaging with 
e-cigarette regulations provided a sweetener to tobacco companies who stood to lose out from 
the imposition of plain packaging while gaining from the opening of a legal e-cigarette market. 
5.7 Passing Bill S-5 
In November 2016, the promised legislation appeared in the Canadian Senate as bill S-5, 
attached to a plain and standardized packaging provision that would apply to cigarettes, cigars, 
and smokeless tobacco products. The fact that the study that underpinned the bill was conducted 
in the House of Commons led to the bill being introduced in the Senate.176 S-5 sailed through 
Senate hearings and amendment processes with only minor revisions being made to a legislative 
review process and the bill passed the Senate in June 2016.177 
Afterward, the bill headed to the House of Commons. It was only at this intermediate stage of the 
legislative process that the Federal government stepped in to set an endgame goal for tobacco 
smoking to reach 5 percent prevalence among the adult population by 2035.178 Setting this goal 
smacked of being an after-the-fact justification rather than being an initial motivation for moving 
S-5 forwards.  
In early 2018 the House held hearings on the bill and largely kept the Senate’s version of S-5 
intact with one significant exception. A small controversy erupted over the issue of lifestyle 
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advertising.179 As originally drafted, S-5 did not prohibit all lifestyle advertising, instead, it 
exempted lifestyle ads distributed by direct mail or placed in areas that were inaccessible to 
youth, while the companion cannabis regulation bill C-45 prohibited all lifestyle advertising for 
that new market.180 The only reasoning given for this choice in the public record comes from 
Minister of Health Jane Philpott, where she claimed in testimony to the Senate, that banning all 
lifestyle advertising would not be compliant with the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.181 
The issue of whether the Canadian Charter protects the use of lifestyle advertising has been 
litigated up to the country’s Supreme Court which ruled in RJR-MacDonald Inc v A-G 
Canada.182 That case ended up setting a common-law definition of lifestyle advertising and ruled 
that a ban on all tobacco advertising was too burdensome on the expressive freedom of tobacco 
companies.183 In reaction to the decision in RJR-MacDonald, the revised Tobacco Products Act 
included a ban on all lifestyle advertising for tobacco products, as such ads did not serve a useful 
public purpose while allowing more utilitarian brand preference advertising.  
Health Canada Tobacco Control Directorate officials claimed they were comfortable taking 
enforcement actions against e-cigarette companies that crossed the line into promoting their 
products in a manner appealing to youth after the incident occurred.184 Public health groups, led 
by the Quebec Coalition for Tobacco Control, worried that the regulators would not be able to 
prevent damage from being done, citing past struggles in policing the marketing of flavored 
cigars and enforcing the prohibition on the sale of nicotine-containing e-cigarettes.185 The groups 
called for Health Canada to produce the legal analysis that Minister Philpott was referencing in 
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her 2017 Senate committee testimony that concluded a ban on all lifestyle advertising was not 
Charter-compliant, but this analysis was never publicly produced.186 The uproar caused by public 
health groups who lobbied the Minister of Health, Ginette Petitpas-Taylor, triggered the adoption 
of a Liberal party amendment banning lifestyle advertising for e-cigarettes.187 Even after the 
change, marketing for e-cigarettes was less restricted than for other tobacco products, 
particularly at the point of sale.   
One line of Conservative objection to S-5 was an argument that that prohibitions on 
communicating relative risk in vaping product marketing materials would stymie doctors from 
informing their patients of the risk reduction a patient would benefit from if they switched from 
smoking cigarettes to vaping.188 The tobacco companies and harm reduction advocates pushed 
this narrative as well.189 Leaders of the Tobacco Control Directorate did not agree that such 
advice from a doctor to their patient constituted a marketing promotion and recommended that 
clarifications defending such activity not need be added to the bill.190 The Liberal party took their 
bureaucrat’s advice and did not amend the bill further.  
No major dissent from the NDP or Liberals was made when Conservatives led the 2014 HESA 
Committee study of e-cigarette regulations. And no such Conservative (or NDP) dissent ever 
broke out during the consideration of Bill S-5 proper that ever imperiled the bill from receiving 
close to unanimous support. Only peripheral issues ever seemed to cause rifts, and these 
differences were smoothed over by the time the bill was reported out of committee.  
Support for S-5’s non-plain packaging related provisions from public health groups was 
lukewarm at best, but there was some openness to the use of e-cigarettes as a harm reduction tool 
for smokers.191 These public health groups explicitly and consistently stated that using an e-
cigarette was less harmful than continuing to smoke tobacco cigarettes.192 This warmness was 
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tempered by a concern that tobacco companies would use vaping products to onboard new 
nicotine consumers who had never smoked.193 Overall, public health groups favored making the 
e-cigarette market legal and endowing the Tobacco Control Directorate with regulatory authority 
over the products194.  
Ultimately, Bill S-5 passed parliament unanimously at every stage but one of the legislative 
process.195 S-5 received royal assent on May 23, 2018, which triggered the opening of Canada’s 
legal e-cigarette market, a change in patterns in the sale and use of vaping products, and a flurry 
of regulatory activity.196 When Bill S-5 received royal assent, public health groups uniformly 
cheered the occasion with press releases welcoming the new laws.197 Tobacco companies were 
more cautious in their public statements.198 Bill S-5 solidified the bureaucracy’s claim to 
regulatory authority over the e-cigarette market, so it would survive court challenges to said 
authority once it was asserted and enforced.199   
5.7.1 Implementation 
After passage, the bureaucrats of Health Canada’s Tobacco Control Directorate began working 
to put into practice the promise of an expansionist e-cigarette regulatory stance that aimed to 
serve the interests of the public health. Implementing S-5 has taken some time. The pace of 
writing regulations to implement bill S-5 was much slower than its “companion” cannabis 
legalization bill, C-45, which received royal assent in June 2018, a month after S-5. C-45’s 
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crucial regulations, needed for the cannabis market to begin operations, were finalized in July 
2018.200 
The regulatory environment before S-5 was characterized as being a “Wild West” environment 
where quality standards were absent, and rules were scoffed at by retailers and importers.201 The 
first six months after royal assent of S-5 was characterized as a different sort of “Wild West” 
environment.202 The new Wild West was defined by the presence of multinational corporations 
who pushed the boundaries of legal marketing activity in the view of more of the Canadian 
public during a period when the Canadian government was required to notify the World Trade 
Organization of impending new regulations, so trading partners could adjust.203 E-cigarette 
marketing and legally questionable behavior moved out of the vape shop and into convenience 
stores, televisions, and radios.204 Promotion of e-cigarettes became rampant, fueled by the 
injection of capital to the sector delivered by tobacco companies newly hawking their own e-
cigarette brands.205 British American Tobacco’s local affiliate blanketed Toronto’s subway 
system with Vype ads and set up pop-up installations that ended up being shut down by the 
Regulatory Operations and Enforcement Branch under the lifestyle advertising prohibition.206 
Television ads for the Vype brand ran over 4000 times over 10 weeks.207 Juul entered the 
Canadian market in August 2018 and quickly supplanted Vype as the best-selling brand on the 
market within two months of entry.208 Sales in the Canadian market began shifting towards 
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transnational tobacco company backed brands, fulfilling the ambitions of these companies that 
notably kept criticisms of the e-cigarette regulatory provisions in bill S-5 quiet before its passage 
into law.209 
Health Canada ended up warning e-cigarette manufacturers, namely the tobacco companies, at 
the end of the “Wild West” period that much of their advertising efforts qualified as prohibited 
lifestyle advertising.210 Tobacco companies voiced their disagreement, claiming that their 
marketing efforts do not constitute lifestyle advertising, and have the resources to engage in 
marketing campaigns that test that definition.211 Legal action is forthcoming and might be sped 
up by the introduction of further limitations on the place and character of marketing that is being 
introduced in regulations.212 
Efforts to involve non-business interests in the creation of market regulations included forming a 
Scientific Advisory Board on Vaping Products in mid-2017 (while S-5 was being debated in 
Parliament) that was staffed by an international team of academics to guide the Tobacco Control 
Directorate’s decision-making process through the changing evidentiary landscape concerning 
the harms and benefits of e-cigarettes.213 One initial task of the board was to draft statements that 
federal regulators could authorize “regulated health claims” for use in communications 
(marketing) about e-cigarettes to demonstrate the relatively lower risks to health these products 
posed compared to tobacco cigarettes.214  The claims in active development contained messages 
like “If you are a smoker, switching completely to vaping is a much less harmful option” and 
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“While vaping products emit toxic substances, the amount is significantly lower than in tobacco 
smoke”.215  
At the November 2018 meeting of the board, David Hammond, a Professor of Public Health at 
the University of Waterloo and member of the board, brought worrisome survey findings to 
share.216 Hammond conducted a repeated online panel survey of youth in Canada before and 
after the passage of S-5 and found rates of youth e-cigarette use had nearly doubled while 
cigarette smoking rates had risen by almost half.217 This combination of findings was viewed as 
unambiguously bad news for public health as it implies that the feared gateway effect from e-
cigarette use to tobacco cigarette use might be playing out in Canada in the wake of the passage 
of Bill S-5. This prompted calls for further regulatory action to clamp down on the growing 
vaping market in the country.218 Meanwhile, the regulated health claim concept fell by the 
wayside.219 
In February 2019, the Tobacco Control Directorate began the process of rulemaking to impose 
further limits on e-cigarette advertising than are present in Bill S-5’s text, in response to what the 
agency perceives is a problem of rising youth e-cigarette use.220 In April 2019, the Tobacco 
Control Directorate issued another public consultation on matters pertaining to making e-
cigarettes less appealing to youth.221 The regulatory measures that may emerge from these 
consultations have not become public yet, but they are all closer to the contractionist end of the 
range of regulatory stances compared to the status quo policy. The first measures that would 
 
215 Azim Chowdhury, “Canada’s New Regulatory Framework for Vaping Products,” The National Law Review, October 9, 2018, 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/canada-s-new-regulatory-framework-vaping-products. 
216 Kelly Crowe, “Teen Vaping in Canada Has Taken a ‘worrisome’ Turn,” CBC, December 8, 2018, 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/health/health-canada-youth-teenage-vaping-smoking-hammond-1.4937593; Health Canada, “Meeting 
Summary - November 19-20, 2018: Scientific Advisory Board on Vaping Products,” transparency - other, aem, May 7, 2019, 
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/corporate/about-health-canada/public-engagement/external-advisory-bodies/vaping-
products/meeting-11-18.html.John Paul Tasker, “‘Troubling Signs’: Health Canada to Review Tobacco Strategy as Smoking Rate 
Spikes,” CBC News, November 20, 2018, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/tasker-health-canada-smoking-troubling-signs-
1.4909402; Health Canada, “Meeting Summary - November 19-20, 2018.” 
217 David Hammond et al., “Prevalence of Vaping and Smoking among Adolescents in Canada, England, and the United States: 
Repeat National Cross Sectional Surveys,” BMJ 365 (June 20, 2019): l2219, https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.l2219. 
218 Adam Hunter, “‘We Have a Big Problem’: Spike in Youth Vaping Sparks Calls for Legislation,” CBC News, June 20, 2019, 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/vaping-spike-canada-1.5183664. 
219 CJ2 @ 18-20 
220 Health Canada, “Consultation Summary: Notice of Intent – Potential Measures to Reduce the Impact of Vaping Products 
Advertising on Youth and Non-Users of Tobacco Products,” consultations, aem, October 31, 2019, 
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/programs/consultation-measures-reduce-impact-vaping-products-advertising-youth-non-
users-tobacco-products/notice-document/summary.html. 
221 Health Canada, “Reducing Youth Access and Appeal of Vaping Products.” 
   
146 
 
affect the packaging and labeling of e-cigarettes were advanced to the first stage of the formal 
rulemaking process in June 2019.222 Those new rules, which are likely to be implemented in 
2020, would mandate ingredient labeling and child-proofing of e-liquid containers. 
A bevy of further regulations is being developed by a regulator that is struggling to keep pace 
with the market they are being tasked with controlling. The Tobacco Control Directorate has 
funded numerous public consultations, focus groups, qualitative evaluations, and quantitative 
studies to make decisions that comport with the concerns of constituents and reflect the best 
available data.223 Finally fleshing out the federal regulatory authority granted by S-5, the first 
large-scale regulations began being published in The Canada Gazette, the country’s register of 
federal regulations in December 2019.224 
5.8 Conclusion 
Each stream in the Canadian policy process became ready to couple at a different time. The 
problem stream reached a state of readiness in the fall of 2014 when the provinces decided that 
they wanted Health Canada to change the way it was regulating e-cigarettes to address the policy 
vacuum at the federal level. The status quo had become untenable to all stakeholders, and no one 
would defend the policy that applied harsher regulatory policies to a less harmful product than 
tobacco cigarettes. The policy stream became ready soon thereafter as through the winter of 2015 
as the standing committee on health in the House of Commons produced a unanimous report that 
underlined the harm-reductionist logic which would be operationalized as an expansionist 
framework for nicotine-containing e-cigarettes at the federal level in Canada. The fact that the 
report was unanimous indicated that no matter the outcome of an impending election, e-cigarette 
regulatory policy was ready for change. The political stream became ready to couple during 2015 
as the Liberal government came to power on a promise to improve health and well-being through 
the expanded use of harm reductionist and strong tobacco control policies.  
The introduction of Bill S-5 in November of 2016 represented the coupling of these streams. Bill 
S-5 was sculpted in a manner that encapsulated the concept of business-friendly harm reduction.  
S-5 effectively muted loud dissent from Conservatives and tobacco companies while still being 
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perceived as a boon to public health, solidifying the support from the NDP and public health 
groups. The bill adopted an expansionist e-cigarette regulatory stance that was balanced off by 
concerns that young people and non-tobacco users could be later protected. Bill S-5 ended up 
empowering federal regulators with new powers that can be tailored to meet policy goals going 
forward. 
In the end, the passage of e-cigarette regulations in Canada represents how policy construction 
and framing can be leveraged to change regulatory stances towards a new market. Political 
support can be smoothed over through strategies like issue linkage and the advancement of ideas 
like business-friendly harm reduction. While the universal rejection of the status quo regulatory 
stance seems to have primed the country for a change, the arrival at a near consensus policy 
alternative ensured that policy change would be resilient in the face of varied political 
landscapes. 
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 New Zealand 
A Cohesive Policy Community Paved the Path to Regulatory Change  
Tarania Turia was born to a single mother of Māori, New Zealand’s indigenous people, descent 
in 1944.1 After an early life spent first engaging in the domestic affairs of raising a family, and 
then turning to run a tribal health service, Turia was elected to the New Zealand Parliament for 
the first time in 1996 as a member of the left-wing Labour Party.2 In 2003, a policy debate over 
ownership of New Zealand’s foreshore and seabed within the Labour government led by Helen 
Clark ended up creating such a rift between Turia and the Labour Party that she resigned from 
the government and formed her own political party. Turia’s new Māori Party focused on 
promoting indigenous rights, wellbeing, and culture.3 After the 2008 Parliamentary election, the 
Māori party joined the right-wing National Party as a junior partner in coalition government. 
Turia was appointed the Associate Minister of Health and she took over the tobacco policy 
portfolio.4 
The Māori focus on tobacco control stretched back at least a decade before a program called “For 
Māori by Māori” to promote smoking cessation in the Māori population under the watch of 
Māori providers.5 This was done in response to revelations during the 1997 World Conference 
on Tobacco or Health in China that Māori had some of the highest lung cancer rates in the 
world.6 Smoking rates among Māori started at levels over twice as high as Paakehaa (New 
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Zealanders of European descent).7 This stark disparity in smoking prevalence, and its role in 
contributing two years to a seven-year gap in life expectancy between the groups, has been a 
salient political issue for decades.8 A sense of the scale of the problem is demonstrated by a 1995 
government goal to get the proportion of Māori women smoking during pregnancy under 50% 
by 2000.9  
In 2011, the Māori Party, as a junior partner in the National Party government, pressed in 
combination with Māori health advocates, to set a goal to make New Zealand Aotearoa (the 
Māori word for the country) Smokefree by 2025.10 Explicitly motivated by the inequities 
afflicting Māori women, Dame Tarania Turia dominated the push to set the Smokefree 2025 
goal.11 Smokefree 2025 set an interim goal to halve smoking in all demographic groups by 2015 
and for the country as a whole to decrease cigarette smoking prevalence to minute levels (less 
than 5% of adults) by 2025.12 This goal was alternately described as ambitious, aspirational, or 
absurd.13 This choice to adopt an ‘endgame’ goal for the tobacco epidemic made New Zealand 
only the second country in the world after Finland to do so.14 The immediate policy outcome 
during the John Key National government era was to set aside some funding to support Māori-
targeted cessation services mostly funded by a plan to increase tobacco taxes 10% per year over 
 
7 In 2011, 41% of Māori adults were current smokers compared to 17% of Paakehaa. Kylie Mason et al., The Health of New 
Zealand Adults 2011 / Key Findings of the New Zealand Health Survey. (Wellington, N.Z.: New Zealand Ministry of Health, 
2012), 23, https://www.health.govt.nz/system/files/documents/publications/nzhs-health-of-new-zealand-adults-2011-12.pdf. 
8 NY @ 5; Ross Barnett, Jamie Pearce, and Graham Moon, “Does Social Inequality Matter? Changing Ethnic Socio-Economic 
Disparities and Māori Smoking in New Zealand, 1981-1996,” Social Science & Medicine (1982) 60, no. 7 (April 2005): 1515–
26, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2004.08.002. 
9 Gillian S. Gould et al., “Smoking in Pregnancy Among Indigenous Women in High-Income Countries: A Narrative Review,” 
Nicotine & Tobacco Research: Official Journal of the Society for Research on Nicotine and Tobacco 19, no. 5 (May 1, 2017): 
506–17, https://doi.org/10.1093/ntr/ntw288; Jenny Salesa, “Progress on Achieving Smokefree 2025 and the Government’s 
Response to the Report of the Māori Affairs and Health Committees on Achieving Smokefree 2025,” July 4, 2019, 
https://www.health.govt.nz/system/files/documents/information-
release/progress_on_achieving_smokefree_2025_cabinet_paper.pdf. 
10 Tony Blakely et al., “The Maori Affairs Select Committee Inquiry and the Road to a Smokefree Aotearoa,” The New Zealand 
Medical Journal (Online) 123, no. 1326 (2010). 
11 NG @ 14-15; Richard Edwards, “Endgames and Smokefree Aotearoa 2025 Update” (PowerPoint, Smokefree Research 
Symposium, Wellington NZ, October 26, 2016), 14, https://bit.ly/2Pax6jL. 
12 Tau Henare, “Inquiry into the Tobacco Industry in Aotearoa and the Consequences of Tobacco Use for Māori” (Māori Affairs 
Committee, November 2, 2010), 10, https://www.parliament.nz/resource/en-
NZ/49DBSCH_SCR4900_1/2fc4d36b0fbdfed73f3b4694e084a5935cf967bb. 
13 NAD @ 15; NW @ 20; NG @ 4 
14 As a point of contrast, Finland’s first tobacco endgame goal was to achieve 5% smoking prevalence by 2040, making it much 
less ambitious than New Zealand’s Smokefree 2025 goal. NH @ 46; Jamie Tam, “Cultivating the next Generation of Tobacco 
Endgame Advocates,” Tobacco Control 22, no. suppl 1 (May 1, 2013): i47–48, https://doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2012-
050810. 
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an extended period.15 Eventually, the National Party agreed to also pass legislation to put tobacco 
products in plain packaging in April 2012, after much lobbying from Turia.16 Perhaps of greater 
importance to what would follow, the adoption of the Smokefree 2025 goal, was never followed 
by the adoption of a strategy mapping out how such an ambitious target would be acheived.17  
The creation of the Smokefree 2025 goal was the result of an interplay between political 
institutions and political opportunities. The creation of this goal later served as an accelerant to 
changing e-cigarette regulatory policy as a Labour government that was keen to try to meet the 
goal came to accept that a large change in regulatory policy might be a good idea. 
6.1 Regulatory Stances Towards E-cigarettes  
Before 2016, New Zealand’s regulatory framework for nicotine-containing e-cigarettes 
essentially mirrored the regulatory framework in Australia and Canada.18 Nicotine-containing e-
cigarettes are classified under the Medicines Act of 1981 as medicines and, as such, could not be 
sold or supplied in New Zealand without approval from the country’s medicines regulator, 
Medsafe.19 The relevant governing legislation for tobacco products, the Smoke-Free 
Environments Act (SFEA) was interpreted by regulators to prohibit advertising selling, 
supplying, or distributing nicotine-containing e-cigarettes.20 In 2010, Medsafe ruled that e-
cigarettes, which either contained nicotine or claimed a therapeutic purpose (i.e. to help smokers 
quit using cigarettes) would be classified as medicines, not as tobacco products.21 The move was 
prompted by the regulator’s decision to warn e-cigarette retailers to refrain from making 
therapeutic claims about their products.22 Figure 12 illustrates the regulatory framework before 
 
15 NO @ 4; Louise Thornley et al., “Achieving Smokefree Aotearoa By 2025” (Wellington NZ: University of Otago, ASPIRE 
2025, Quit Group Trust and Hapai Te Hauora, August 1, 2017), https://aspire2025.files.wordpress.com/2017/08/asap-main-
report-for-web2.pdf. 
16 Crosbie and Thomson, “Regulatory Chills.” 
17 Richard Edwards, Chris Cunningham, and Janet Hoek, “The Smokefree 2025 Goal Is in Danger of Receding – Will the 
Ministry of Health’s ‘Realignment’ Get It Back on Track? –,” Public Health Expert, University of Otago (blog), May 18, 2015, 
https://blogs.otago.ac.nz/pubhealthexpert/2015/05/18/the-smokefree-2025-goal-is-in-danger-of-receding-will-the-ministry-of-
healths-realignment-get-it-back-on-track/. 
18 Wilson et al., “Potential New Regulatory Options for E-Cigarettes in New Zealand.” 
19 Li, Newcombe, and Walton, “The Prevalence, Correlates and Reasons for Using Electronic Cigarettes among New Zealand 
Adults.” 
20 NZ Ministry of Health, “Smoke-Free Environments (Controls And Enforcement) Amendment Bill: Departmental Report” 
(Wellington NZ: New Zealand Parliament Health Committee, March 16, 2011), 21–23, https://www.parliament.nz/resource/en-
NZ/49SCHE_ADV_00DBHOH_BILL10487_1_A176996/6dfc86a1ee521f5f64424117ea42fd097a230a40. 
21 Medsafe, “Electronic Cigarettes,” Medsafe, November 5, 2010, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20121010134327/http://www.medsafe.govt.nz/regulatory/guideline/electroniccigarettes.asp. 
22 Martin Johnston, “Medical Rules Lead to Withdrawal of Electronic Quit-Smoking Aid,” New Zealand Herald, April 16, 2010, 
sec. National, https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10638910. 
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March 2018. Nicotine-containing e-cigarettes were not permitted to be sold and the only legal 
routes to access the products were through a personal importation scheme or if a company were 
to submit the product to Medsafe for premarket approval as a medicine.23  
 
Figure 12: Regulatory Framework for Nicotine Containing E-Cigarettes Before 2018 in New Zealand 
If an e-cigarette had been granted permission to be sold as a medicine then such a product would 
have received an expansionist regulatory stance as it could have been sold at pharmacies, used in 
public places, marketed with direct-to-consumer advertisements and exempted from the graphic 
warning labels that were required to be displayed on tobacco products.24 In addition, the cost of 
such a product could have been publicly subsidized if it qualified for the Prescription Subsidy 
Scheme.25 If an e-cigarette was imported for personal use then it could be used in the same 
places as tobacco cigarettes, except for in a few cities where vaping has been carved out from 
smoking bans, especially in the outdoor areas of restaurants.26 But, no e-cigarette ever received 
 
23 Jill Lane, “Regulation of E-Cigarettes and Emerging Tobacco and Nicotine-Delivery Products,” Regulatory Impact Statement 
(Wellington NZ: NZ Ministry of Health, March 29, 2017), 5, 8, 19, https://www.health.govt.nz/about-ministry/information-
releases/regulatory-impact-statements/regulation-e-cigarettes-and-emerging-tobacco-and-nicotine-delivery-products. 
24 Peter R. Mansfield et al., “Direct to Consumer Advertising,” BMJ 330, no. 7481 (December 30, 2004): 5–6, 
https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.330.7481.5. 
25 Simon Thornley et al., “Few Smokers in South Auckland Access Subsidised Nicotine Replacement Therapy,” The New 
Zealand Medical Journal 123, no. 1308 (January 29, 2010): 16–27. 
26 Local councils in New Zealand retain powers to regulate the usage of e-cigarettes in public spaces. Some councils like Porirua 
and Wellington have considered imposing rules putting e-cigarettes on parity with tobacco cigarettes but have declined to adopt 
them. Others, like Hamilton, removed e-cigarettes from public smoking ban coverage after the rules had been put in place, 
effectively backtracking. Lastly, some councils decided to keep the inclusion of e-cigarettes in their usage policies. Virginia 
Fallon, “Vaping Rules at Odds with Government Aims,” The Dominion Post, May 8, 2019, sec. News, National, NexisUni. 
“Vaping Ban for CBD Goes up in Smoke,” Hamilton News, March 22, 2019, sec. Regional, NexisUni. Emma Dangerfield, 
“Tourist Hotspot Going Smokefree,” Northern Outlook, November 7, 2018, sec. National, NexisUni; “Public Areas Now 
Smokefree,” Waihi Leader, August 8, 2019, sec. Regional, NexisUni. 
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premarket approval from Medsafe, so the entire were considered to be drugs that were subject to 
a prohibitionist stance that officially barred such products from legal sale. 
However, many regulations regarding marketing, retail, and product standards were made fuzzier 
because it was not clear that these restrictions applied to e-cigarette hardware. The law was 
clearer in its applicability to nicotine e-liquid. The total effect of this regulatory scheme was that 
the e-cigarette market grew, but did not professionalize or see the entry of multinational tobacco 
companies.27 Nevertheless, by 2017, estimates placed the number of people using e-cigarettes in 
New Zealand each month at around 150,000, a not-insignificant group compared to the 581,000 
tobacco cigarette smokers in the country at the time.28 
6.1.1 March 2018 Forwards 
This framework remained in place until March 2018, when the decision in the case of Philip 
Morris v Ministry of Health determined that all tobacco products sold in the country should be 
legally allowed to be sold unless expressly prohibited by prior statute(see Section 6.2.3).29 The 
judge determined that Section 29.2 of the Smoke-Free Environments Act should be read to only 
prohibit the sale of tobacco products that were not made to be inhaled. As a result, Philip Morris 
was permitted to sell its heated tobacco product, IQOS, in the country but it was subject to all 
regulations placed on tobacco products therein.30 This ruling was immediately viewed by the 
Ministry of Health as applying to nicotine-containing e-cigarettes, thereby legalizing them under 
a similar regulatory framework as tobacco cigarettes, in effect establishing a permissive 
regulatory stance towards the e-cigarette market.31 The Crown did not appeal the decisions, de 
facto acceding to the change. 
After the decision was handed down, the regulatory framework for e-cigarettes was thrown into 
chaos. As best as can be deduced, the regulatory framework post-Philip Morris is shown in 
Figure 13. Generally, the medicine pathway was unchanged and nicotine-containing e-cigarettes 
 
27 David Attwood, Daniel Irwin-Brown, and Nick Wenbourne, “In Depth: E-Cig Market and Law in Australia and New 
Zealand,” ECigIntelligence (blog), December 18, 2014, https://ecigintelligence.com/in-depth-e-cig-market-and-law-in-australia-
and-new-zealand/. 
28 NZ Ministry of Health, “Indicator: Use Electronic Cigarettes at Least Once a Month,” New Zealand Health Survey Annual 
Data Explorer, March 25, 2019, https://bit.ly/2PhQ1cg; NZ Ministry of Health, “Indicator: Current Smokers,” New Zealand 
Health Survey Annual Data Explorer, March 25, 2019, https://bit.ly/2PhQ1cg. 
29 Butler, Ministry of Health v Phillip Morris (New Zealand) Ltd, NZDC. 
30 Zaharia and Craft, “New Zealand Court Gives Philip Morris Nod to Sell Heated Tobacco...” 
31 “Vaping, Smokeless, Including Heated Tobacco,” Ministry of Health NZ, May 9, 2018, https://www.health.govt.nz/our-
work/preventative-health-wellness/tobacco-control/vaping-smokeless-including-heated-tobacco. 
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were reclassified by default as tobacco products. Bureaucrats in the Ministry of Health pointed 
out in policy consultations and cabinet meetings that it was not entirely clear which regulations 
applied to nicotine-containing e-cigarettes in the tobacco products pathway.32 For example, it 
seems that the post-Philip Morris regulatory framework might have only applied to e-liquid 
made from tobacco and not to e-cigarette hardware.33 This made for a confusing set of 
regulations that applied to some devices and products and not to others. Notably, the Labour 
government was clear that certain product standards, prohibitions on usage in public places, and 
excise taxes did not apply to e-cigarettes.34 Product standards meant to ensure the quality and 
safety of e-liquids and e-cigarettes were also nonexistent.35 Officials commented that similar 
restrictions on e-cigarette marketing and retailing apply, but point-of-sale display bans that apply 
to tobacco cigarettes are not being enforced for nicotine-containing e-cigarettes.36 Regulatory 
uncertainty defined the market.37 Amongst this regulatory uncertainty, observers viewed the 
growth of the market as speeding up.38 
Figure 13: Post Philip Morris Regulatory Framework for Nicotine-Containing E-Cigarettes 
 
 
32 Jenny Salesa and Jill Lane, “Supporting Smokers to Switch to Significantly Less Harmful Alternatives” (Wellington NZ: NZ 
Cabinet Office, November 21, 2018), sec. 30, https://bit.ly/2QfoDee. 
33 While it cannot always be assured that the nicotine in an e-cigarette is derived from tobacco, it is far more economical to 
produce liquid nicotine from tobacco leaves than from other plants or to synthetically produce this key chemical. After Philip 
Morris, e-cigarette retailers and producers had incentives to claim that their nicotine was produced from tobacco because it 
qualified the product for a permissive/expansionist regulatory stance instead of the prohibitionist stance that would be applied to 
synthetically derived nicotine-containing e-cigarettes. 
34 Martin Johnston, “Kiwi Smokers Urged to Make New Year’s Switch to Vaping for Health and to Avoid Tax Hike,” NZ 
Herald, December 31, 2018, sec. New Zealand, https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12184226. 
35 NAC @ 5 
36 NQ @ 21 
37 NY @ 19 
38 NW @ 75 
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6.1.2 Towards Risk Proportionate Regulation  
New Zealand regulatory agencies have gained confidence in a belief over time that, given robust 
regulatory powers, the risks of expanding the market for e-cigarettes can be mitigated and public 
health benefits can be gleaned.39 Under the last National government, and the current Labour-
coalition government, the changes each government would make to e-cigarette regulatory policy 
have been described in regulatory impact statements that have been presented to cabinet. These 
plans coalesced into the Smokefree Environments and Regulated Products (Vaping) Amendment 
Bill which was introduced in February 2020 to finally change the country’s e-cigarette regulatory 
stance.40  
Each plan was written by Ministry of Health officials in the Tobacco Control Programme and 
sought to implement a risk-proportionate regulatory framework to impose restrictions in line 
with the risk to health that a product posed. Essentially, the officials wanted to provide 
advantages to help grow the e-cigarette market at the expense of the tobacco products market. 
The regulatory framework proposed to the National Party government in March of 2017 
prohibited the sale of e-cigarettes to persons under the age of 18, restricted the sales of e-
cigarettes in vending machines to the same establishments where cigarette sales were allowed in 
vending machines, prohibited most marketing activity beyond the retail setting, advised 
businesses to set up voluntary clean air policies, and empowered the Ministry of Health to set 
product quality, ingredient, and manufacturing standards.41 
In late 2018, a very similar plan was promoted by Ministry of Health officials in a cabinet 
meeting with the Ardern Labour-coalition government, with several additional provisions that 
limited marketing to adult-only retailers, disallowed the use of vending machines, and set out 
pre-market notification responsibilities for manufacturers.42 Eventually, the Labour-coalition 
government’s plan would evolve to ensure that usage of e-cigarettes in public places was limited 
to the same places that tobacco cigarettes are allowed to be used.43 By September 2019, Ministry 
 
39 Salesa and Lane, “Supporting Smokers to Switch to Significantly Less Harmful Alternatives,” 7. 
40 Salesa and Lane, “Supporting Smokers to Switch to Significantly Less Harmful Alternatives”; Lane, “Regulation of E-
Cigarettes and Emerging Tobacco and Nicotine-Delivery Products.” 
41 Lane, “Regulation of E-Cigarettes and Emerging Tobacco and Nicotine-Delivery Products.” 
42 Salesa and Lane, “Supporting Smokers to Switch to Significantly Less Harmful Alternatives,” sec. 6.1. 
43 Hannah Martin, “Plan to Ban Vaping in Bars, Restaurants, Schools and Workplaces in New Zealand,” Stuff, November 23, 
2018, https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/health/108816764/plan-to-ban-vaping-in-bars-restaurants-schools-and-workplaces-in-
new-zealand. 
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of Health officials announced that e-cigarette flavors would be limited in any legislation to 
tobacco, mint, and menthol and that further powers to establish product standards limiting the 
appeal of e-cigarettes to non-smokers would be added going further.44  
In February 2020, on the eve of COVID-19-spurred lockdowns, the Labour government 
introduced a bill to legalize and regulate the e-cigarette market.45 The government aimed to fast-
track the Smokefree Environments and Regulated Products (Vaping) Amendment Bill to passage 
before the country’s September 2020 elections.46 Figure 14 lays out the expansionist regulatory 
stance towards the e-cigarette market that the bill would put in place.  
Figure 14: Proposed Regulatory Framework for E-Cigarettes under the Smokefree Environments and Regulated Products 
(Vaping) Amendment Bill 
 
E-cigarettes would be granted competitive advantages over substitute tobacco cigarettes in 
marketing, retail, pricing, and product standards. In Marketing, public health campaigns, subject 
to the approval of the Director-General of Health, would be allowed to encourage cigarette 
smokers to switch to vaping. In retail, vape shops will be allowed to register with the Ministry of 
Health and be granted special permission to sell flavors beyond mint, menthol, and tobacco. For 
 
44 This announcement reflected survey data indicating that these flavors were preferred by older e-cigarette users in New 
Zealand. Cira Olivier, “Plans for Vaping Regulation but Fear of Job Losses, More Smoking,” The Daily Post, November 16, 
2019, sec. Regional; Lucy Warhurst, “Ministry of Health Proposes More Regulations after Survey Shows School Children 
Vaping,” Newshub, September 19, 2019, sec. NZ, https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2019/09/ministry-of-health-
proposes-more-regulations-after-survey-shows-school-children-vaping.html. Hayley Guiney, Alana Oakly, and Greg Martin, “E-
Cigarette Use and Perceptions among Current and Ex-Smokers in New Zealand,” HPA Report (Wellington NZ: Health 
Promotion Agency, January 2019), 16, https://bit.ly/2HjywRT. 
45 Lidia Kelly, “New Zealand Moves to Ban Vaping Ads, Sales to Minors,” Reuters, February 23, 2020, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-newzealand-vaping-idUSKCN20H00M. 
46 “Full Interview: Associate Health Minister Jenny Salesa on Q+A with Jack Tame,” 1NEWS (Auckland: TVNZ, February 23, 
2020), https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/full-interview-associate-health-minister-jenny-salesa-q-jack-tame. 
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pricing, policymakers have not yet expressed interest in levying an excise tax on e-cigarettes. For 
product standards, e-cigarettes will not have to carry graphic health warning labels, be subject to 
plain packaging provisions, and will not be subject (yet) to nicotine concentration limits. These 
expansionist policy proposals are balanced off by several provisions aimed to limit the appeal 
and availability of the devices to young people and avoid some of the pitfalls suffered by Canada 
and the United States, like limiting the sales of products sold in retailers that allow youth inside 
(grocery stores, and pharmacies) to tobacco, mint, and menthol flavors. All these changes would 
create an expansionist regulatory stance towards the e-cigarette market. 
Summary 
New Zealand proceeded from a Prohibitionist to a Permissive/Expansionist regulatory stance 
almost by accident. The coming decision to formally adopt an Expansionist regulatory stance can 
be explained by a confluence to an influential research community that favored tobacco harm 
reduction policies, a problem in the form of lackluster progress towards meeting a self-imposed 
tobacco control goal, and a political community that largely favored the regulatory stance on 
offer from the policy community.   
6.2 Problem Stream 
The issue of e-cigarette regulation bubbled up in the consciousness of the New Zealand public 
through the country’s media, but these institutions proved less than consequential in the ripening 
of the problem stream in the current case. Just two companies, NZME, and Stuff control 90% of 
New Zealand’s online and print journalism market.47 Public media is sustained and important in 
television and radio.48 The editorial choices of these actors made little difference in how a lack of 
e-cigarette availability or regulation became framed as a problem. 
E-cigarettes came to be perceived by policymakers as a problem worthy of intervention due to a 
collision of two decisions. The first decision of consequence was the establishment of the 
Smokefree 2025 goal and the subsequent unwillingness of policymakers to present a strategy to 
 
47 Mel Bunce, The Broken Estate: Journalism and Democracy in a Post-Truth World (Bridget Williams Books, 2019), 2. 
48 Merja Myllylahti and Sarah Baker, “JMAD New Zealand Media Ownership Report 2019” (Auckland, New Zealand: AUT 
research center for Journalism, Media and Democracy, May 12, 2019), 
https://www.aut.ac.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/329770/JMAD-2019-Report.pdf. 
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meet the ambitious goal. As the country repeatedly fell short of meeting the interim Smokefree 
2025 goals, an appetite for trying something new in tobacco control grew.  
The second decision of consequence was the unexpected turn of events in the case of Philip 
Morris v Ministry of Health which triggered the unscheduled legalization of the sale of nicotine-
containing e-cigarettes in the country in March 2018. The decision left the country with a 
regulatory framework that satisfied no one and created the impetus to revise the regulatory 
framework for e-cigarettes in a more expansionist direction. 
6.2.1 Tobacco Control Policy Progress 
Tobacco cigarette smoking in New Zealand has remained on a long downward trajectory for over 
40 years, largely as a result of a sustained tobacco control campaign, that has been a 
comprehensive and evidence-based approach.49 New Zealand’s tobacco epidemic has been 
slightly different from other countries in this study because it has consistently impacted nearly as 
many women as men.50 
Over time New Zealand has adopted a tobacco control policy regime that, like the other case 
countries, ranks among the world’s strongest contractionist regulatory stances.51 Regulation of 
tobacco products began through voluntary agreements with the tobacco industry to place warning 
labels on packages and to remove advertising from television and radio through the 1960s and 
70s.52 This era was defined by a strong tobacco industry-supported on multiple fronts by local 
tobacco farmers, advertising agencies, and political parties who benefitted from the tobacco 
industry’s financial largesse.53 
The foundation of the current policy regime was created in the form of the Smoke-Free 
Environments Act of 1990 (SFEA) which was shepherded to passage by then Labour Party 
Health Minister and future Prime Minister, Helen Clark.54 That bill banned or restricted most 
 
49 Chris Money and Susie Keegan, “Evaluation of the Tobacco Excise Increases – Final Report” (Wellington NZ: NZ MInistry of 
Health, November 27, 2018), 28, https://bit.ly/2QEbo7O. 
50 D. R. Hay and F. H. Foster, “Intercensal Trends in Cigarette Smoking in New Zealand 1: Age, Sex and Ethnic Status.,” The 
New Zealand Medical Journal 97, no. 755 (May 1984): 283–85. 
51 World Health Organization, WHO REPORT ON THE GLOBAL TOBACCO EPIDEMIC, 2019: Offer Help to Quit Tobacco 
Use. 
52 Studlar, “Ideas, Institutions and Diffusion.” 
53 George Thomson and Nicholas Wilson, Resource Document, a Brief History of Tobacco Control in New Zealand (Wellington, 
N.Z.: AFPHM (N.Z.), 1997), sec. 8.3, https://bit.ly/2LaWPTN. 
54 Michael Carr-Gregg, “Interaction of Public Policy Advocacy and Research in the Passage of New Zealand’s Smoke-Free 
Environments Act 1990,” Addiction 88 (1993): 35S–41S, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1360-0443.1993.tb02160.x. 
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tobacco marketing activities, restricted public smoking, and set a government-wide strategy for 
tobacco control for the first time.55 The SFEA also created the Health Sponsorship Council to 
fund the replacement of tobacco sponsorships; wherein the Benson & Hedges Fashion Design 
Awards became the Smokefree Fashion Design Awards and motorsports’ Rothmans Rally 
became the Smokefree Rally.56  
An SFEA Amendment passed in 1997 by a right-wing coalition government further restricted 
tobacco marketing, increased the minimum age of sale for tobacco products from 16 to 18, and 
empowered the Ministry of Health to set product standards.57 In 2003, then PM of a Labour-led 
coalition government, Helen Clark and then-Associate Minister of Health Steve Chadwick led 
the drive to amend the SFEA to ban smoking in almost all workplaces.58  
After the adoption of the Smokefree 2025 goal (see page 149), in 2011, amendments to the 
SFEA passed by the right-wing coalition government tightened rules on tobacco retailing to keep 
tobacco products and advertisements for those products out of sight at shops.59 In 2012, the 
Health Sponsorship Council was dissolved and replaced by the Health Promotion Authority 
which had a broader mission than its predecessor. In between these milestone legislative 
achievements, right-wing governments occasionally acted to weaken some of the more 
progressive policies, such as the insertion of exemptions on tobacco sponsorships for 
international sporting competitions.60 Since the 2011 SFEA Amendments, the country has 
largely relied upon using tobacco tax increases as its primary driver on tobacco control policy 
progress. The same period was also marked by passing a point-of-sale display ban as well as 
adopting plain packaging once Australia had cleared up the legality of the measure both national 
and international court.61  
Nonetheless, at an increasing pace since the 1990s, governments across the political spectrum 
have managed to find tobacco control legislation that adopted an ever-increasing contractionist 
 
55 Studlar, “The Political Dynamics of Tobacco Control in Australia and New Zealand.” 
56 These programs were modeled on similar tobacco sponsorship buyout efforts that began first in Australia (see note 100 at page 
99). ND @ 14; Claire Regnault, “Smokin’! When Cigarettes and Fashion Went Hand in Hand,” Te Papa’s Blog, March 30, 2017, 
https://bit.ly/2NzduTJ.  
57 Murray Laugesen and Boyd Swinburn, “New Zealand’s Tobacco Control Programme 1985-1998,” Tobacco Control 9, no. 2 
(June 1, 2000): 155–62, https://doi.org/10.1136/tc.9.2.155. 
58 Cairney, Studlar, and Mamudu, Global Tobacco Control, chap. 7. 
59 Claire Trevett, “New Law: Smokes, Tobacco in Shops to Be Hidden,” NZ Herald, July 14, 2011, https://bit.ly/341uRCE. 
60 Thomson and Wilson, Resource Document, a Brief History of Tobacco Control in New Zealand, sec. 7.5. 
61 Crosbie and Thomson, “Regulatory Chills.” 
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regulatory framework that was agreeable and worthwhile of passage. The effects of this 
contractionist policy regime have largely been favorable to the health of the New Zealand 
population at large. The prevalence of tobacco cigarette smoking fell steadily over time, 
especially among Paakehaa.62 All of this has resulted in current cigarette smoking rates falling to 
14.9% of New Zealand adults in 2017/18 while 3.8% of adults were counted as current e-
cigarette users in the same period.63 But, none of this progress is moving at a pace to be on track 
to meet the final Smokefree 2025 goal, and interim goals have already been missed.64 
6.2.2 Falling Off Track to Meet the Smokefree 2025 Target 
Over time, the commitment of politicians to reach the Smokefree 2025 goal has been unsteady at 
best.65 But, surveys of the New Zealand public have found that awareness of the goal’s existence 
is high, while understanding of the target is only middling.66 Smokers are more likely to believe 
than non-smokers that the goal entails getting smoking prevalence to zero or ending tobacco 
sales altogether.67 This misunderstanding among the target population for policy change did not 
speed the country towards achieving its goal. Instead, it only made the goal seem harsher and 
less achievable. 
The policy community vacillated between a belief that tobacco control in New Zealand was 
working, but progress was too slow, and that because tobacco control had inadvertently 
exacerbated Māori health disparities, it wasn’t working at all.68 Oddly, this belief in the declining 
efficacy of traditional tobacco control measures was held both by the public health policy 
 
62 Money and Keegan, “Evaluation of the Tobacco Excise Increases – Final Report,” 67. 
63 Since 2015/16, the rate of current vaping rose 2.4 percentage points while the rate of current smoking fell by 1.4 percentage 
points. NZ Ministry of Health, “Indicator: Use Electronic Cigarettes at Least Once a Month”; NZ Ministry of Health, “Indicator: 
Current Smokers.” 
64 Some were keen to point out the goal was aspirational in nature, and that there have been no formal mid-term targets that have 
been failed to be reached. Nick Wilson et al., “Modelling the Number of Quitters Needed to Achieve New Zealand’s Smokefree 
2025 Goal for Māori and Non-Māori,” The New Zealand Medical Journal 131, no. 1487 (December 14, 2018): 30–37. ND @ 17 
65 NP @ 29; Richard Edwards, Janet Hoek, and George Thomson, “Smokefree 2025: Patterns and Trends in References to the 
Smokefree Goal in Political Speeches and Press Releases,” The New Zealand Medical Journal 127, no. 1398 (July 18, 2014): 
122–25. 
66 Philip Gendall, Janet Hoek, and Richard Edwards, “What Does the 2025 Smokefree Goal Mean to the New Zealand Public?,” 
The New Zealand Medical Journal 127, no. 1406 (November 28, 2014): 101–3; Richard Edwards et al., “Support for a Tobacco 
Endgame and Increased Regulation of the Tobacco Industry among New Zealand Smokers: Results from a National Survey,” 
Tobacco Control 22, no. e1 (May 1, 2013): e86–93, https://doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2011-050324. 
67 Gendall, Hoek, and Edwards, “What Does the 2025 Smokefree Goal Mean to the New Zealand Public?,” fig. 2. 
68 The exacerbation stems from the faster decline in smoking rates among Paakehaa than Māori. NAC @ 7; NS @ 36-37; Louise 
Thornley et al., “Smokefree Aotearoa 2025 Progress Report 2017” (ASPIRE 2025, August 2017), 
https://aspire2025.files.wordpress.com/2017/08/asap-progress-report-for-web.pdf. 
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community and the more free-market/libertarian policy community.69 There was a widely held 
concern that the country had become overly reliant on traditional tobacco control measures and 
that they worried about impoverishing smokers.70 While this excise tax-driven economic 
pressure has been consistently found to increase smoking cessation, in the face of US $25 
cigarette packs, even public health advocates became gun-shy about arguing for further tobacco 
excise tax increases.71 The socioeconomic and racial composition of the remaining smokers in 
New Zealand has caused left-wing minded public health advocates to become nervous about the 
distributional effects of excise tax rises.72 Dissatisfaction with the rate of progress in smoking 
reduction has become palpable, and there is an awareness that without doing something different, 
the Smokefree 2025 goal will remain out of reach.73 
6.2.3 Philip Morris v Ministry of Health 
In December 2016, British American Tobacco alerted the Ministry of Health that Philip Morris 
was planning on begging to sell its heated tobacco product in the country in violation of the 
SFEA’s ban on the sale of tobacco “for chewing or any other oral use (other than smoking)”.74 
That month, officials from the Ministry of Health’s Tobacco Control Programme held a meeting 
with Philip Morris employees and informed them that the ministry believed selling heated 
tobacco would violate the SFEA.75 They asked Philip Morris not to sell the products, but Philip 
Morris demurred. Instead, they debuted IQOS at a New Year’s Eve 2017 party on Waiheke 
Island and sales began in shops, thereafter.76 
 
69 Jenesa Jeram, “Smoke and Vapour: The Changing World of Tobacco Harm Reduction” (Wellington NZ: The New Zealand 
Initiative, May 11, 2018), https://www.scimex.org/__data/assets/file/0007/322927/Smoke-and-Vapour-Embargoed-Fri-11-
May.pdf. 
70 Maintaining a 10 cigarette a day habit on the minimum wage cost nearly one-quarter of that worker’s income. Health 
Promotion Agency, “Cost of Smoking,” Smokefree NZ, June 9, 2019, https://www.smokefree.org.nz/smoking-its-effects/cost-of-
smoking; Marewa Glover and David Sweanor, “How to Stop Smoking (Hint: It’s Not Making Cigarettes More Expensive),” The 
Spinoff (blog), August 4, 2017, https://thespinoff.co.nz/society/04-08-2017/how-to-stop-smoking-hint-its-not-making-cigarettes-
more-expensive/. 
71 Frank J. Chaloupka, Ayda Yurekli, and Geoffrey T. Fong, “Tobacco Taxes as a Tobacco Control Strategy,” Tobacco Control 
21, no. 2 (March 1, 2012): 172–80, https://doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2011-050417. 
72 “‘Shock Increases’ on Cigarette Tax Ineffective, Says ASH - ‘There Was No Plan,’” 1News Breakfast (TVNZ, June 24, 2018), 
https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/shock-increases-cigarette-tax-ineffective-says-ash-there-no-plan. 
73 NAC @ 9 
74 ND @ 40 
75 Luke Cunningham Clere, “Brief of Evidence of Brendon Neville Baker,” PMI Science, December 2017, 
https://www.pmiscience.com/resources/docs/default-source/NCDC-vs-Morris/nz_brief-of-evidence-of-brendon-neville-baker-
(nz-moh)_december-2017.pdf. 
76 Luke Cunningham Clere, “Closing Submissions on Behalf of the Ministry of Health” (PMI Science, March 2018), para. 36(e), 
https://www.pmiscience.com/resources/docs/default-source/NCDC-vs-Morris/nz_closing-submissions-on-behalf-of-moh_march-
2018.pdf. 
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On March 3, 2017, a Ministry of Health employee purchased a pack of Philip Morris’s heated 
tobacco from a shop.77 Then in May 2017, the Ministry of Health laid charges against Philip 
Morris for violating the SFEA.78 In court, the Ministry of Health argued that heated tobacco was 
not being smoked, and therefore was not allowed to be sold.79 Philip Morris’ counsel countered 
that the prohibition on sales of tobacco products that were not smoked only meant to apply to 
tobacco products that were not inhaled, like chewing tobacco, oral snuff, and Swedish snus.80 In 
the end, the district court judge sided with Philip Morris’ interpretation of the statute and ruled 
that heated tobacco could be sold in New Zealand, but that it was also subject to tobacco product 
regulations.81 This meant that heated tobacco would be subject to the strictly contractionist 
policy stance currently in place for tobacco cigarettes, including advertising prohibitions, plain 
packaging, and excise taxation.82 
Most importantly, in May of 2018, after consultation with legal experts, the Ministry of Health 
announced it would not appeal the case to a higher court.83 The ruling that inhaled tobacco 
products, which the Ministry of Health had concluded included e-cigarettes, which were now 
legally allowed to be sold, and required policy to change to conform to the new legal reality.84 
The Ministry had already concluded that it wanted a legal and regulated e-cigarette market to be 
created in New Zealand. The opportunity to take the first step towards legality fell into their 
lap.85 In effect, the court decision promulgated the opening of a market and begged Parliament to 
pass a new regulatory framework into law. 86 While e-cigarette retailers and manufacturers 
 
77 Butler, Ministry of Health v Phillip Morris (New Zealand) Ltd, NZDC paragraph 3. 
78 Deidre Mussen, “Charges Laid against Philip Morris,” Ministry of Health NZ, May 18, 2017, 
https://www.health.govt.nz/news-media/media-releases/charges-laid-against-philip-morris. 
79 Ben Rumsey, “Investigation into IQOS Device, HEETS Tobacco Sticks and Evidence of Combustion” (Wellington: CRL 
Energy Ltd, November 17, 2017), https://www.pmiscience.com/resources/docs/default-source/NCDC-vs-Morris/nz_crl-energy-
ltd---investigation-into-iqos-device-heets-tobacco-sticks-and-evidence-of-combustion_november-2017.pdf. 
80 David Boldt and Matt Sumpter, “Defendant’s Submissions” (Champan Tripp, March 7, 2018), 
https://www.pmiscience.com/resources/docs/default-source/NCDC-vs-Morris/nz_pm-submission_march-2018.pdf. 
81 Butler, Ministry of Health v Phillip Morris (New Zealand) Ltd, NZDC paragraphs 33–35. 
82 ND @ 46; It should be noted that the excise tax for tobacco is based on the weight of the tobacco leaf in a product. Philip 
Morris’ heated tobacco product contains about 36% as much tobacco per stick as a combustible cigarette. This tax structure 
creates a price advantage for heated tobacco in New Zealand relative to cigarettes that is one of the largest in the world. Philip 
Morris International, “Investor Information,” May 1, 2018, 51, 53, http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9NjkzODEwfENoaWxkSUQ9NDA1MDYxfFR5cGU9MQ==&t=1; Liber, “Heated 
Tobacco Products and Combusted Cigarettes.” 
83 “Vaping, Smokeless, Including Heated Tobacco”; Salesa and Lane, “Supporting Smokers to Switch to Significantly Less 
Harmful Alternatives,” 7. 
84 “Vaping, Smokeless, Including Heated Tobacco.” 
85 NH @ 4 
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preferred to establish voluntary standards on all these matters, public officials stated that they 
wanted to codify policy.87 The consequence of the unexpected court outcome was that the sale of 
e-cigarettes in New Zealand became legal overnight.88 Political actors, like the Associate 
Minister of Health under the new Labour government, Jenny Salesa, were faced with the choice 
of allowing e-cigarette manufacturers and retailers to self-regulate or to pass a new regulatory 
framework were then spurred into action.89 
Summary of the Problem Stream 
New Zealand’s reaction to e-cigarettes changed over time, but certain decisions by disparate 
actors all tipped the balance of the tobacco control conversation towards a state defined by a 
building concern about the failure of Māori to sufficiently improve their smoking prevalence 
rates. This growing concern can be traced to several causes; the political rights of Māori in the 
New Zealand government, the decision to set a Smokefree 2025 endgame goal, and the decision 
to defund all but one tobacco control advocacy group in 2016. By the time the 2018 decision in 
Philip Morris arrived, everything had been laid out to match the major problem of impending 
failure to meet the ambitious Smokefree 2025 goal and the minor problem of a confusing 
regulatory system to the solution of imposing an expansionist regulatory framework on the 
nicotine-containing e-cigarette market. A series of mobilized and credible policy entrepreneurs 
helped push such a policy through an open policy window. 
6.3 Policy Stream 
The development of an expansionist e-cigarette regulatory policy in New Zealand took place in 
an academic community that closely interfaced with the Ministry of Health. The deep links 
between academics, who developed a largely positive disposition towards tobacco harm 
reduction, and government officials shaped the direction of e-cigarette regulatory policy even as 
tobacco industry interference constantly threatened to undermine public support for tobacco 
harm reduction. This section traces the development of a policy consensus that favored adopting 
an expansionist regulatory stance towards e-cigarettes. 
 
87 Hamish McNeilly, “VAPING PACKAGING, FLAVOURS CONCERN,” Dominion Post, June 9, 2018. 
88 Zaharia and Craft, “New Zealand Court Gives Philip Morris Nod to Sell Heated Tobacco...” 
89 NAD @ 11 
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6.3.1 The Bureaucracy 
The two units of the national bureaucracy who were primarily tasked with establishing and 
enforcing a regulatory framework for e-cigarettes were the Ministry of Health and the Ministry’s 
pharmaceutical regulating arm, Medsafe. Ministry of Health officials attempted to contain the 
growth of the e-cigarette market but eventually concluded that effort to be a failure before they 
aided in the process of creating a change in the regulatory stance towards e-cigarettes. 
The New Zealand Ministry of Health initially gave e-cigarettes a cordial greeting when they 
arrived in the country. At the first mention of e-cigarettes in the New Zealand media in 
December 2007, the Ministry welcomed the devices being used in areas where smoking was 
banned but noted that if the devices contained nicotine they would need to be registered as 
medicines with Medsafe.90  
New Zealand’s medicines regulator, Medsafe, was created by the passage of the Medicines Act 
of 1981.91 The agency possesses similar powers to other industrialized countries’ medicines 
regulators including premarket review.92 By dint that nicotine-containing e-cigarettes contain a 
chemical that Medsafe has deemed to be a medicine, the regulator considers all nicotine-
containing e-cigarettes to be under its regulatory purview.93 However, only one nicotine-
containing e-cigarette appears to have ever been submitted for consideration as a therapeutic 
product to Medsafe, and that product never made it to market.94 
An early e-cigarette retailer, AFP International, claimed that in 2008, Medsafe had clarified its 
lack of interest in regulating cigarette sales, which supposedly carried over to a lack of intent to 
regulate e-cigarettes.95 By 2010, Medsafe changed its mind and began warning retailers, like 
Dunedin-based OnlinePharmacy to stop selling nicotine-containing e-cigarettes as they were 
 
90 Martin Johnston, “No Smoke, No Fire, Just Nicotine,” NZ Herald, December 7, 2007, sec. National, https://bit.ly/2kwsZ2M. 
91 The full name of the agency is the New Zealand Medicines and Medical Devices Safety Authority. Abdul F. Mutlib, “The 
Regulatory Approach to Medicines in New Zealand,” Drug Information Journal 30, no. 4 (October 1996): 905–12, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/009286159603000406. 
92 Moshe Maor, “Organizational Reputations and the Observability of Public Warnings in 10 Pharmaceutical Markets,” 
Governance 24, no. 3 (July 1, 2011): 557–82, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2011.01536.x. 
93 Medsafe, “Guideline on the Regulation of Therapeutic Products in New Zealand: Part 1: Overview of Therapeutic Product 
Regulation” (NZ MInistry of Health, October 2014), sec. 4.4, 
https://www.medsafe.govt.nz/regulatory/Guideline/GRTPNZ/overview-of-therapeutic-product-regulation.pdf. 
94 Lane, “Regulation of E-Cigarettes and Emerging Tobacco and Nicotine-Delivery Products,” para. 84. 
95 “E-Cigarette Seller Hit with Warning,” New Zealand Herald, December 31, 2010, sec. National, https://bit.ly/2NCk6km. 
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doing so in violation of the Medicines Act.96 Medsafe never appeared to do more than warn 
retailers that they violated the Medicines Act, and no records of formal prosecution for violations 
of the ban on nicotine import and sale can be found. Medsafe concluded it would be very 
difficult, expensive, and of limited value to prove in a court that a particular nicotine-containing 
liquid meant for use in an e-cigarette derived its nicotine from a natural tobacco leaf and not 
from synthetic sources.97 As a result, by 2017, the Ministry of Health bluntly assessed that it was 
“unable to effectively enforce the law”.98  
By April 2010, the Ministry of Health was still saying in media statements that more research 
was needed to prove that e-cigarettes assisted in smoking cessation before it could regulate the 
devices as medicines.99 At the same time, the Ministry was advising Parliament that e-cigarettes 
were an option for smokers to use in cessation, although they warned the devices were not yet 
approved for that therapeutic use by Medsafe.100 This line of reasoning echoes through advice 
given by the Ministry to Parliament in 2011, when it reiterated that cessation trials would be 
required before they would throw their weight behind opening commercial sales of the 
devices.101 
By 2013, Ministry officials were quoted as being worried about gateway effects into smoking 
that could follow the expansion of the e-cigarette market and recommending people use Medsafe 
approved smoking cessation aids instead of e-cigarettes.102 By 2014, Ministry of Health officials 
stated they were actively considering regulatory options for the products, recognizing the 
deficiency of clarity and control in the existing regulatory framework.103 Internal consultations 
 
96 Martin Johnston, “Smoker Wants E-Ciggie Nicotine at a Shop near Him,” NZ Herald, April 14, 2010, sec. New Zealand, 
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98 Lane, 19. 
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Departmental Report” (Wellington NZ: New Zealand Parliament Health Committee, March 23, 2011), 18, 
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102 Martin Johnston, “$40 a Pack to Hit ‘smokefree’ Goal,” NZ Herald, March 3, 2013, sec. New Zealand, https://bit.ly/2k8quUg; 
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on the matter concluded in early 2015, with few noticeable external changes to Ministry 
policy.104 While consultations continued, Ministry of Health officials claimed they were trying to 
regulate the flourishing black market in e-liquid on their hands, but they were not empowered to 
do more than send warning letters to retailers to crack down on such commerce.105 However, 
through 2015, Ministry officials were still unwilling to recommend the products as potential 
cessation aids and was reportedly continuing to enforce provisions barring the retail sale in 
shops, mostly in the form of cease and desist letters that were sent to retailers.106 No evidence of 
tougher enforcement measures being taken could be found.  
Tonally, everything changed around December 2016 when Nicky Wagner, took over as 
Associate Health Minister for Peseta Sam Lotu-Iiga upon his retirement from public service.107 
By late 2017, the Ministry was saying in public communications that vaping was “significantly 
less harmful than smoking tobacco” and that tobacco cigarette smokers would benefit from 
switching to the new devices.108 That message from the Ministry of Health has endured ever 
since. The reason for the shift is not clear, but like everyone else in the field, Ministry of Health 
Officials, particularly those in the Tobacco Control Programme, were on an intellectual journey 
through the evidence on the effects of e-cigarettes on public health.109 
By June 2019, the Health Promotion Authority within the Ministry of Health, rolled out a web-
based marketing campaign extolling the virtue of switching from cigarettes to e-cigarettes as a 
great way to quit smoking.110 They explicitly claimed that vaping products had the potential to 
 
104 NZ Ministry of Health, “Four Monthly Report: 1 July 2014 to 28 February 2015,” June 24, 2015, 15, 
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contribute to achieving Smokefree 2025 by disrupting significant health inequities in New 
Zealand society.111 
6.3.2 Empowering a Cohesive Coalition 
Three primary groups were able to cooperatively speak with a single voice when agitating for e-
cigarette regulatory policy change. Each group brought separate fonts of expertise and credibility 
to the policy debate around e-cigarettes in New Zealand. The first group was the tobacco harm 
reduction (THR) advocates academics based primarily at the University of Auckland who were 
colleagues of Murray Laugesen, the first non-industry scientist in the world to study e-cigarettes. 
The second group was a group of academics who were based at the University of Otago and 
were less enthusiastic about the potential for e-cigarettes to improve public health. Finally, the 
group was strengthened by the presence of non-governmental organizations that supported the 
use of e-cigarettes, particularly Hāpai te Hauora. This coalition also viewed the nascent domestic 
vaping industry, comprised of small business owners trying to sell their wares to smokers, as 
separate from the tobacco industry. The forthright nature of some of the domestic vaping 
industry’s leaders served to build trust and even scored them invitations to serve on the Ministry 
of Health E-cigarette Technical Expert Advisory Group, which created detailed 
recommendations to the Ministry outlining a comprehensive set of product standards that could 
be included in a future regulatory framework.112  
The role played by grassroots e-cigarette advocacy groups in New Zealand may have been 
important to building momentum towards the creation of this amicable coalition of THR 
advocates. However, it is difficult to determine if their presence was instrumental in creating a 
policy window as their actions were not wholly different from vapers in other countries. Their 
contributions no doubt provided endless anecdotes that fueled policy change efforts, but it is 
difficult to translate how this community readied the ground for policy change.   
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6.3.2.1 The unbroken line of credible policy entrepreneurs from Murray Laugesen on 
The presence of credible public health actors in the New Zealand policy stream that favored 
THR policy from an early date enabled future changes in the regulatory stance to become likely 
and even acceptable to a vast array of policymakers. New Zealand has a solid research 
community focusing on the subject. Laugesen’s presence and work set up THR advocates to 
successfully change the e-cigarette regulatory framework towards an expansionist stance. The 
academic discussion around e-cigarettes contained more THR advocates than in Australia. But 
even those persons who were e-cigarette skeptics were much less skeptical than counterparts 
across the Tasman Sea in Australia.  
The progenitor THR advocate in New Zealand was a former Ministry of Health official, Murray 
Laugesen, who was instrumental in passing the SFEA and other tobacco control policies in the 
1980s and 1990s who transitioned to working in a para-academic position in his retirement.113 
Laugesen’s presence as a THR advocate was also made clear and raised to a level of importance 
as the paper of record referred to his advocacy for e-cigarettes in the same breath that it also 
called him the “nation’s most high-profile tobacco expert”.114 Laugesen worked to cultivate the 
development of his younger Auckland-based colleagues including Christopher Bullen, Hayden 
McRobbie, Marewa Glover, and Natalie Walker who would later come to dominate the framing 
of e-cigarettes in New Zealand policy circles.115 Laugesen’s colleagues would end up shaping the 
scientific and policy debate around e-cigarettes in New Zealand, even as he withdrew from 
active participation.  
Dr. Laugesen published some of the first scientific literature about modern nicotine-containing e-
cigarettes in partnership with the Chinese firm, RuYan, that is crediting with inventing the device 
category.116 In June 2007, RuYan staff based in Australia asked Laugesen if he would perform 
toxicological studies on their new electronic nicotine delivery system.117 These early tests 
focused on the chemical constituents of the vapor produced by the RuYan e-cigarette and the 
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findings indicated the product contained many fewer hazardous compounds than tobacco 
cigarette smoke. Laugesen’s work continued to build as he incorporated more New Zealand-
based academics in world-first trials examining nicotine delivery and craving reductions from e-
cigarettes and the world’s second randomized controlled trial examining the use of nicotine-
containing e-cigarettes for smoking cessation.118 Laugesen and his colleagues even organized 
several additional e-cigarette trials that were funded by the New Zealand government’s Health 
Research Council that focused on underserved demographics like Māori and those suffering from 
mental illness.119   
This line of policy entrepreneurs became the subject matter experts that the Ministry of Health 
called on to advise them over the intervening years. Chris Bullen stepped into the role of primary 
adviser after Murray Laugesen reached the age of retirement.120 Hayden McRobbie eventually 
superseded Bullen in the role.121 McRobbie, a clinical academic with professional roots in both 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom, emerged as the figurehead scholar-advocate and Ministry 
of Health’s clinical advisor on matters concerning e-cigarettes.122 McRobbie obtained his 
doctorate at London’s Queen Mary University, where he studied with Robert West and Peter 
Hajek, UK academics who would later become prominent THR advocates.123 McRobbie had 
worked as a consultant to the Ministry since 2008 and would end up chairing the Ministry’s E-
Cigarette Technical Expert Advisory Group.124 
 
118 C. Bullen et al., “Effect of an Electronic Nicotine Delivery Device (e Cigarette) on Desire to Smoke and Withdrawal, User 
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New Zealand’s public health-focused non-governmental organizations have played important 
roles in the development of the countries strongly contractionist regulatory stance towards 
tobacco cigarettes. In 2016, the extant policy community around tobacco policy in New Zealand 
was severely disrupted when the Ministry of Health was instructed to shift tobacco control 
funding away from tobacco control advocacy organizations (ASH, Smokefree Coalition, and Te 
Ara Hā Ora) and into stop smoking treatment services.125 Progress towards Smokefree 2025 was 
disrupted overnight as policy community collaboration turned into a competition for a pot of 
funds that had shrunk by three-fourths in size.126 Eventually, the advocacy groups that were 
defunded either wound down operations, like the Smokefree Coalition, or transitioned into 
functioning with unpaid staff, like ASH.127 Hāpai te Hauora remained the sole government-
funded tobacco control advocacy group. Hāpai is an organization focused primarily on Māori 
health and their continued funding allowed the problem of Māori smoking to remain a focal 
point in the tobacco control discussion. Even though Hāpai is funded with public dollars, that has 
not stopped the group pressing for policies that are likely beyond the scope of what political 
realities will allow, like the banning of the sale of tobacco cigarettes by 2025.128 Hāpai’s status as 
the lone publicly-funded tobacco control advocacy organization cemented its role as a valued 
partner of the government when it sought external strategic and policy advice.129 
One wing of the policy community which has remained more skeptical of e-cigarettes than 
Laugesen’s colleagues formed the group ASPIRE 2025 and released a policy strategy to achieve 
Smokefree 2025 in 2017.130 This second group of academics with expertise in tobacco control 
policy was based at the University of Otago. While they did not always see the world through the 
perspective of Murray Laugesen, important compromises were struck between the groups of 
researchers and a unified message was able to be presented regarding what an ideal e-cigarette 
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regulatory framework would look like in New Zealand. This is not to say that others outside of 
Otago and Auckland have worked on coming up with a unified position going forward.131 Otago 
and Auckland researchers met repeatedly to come up with a consensus viewpoint on what 
constitutes an appropriate regulatory framework.132 As new evidence arose of the utility of e-
cigarettes for smoking cessation and the relative safety of the products, skeptics like Edwards, 
Hoek, and Thompson evolved their stances in response.133 They all came to agree that e-
cigarettes could be more tightly regulated as their potential substitute product was subjected to 
ever harsher rules.134 They referred to this strategy as risk-proportionate regulation and it became 
the watchword echoed by stakeholders inside and outside of the public sector alike.135  
6.3.2.2 Excommunicating Marewa Glover  
Marewa Glover was instrumental in pushing e-cigarette regulation and tobacco control issues 
from the Māori perspective.136 Māori by birth, her early work in the area was conducted in 
cooperation with Murray Laugesen and every other relevant tobacco control academic in the 
country.137 Before 2014, Glover expressed a healthy skepticism towards the value of e-cigarettes 
as a public health tool as she was particularly concerned that tobacco companies might co-opt the 
market to their own less publicly-minded ends.138 In 2015, after changing her mind about the 
efficacy of e-cigarettes, Glover began to work in tandem with McRobbie and was tagged as 
instrumental in the initial push to change the Ministry’s stance.139 
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The New Zealand public health community has virtually excommunicated one of its own who 
has tarnished her reputation by taking a $1.5 million grant from Philip Morris International’s 
Foundation for a Smoke-Free World.140 An article was published in the subfield’s flagship 
journal, Tobacco Control, that excoriated the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World and without 
naming her, Glover, for facilitating a modern form of colonization of indigenous peoples.141 
Glover was not seen as indispensable to the coalition of THR advocates in the country.  
Her stances on tobacco control policy issues drifted further from the public health community 
after receiving funding from the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World. For example, in the 
deliberation over a 2019 bill that would create a civil offense for smoking in a car with a child, 
Glover testified that ‘bodies heal’ from secondhand smoke and that children will recover their 
full health once exposed to tobacco smoke.142 This claim even offended members of the right-
wing National Party who called her claim ‘outrageous’. In August 2019, the Ministry of Health 
even sent out letters to District Health Boards warning them not to collaborate with Glover’s 
center to fulfill obligations the country had made under Article 5.3 of the FCTC to avoid undue 
tobacco industry influence.143  
The place of Hāpai te Hauora as the sole nationally-funded tobacco control advocacy 
organization provided far more credibility as a leading indigenous voice in policy debates around 
e-cigarettes.144 The fact that there were so many other capable policy entrepreneurs in the space 
made Glover’s departure from credibility an easy obstacle to overcome.145 
6.3.2.3 Disempowered Dissenters 
There were some holdouts from this eventual coalition, most of whom were public health-
oriented non-governmental organizations, most prominent among them being the Asthma and 
Respiratory Foundation.146 These groups, like other e-cigarette skeptics in other countries, relied 
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on a message that e-cigarettes were being targeted for sales to youth, that they were not effective 
smoking cessation devices, and that they were generally unsafe to use.147 
Certain Māori groups also resisted the introduction of e-cigarettes into the country.148 Most 
prominently, Tariana Turia has come out firmly against the expansion of e-cigarettes and sees 
addiction to corporately supplied nicotine as akin to colonialism, no matter the form the nicotine 
is delivered.149 Turia viewed Smokefree 2025 as getting to an endgame on smoking, getting rid 
of the symbolic and actual colonization threat of nicotine addiction, and the requisite harm it 
wrecked on her community.150 Other Māori groups express a belief that e-cigarettes represent yet 
another mass-marketed evil.151  
The dissenters lacked support from two key components of the THR-supporting coalition; 
government bureaucrats and academics. The Ministry of Health and Medsafe had long 
abandoned seeing the e-cigarette market as worthy of the prohibitionist policy it used to be 
subject to. Academics supporting e-cigarettes had to be imported from the United States to make 
the case against the products in media appearances, while THR-supporters could rely on local 
experts.152 Thus far, it does not appear as though e-cigarette skeptics have disrupted the ripening 
of the policy stream.   
Summary 
Even as rifts break out in policy preferences among the policy community eager to see e-
cigarette regulation be adopted in New Zealand, the community has not fractured in any 
meaningful sense. Letter writing campaigns agitating for action are signed by almost the entire 
spectrum of persons interested in policy reform and there is general agreement on the contours of 
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policy that needs to be adopted.153 Non-governmental organizations have worked with academics 
to put aside the fears of those who oppose any expansion of an e-cigarette market and to cleave 
off participation from actors deemed to hold positions too far from group consensus. 
Government bureaucrats eventually joined this consensus. In this way, a broadly acceptable 
policy that aimed to further the goals of Smokefree 2025 by expanding access to e-cigarettes 
became the consensus policy alternative to the status quo in New Zealand. 
6.4 Politics Stream 
The political stream ripened at a relatively early stage in this process, but a lack of urgency 
seems to have slowed the issues rise towards actual policy change. If we apply the multiple 
streams approach to agenda-setting rather than to policy change, then we might find that the 
streams have truly ripened in New Zealand. Policy entrepreneurs have been able to sell the 
concept of tobacco harm reduction being a good idea to two successive governments led by 
opposing parties. 
6.4.1 Parliament 
New Zealand became a British colony in 1840 when the Treaty of Waitangi was signed by 
indigenous Māori chiefs and British settlers.154 Before 1993, New Zealand had what Arend 
Lijphart called ‘the only true example’ of a Westminster system left in the world.155 The 
Parliament became unicameral after the upper house was abolished in 1950, eliminating any 
check on the power of the lower house.156 Since 1867, several seats in the legislature have been 
reserved for representatives of Māori descent to assimilate Māori into European political 
institutions.157 The other significant feature of the Parliament is that it has been selected by a 
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mixed-member proportional system similar to the one used to elected the German Bundestag 
since 1996.158 These institutional features combine to produce a sovereign Parliament which is 
not subject to external checks on its power beyond elections which occur on an unusually rapid 
three-year cycle. Additionally, this parliament elevates minority Māori voices and places them in 
positions to make or break governments that have been repeatedly formed as coalitions between 
several parties with different ideological outlooks and constituencies.159 
New Zealand voted minority coalition governments into power in the elections of 2008, 2011, 
and 2014 which were all led by the right-wing National Party and the center-left/indigenous 
rights Māori party along with the ACT and United Future, small right-wing parties.160 The Māori 
party initially lent the John Key-led National government a decisive majority in 2008 but in 
subsequent elections, the Māori Party contribution to the governing majority dwindled along 
with the party’s policy influence.161 During its brief interlude with power, the party was able to 
set the course which has led to changing the regulatory framework for e-cigarettes years after the  
Māori Party left government. 
6.4.2 National Party Government Considers E-Cigarette Regulatory Policy Change 
Vaping came as an opportunity to do something different and something positive on public 
health for a government lacking such bona fides. The first mention of e-cigarettes on the floor of 
the New Zealand Parliament was made by Tariana Turia in 2009 in response to a question about 
tobacco harm reduction strategies from a fellow MP.162 The next year, National MP Tau Henare, 
wondered aloud in Parliament why e-cigarettes with nicotine were not allowed to be imported 
into the country if they could help some smokers (like himself) quit their habit.163 
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National Party Associate Minister of Health Peseta Sam Lotu-Iiga was incredibly cautious and 
suspicious of e-cigarette legalization.164 While attending a 2015 tobacco control symposium at 
the University of Auckland, Lotu-Iiga commented that there was not yet enough evidence 
available to allow the unregulated use of e-cigarettes.165 
However, National exploration of the potential of e-cigarettes eventually yielded a response from 
PM Key stating that more data was needed to understand the role e-cigarettes should play in the 
country, a point on which the opposition Labour leader Andrew Little agreed.166 By the summer 
of 2016, Lotu-Iiga recommended the rules prohibiting the sale or supplying of e-cigarettes with 
nicotine be changed to allow the sale of such products in New Zealand.167 Discussions in Cabinet 
Committee meetings began to reflect a viewpoint that e-cigarettes were certainly less harmful 
than tobacco cigarettes and continuing to apply a stricter regulatory framework to a less 
dangerous product was becoming harder to justify.168 The government sought public consultation 
on a laundry list of issues regarding how e-cigarettes could be legalized and what sorts of 
restrictions on sales or regulations of the sale of e-cigarettes would be required.169  
Media commentators at the time noticed that tobacco companies had adopted a quietly 
supportive position in favor of regulatory reform, likely because such a policy change would 
allow them to enter a newly legal market.170 98% of respondents to the inquiry favored changing 
the regulatory framework for e-cigarettes to make their sale legal, although there was much less 
agreement about the details of that framework.171 Ministry of Health officials counseled the 
cabinet to take a “precautionary approach” when formulating an e-cigarette regulatory policy.172 
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As a result, the consultation ended with the Cabinet deciding not to move forward with changing 
the regulatory framework, heeding the advice of the Ministry of Health.173 
When National Party Prime Minister John Key resigned from Parliament in December 2016 and 
Bill English stepped into the role, a requisite cabinet reshuffle followed.174 Once English 
reshuffled his cabinet in 2016, he brought in Nicky Wagner as the Associate Minister of Health 
in charge of the tobacco policy portfolio, the tone of the Ministry on the subject of e-cigarette 
regulation changed.175 
After she was installed, Ministry of Health officials approached Wagner to tell her that 
something needed to be done about e-cigarettes.176 Wagner ended up liking the concept and 
purpose of e-cigarettes much more than Lotu-Iiga, was much more comfortable with evidence 
finding a lack of harm; she ended up viewing e-cigarettes as a pragmatic solution to the smoking 
problem.177 In February 2017, Nicky Wagner even demonstrated, to a great coughing fit, a 
variety of e-cigarettes in front of her caucus room, causing a great laugh to arise from her 
colleagues.178 Her comfort with the issue led to the announcement in March 2017, that the 
government intended to pass legislation that would legalize the sale of nicotine-containing e-
cigarettes in the coming year.179 In the regulatory impact statement that the Ministry of Health 
produced to evaluate such a policy change, a wealth of information conveying the bureaucratic 
perspective is divulged. For example, the Ministry considered comparator country regulatory 
frameworks they could emulate, choosing between Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States.180 The Ministry eventually wrote a draft bill, which for unknown reasons was 
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not immediately submitted to Parliament.181 This draft bill might be characterized as a victory for 
business-friendly harm reduction in the New Zealand context. Business, in the form of the 
tobacco industry, approved of abandoning a prohibitionist policy and unleashing a new market. 
The right-wing government, without moral hackles to raise in this instance of harm reduction, 
was inclined to agree. 
The progress being made towards changing e-cigarette regulatory policy was abruptly halted as 
the 51st New Zealand Parliament was dissolved on August 22, 2017, and an election was set to 
be held four and a half weeks later.182 Just as the regulatory legislation was beginning to solidify, 
political winds suddenly shifted and pulled the country to the left. E-cigarettes had no formal 
legal regulatory framework that would be in place for the foreseeable future. A vacuum was 
created, which was in turn exacerbated by the Philip Morris decision the following March. 
6.4.3 Change of Government puts Coalition led by Labour in Charge 
The regularly scheduled 2017 general election saw the sudden rise of Jacinda Ardern and her 
Labour party to power.183 E-cigarettes did not feature as an issue of any importance in the 
ensuing election campaign.184 Instead, the campaign was dominated by Labour’s promises to 
address a housing affordability crisis and child poverty while the Nationals promised to fight 
crime and maintain economic stability.185 The National Party won the most seats in Parliament 
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but was short of a majority. National instinctively partnered with the libertarian ACT Party. 
Labour partnered with the pro-environment Greens. This put the right-wing populist New 
Zealand First’s party leader and the country’s longest-serving MP, Winston Peters in the position 
of ‘kingmaker’ concerning who would form a government.186 Eventually, Peters chose to go into 
government with Labour and serve as Deputy Prime Minister, gaining concessions from Labour 
to place New Zealand First in the cabinet along with promises to balance the goals of 
environmental sustainability with economic prosperity.187 
The initiative to change e-cigarette regulatory policy slowed its pace after the National Party lost 
its governing majority in the 2017 election. However, the coalition led by PM Jacinda Adern 
formed by Ardern’s Labour, Greens, and New Zealand First slowly began moving forward on 
the issue again.188 The progress towards introducing a new regulatory framework moved forward 
without urgency until the Philip Morris v Ministry of Health decision landed just six months into 
the new government’s term. 
6.5 Coupling the Streams 
While it has yet to become a fully realized piece of legislation, the policy streams in New 
Zealand seem to have ripened and are ready to couple. The process of moving from a defined 
problem to a solution took several governments and much discussion, but it was marked by 
goodwill and cooperation along the way. The Ministry of Health describes its goal to be the 
creation of a risk-proportionate regulatory framework. Advocates agreed, stating that such a 
framework can manage the potential problems e-cigarettes pose by putting more contractionist 
policies in place on tobacco cigarettes.189 
In the wake of the Philip Morris decision, e-cigarette retailers tried to implement self-imposed 
regulations that were, effectively, promises to provide clean products that were responsibly 
marketed and to not sell e-cigarettes to children.190 While companies were still waiting for 
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regulatory legislation to be introduced, in August 2019, British American Tobacco, Imperial 
Tobacco, and local e-cigarette company VAPO all began airing advertisements in the New 
Zealand media.191 Much of this advertising was later deemed by the Advertising Standards 
Authority to contravene community standards and it was put to an end.192 Even Philip Morris 
continued to upset norms and insult local standards. In March 2019, Philip Morris made a public 
pitch to the Labour government that it was willing to stop selling tobacco cigarettes if the 
government provided significantly lower excise rates on heated tobacco and e-cigarettes, in 
effect, an expansionist regulatory stance.193 Jacinda Ardern addressed the offer head-on and 
turned the idea down.194  
Then, beginning in July 2019, Guyon Espiner, an investigative reporter for Radio New Zealand, 
began to raise eyebrows around the country as he exposed the motives of Philip Morris in 
advancing e-cigarette regulatory reform in New Zealand. Espiner documented that Philip Morris’ 
aggressive behavior pushing its novel tobacco products had continued after the Ministry of 
Health court case and the tax break proposal. The company began distributing its tobacco heating 
devices at half-price through Māori social, cultural, and sporting institutions.195 Minister Salesa, 
rejected Philip Morris’ claim that it was looking out for the health of Māori by promoting 
reduced-risk products.196 Following on that revelation, Espiner was able to confirm that Philip 
Morris’ American sister company, Altria, was planning on bringing JUUL e-cigarettes to the 
country by the end of the year.197 Finally, Espiner uncovered a Philip Morris initiative that 
sought to partner with poverty advocates to distribute its IQOS device to poor smokers.198 These 
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revelations had the effect of increasing the level of incredulity that THR advocates had to face as 
they continued to push for e-cigarette regulatory framework changes.199 
This ongoing morass of voluntary standards and questionable behavior on the part of e-cigarette 
manufacturers combined to emphasize the vacuum in regulation that existed. The reticence of the 
Labour government to introduce e-cigarette regulation is curious, but the fact that they did not 
scrap the initiative points to the fact that the policy window to introduce legislation did not 
closed. Instead, it became subject to the whims of politicians waiting for an opportune moment 
to act.   
6.5.1 Labour Takes its Time Delivering Legislation 
The Labour party spent nearly a decade in opposition before the election of the Ardern 
government.200 Once they returned to power, they required time to gain focus, expertise, and 
direction for their policies. Tobacco control and the regulation of e-cigarettes were not unique in 
this respect. Instead of passing e-cigarette regulation, the government focused on advancing its 
KiwiBuild policy to alleviate a shortage of affordable housing, its Wellbeing Budget that sought 
to prioritize something other than economic growth and passing gun control in the wake of the 
Christchurch Massacre.201 
Deputy Prime Minister Winston Peters is famously a longtime smoker.202 He has denigrated the 
Smokefree 2025 as “National Party bulldust” and was said to have recently become a dual user 
of both cigarettes and e-cigarettes.203 Peters’ New Zealand First party is best characterized as a 
Nationalist, Populist, and Right-Wing.204 But their viewpoint on e-cigarette regulation is that the 
products should be available and well regulated, and able to be used for smoking cessation.205 As 
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junior partners in government, the Greens have not invested any resources in developing their e-
cigarette regulatory policy.206 Instead, they will support any policy Labour brings forward. 
Initially, Associate Minister of Health Jenny Salesa tried to float a ban on smoking in cars with 
children in early 2018 and got no support from her party until the following year.207 Salesa was 
viewed as not being concerned with e-cigarettes or Smokefree 2025 as an urgent policy 
problem.208 She was thought to be the policy actor who needed to be the entrepreneur in 
government as tobacco policy was contained in her portfolio.209 Over time, she stepped into that 
role while never hurrying up the pace of policy change. Civil servants in the Ministry of Health, 
likely boosted by the appointment of ASH board member Ashley Bloomfield to Director General 
(head bureaucrat of the Ministry of Health), eventually impressed upon the politicians that they 
should focus on the matter.210 Minister Salesa’s office remained in close contact with officials in 
the Tobacco Control Programme throughout as inquiries about various details of forthcoming 
legislation were bounced back and forth between political actors and bureaucrats.211 
In June 2018, the Labour government commissioned a study from Ernst & Young to examine the 
necessity of continued increases in the tobacco excise tax rate and whether the Smokefree 2025 
goal should be re-evaluated.212 By this point, even public health groups began to feel that 
tobacco taxes were losing their punch even as cigarette prices rose to ever more eye-watering 
heights (around US $25 per pack).213 When Ernst & Young reported back to the Ministry of 
Health later that year, they emphasized that the tax increases were steadily chipping away at 
smoking prevalence, but that they were not resolving Māori inequality and that more would need 
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to be done to reach Smokefree 2025 goals.214 The report highlighted the potential for a properly 
regulated e-cigarette market to meet the Smokefree 2025 goal.215  Advocates made the pitch to 
Salesa that, like Clark and Turia before her, she could cement her legacy by achieving 
Smokefree 2025.216 Like her predecessors, Salesa repeatedly promised to deliver a formal 
Smokefree 2025 Action Plan but none has materialized in public, even though Official 
Information Act Requests indicate that such a plan is under development in the Ministry of 
Health.217  
Momentum towards altering New Zealand’s e-cigarette regulatory framework to become more 
expansionist in its stance continued to grow through the end of 2018 and into 2019 as the 
introduction of a long-promised amendment to the SFEA grew nearer.218 In an October 2018 
meeting, Ardern’s cabinet assigned an SFEA Amendment bill (described in Figure 14) that 
would implement a risk-proportionate framework on e-cigarettes a low level of priority.219 In 
early 2019, the Health Promotion Authority within the Ministry of Health began releasing data 
indicating that New Zealanders were perceiving e-cigarettes as being equally harmful to 
cigarettes.220 In response, the Health Promotion Authority was authorized to conduct a rather 
unusual public education campaign, which was titled “Switch to Quit”.221 “Switch to Quit” 
encouraged cigarette smokers to switch to e-cigarette products to quit smoking by discouraging 
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the dual use of the two products and clarifying the relative risk levels between them.222 In June, 
Salesa stated that e-cigarettes were ‘vital’ to efforts to lower Māori women’s smoking.223  
But as time ran on, and the EVALI scare developed in the United States, the role that e-cigarettes 
would play in New Zealand’s Smokefree 2025 effort evolved as well.224 The work done to arrive 
at a policy consensus between Otago and Auckland showed in the messaging to New Zealand 
media during the outbreak in the US. Otago-based researchers asked for cool heads to prevail 
and to wait for more evidence to emerge when e-cigarette skeptical colleagues in other countries 
were trying to push for contractionist e-cigarette policies.225 
Ministry of Health and Labour government messaging has maintained a promise to deliver the 
SFEA Amendments in the decennial New Zealand Cancer Action Plan to promote vaping to 
support smokers to switch.226 Their tone on the policy varied between being optimistic about the 
potential of e-cigarettes to help smokers quit over to the required admonitions against youth 
usage of the products.227 By November 2019, Minister Salesa confirmed that the Ministry of 
Health was trying to “get this legislation right” before introducing the bill to Parliament.228 
The Smokefree Environments and Regulated Products (Vaping) Amendment Bill was finally 
delivered to Parliament in late February 2020 and was fast-tracked towards passage.229 The 
regulatory framework, described in Figure 14, would set and expansionist regulatory stance 
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towards e-cigarettes that is measured and careful in certain respects in an attempt to limit the 
appeal of the products to young people.230 On the occasion of the media tour the introduced the 
bill, Jacinda Ardern provided some enlightening commentary demonstrating that her instinct was 
to introduce a bill that was less expansionist than the one she delivered. Ardern claimed that 
while she would have originally banned the sale of all flavors of e-cigarettes, the evidence that 
had been presented to her over the past few months had convinced here that flavored product 
availability was important to those persons who successfully quit smoking by starting to vape.231 
The proposed regulatory framework has mostly been criticized by right-wing figures for being 
advanced on an accelerated timeframe (and during COVID-19-induced lockdown) and for not 
being lenient enough on the e-cigarette market.232 None of these criticisms seem to be impairing 
the progress of the bill, as the country’s government and health bureaucracy are steadily building 
trust and political capital via their extremely competent response to the COVID-19 pandemic.233  
6.6 Conclusion 
Like Australia and Canada, New Zealand first approached e-cigarette regulation with a 
prohibitionist policy inherited from an earlier era. The process of abandoning the older policy for 
a new one stemmed from the creation of a two-pronged problem that could be solved with one 
common policy solution. New Zealand’s ambitious Smokefree 2025 goal is widely recognized to 
be unreachable, especially for Māori, without taking drastic action. The case of Philip Morris v 
Ministry of Health unexpectedly legalized the sale of e-cigarettes, albeit without much formal 
regulation. The combination of indicators pointing to a faltering tobacco control policy with a 
focusing event in the form of the court case caused the problem stream to decisively ripen. Māori 
political empowerment, embedded in the structure of Parliament and the choices made by past 
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governments, allowed Māori issues to be considered important enough to address on the national 
policy agenda. This path-dependently led to the creation of the Smokefree 2025 goal. Political 
forces eventually warmed to the idea of e-cigarettes being an acceptable tool to help reach the 
Smokefree 2025, but there was little rush to finalize the regulations. 
At the center of this story though, is a coalition of bureaucrats, academics, and non-governmental 
organizations that all agreed that the e-cigarette market should be subject to regulatory policies 
that were less strict than tobacco products. This coalition advanced a brand of tobacco harm 
reduction in the guise of risk-proportionate regulation that was acceptable to most every political 
party and was seen as a Pareto improvement over the status quo of first, prohibition, and then 
post-Philip Morris, an informal permissive regulatory stance. This THR coalition advanced a 
vision that New Zealand could solve its Smokefree 2025 problem as well as the trouble created 
by the Philip Morris case in a matter that could be broadly acceptable to the governing coalition. 
Their vision of risk-proportionate regulation would aim to shift smokers from tobacco cigarettes 
to e-cigarettes while hopefully stemming a rising tide of youth use that has swamped other 
jurisdictions. Whether they can accomplish this goal remains to be seen, but the stage has been 
set for this legislation to proceed through Parliament once it is delivered.  
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 Cross Case Lessons 
Similarities, Differences, and Lessons from EVALI 
The case studies in the prior chapters illustrated in detail how the lack of international consensus 
in approaches to e-cigarette regulation may have been created. Even countries that started in 
similar situations diverged in response to unique events and circumstances. Their stories 
illustrate that regulatory policymaking, like so much in politics, is not an exercise in rational 
deliberation of experts who simply dictate their conclusions to supplicant legislatures. 
Bureaucracies prefer to expand their power. Politicians do not want to take unnecessary risks. 
Public health and business interests sometimes find themselves in agreement.  
This study boils down to a simple question; why did some countries change regulatory stances 
while others stayed put? Australia kept a regulatory stance that was developed before e-cigarettes 
were even a viable commercial market. New Zealand and Canada decided to adopt new 
regulatory stances toward this market. Certain conditions were necessary to open a policy 
window to change a regulatory framework. The need for multiple conditions to be present to 
open a policy window to change the regulatory stance for e-cigarettes illustrates the necessity of 
paying close attention to the details in any case study. This study carefully documented how each 
case study changed its regulatory framework over time. To leverage the multiple cases at work in 
this comparative study, we must now engage with the isolated explanations of policy change and 
stasis to determine if the findings in one country are generalizable first to other cases in the 
study, and second to other proximate cases. Here the similarities and differences between each of 
the primary case studies are broken out by Kingdon’s streams to illustrate the key lessons to be 
gleaned comparing across cases. Then, a comparison of the rhetorical framing of each regulatory 
framework is considered for what it can tell about the relative goals and values of each case. 
Then the experience of the case countries when confronting the simultaneous focusing event of 
the EVALI outbreak, an incident that defined the global media environment after my fieldwork 
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had concluded, will be explored. Each country reacted to EVALI in a manner that reiterated its 
commitment to achieving pre-established regulatory goals. 
7.1 Lessons Learned  
At an abstract level in the Multiple Streams Approach, the problem and policy streams had to 
become primed before they could successfully merge with a primed politics stream. First, the 
problem stream became primed once the current regulatory policy was deemed a failure. The 
regulatory policy failed by being rejected by the courts as illegal, rejected by bureaucracies as 
not worth enforcing, or it failed to achieve its goals. Next, the policy stream became primed once 
a policy community came to a consensus on an alternative to the failed regulatory policy. 
Finally, the politics stream was primed when left-wing politicians were permitted to support a 
regulatory policy change favored by business groups because the policy community agreed the 
alternative policy was preferable to the failed policy. This freed right-wing politicians to support 
the alternative policy without facing a political penalty. As regulatory policy change is not 
typically an important issue for voters, a permission structure had to be created that allowed all 
politicians to agree to the policy community’s consensus alternative regulatory policy, insulating 
politicians from electoral consequences. This section explains in great empirical detail how these 
conclusions were arrived at in each of Kingdon’s streams and how they fit together.  
7.1.1 Problem Stream 
The problem stream defined the largest difference between the cases of regulatory policy change 
and stasis. New Zealand and Canada have identifiable focusing events that led to the rejection of 
the pre-existing regulatory stance and precipitated the drive towards change. Bureaucracies in 
those countries aided this drive to change by abandoning the enforcement of prohibitionist 
policies. And in New Zealand, general frustration with a failure to make adequate progress in 
tobacco control for the Maori population deepened suspicion towards the effectiveness of the 
status quo. None of these forces were present in Australia. The unifying lesson across the three 
cases is that unless a status quo regulatory stance was rejected, in either a de jure or de facto 
manner, the problem stream did not become ready to couple with the problem or politics stream. 
This section summarizes the findings regarding the importance of the failure of tobacco control 
and the rejection of the regulatory stance by the bureaucracy in the subsequent development of 
the problem stream across the three cases.  
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7.1.1.1 Failure of Tobacco Control 
In the case of New Zealand, failure to make adequate progress towards the goal of reaching the 
country’s Smokefree 2025 target, particularly for the indigenous Māori, increased the appetite to 
abandon New Zealand’s regulatory stance towards e-cigarettes.1 By contrast, Australia lacked an 
ambitious public tobacco control target that was on track to be missed. Without an impetus to 
change policy course, without the condition of 15% of Australians continuing to smoke turning 
into a real problem that needs to be solved, there is no reason to change course for these entities.2 
In New Zealand, health inequity played an important role in defining the problems that changing 
the e-cigarette regulatory framework could address.3 Health inequity and an implicit 
dissatisfaction with the progress of tobacco control for Māori rose on the political agenda 
because the country’s structure of representation reserved seats in Parliament for indigenous 
Māori and the adoption of a mixed-member proportional electoral system encouraged the 
formation of coalition governments.4 This structure fomented the creation of the Smokefree 2025 
goal which successive governments have targeted as an ambitious, but worthwhile, target that 
would substantially redress health inequities if it were to be achieved.5 The presence of the 
looming Smokefree 2025 target along with pressure being applied to form the policy and 
political realms enabled the Ministry of Health bureaucrats to abandon the continued 
enforcement of the prohibitionist e-cigarette regulatory stance in the wake of Philip Morris v 
Ministry of Health.6 
Canada’s experience with tobacco control policy failure had more to do with a failure to enforce 
federal policy on the nascent e-cigarette retail market than it did with failing to reach federal 
targets. The federal tobacco endgame target in Canada was only proposed after all political 
parties had agreed to change the e-cigarette regulatory stance in the HESA Committee report.7 
Instead, Canada’s geographic proximity to the United States border aided the growth of e-
cigarette retailers and e-cigarette use in Canada.8 Ready access to supplies across a friendly 
 
1 See 6.2.2 Falling Off Track to Meet the Smokefree 2025 Target on page 171. 
2 See 4.2.1 Tobacco Control Progress and Skeptics’ Framing on page 92. 
3 Edwards, “Endgames and Smokefree Aotearoa 2025 Update.” 
4 Mittal, “Electoral Reform in New Zealand.” 
5 Blakely et al., “The Maori Affairs Select Committee Inquiry and the Road to a Smokefree Aotearoa.” 
6 See 6.2.3 Philip Morris v Ministry of Health on page 172. 
7 See 5.7 Passing Bill S-5 on page 151. 
8 Hammond et al., “Retail Availability and Marketing of Electronic Cigarettes in Canada.” 
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tariff-free border meant that retailers could supply themselves from the United States easily. This 
growth in e-cigarette retailers seeded the growth in the e-cigarette user base and the number of 
confrontations Canadians had with e-cigarette users.9 These confrontations led to calls for 
regulation of e-cigarette use in public spaces which bubbled up to become local and provincial 
legislation.10 These moves to regulate e-cigarette use at the local level illustrated vividly the need 
for a change in the federal regulatory stance for e-cigarettes to provincial and territorial officials 
charged with protecting the public health. Their agreement on the need for federal change 
precipitated in a call to action that resulted in a change to the country’s regulatory stance towards 
e-cigarettes.11 
The result of policy stasis in Australia could be viewed as an active choice to maintain the 
current prohibitionist policy stance through events ranging from the TGA’s poisons scheduling 
to the House’s Committee reporting process.12 That perspective misses what differentiated 
Australia from the other cases; no reason to change the e-cigarette regulatory stance became 
prominent enough for the Commonwealth to change course. No actor was pushed to change 
because there was no failure of tobacco control problem to solve.  
7.1.1.2 Rejecting the Regulatory Stance 
The process of readying the problem stream for coupling in New Zealand and Canada relied 
upon bureaucrats deciding that the prohibitionist regulatory stance was not worth enforcing. The 
2012 decision to stop confiscating e-cigarette materiel in Canada and the 2018 decision to not 
appeal the ruling in Philip Morris v Ministry of Health in New Zealand marked turning points 
where the central government bureaucracy decided to abandon its regulatory stance. New 
Zealand’s hand was forced halfway to changing its regulatory stance after Philip Morris v 
Ministry of Health was decided against the government by the country’s perceived tobacco 
control failures.13 The 2012 decision to abandon enforcement led directly to a concerted call in 
2014 from provincial and territorial ministers of health for a change in the country’s e-cigarette 
 
9 Tilson, “Regulating E-Cigarettes as Drugs Is Not the Best Solution.” 
10 Strang et al., “Provincial/Territorial Chief Medical Officers of Health Position Statement on Electronic Nicotine Delivery 
Systems.” 
11 Vogel, “Provinces Press for E-Cigarette Crackdown.” 
12 Australian Government Department of Health Therapeutic Goods Administration, “Scheduling Delegate’s Final Decisions, 
March 2017: 2.1 Nicotine,” Text, Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA), March 23, 2017, https://www.tga.gov.au/book-
page/21-nicotine-0; Standing Committee on Health, Aged Care and Sport, Report on the Inquiry into the Use and Marketing of 
Electronic Cigarettes and Personal Vaporisers in Australia. 
13 Butler, Ministry of Health v Phillip Morris (New Zealand) Ltd, NZDC. 
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regulatory stance that Canada’s federal bureaucracy was forced to respond to.14 The New 
Zealand case illustrates the importance of the bureaucrat’s decision to surrender the status quo 
regulatory stance rather than the judiciary’s decision to invalidate the old policy. Canada’s 
experience even demonstrates that a policy that was held up to be legal in court was not, by 
itself, reason enough to continue its enforcement, as bureaucrats there also abandoned the old 
prohibitionist e-cigarette regulatory stance because they rejected the idea there was utility to be 
gained from enforcing the policy.15  
The assent of bureaucrats to abandoning the prior regulatory stance provided a great deal of 
validation to the arguments other had made to abandon the old policy (see the prior section), and 
thus, served to prime the focusing event needed to begin drafting a new regulatory stance. The 
decision to abandon the prohibitionist regulatory stance emanated from a belief that the old 
regulatory framework was failing to deliver utility the bureaucrats wanted. From the Australian 
perspective, everything was under control and there was no pressure to change strategy. 
Australian bureaucrats never stopped enforcing the prohibitionist regulatory framework, thereby 
setting up one more bulwark to policy change. The utility of enforcing the rules of the ACCC 
and the TGA was never questioned as giving consumers good information and protecting people 
from ingesting poison continued to be viewed as worthy causes of the time and attention of 
bureaucracies. As there was no point where this utility was brought into question, no follow-on 
focusing event ever brought the regulatory stance into question. Without such a force, policy 
inertia held sway. 
7.1.2 Policy Stream 
Two primary policy communities were concerned about the regulation of e-cigarettes; a public 
health policy community, and a community composed of tobacco and e-cigarette manufacturers. 
The public health policy community, who was consistently influential with left-wing politicians, 
favored changing the e-cigarette regulatory framework in Canada and New Zealand while 
opposing such change in Australia. The tobacco and e-cigarette manufacturers commanded 
influence with right-wing politicians in every case country. In every case, the tobacco and e-
 
14 CICS, “News Release - Provinces and Territories Talk Health Care.” 
15 Geller et al., Evidence on E-Cigarettes.; André F.J. Scott, Zen Cigarette Inc v. Canada (Health), 2012 FC 1465 (Federal Court 
2012); Robert Strang et al., “Provincial/Territorial Chief Medical Officers of Health Position Statement on Electronic Nicotine 
Delivery Systems” (Council of Chief Medical Officers of Health, July 25, 2014). 
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cigarette manufacturers made the same request of politicians; to abandon the prohibitionist e-
cigarette regulatory framework. When explaining variance in outcomes, it makes sense to focus 
on the difference in the public health community. 
The public health policy communities differed in two primary ways between the cases. First, the 
New Zealand public health policy community actively worked with persons who self-identified 
as tobacco harm reduction advocates while Australia’s policy community shunned those persons 
who identified as such. Second, the Canadian and New Zealand public health policy 
communities were effectively able to reach consensus on a chosen alternative regulatory stance 
as being preferable to the status quo. No such alternative stance was ever agreed to in Australia. 
These factors combined to mobilize a push for change in policy from the public health 
community that was recognized as legitimate by politicians and policymakers in the cases where 
change was observed. 
7.1.2.1 Reaching a Consensus Alternative Policy 
When a public health community decided by consensus to back an alternative to the status quo, 
we observed that policy change was more universally accepted across the political spectrum. 
‘Consensus’ is an important qualifier here. As we saw in Australia, there were isolated members 
of the public health community who supported changing the country’s regulatory stance towards 
e-cigarettes. Those individuals were unable to sway the bulk of the public health community to 
join their perspective, and the evidence for this possible intransigence stems from the fact that 
most of the Australian public health community did not believe the status quo was not working 
well. Australia’s policy community in favor of tobacco harm reduction policy was not the 
dominant force within the policy stream on this issue. Instead, their contributions were 
outweighed by a better positioned and more influential advocacy community that was skeptical 
of the expansion of e-cigarette sales. Without a driving force to push the community to coalesce 
around an alternative policy, inertia won out.  
The preferred regulatory stance of the public health policy community towards e-cigarettes 
aligned with outcomes in all case countries. When problems were created by the sudden 
uncontrolled legalization of e-cigarette sales, by a perceived failure in the tobacco control policy 
regime, or by a rejection of the old regulatory framework as adequate for a jurisdiction’s needs, 
then the incentive to coalesce around an acceptable alternative was heightened. New Zealand and 
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Canada-based policy community members were quick to abandon defenses of their respective 
country’s regulatory frameworks for e-cigarettes. In Australia, the bulk of the public health 
policy community decided that maintaining the status quo was their preferred option. When the 
public health policy community shifted their preference from the status quo, left-wing politicians 
were permitted to follow.  
The chosen consensus alternative policy in New Zealand and Canada were functionally similar. 
Both public health policy communities preferred applying more contractionist regulations to 
tobacco cigarettes than to e-cigarettes. Both communities wanted to keep young people from 
using e-cigarettes. When presented with choosing between the status quo prohibitionist stance, 
adopting a contractionist stance, or adopting an expansionist stance — both public health 
communities encouraged choosing an expansionist stance. Nearly every public health advocate 
who was interviewed in this study believed that a tobacco cigarette smoker would suffer less 
disease and premature death if they switch completely to using an e-cigarette. Encouraging this 
switch between products then became a delicate exercise in choosing to apply certain 
contractionist regulations to the new market and its close substitute.  
The public health policy communities in New Zealand and Canada shifted its internal debate 
away from whether the e-cigarette market should be legal and towards discussions over which 
policies should be applied to which market. The consensus alternative policy extended only as 
far as the basic concept that regulatory agencies should be empowered to regulate the e-cigarette 
market and that regulation should be harsher for tobacco cigarettes than e-cigarettes. It then 
became the job of bureaucrats and politicians to decide on the exact outlines of first, legislation, 
and then regulations. The results of the chosen policies in achieving these goals have been 
mixed, but efforts to improve upon the mistakes made by one jurisdiction by the next are evident. 
7.1.2.2 Policy Learning 
Overall, the role of policy learning in this study was limited to determining the details of 
regulatory frameworks rather than the broader regulatory stance. Policy communities that agreed 
on the adoption of an expansionist regulatory framework appeared to learn lessons from the 
failures of others who dispositively agreed with them. Lessons have not yet transferred between 
policy communities who disagree on the proper regulatory stance for e-cigarettes. For the time 
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being, policy convergence driven by policy learning in this area will remain relegated to the 
smaller details of regulatory policy rather than the overarching goal and intent. 
In the illustrative example of this smaller dynamic, both Canada’s and New Zealand’s efforts 
relied heavily on government bureaucrats to create an expansionist e-cigarette regulatory stance. 
In each case, the process was slow and drawn out over the course of nearly two years. The 
policies that each bureaucracy put forward at the end of that process adopted policies that 
substantially expanded the regulatory authority of the bureaucracy to set rules over the e-
cigarette market. The bureaucracy functioned professionally, as officials considered evidence 
and input from stakeholders as they attempted to write policies that actively learned from the 
mistakes of others to avoid repeating their errors.  
In the example of e-cigarette flavors, we can see this iterative learning process in action. When 
Canadian officials wrote their product standards for flavors, they only prohibited marketing 
flavors that claimed to taste like candy, dessert, cannabis, soft drinks, and energy drinks.16 
Arguably, this was done to curb the worst practices that Canada was observing in the United 
States as small e-cigarette retailers sold flavors like ‘unicorn puke’ and ‘gummi bear’ that were 
assumed to be inherently appealing to youth.17 After the opening of the legal Canadian e-
cigarette market was marred by rising rates of youth e-cigarette usage – in 2019, Canadian 
bureaucrats had to scramble to implement relatively contractionist rules on e-cigarette marketing 
and product standards.18  
While Canada struggled to reverse the tide against youth e-cigarette use, throughout 2019, New 
Zealand officials wrote e-cigarette regulations that reacted to even more current data from the US 
and Canada about the role that flavorings played in youth and adult vaping.19 The eventual policy 
proposed in New Zealand’s legislation limited the sale of e-cigarette flavors sold in non-specialty 
retailers (any store that is not an adult-only vape shop) to menthol and tobacco flavors, while no 
limits on flavors were placed on businesses who registered with the Ministry of Health as e-
 
16 Harder, An Act to amend the Tobacco Act and the Non-smokers’ Health Act and to make consequential amendments to other 
Acts. 
17 Robert K. Jackler and Divya Ramamurthi, “Unicorns Cartoons: Marketing Sweet and Creamy e-Juice to Youth,” Tobacco 
Control 26, no. 4 (July 1, 2017): 471–75, https://doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2016-053206. 
18 Health Canada, “Backgrounder: Regulation of Vaping Products in Canada,” backgrounders, gcnws, December 19, 2019, 
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/news/2019/12/backgrounder-regulation-of-vaping-products-in-canada.html. 
19 “Jenny Salesa Defends Delay to Release Vaping Legislation.” 
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cigarette retailers and who agreed to limit entry to persons who could prove they were over the 
age of 18.20 This policy seems to react to evidence that the appeal of sweet- and fruit-flavored e-
cigarette products to adult smokers is a major factor behind switching to e-cigarettes from 
tobacco cigarettes.21 However, initiation of e-cigarette use by youth also seems to be linked to 
flavor availability.22 The rationale behind New Zealand’s policy is that keeping all flavors except 
those that are least attractive to youth out of non-specialty retailers, while preserving the 
availability of flavors in retailers that are only accessible to adults, will minimize health risks to 
young people while preserving some upside for adults. Whether this policy keeps a lid on youth 
e-cigarette use in New Zealand remains to be seen, but we can be certain that each case country 
will be closely observing the other’s results. Policy communities around the globe with interests 
in expansionist e-cigarette regulation will be watching and learning, too. Those policy 
communities interested in promoting alternative stances may be watching and drawing different 
lessons.23 
7.1.2.3 Harm Reduction 
New Zealand and Australia handled the entry of individuals associated with tobacco companies, 
in the same manner, ostracization from public health credibility. However, New Zealand’s policy 
community worked closely with actors who had ties to the e-cigarette industry.24 Crucially, these 
actors had established their bona fides as credible public health advocates in the years before e-
cigarettes arrived in their country. The New Zealand policy community was also willing to 
cleave off members who strayed too far from a consensus policy position or who worked too 
closely with the increasingly disruptive tobacco industry.25 Australia effectively marginalized the 
few public health policy community members who pushed for a change in the regulatory stance 
that was sympathetic to the ideals of tobacco harm reduction.26 The Canadian public health 
 
20 Salesa, Smokefree Environments and Regulated Products (Vaping) Amendment Bill. 
21 Christopher Russell et al., “Changing Patterns of First E-Cigarette Flavor Used and Current Flavors Used by 20,836 Adult 
Frequent e-Cigarette Users in the USA,” Harm Reduction Journal 15, no. 1 (June 28, 2018): 33, https://doi.org/10.1186/s12954-
018-0238-6. 
22 John Buckell and Jody L. Sindelar, “The Impact of Flavors, Health Risks, Secondhand Smoke and Prices on Young Adults’ 
Cigarette and e-Cigarette Choices: A Discrete Choice Experiment,” Addiction (Abingdon, England) 114, no. 8 (August 2019): 
1427–35, https://doi.org/10.1111/add.14610; Adam M. Leventhal et al., “Flavored E-Cigarette Use and Progression of Vaping in 
Adolescents,” Pediatrics 144, no. 5 (November 2019), https://doi.org/10.1542/peds.2019-0789. 
23 See 7.3 EVALI on page 218 for an example of this divergent pattern of policy learning. 
24 See 6.3.2.1 The unbroken line of credible policy entrepreneurs from Murray Laugesen on, at page 179. 
25 Espiner, “Gloves Off.” 
26 See 4.3.2 THR Advocates Dissent from the Consensus at page 102. 
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policy community was never presented with clear opportunities to perform similar ostracizations, 
as the public health community was never as centralized in its position or as influential in the 
debate as the provincial and territorial Ministers of Health. 
Harm reduction as a generic concept was in vogue during Justin Trudeau’s early years in 
government, as progress in opioids, criminal justice, and cannabis regulation were closely tied to 
harm reduction concepts.27 Regulated marketplaces were seen as preferable to unregulated 
marketplaces, as the worst actions of market participants could be curbed with proper regulatory 
oversight. The appetite to apply similar harm reduction principles to tobacco policy was strong 
among Canadian politicians and the public health policy community.28 While Australia and New 
Zealand both have histories of experimenting with harm reductionist programs in the areas of 
substance use and sex work, in neither country was harm reduction a prominent policymaking 
philosophy. The presence or absence of a harm-reductionist policymaking streak must be further 
investigated in other jurisdictions to determine its relative importance to shaping the preferences 
of actors in the public health policy community for e-cigarette regulation. 
The concept of business-friendly harm reduction showed appeal in the Canadian and New 
Zealand contexts, wherein right-wing parties that did not traditionally approve of harm reduction 
efforts in other areas of public health concern approved of such efforts in the realm of e-cigarette 
regulation. Nicotine has not traditionally presented the moral quandaries that more traditionalist, 
less-egalitarian right-wing political parties that have invoked in their opposition to harm 
reduction initiatives in the realm of sexually-transmitted infections and injection drug safety. 
Businesses who sell nicotine are viewed as legitimate members of society and allowing new 
opportunities to advance their interests has been deemed compatible with general classical liberal 
positions taken by right-wing political parties. The appeal of business-friendly harm reduction 
may be a phenomenon that will continue propagating through other venues and the concept 
merits further study. 
7.1.3 Politics Stream 
The issue of e-cigarette regulatory policy never achieved political salience during an election in 
any case examined. Prime Ministerial attention to the issue was almost entirely lacking as well. 
 
27 Health Canada, “Harm Reduction.” 
28 CD @ 39 
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Federal structures do not seem to have operated in a manner that offers clean predictions about 
the likelihood of changing a regulatory stance towards a market. The role of the tobacco industry 
was played up by politicians when it suited the cause of regulatory policy stasis, but it was 
played down when regulatory policy change was imminent. But the role of tobacco companies in 
the policy process did not differ much between the cases. The difference, then, in the operation 
of the political stream between cases boils down to a single variable, whether the left-of-center 
political parties came to support changing the country’s regulatory stance towards e-cigarettes. 
The political calculations either played out as a latent issue (Australia) or as a depolarized issue 
(New Zealand and Canada), largely because the left-wing party supported changing the e-
cigarette regulatory stance. In this section, I discuss how the first two factors are not powerful 
predictors of change while the last fact was consequential in the cases at hand. 
7.1.3.1 Federalism 
The influences of governmental structure and centralization on the outcomes observed in the 
case studies was limited. New Zealand’s centralized governing structure limited the amount of 
pressure that regional governments could apply to the central government to change the impetus 
for regulatory framework reform. However, the lessons from Australia and Canada are an 
exercise illustrating the importance of timing more than the importance of government structure 
on the likelihood of changing a regulatory stance. Further, it does not seem that differences in the 
forms of federal structure between the countries had much of an effect on the outcomes of 
interest in this study. 
The Australians faced a cadre of e-cigarette regulatory policy entrepreneurs who favored the 
creation of a truly liberalized marketplace for the products devoid of any contractionist or even 
permissive (relative to tobacco cigarettes) component policies.29 These policy entrepreneurs 
focused on attempting to pass their chosen policies at the Commonwealth level while public 
health-minded policy entrepreneurs were successfully passed contractionist regulatory policies at 
the State and Territory level.30 The traction that the latter group gained at the regional 
government level set the stage for maintaining the status quo at the Commonwealth level. E-
 
29 See 4.4.2 THR Advocates Latch onto David Leyonhjelm on page 108. 
30 See 4.4.1 Skeptics Push Regional Regulation into Effect on page 105. 
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cigarettes were successfully defined as a threat to the hard-won gains against smoking that the 
country had made. 
In Canada, provincial and territorial legislation regulating the use and marketing of e-cigarettes 
was passed after a Federal Parliamentary report was finalized.31 Because federal political actors 
reached unanimous agreement on the outlines of a proper regulatory framework for e-cigarettes 
before regional governments could finalize legislation, the possibility of maintaining the 
prohibitionist status quo had diminished. The lesson seems to be that there is a first-mover 
advantage towards carving the path that the political actors would later follow. But, a lack in the 
consistency of observations that contribute to this small finding, undermines my confidence in its 
broader applicability. 
7.1.3.2 The Role of the Tobacco Industry 
In every case country, the tobacco industry and e-cigarette manufacturers consistently favored 
moving away from prohibitionist regulatory stances towards e-cigarettes. Their motives were 
consistently business-related, and their rhetoric always supported the advancement of public 
health through expanded consumer choice. However, support for change in regulatory policy 
from these companies was in the final analysis, inconsequential.  
One could argue that there was a difference of degree in the mistrust and dislike of the tobacco 
industry among the public health community, bureaucracy, and government officials in Australia 
relative to New Zealand and Canada. Those groups watched the tobacco industry in Australia 
fight a scorched-earth legal battle against tobacco product plain packaging in the last decade.32 
The Australian Commonwealth government's center and left-wing opposition had no appetite to 
reward the tobacco industry in any way with new revenue streams.33 It was easier for them to 
insist that tobacco companies should sell e-cigarettes as medicines than to do any grappling with 
what an acceptable regulatory framework that liberalized e-cigarette sales would look like. 
Efforts to abandon the old prohibitionist regulatory framework would reward their mortal 
enemies. The relationships between THR policy entrepreneurs and tobacco companies in 
 
31 See 5.4.1 HESA Committee on page 139. 
32 Jarman, “Normalizing Tobacco?”; Jarman, “Attack on Australia.” 
33 See 4.4 Politics Stream at page 104. 
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Australia only served to close the door to regulatory reform tighter, and attributing that to some 
remaining animosity would be reasonable. 
By contrast, the tobacco industry’s interests in changing the e-cigarette regulatory framework 
were put into the background in Canada and New Zealand. With left-wing governments leading 
the charge towards regulatory reform, the benefits to public health were foregrounded in the 
public-facing policy debate. In Canada, tobacco companies made the strategic choice to focus 
their policy concerns on the matter of plain packaging.34 While these companies stood to benefit 
from the change in e-cigarette regulations, they did not focus their lobbying efforts on that 
matter. The interests of tobacco companies in the e-cigarette market were effectively hidden 
behind the interests of small businesses. In that circumstance, abandoning the prohibitionist 
regulatory stance served the interests of all parties through the strategy of business-friendly harm 
reduction. Whether tobacco companies would benefit from the new regulatory framework was 
subdued beneath more pressing concerns. 
New Zealand’s regulatory policy battle has been marked by a tobacco industry eager to be seen 
acting like a good corporate citizen. However, the left-wing coalition government has taken little 
interest in hearing out the concerns of large tobacco companies. Select small e-cigarette 
manufacturers have been allowed to participate in the policy advisory process, but their concerns 
do not diverge far from the main public health community in the country. Even when e-cigarette 
manufacturers are in the room with policymakers, their influence seems to be minor at best. 
7.1.3.3 Left-Wing Party Support 
In the case studies considered here, one country resisted changing its regulatory stance towards 
e-cigarettes and two countries changed. The country that resisted change (Australia) begin the 
study period with a left-wing government and transitioned to a right-wing government in 2015. 
The countries that changed policy began the study period with right-wing governments and 
moved to left-wing governments later on. This pattern of political party governance seems to 
have been consequential as the ascendance of left parties in New Zealand and Canada paved the 
way to a change in the regulatory stance towards e-cigarettes, that may not have happened 
 
34 Siebert, “Imperial Tobacco Wants the Government to Treat Cigarettes and Cannabis Equally.” 
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without a change in the party in power. To draw a through-line between the cases, we must note 
what differed in their political configurations at a national level.  
In both New Zealand and Canada, right-wing parties expressed that they favored changing e-
cigarette policy before they lost power. In Australia, only the extreme right flank of the right-
wing government ever expressed their support for e-cigarette regulatory policy change. 
Additionally, in both Canada and New Zealand, most left-wing parties expressed their favor for 
changing e-cigarette regulatory policy as well. By contrast, the Australian left-wing has 
vociferously denied their support to liberalizing their country’s e-cigarette regulatory policy. 
Consequently, in Australia, the center-right of the government has also held back their support 
from such a regulatory policy change. 
What then, can consistently explain this fact pattern? Cross-party consensus leads to change, 
while party division and polarization maintain the status quo. Across all the cases, the left-wing 
political party’s support for changing the e-cigarette regulatory framework proved to be a 
sufficient condition for policy change going forwards. In Canada, the Liberals and NDP reached 
a unanimous agreement with Conservatives on the path forwards to an e-cigarette regulatory 
framework, thereby enabling policy change to proceed. In New Zealand, Labour and Green 
provided their support for abolishing the prohibitionist e-cigarette regulatory framework joining 
the Nationals who had initially led the push for change. Notably, remaining Māori Party leaders 
favored changing the country’s e-cigarette regulatory framework, while retired party founder 
Tarania Turia continued to oppose such a change.35 In cases where left-wing parties lent their 
support, they created permission structures that allowed changing the e-cigarette regulatory 
framework to proceed without carrying downside political risk for the parties involved. 
Australia’s Commonwealth Labor Party stands apart from the other major left-wing parties in the 
study as being wholly resistant to creating a legal market for e-cigarettes.36 Australian Labor 
uniformly resisted changing e-cigarette policy, denying the Coalition government consensus on 
the issue. This is the only case where a political party prepared to turn e-cigarette regulation into 
 
35 Ripeka Timutimu, “Government to Regulate Vaping,” Māori Television, August 20, 2018, 
https://www.maoritelevision.com/news/politics/government-regulate-vaping.  
36 AQ@ 10; AW @ 35 
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a voting issue among the cases. This action stood apart from those of other left-wing parties in 
the case studies for two reasons.  
First, the Commonwealth Labor Party has remained out of power in Australia during the entire 
period where e-cigarette regulatory policy has become salient. Where Australian Labor has been 
in power at the regional level, they have favored imposing restrictions on e-cigarette sale and 
usage in a manner indistinguishable from their right-wing counterparts.37 Without putting the 
Commonwealth Labor Party into government, we cannot know whether common ground with 
right-wing parties could be found to change the e-cigarette regulatory framework. The findings 
from New Zealand and Canada indicate that finding such common ground is possible, but left-
wing politicians would need to be prodded forwards to solve a problem if they are to begin 
seeking such a policy change. 
Second, the Australian Labor Party managed to alter the political calculation of their right-wing 
counterparts on the issue of e-cigarette regulations. This is notably different from Canada, where 
all parties reached unanimous agreement on an alternative regulatory framework for e-cigarettes 
before the 2015 Federal election which brought the center-left into government.38 The Canadian 
left-wing did not calculate that withholding their support from e-cigarette regulatory policy 
change would have been a winning political decision. Instead, when the left-wing came to power 
in Canada following the 2015 Federal elections, the Liberal party employed an issue linkage 
strategy that attached tobacco plain packaging to e-cigarette regulatory policy reform as a 
sweetener to public health groups.39 Everyone in Canada could point to the piece of Bill S-5 that 
they liked best and that characteristic enabled the smooth passage of a policy that had the support 
of almost everyone. In New Zealand, the multi-member proportional representation scheme 
increases the likelihood of the formation of coalitional governments and forces policymakers to 
find common ground with ideologically distinct coalition partners. Reforming the prohibitionist 
e-cigarette regulatory stance turned out to be an initiative that all three members of the Ardern 
government from the right-wing populist New Zealand First Party to the left-wing Greens could 
 
37 See 4.4.1 Skeptics Push Regional Regulation into Effect on page 105 
38 HESA Committee, “Vaping: Toward a Regulatory Framework for E-Cigarettes.” 
39 CIG @ 42-43; CD @ 28-29 
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agree upon. The depolarized nature of the progressing of the regulatory policy debate in Canada 
and New Zealand is a notable contrast to Australia.  
A further contrast between Canada and Australia can be seen in the actions of the political parties 
who reacted differently to the writing up of committee reports that assessed the need to change e-
cigarette regulatory policy in each country. In both cases, the committee was chaired by 
incumbent right-wing parties. In the case of Canada, the left-wing parties signed on to a 
unanimous recommendation to adopt an expansionist e-cigarette regulatory policy. In Australia, 
the right-wing committee members splintered—the committee chair wrote a dissenting report, 
and the left-wing joined with a center-right member to write the majority.40 Close analysis 
revealed that in Australia, the right-wing committee member never sought to write a consensus 
report or even successfully obtained the support of their party leadership.41  
In sum, the cooperation of left-wing parties seems to be crucial to changing e-cigarette 
regulatory stances in the cases at hand. Left-wing parties have behaved as though e-cigarette 
regulatory policy is not a vote-winner, but right-wing parties have behaved as if the subject is a 
vote-loser. Voters do not mention the subject as being pivotal to determining their vote. The 
issue remains one of low salience in the political arena. Only left-wing support for change has 
been able to de-polarize this issue and lead to the opening of a policy window. 
7.1.4 Coupling and Policy Windows 
In the case studies where policy change happened, the time elapsed between a focusing event and 
the introduction of legislation to change regulatory policy numbered in years. The task of re-
writing regulatory frameworks was assigned to the Canadian and New Zealand bureaucracies 
that would implement the new regulatory stance. The bureaucrats took their time to craft what 
they believed to be an evidence-based regulatory policy that expanded their powers over markets 
and provided them with tools to make necessary adjustments to policies as new evidence of the 
effects of policy choices was published. The urgency to pass e-cigarette regulatory legislation 
was relatively low in each primary case study. When legislation eventually appeared, it 
represented the slow and grinding work of policy crafting in partnership with expertise. 
 
40 AQ @ 3-4; Standing Committee on Health, Aged Care and Sport, Report on the Inquiry into the Use and Marketing of 
Electronic Cigarettes and Personal Vaporisers in Australia, 141. 
41 AQ@ 10 
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The work of coupling the streams in Australia was bungled by THR policy entrepreneurs who 
remained insensitive to the political calculation and problem definitions available to be 
exploited.42 The entrepreneurs’ chosen policy alternative of a broadly expansionist and lightly 
governed e-cigarette market was unresponsive to electoral concerns of the government who 
feared losing votes to the left-wing if they were too friendly to business interests.43 The 
politicians recruited to their cause were not natural allies to public health or harm reduction 
causes.44 When presented with the opportunity to recruit converts to their coalition, the THR 
policy entrepreneurs were unable to sell their wares and were roundly defeated. 
By contrast, the policy entrepreneurship on the issue in Canada was quiet, consensual, and 
conducted hand-in-glove by policymakers, public health groups, and bureaucrats.45 A solution 
(an expansionist stance) that was responsive to an issue (dissatisfaction with the prohibitionist 
stance) was constructed in a manner that made it attractive to all political parties (linking plain 
packaging with business-friendly harm-reduction). The New Zealand Ministry of Health also 
bridged the gap in its policy advice to two successive governments to create a policy that few 
have found objectionable in a similar manner (excluding the use of policy linkage) to the 
Canadian case.46 The New Zealand case is defined by a court case that invalidated a pre-existing 
regulatory stance and created an acute focusing event to which the Ministry of Health and 
government officials chose to deliberately respond.47 The cases of policy change are therefore 
defined by entrepreneurship that is opportunistic, cooperative, and constrictive while the case of 
policy stasis is defined more by impatience and antagonism. 
Summary 
Certain conditions were necessary to create a policy window to change the regulatory framework 
for e-cigarettes. Within the Multiple Streams Approach, the problem and policy streams had to 
become primed before they could successfully merge with the politics stream. First, the problem 
stream became primed once the current regulatory policy banning the sale of e-cigarettes was 
 
42 See 4.5 Failure to Couple the Streams at page 110. 
43 McGowan, “The Australian Election 2019 Has (Finally) Been Called.” 
44 See 4.4.2 THR Advocates Latch onto David Leyonhjelm at page 108. 
45 See 5.5 The Politics Stream at page 141. 
46 “Ministry to Consider Risk-Proportionate Regulation for Vaping and Heated Tobacco Products,” Ministry of Health NZ, May 
9, 2018, https://www.health.govt.nz/news-media/news-items/ministry-consider-risk-proportionate-regulation-vaping-and-heated-
tobacco-products. 
47 Butler, Ministry of Health v Phillip Morris (New Zealand) Ltd, NZDC. 
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deemed a failure. The regulatory policy failed by being rejected by the courts as illegal, rejected 
by bureaucracies as not worth enforcing, or it failed to achieve its goal to advance the fight 
against smoking. Next, the policy stream became primed once the public health policy 
community came to a consensus preference on a policy to expand access to e-cigarettes to 
replace the failed e-cigarette sales ban. Finally, the politics stream was primed when left-wing 
politicians were given permission to support a regulatory policy change favored by business 
groups because public health groups and health bureaucracies agreed that the alternative policy 
was preferable to the old. This freed right-wing politicians to support regulatory policy change 
without facing a political penalty. As regulatory policy change is not typically an important issue 
for voters, a permission structure had to be created that allowed all politicians to agree to the 
policy community’s consensus alternative regulatory policy, insulating politicians from electoral 
consequences. Once left-wing politicians, right-wing politicians, public health non-governmental 
organizations, tobacco companies, e-cigarette companies, and government bureaucrats concluded 
that they would benefit more from the adoption of the alternative regulatory policy than if they 
defended the failed policy, a policy window to change the failed e-cigarette regulatory 
framework opened. 
7.2 Framing the Regulatory Framework 
Each country’s bureaucracy and public health policy community coalesced around a framing for 
their regulatory stance for nicotine-containing e-cigarettes. Australia chose to describe their 
policy as a “precautionary approach”. Canada chose to describe its regulatory policy as a 
“balanced approach”. New Zealand describes its policy approach as “risk-proportionate 
regulation”. Policy community participants from each country were in constant contact with one 
another and were keenly aware of what the others were doing and saying on e-cigarette 
regulatory matters. Therefore, comparing these framings may be a useful exercise. 
The consistency of how each country’s policy community defined their approach was perhaps 
more enlightening than the fact that their framings diverged. Canadians were consistently able to 
point out that a “balanced approach” to regulating the e-cigarette market meant preserving access 
to reduced risk products should be preserved for adults, while efforts to decreasing access and 
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uptake for youth.48 The fact that these access goals were in tension with one another was always 
recognized and brought forwards as an ongoing challenge to policymakers.  
New Zealanders were consistently able to define “risk-proportionate regulation” as a strategy of 
regulatory policies that applied harsher (more contractionist) rules to more dangerous products.49 
The implementation of a strategy of “risk-proportionate regulation” could differ markedly, 
however. Tobacco companies preferred that risk-proportionate regulation meant exempting e-
cigarettes from the contractionist regulatory policies already in place for tobacco cigarettes. 
Many in the public health policy community interpreted a risk-proportionate regulation strategy 
as justifying imposing ever-harsher contractionist regulatory policies on tobacco cigarettes while 
subjecting e-cigarettes to a modicum of regulatory policies that were harsher than the typical 
consumer product. 
The term “precautionary approach” is consistently used to describe Australian e-cigarette 
regulatory policy. 50 This language was agreed upon as an official descriptor of national policy at 
a November 2017 meeting of the Council of Australian Governments.51 Attempts to define what 
the descriptor means beyond the tautological are varied in their results. Some described 
precautionary policy as simply having a premarket approval system.52 Others defined precaution 
as the concept that novel products with unknown risks merit caution from policymakers, as the 
classic precautionary principle asks, instead of assuming that novelty implies harm 
minimization.53 Each definition makes the case that the pre-existing medicines, therapeutics, and 
consumer goods framework is a precautionary regulatory policy. Medicines require proof of 
safety and efficacy before receiving pre-market approval. In a related sense, the poisons standard 
is an even purer application of the precautionary principle because poisons are de-scheduled 
once safety is established. The precautionary approach was baked into the pre-existing policy 
framework wherein e-cigarettes were assumed to not be legal for sale instead of being assumed 
to be legal. Thus, the characterization of premarket approval as the keystone of the policy in the 
framework seems appropriate. Premarket approval has maintained a prohibitionist stance 
 
48 Van Loon, “Canada’s Approach to Vaping Products: Responding to Youth Vaping Rates.” 
49 “Ministry to Consider Risk-Proportionate Regulation for Vaping and Heated Tobacco Products.” 
50 Australian Government Department of Health Therapeutic Goods Administration, “Electronic Cigarettes.” 
51 AI @ 30; Australian Department of Health, “E-Cigarettes,” Commonwealth of Australia, October 31, 2017, 
https://bit.ly/2xLBnOP. 
52 AH @ 34; AL @ 10 
53 AJ @ 9 
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towards nicotine-containing e-cigarettes in Australia because no product has qualified for 
expansionist treatment under the therapeutic pathway.  
The chosen framing of each regulatory approach reflects the philosophy, goals, and fears of each 
case country. Efforts to avoid making one error (causing an uptake in youth vaping) may 
outweigh concerns to avoid making a different error (not providing cessation support for adult 
smokers). Australia’s framing purports to avoid making the first error in favor of committing the 
second. New Zealand’s framing attempts to correct for the second error. Canada’s framing tries 
to address both errors at once.  
The acknowledgment of the need to help adult smokers quit smoking has never been lost on 
Australians. The key issue we have learned is that the issue of continued adult smoking is not 
considered an issue acute enough to address by changing e-cigarette regulation. Australia’s 
general satisfaction with the progress it has made against smoking has caused it to jealously 
protect those gains. Preserving their progress became the Australian goal. 
By contrast, the New Zealand framing belies frustration with tobacco control progress. A belief 
that the status quo is inadequately serving New Zealand adults, particularly those of Māori 
descent, drives the need to risk limited youth e-cigarette uptake to expand adult tobacco smoking 
cessation.54 New Zealand is in near full compliance with the tobacco control policy 
recommendations of the WHO FCTC.55 And yet, the country is still seeing tobacco cigarette 
smoking prevalence in Māori women (36% in 2019) that exceeds anything ever observed in 
Australian, American, or French women during the height of the popularity of smoking in the 
20th century.56 The public health policy community felt the need to look for innovative solutions, 
and risk-proportionate regulation stood apart as the solution they could sell to policymakers. 
As no large shift in the language used to describe a regulatory framework has yet occurred in a 
case country, we cannot know if the framing is antecedent to the taking of a regulatory stance. In 
Canada, mentions of a balanced approach to e-cigarette regulation only began cropping up after 
the introduction of Bill S-5.57 In New Zealand, the Ministry of Health only began to describe the 
 
54 Edwards, “Endgames and Smokefree Aotearoa 2025 Update.” 
55 World Health Organization, WHO REPORT ON THE GLOBAL TOBACCO EPIDEMIC, 2019: Offer Help to Quit Tobacco 
Use. 
56 Forey et al., “International Smoking Statistics: Web Edition”; NZ Ministry of Health, “Indicator: Current Smokers.” 
57 Seidman and Philpott, Issue No. 21 - Evidence - April 12, 2017. 
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goal for e-cigarette regulation as “risk-proportionate” after the public health policy community 
lobbied them to adopt such an approach.58 A shift in the framing of the goal of regulation in 
these cases likely belied a shift in intent or strategy that was in progress. Paying attention to 
framing then can help determine how a regulatory stance is likely to shift, although 
determinative policy choices may be expressed in the details outside of policymaker’s rhetoric 
and evaluated through changes in market outcomes. 
7.3 EVALI 
A Global Focusing Event and a Test of Lessons Learned  
In August of 2019, reports of young people who had used e-cigarettes before turning up in the 
intensive care units of Midwestern US hospitals began spreading through American media.59 
These young people were suffering from a syndrome of pneumonia-like lung injuries that were 
not traceable to any microbial source, yet all of them had reported recently using e-cigarettes.60 
These hospitalizations were shortly followed by reports of the first-ever deaths known to be 
caused by vaping.61  
In the scramble to identify the cause of the outbreak, a key detail kept on being articulated in an 
inartful manner to the public; that most of the people falling ill from this new syndrome had been 
using their e-cigarettes to ingest tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the primary psychoactive 
compound in cannabis.62 By October, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
 
58 Richard Edwards et al., “‘Achieving Smokefree Aotearoa by 2025’: A Response to Critiques,” Public Health Expert, 
University of Otago (blog), October 6, 2017, https://blogs.otago.ac.nz/pubhealthexpert/2017/10/06/achieving-smokefree-
aotearoa-by-2025-a-response-to-critiques/; “Ministry to Consider Risk-Proportionate Regulation for Vaping and Heated Tobacco 
Products.” 
59 Stephen S. Hall, “Who Thought Sucking on a Battery Was a Good Idea?,” Intelligencer, February 4, 2020, 
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/02/vaping-health-crisis.html; Isaac Ghinai et al., “E-Cigarette Product Use, or Vaping, 
Among Persons with Associated Lung Injury — Illinois and Wisconsin, April–September 2019,” Morbidity and Mortality 
Weekly Report 68, no. 39 (October 4, 2019): 865–69, https://doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6839e2. 
60 “2019 Lung Injury Surveillance Primary Case Definitions” (Atlanta, GA: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
September 18, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/basic_information/e-cigarettes/assets/2019-Lung-Injury-Surveillance-Case-
Definition-508.pdf. 
61 This excludes deaths caused by e-cigarette battery explosions. “First Death Linked to Vaping Reported in US,” BBC News, 
August 24, 2019, sec. US & Canada, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49452256. 
62 Joe Neel, “CDC Says Number Of Possible Cases Of Vaping-Related Lung Illness Has Doubled,” NPR.org, September 6, 2019, 
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/09/06/758337583/cdc-says-number-of-possible-cases-of-vaping-related-lung-
illness-has-doubled. 
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had deemed the syndrome, E-cigarette, or Vaping, product use Associated Lung Injury (EVALI), 
a name that implied that using any e-cigarette product could cause the syndrome.63  
A month before the naming of EVALI, questions about the inclusion of a novel additive, 
Vitamin E Acetate, to illicitly sourced THC cartridges began being bandied about as a supposed 
cause of the syndrome.64 Vitamin E Acetate was added to THC cartridges by cost-cutting 
manufacturers who would purport that their products contained more THC than they did because 
Vitamin E Acetate increased the viscosity of the liquid like THC.65 Eventually, the CDC came to 
agree that EVALI could be attributed in almost every case to an illicitly supplied THC product 
that was laced with Vitamin E Acetate or similar compounds.66 In response, the FDA and Drug 
Enforcement Agency confiscated the websites of retailers who sold Vitamin E Acetate-laced 
vaping products.67 Law enforcement officials at the state and local level seized suspect cartridges 
from manufacturers and arrested distributors.68 These actions would take some time to affect the 
outbreak. 
EVALI cases began to mount as an unnervingly young cohort of patients began turning up at 
hospitals and being treated for pneumonia-like symptoms.69 In response, media attention focused 
on e-cigarettes in an unprecedented manner. A tally of stories about e-cigarettes in the national 
media of the case study countries along with the United States is summarized in Figure 15.70 We 
 
63 Using a name like NVALI or TVALI to designate which substance, nicotine or THC, was responsible for the outbreak was 
possible but CDC did not choose that option David A. Siegel, “Update: Interim Guidance for Health Care Providers Evaluating 
and Caring for Patients with Suspected E-Cigarette, or Vaping, Product Use Associated Lung Injury — United States, October 
2019,” MMWR. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 68 (2019), https://doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6841e3; Michael 
McGrady, “EVALI and Risk Communication, Explained,” Vaping Post, October 21, 2019, 
https://www.vapingpost.com/2019/10/21/evali-and-risk-communication-explained/. 
64 David Downs, “Amid Vape Pen Lung Disease Deaths: What Exactly Is Vitamin E Oil?,” Leafly (blog), September 11, 2019, 
https://www.leafly.com/news/health/vape-pen-lung-disease-vitamin-e-oil-explained. 
65 Marissa Wenzke and David Downs, “From ‘Veronica Mars’ to Toxic Vapes: The Rise and Fall of Honey Cut,” Leafly (blog), 
November 8, 2019, https://www.leafly.com/news/health/toxic-vaping-vapi-evali-lung-injury-rise-and-fall-of-vitamin-e-oil-
honey-cut. 
66 Kathleen P. Hartnett et al., “Syndromic Surveillance for E-Cigarette, or Vaping, Product Use–Associated Lung Injury,” New 
England Journal of Medicine 0, no. 0 (December 20, 2019): null, https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMsr1915313. 
67 Office of the Commissioner, “FDA, DEA Seize 44 Websites Advertising Sale of Illicit THC Vaping Cartridges to US 
Consumers as Part of Operation Vapor Lock,” FDA, December 20, 2019, http://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-
announcements/fda-dea-seize-44-websites-advertising-sale-illicit-thc-vaping-cartridges-us-consumers-part-operation. 
68 Joanne Taylor et al., “Characteristics of E-Cigarette, or Vaping, Products Used by Patients with Associated Lung Injury and 
Products Seized by Law Enforcement — Minnesota, 2018 and 2019,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 68, no. 47 
(November 29, 2019): 1096–1100, https://doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6847e1. 
69 Isaac Ghinai, “Characteristics of Persons Who Report Using Only Nicotine-Containing Products Among Interviewed Patients 
with E-Cigarette, or Vaping, Product Use–Associated Lung Injury — Illinois, August–December 2019,” MMWR. Morbidity and 
Mortality Weekly Report 69 (2020), https://doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6903e1. 
70 Performed using the MediaCloud tool. MIT Center for Civic Media and Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society, “Media 
Cloud,” Media Cloud, 2020, https://mediacloud.org. 
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can see that the beginning of the outbreak, September 2019, marked the high-water point for 
media attention about e-cigarettes in every country. In the US, almost 4500 news stories were 
written that month about e-cigarettes. Canada, who was suffering a smaller EVALI outbreak than 
the US saw media interest in e-cigarettes spike nearly as high as the US. Australia and New 
Zealand paid considerably less attention to the story than the North American countries. 
Figure 15: EVALI Hospital Admissions and National Media Attention to e-Cigarettes as a Proportion of all Stories by Country 
(January 2018 to April 2020) 
 
When the first deaths caused by EVALI began occurring in late August, EVALI had become a 
problem to which policymakers had to respond.71 The CDC, Campaign for Tobacco Free-Kids, 
and many other American public health organizations began leveraging the crisis to push for 
contractionist regulatory stances towards nicotine e-cigarettes, even though those products were 
not directly at fault for the injuries and deaths.72 Michigan was the first state to move. Governor 
Whitmer announced that she would be issuing an executive order that temporarily banned the 
sale of flavored e-cigarettes on September 4th.73 The states of New York, Montana, Washington, 
Oregon, and New Jersey followed soon afterward issuing executive orders temporarily banning 
the sale of e-cigarettes with non-tobacco flavors while Massachusetts banned sales of all e-
 
71 Matt Richtel and Sheila Kaplan, “First Death in a Spate of Vaping Sicknesses Reported by Health Officials,” The New York 
Times, August 23, 2019, sec. Health, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/23/health/vaping-death-cdc.html. 
72 Ronald Bayer et al., “Risk And Reason: Australia, England, And The US E-Cigarette Crisis Of 2019,” Health Affairs Blog 
(blog), April 22, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1377/hblog20200407.144029. 
73 Angelica LaVito, “Michigan Becomes First State to Ban Sales of Flavored E-Cigarettes,” CNBC, September 4, 2019, 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/04/michigan-bans-sales-of-flavored-e-cigarettes-restricts-vaping-marketing.html. 
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cigarettes, regardless of flavoring.74 Governors and legislators across the US political spectrum 
applauded these moves, as majorities of voters in both political parties stated their agreement 
with a flavored e-cigarette ban.75 
The President of the United States, Donald Trump, then stepped into the EVALI fray by stating 
that a federal ban on the sale of flavored e-cigarettes was under consideration on September 
11th.76 The solution closest at hand, it seems was a replication of the gubernatorial policies 
banning on the sale of flavored e-cigarettes, even though this solution did little to directly 
address the problem of tainted THC vaping products. As Trump’s policy simply mimicked the 
actions taken by Governor Whitmer the week prior, the garbage can model of organizational 
choice (of which Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach is a close descendant) seems to be a 
useful metaphor in this instance.77 Trump’s proposed flavor ban was well-received by American 
political elites.78 
Soon after Trump spoke up on the matter, state courts began to strike down several of the 
executive orders that served as inspiration for the president79. Governor Whitmer’s order was 
only in effect for a few weeks as a state judge issued a preliminary injunction against the policy 
citing the irreparable harm it would do to the state’s e-cigarette retailers in October.80 The bans 
 
74 “US Regulatory Tracker: State Executive Orders Banning Flavours,” ECigIntelligence (blog), April 16, 2020, 
https://ecigintelligence.com/regulatory-tracker-us-state-executive-orders/. 
75 Lunna Lopes et al., “Data Note: Public Views on Vaping and E-Cigarettes,” The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation (blog), 
October 17, 2019, https://www.kff.org/other/issue-brief/data-note-vaping-and-e-cigarettes/. 
76 Audrey McNamara, “Trump Administration Considering Ban on Flavored E-Cigarettes,” The Daily Beast, September 11, 
2019, https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-administration-considering-ban-on-flavored-e-cigarettes. 
77 Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice,” Administrative 
Science Quarterly 17, no. 1 (1972): 1–25, https://doi.org/10.2307/2392088. 
78 Nicole Vas, “Lawmakers Applaud Trump’s Ban on Flavored e-Cigarettes,” Text, TheHill, September 11, 2019, 
https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/461017-lawmakers-applaud-trumps-ban-on-flavored-e-cigarettes. 
79 Rhode Island’s policy became permanent via executive order, while New York and Massachusetts passed legislation codifying 
bans on the sale of flavored tobacco products (including both tobacco cigarettes and e-cigarettes). NBC 10 NEWS, “RI’s Ban on 
Flavored Vape Products Becomes Permanent,” WJAR, March 26, 2020, https://turnto10.com/news/local/ris-ban-on-flavored-e-
cigs-becomes-permanent; Melanie Lekocevic, “State Bans Flavored Vaping Products,” The Daily News, April 12, 2020, 
https://www.thedailynewsonline.com/top_story/state-bans-flavored-vaping-products/article_43a406e3-5838-50ee-b5e9-
ea36acb3e56b.html; Vanessa Romo, “Massachusetts Governor Signs Law Severely Restricting Flavored Tobacco, Vape 
Products,” NPR.org, November 27, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/11/27/783400051/massachusetts-governor-signs-law-
severely-restricting-flavored-tobacco-vape-prod. 
80 Scott McClallen, “Michigan Supreme Court Declines to Restore Ban on Flavored Nicotine Vaping Products,” Detroit Metro 
Times, January 3, 2020, https://www.metrotimes.com/news-hits/archives/2020/01/03/michigan-supreme-court-declines-to-
restore-ban-on-flavored-nicotine-vaping-products. 
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in New York and Oregon were also struck down on similar grounds.81 Only Montana’s 
temporary ban survived court scrutiny.82 
By mid-November, President Trump ended up backing off the plan to institute a comprehensive 
ban on the sale of flavored e-cigarettes, largely in response to a pressure campaign mounted by 
e-cigarette users, manufacturers, and retailers.83 His administration ended up advancing a much 
more narrowly tailored policy restricting the sale of flavored e-cigarettes to certain form factors 
of e-cigarettes (disposable and open systems).84 On January 17, 2020, Trump even sent a briefing 
on the nascent coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan, China from Health and Human Services 
Secretary Alex Azar off course to excoriate Azar for pushing him to respond to EVALI 
exclaiming, “I never should have done this f****** vaping thing!”85 Trump viewed his 
administration’s actions to advance a contractionist e-cigarette policy as a losing political 
proposition that antagonized his supporters and rewarded his political opponents.86  
The combined effects of enforcement actions, public health campaigns warning the public about 
EVALI, and changing the behavior of THC product manufacturers all contributed to an 
environment that brought the outbreak to a speedy end. More Americans began to believe that e-
cigarettes were more hazardous to one’s health than tobacco cigarettes.87 By the time the 
outbreak of illnesses had peaked and then subsided in early 2020, every US state, the District of 
 
81 Kandra Kent, “Oregon Judge Thwarts Temporary Ban on Flavored Nicotine E-Liquids,” KPTV.com, October 17, 2019, 
https://www.kptv.com/news/oregon-judge-thwarts-temporary-ban-on-flavored-nicotine-e-liquids/article_a5b0a592-f135-11e9-
9f2f-cf4c2a60bcb1.html; Brendan J. Lyons, “Judge Strikes down New York’s Ban on Flavored Vaping Products,” Times Union, 
January 11, 2020, https://www.timesunion.com/news/article/Judge-strikes-down-New-York-s-ban-on-flavored-14967736.php. 
82 Associated Press, “Judge Approves Temporary Ban on Flavored E-Cigarettes,” KECI, December 18, 2019, 
https://nbcmontana.com/news/local/judge-approves-temporary-ban-on-flavored-e-cigarettes. 
83 Megan Theilking and Nicholas Florko, “Trump’s Stalling on Vaping Issue Raises Fear of Lasting Health Consequences,” 
STAT (blog), November 19, 2019, https://www.statnews.com/2019/11/19/trumps-stalling-on-flavored-vape-ban-draws-blowback-
and-fears-of-lasting-damage-to-american-health/; Angelica LaVito, “Vape Shop Owners on Edge While Trump Administration 
Wavers on Banning Flavored E-Cigarettes,” CNBC, November 14, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/14/vape-shop-owners-
await-trumps-decision-on-banning-flavored-e-cigarettes.html. 
84 Jane Weaver and Lauren Dunn, “FDA Pulls Most Fruity and Minty E-Cigarettes Flavors, but Menthol and DIY Still 
Available,” NBC News, January 2, 2020, https://www.nbcnews.com/health/vaping/some-flavored-e-cigarette-pods-be-pulled-
market-except-menthol-n1109531. 
85 Gabriel Sherman, “Inside Donald Trump and Jared Kushner’s Two Months of Magical Thinking,” Vanity Fair, April 28, 2020, 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/04/donald-trump-jared-kushners-two-months-of-magical-thinking. 
86 E. J. Dickson, “The Vaping Industry Is Furious at President Trump -- Could It Cost Him the Election?,” Rolling Stone (blog), 
November 11, 2019, https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/vaping-rally-washington-dc-donald-trump-flavors-
ban-910474/. 
87 Dhaval M Dave et al., “News That Takes Your Breath Away: Risk Perceptions During an Outbreak of Vaping-Related Lung 
Injuries,” Working Paper, Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2020), 
https://doi.org/10.3386/w26977. 
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Columbia, the US Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and six Canadian provinces had seen EVALI 
cases, almost 3000 in total.88 As of February 2020, 68 people had died in the EVALI outbreak.89 
After EVALI had begun to recede, US public health officials began to admit that EVALI had 
been conflated with a distinctly different health problem of youth e-cigarette use.90 Nicotine-
containing e-cigarette use among US youth had been rising since the introduction and 
exponential expansion of the JUUL brand in 2016 and 2017.91 In 2018 and 2019, the two largest-
ever one-year increases in youth substance use in the US were recorded in the Monitoring the 
Future Survey for nicotine and marijuana vaping.92 Young people in the US were using more and 
more vaping products every year, data confirming this increase in substance use was reported to 
federal officials at the same moment when EVALI was spiking in the public’s attention.93 
Removing flavored e-cigarettes from the US market was a much more plausibly connected 
policy response to youth use than to EVALI. Flavored e-cigarettes have been found to be 
attractive to youth.94 E-cigarette industry-led responses to address sales of favored e-cigarettes 
have been found to be inadequate to address this issue.95 The conflation of the EVALI crisis with 
a youth e-cigarette usage problem advanced a policy solution that addressed the latter problem 
instead of the former. 
 
88 Krishnasamy, “Update”; Public Health Agency of Canada, “Vaping-Associated Lung Illness,” alerts, aem, February 13, 2020, 
https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/diseases/vaping-pulmonary-illness.html. 
89 CDC’s Office on Smoking and Health, “Outbreak of Lung Injury Associated with the Use of E-Cigarette, or Vaping, 
Products,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, February 25, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/basic_information/e-
cigarettes/severe-lung-disease.html. 
90 Brian A. King et al., “The EVALI and Youth Vaping Epidemics — Implications for Public Health,” New England Journal of 
Medicine, January 17, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp1916171. 
91 Jidong Huang et al., “Vaping versus JUULing: How the Extraordinary Growth and Marketing of JUUL Transformed the US 
Retail e-Cigarette Market,” Tobacco Control 28, no. 2 (March 2019): 146–51, https://doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2018-
054382; David Hammond et al., “Use of JUUL E-Cigarettes Among Youth in the United States,” Nicotine & Tobacco Research 
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A confluence of problem, vaping-caused illness of mysterious origins and rising youth e-
cigarette use, and policy response, removing flavored e-cigarettes from retail, met with receptive 
politicians who wanted appear to be “doing something” in a policy window to produce scads of 
new contractionist policies targeted at e-cigarettes in the US. EVALI, more than representing a 
straightforward extension of regulatory path dependence96, served as the impetus for flexing 
regulatory power by US governors and bureaucrats. EVALI’s effects were concentrated in the 
US, and to a lesser extent, Canada, but the paths taken by officials represented what was 
bounded by the solutions available at hand as well as what was perceived to be politically 
possible. Canada’s experience illustrates how officials tasked with expanded regulatory power 
leveraged EVALI as a catalyst to flex their newfound regulatory powers to roll back the recent 
adoption of an expansionist regulatory stance. The experience of New Zealand and Australia 
with EVALI served to rededicate each country’s bureaucracy to the regulatory stances it was 
already pursuing. What follows is a short description of how each country reacted to this 
momentous focusing event that occurred after the completion of the fieldwork for this study. 
7.3.1 EVALI in Canada 
The Federal Liberal Party of Canada sought re-election in mid-2019 in the aftermath of the SNC-
Lavalin affair and reduced enthusiasm about the Prime Minister.97 The campaign paid little 
attention to the matter of e-cigarette regulation as no party manifesto touched on the subject. As 
the trouble with EVALI began stirring up the political response to e-cigarettes south of the 
Canadian border, party leaders were asked their opinions on the matter of e-cigarette regulation 
and none would commit to policy action.98 By the 2019 election, NDP voters reported less net 
support for a ban on flavored e-cigarette sales or a temporary ban on sales of all e-cigarettes than 
did Liberal or Conservative voters.99 The Liberal Party ended up winning a smaller share of seats 
 
96 As suggested in Bayer et al., “Risk And Reason.” 
97 Zack Beauchamp, “Justin Trudeau’s Liberals Won Canada’s Election,” Vox, October 21, 2019, https://www.vox.com/policy-
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than in 2015, enabling Justin Trudeau to form a minority government that had to share power 
with smaller rivals to advance legislation.100 
The media’s portrayal of e-cigarettes soured further as 2019 wore on. In the aftermath of the 
EVALI scare, some public health activists, like Neil Collishaw of Physicians for a Smoke-Free 
Canada, began publicly scorning the thinking that led to the passage of Bill S-5 by characterizing 
the enthusiasm for harm reduction as a “suspension of critical thinking”.101 Health Canada, for its 
part, was measured in its reaction to the EVALI outbreak and simply advised e-cigarette users to 
monitor their health while using the products.102 
EVALI news reports likely opened a policy window at the provincial level.103 This happened 
even as Health Canada emphasized that ongoing efforts to change the regulatory stance towards 
e-cigarettes in the country would not affect the fight against EVALI.104 As the federal election 
unfolded, a new round of provincial e-cigarette regulations was adopted to cut down on e-
cigarette use among youth. Some bills seemed well-targeted to that purpose like the effort of 
Prince Edward Island to raise the minimum age of sale for tobacco and vaping products from 19 
to 21 years of age.105 Other legislative efforts, like that announced by British Columbia, seem 
more poised to contract the size of the e-cigarette market by altering product standards, prices, 
and the retail environment to make these products into less attractive and effective nicotine 
sources.106  
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Enthusiasm to change Canada’s regulatory stance towards e-cigarettes into something more 
contractionist is building, especially at the provincial level.107 The presence of credible policy 
entrepreneurs hawking politically acceptable solutions across partisan divides like excise taxes, 
stricter marketing rules, and more stringent rules around product standards as a solution to the 
identified problems, leads one to conclude the Canadian regulatory framework for e-cigarettes 
has not reached an evolutionary endpoint.108  
7.3.2 EVALI in New Zealand 
New Zealand was in the middle of writing draft legislation to reform their e-cigarette regulatory 
stance when EVALI unfolded in the US. The attention garnered by the issue of e-cigarette use in 
the New Zealand media was significant, even though not a single Kiwi was harmed by the 
outbreak. Videos of American teenagers sitting in hospital beds stating that they had wished they 
had never picked up a vape were broadcast in New Zealand.109 
Just before the outbreak came into focus, the Minister of Health was promising to deliver e-
cigarette regulatory reform legislation in October 2019 that would eliminate most flavors, cap 
nicotine levels, and eliminate marketing of e-cigarettes.110 PM Ardern promised in November 
that legislation that would protect young people from becoming addicted to e-cigarettes was 
“coming soon”.111 By the time that the promised e-cigarette regulatory legislation appeared in 
February 2020, Ardern explained that the delay was attributable to the back-and-forth exercise 
that her government had engaged in with a bureaucracy that wanted to preserve access to e-
cigarettes for adult smokers.112  
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The policies that were put forward in the Smokefree Environments and Regulated Products 
(Vaping) Amendment bill of 2020 were less restrictive than the ideas being bandied about in 
public before the EVALI outbreak.113 E-cigarettes could be sold in almost any flavor in adult-
only vape shops, no cap on nicotine was introduced, and marketing was restricted in almost 
every manner with a notable exemption of public health campaigns that would encourage 
smokers to switch.114 That EVALI did not cause a retrenchment towards a more contractionist 
policy in New Zealand is notable. The policy development process continued behind closed 
doors in a controlled environment. Bureaucrats did not have to respond to imminent threats to the 
health of young people and politicians felt no pressure to “do something” about EVALI. Instead, 
New Zealand acted in a manner that understood EVALI was not caused by nicotine-containing e-
cigarettes and that contractionist policies towards that market were unlikely to solve that public 
problem.  
7.3.3 EVALI in Australia 
Across the Tasman, September of 2019 provided plenty of fodder for the Australian national 
media and Commonwealth government to justify its current regulatory stance towards e-
cigarettes. The pictures of sick and sad American teenagers swearing they should have never 
started vaping served to justify that Australia’s precautionary approach had been the right choice 
all along.115 As in the US, the role of THC-containing products in the EVALI outbreak was not 
prominently mentioned in Australian media coverage of the outbreak.116 An e-cigarette was an e-
cigarette was an e-cigarette. Heated tobacco was mixed up with nicotine-containing e-cigarettes 
in the original push for regulatory policy change, and EVALI mixed up the misfortune of THC e-
cigarette users with nicotine-containing e-cigarette users. Media framing of the continuing push 
from THR advocates to ask the government to reconsider its stance on e-cigarette regulation 
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shifted from cynicism to something more sinister as it was juxtaposed against the EVALI 
outbreak.117  
EVALI further entrenched the negative perception of e-cigarettes by politicians from the left and 
right-wings of Australian politics.118 A spokesperson for Health Minister Hunt emphasized that 
the government maintained “a strict commitment to opposing vaping or any liberalization on 
laws”.119 Hunt directed Australia’s medicines regulator to strengthen its partnership with customs 
officials to crack down harder on illicit importation of nicotine liquid.120 Questions about the 
relative risk of e-cigarettes compared to tobacco cigarettes evaporated as focus on a condition 
that could kill in weeks instead of years became the focus of concerned parents and politicians. 
Mentions of liberalizing e-cigarette regulations disappeared from Parliamentary records in its 
aftermath. Australia’s public health policy community already viewed its tobacco control issue 
as being under control before EVALI. After seeing peer countries with legal e-cigarette markets 
suffer from EVALI, appetites for liberalization in Australia died.  
7.3.4 Summary 
As a global focusing event on the topic of e-cigarette regulation, EVALI turned out to be a prism 
through which a country’s concerns about e-cigarettes were reflected. The scary and sudden 
nature of the outbreak and its choice of victim made the outbreak a salient, negative image for e-
cigarette use in each case country. But, the reactions to the outbreak reflected the pre-existing 
problems that countries believed they needed to address. Canada’s concerns about youth uptake 
of e-cigarettes, Australia’s concerns about the nefarious nature of e-cigarettes as a product 
category, and New Zealand’s more staid and technocratic policy conversations all absorbed the 
EVALI news and produced a policy that was structured by the limiting conditions of each of 
Kingdon’s stream. Pre-existing regulatory policy, problem definition, political possibility, and 
policy community decisions structured and limited the scope of action each country could take as 
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EVALI cropped up. The crisis even precipitated a decision by Indian officials who were 
predisposed to adopting other prohibitionist policies to officially ban the sale of e-cigarettes 
countrywide.121 This points to the utility of future scholarly work in this area and others within 
and beyond comparative regulation that examines the effect of past decisions on future focusing 
events.122 
7.4 Conclusion 
This case study has pointed to the utility of the Multiple Streams Approach in breaking down the 
steps that led to policy change or agenda-setting into their component parts. It has enabled the 
sketching of a clearer picture of what led to regulatory policy change or stasis in the selected 
case studies. Problem definition precipitated the events that led to a policy change, wherein the 
status quo prohibitionist regulatory framework was rejected as being unworkable through a 
focusing event. The rejection of the regulatory framework enabled the public health policy 
community to settle on a consensus alternative regulatory policy. That consensus alternative 
regulatory policy was then shepherded to becoming legislation once left-wing parties came to 
agree with the change.  
The roles that other factors highlighted here, like governmental structure and differences in 
ideology, might play in determining changes in other cases of regulatory policy debates, should 
be explored in other case studies. The vast differences in circumstance, history, and structure 
between jurisdictions points to the necessity of continuing to utilize qualitative comparative 
techniques to explain the outcomes of regulatory policy. What triggered a change in Canada and 
New Zealand was highly dependent on factors that are not easily summed up into a set of 
quantitative variables highlighting whether problem definition caused a bureaucracy to abandon 
an older regulatory stance. This is an inherently limiting quality of such scholarship, but the 
important explanatory variables found here should nonetheless be tested in other venues and 
cases. There are myriad examples of bureaucrats surrendering or standing up for their 
 
121 Adi Robertson, “India Bans E-Cigarette Sales and Says There’s an ‘Epidemic’ of Kids Vaping,” The Verge, September 18, 
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enforcement duties over markets. There are myriad examples of governments failing to live up to 
their ambitious regulatory policy goals. Policy communities constantly disintegrate into discord 
or arrive at collective agreement. And politicians always seek power. The effects of these 
common forces should be explored in other regulatory policy contexts. The details and reasons 
for changes in policy differed within these cases and are sure to differ in future studies. 
Collecting detailed accounts of the reasoning for these changes will be a useful exercise for the 
study of governance and activism alike. If we can better understand why regulatory policies 
maintain their base of support and how they lose it, we will be better equipped to become 
effective reformers of broken regulatory frameworks going forward. 
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 Conclusion 
This study makes two key contributions to the social science literature. First, it describes why e-
cigarette regulatory policy in Canada and New Zealand changed when Australia stayed put. 
Second, it describes a useful lens through which regulatory policy can be compared, contrasted, 
and studied across markets, time, and place. While the previous chapter covers the empirical 
lessons learned within the narrower confines of the primary case and their immediate extensions, 
this chapter focuses on why these findings should matter to readers who are not focused on 
comparative e-cigarette regulatory policy.  
Instead of comparing stringency, comprehensiveness, or styles, a regulatory stance should be 
preferred as a measure for comparative regulation because it focuses on comparing intent. 
Specifically, it compares the intent of policy to alter the size of a market within an economy in 
the future compared with the present. The actual stance being taken in any situation can be 
debated, but a chosen regulatory stance exists in every regulatory policy debate. In cases where 
governments truly aim to be laissez-faire in their regulatory policy, the regulatory stance concept 
can handle such a decision.123 Clear comparisons can be made once regulatory policy is reduced 
to a parsimonious outcome variable, like a regulatory stance. Intent is measurable across 
markets, time, and place, thereby enabling useful comparative studies. 
Additionally, the concept of intent to change the size of a market is flexible enough to apply to 
most regulatory policy debates concerning markets. By applying the concept of a regulatory 
stance, we can better understand the motive, power dynamics, and logic behind the important 
regulatory policy choices that shape our world. Being able to assign a regulatory stance towards 
a market for a given jurisdiction has several distinct benefits. By being so flexible and 
parsimonious, the regulatory stances concept eases and enables studies across the major 
dimensions of comparative regulation of jurisdiction, markets, and time.  
 
123 As a permissive stance represents a failure to state a preference for growth, this study makes the case that a neutral stance on 
this point is evidence of affirmative intent to not alter a market’s trajectory. 
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The use of regulatory stances enables comparisons across markets within a jurisdiction at a point 
in time by bringing the rationalizations supporting such divergences to the forefront of policy 
conversations. Policymakers, advocates, and enforcement officials should confront these 
differences directly and consider why one market is subject to a contractionist stance while 
another market that causes more damage to consumers is subject to a permissive stance. Further 
work by social scientists can then be conducted on why certain policies were applied to one 
market and not another.124 As in the current study, regulatory stances can be used to ask and 
understand why policy convergence and divergence happen within markets and across 
jurisdictions. Finally, as was the case in this study, a regulatory stance can be used to identify 
when regulatory policy shifted within a market over time and to ask why such changes occurred 
within a jurisdiction. The work offered in this study is then, a glimpse of what is possible with a 
clarifying and useful organizing concept for a complex and messy area of policy. 
In the remainder of this concluding chapter, two examples of the utility of the regulatory stances 
concept are offered. The first case illustrates why a focus on the goal of regulatory policy is 
preferable to the process of passing so-called comprehensive policies. The regulatory stances 
concept centers policy discussions around the idea that regulation should correct market failures 
rather than check boxes. Second, the regulatory stances concept is invoked as a critique of the 
commercial determinants of health literature. The regulatory stance concept offers a clarifying 
perspective on a literature that is both Pollyannaish and lacking in ambition. Finally, the chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the largest unanswered questions raised by this study.   
8.1 Powerful Policies over Comprehensive Policies  
This study brought to light a certain frustration with the policy advice that is provided to activists 
and policymakers attempting to contain the tobacco epidemic and public health threats more 
broadly. In tobacco control, parties to the FCTC have been advised to adopt “comprehensive 
tobacco control policies”.125 This refers to a series of evidence-based best-practices which cover 
 
124 For example, determining why the Canadian government has strengthened a contractionist stance towards the tobacco 
cigarette market while adopting a permissive stance towards the cannabis market would shed light on the different politics of 
governing each market, but perhaps even more broadly, illustrate how a single government can adopt different regulatory stances 
to broadly similar markets. 
125 World Health Organization, WHO REPORT ON THE GLOBAL TOBACCO EPIDEMIC, 2019: Offer Help to Quit Tobacco 
Use, 26. 
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the gamut of policy domains that have been deemed relevant to combatting the tobacco control 
epidemic.  
Each of the countries featured in this comparative case study (Australia, Canada, and New 
Zealand) has adopted almost every one of the recommended WHO policies and each country 
dutifully enforces those laws. To highlight a specific example, the FCTC recommends that 
countries raise excise taxes on tobacco cigarettes to raise prices and decrease the affordability of 
these products. Specifically, the FCTC recommends that 75% of the price of a pack of cigarettes 
be made up of taxes and that those taxes should regularly increase.126 New Zealand and Australia 
have taken this recommendation to heart and have increased their cigarette prices to be the 
highest in the world.127 While tobacco tax policy is still effective and is still working in these 
settings, the implications for health equity have become messy and uncomfortable for health 
advocates who no longer feel comfortable claiming that cigarettes are normatively too cheap. 
Despite those significant accomplishments, smoking prevalence rates remain stuck in the mid-
teens and disparities within population remain as starkly present as ever. 
That result brings the question of why adopting such a comprehensive policy regime remains the 
state-of-the-art policy advice being doled out by the WHO. We can imagine that policies which 
would bring smoking prevalence and the size of the tobacco market down faster is possible. Why 
is finding and utilizing that powerful policy not the recommendation of the WHO? I believe that 
a reliance on the framing concept of adopting “comprehensive policies” being the goal of 
regulatory policy towards the tobacco markets and others has prevented the consideration of 
powerful policies.  
Passing individual policies only alters the profit-maximizing behavior of firms to pursue 
alternative strategies to continue growing sales of their most profitable product lines. This 
discussion about piecemeal regulation has morphed over time into the pursuit and design of 
comprehensive policy regimes to regulate markets. I argue that discussion of comprehensive 
policies is a prelude to discussions of regulatory stances. A regulatory stance is the intended goal 
 
126 Heikki Hiilamo and Stanton Glantz, “Limited Implementation of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control’s Tobacco 
Tax Provision: Global Comparison,” BMJ Open 8, no. 10 (October 1, 2018): e021340, https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2017-
021340. 
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of intervention rather than a checklist of policies to adopt. Utilizing the regulatory stances 
concept highlights the gap between current regulatory policy recommendations and the less-than-
satisfying outcomes by pointing towards the importance of considering and testing powerful, 
novel policy solutions. 
8.1.1 Shortcomings of a Comprehensive Policy 
It might behoove activists to ask whether comprehensive policies are the ideal policies they 
would adopt in a vacuum, free of the considerations of politics. Comprehensive regulatory 
policies may address isolated market failures in a piecemeal fashion, but they do not directly 
answer whether the size of a market ought to change. This points to the litany of shortcomings of 
recommending comprehensive policies instead of recommending regulatory stances to redress 
market failures.  
Recommendations to adopt “comprehensive policies” to regulate markets are an inherently 
limiting construct. They may be overly prescriptive in telling jurisdictions what actions to take 
and they may not adapt well to local context or capacity. The evolving definition of a 
comprehensive policy might frustrate jurisdictions seeking to uphold best practices. Setting 
comprehensiveness as the defining goal of policy development may limit creativity and 
experimentation. Essentially, adopting comprehensive, best-practice policies could devolve into 
a box-checking exercise, devoid of aim beyond fulfilling a promise to be comprehensive and to 
follow best-practices. 
Further, the definition of what comprehensive policy is may not adapt well to different 
environments. The regulatory tools at the disposal of governments to regulate depends on 
technical capacity, a path-dependent historical context, and the political environment in which 
they operate. Available tools vary by jurisdiction and market context, and not every tool can be 
applied to every market. The best regulatory strategy for a low-capacity anocracy might differ 
from what is best in a medium-capacity democracy or a high-capacity technocracy. Failing to be 
sensitive to these differences may be setting up governments to pursue suboptimal regulatory 
policy on the direction of those seeking to apply a uniform comprehensive policy approach. 
For example, Sacks, Swinburn, and Lawrence propose adopting a comprehensive policy 
framework to address rising levels of obesity by tackling upstream, midstream, and downstream 
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factors in rising body-mass indices around the world.128 While this approach is meaningful in the 
sense that it wants to address all the causes of the obesity epidemic, it defines comprehensive as 
a near-exclusive consumer-centric approach to achieving that goal. The authors seek to change 
consumer behavior by reducing energy intake, increase energy usage, and providing a supportive 
environment for those behaviors. While this framework would indeed address every major cause 
of obesity, it disperses the responsibility to act over an entire society, reducing the culpability of 
parties with concentrated interests in maintaining high levels of caloric intake. 
In another case, Kokubo et al., argue that adopting a comprehensive regulatory policy towards 
sugar-sweetened beverages entails focusing on just five policies. None of these policies seem 
likely to dramatically cut the size of the sugar sweetened beverage market. They recommend that 
removing such beverages from school, leveraging an excise tax, restricting marketing, regulating 
government procurement, and improving product labeling would constitute a comprehensive 
policy.129 These policies have been in place on the tobacco cigarette market for decades in many 
jurisdictions and have only minimally affected the market’s trajectory. While policies would 
undoubtedly be helpful, they do not speak to the goal of public health activists as directly as 
possible. 
A comprehensive policy regime is made up of many individual policies. The intent of that 
comprehensive policy regime and the direction it seeks to drive a market is a regulatory stance. 
A regulatory stance does not function as a checklist of policy milestones that must be ticked off 
before a market conforms to the whims of the policymaker. A regulatory stance can be shifted by 
passing just a few policies intent on consequentially changing the character of a market, be it a 
cap-and-trade system, product standards, or extreme differential excise taxation. A change in a 
regulatory stance gives a metaphorical ‘shove’ to markets, fundamentally altering what is 
profitable and what is not. 
 
128 G. Sacks, B. Swinburn, and M. Lawrence, “Obesity Policy Action Framework and Analysis Grids for a Comprehensive 
Policy Approach to Reducing Obesity,” Obesity Reviews 10, no. 1 (2009): 76–86, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
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8.1.2 Using Regulatory Stances May Emphasize Powerful Policies 
When regulatory policy debates shift focus based on an understanding informed by the 
regulatory stances concept, the attraction of employing powerful policies to redress market 
failures may increase. As market failures have an implicit regulatory stance that must be adopted 
to remedy them, the use of stances might connect the idea that said market failure’s effect on 
market size could be more effectively remedied by the adoption of a powerful policy than a 
narrowly tailored portion of a comprehensive policy.130  
In contrast to the more amorphous comprehensive policy concept, a regulatory stance centered 
on changing the shape of markets would narrowly focus on changing the size of markets for 
certain desirable or undesirable food products. Whether a market-centric approach would be 
more effective at achieving say, obesity reduction, remains to be seen, as no jurisdiction has yet 
decisively decreased obesity prevalence. If a jurisdiction decided it wished to adopt a 
contractionist stance towards sugar-sweetened beverages, it might write an excise tax policy that 
aimed to make beverages sweetened with caloric sweeteners multiple times more expensive to 
purchase than beverages sweetened with non-caloric sweeteners. Such a policy would ramp up 
demand for the substitute product. This powerful policy could produce larger positive changes in 
outcomes than any number of components of a comprehensive policy that excluded the use of 
powerful policies. A powerful policy’s focus on remedying the market failure, where for several 
reasons including poor information and negative externalities, consumption of a sugar-sweetened 
beverages was too high, by resolving the consequence of the market failure might be more 
efficient than the alternative comprehensive policy. That comprehensive policy would remedy 
each market failure in turn in the hopes that the consequence of said market failure would be 
resolved as a knock-on down-stream effect. 
The same can be said for tobacco control policy which could dramatically decrease the sales of 
tobacco cigarettes by removing nicotine from those products while leaving nicotine for sale in e-
cigarettes.131 Performance-based regulation could provide incentives for grocery stores to sell far 
 
130 See 2.1.1 The Regulatory Stance at page 29. 
131 Benjamin J. Apelberg et al., “Potential Public Health Effects of Reducing Nicotine Levels in Cigarettes in the United States,” 
New England Journal of Medicine 378, no. 18 (May 3, 2018): 1725–33, https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMsr1714617; Kenneth E. 
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fewer calories.132 Aggressive renewable portfolio standards could crash the energy market for 
fossil fuels in a couple of years rather than waiting generations.133 When the purpose of 
regulation becomes centered on shaping the size of markets, the number of potential powerful 
policies that are possible to consider come into view. The focus shifts from remedying the cause 
of a market failure to remedying the effect of the market failure. Measuring intent via a 
regulatory stance allows us to capture the importance of a small number of powerful policies.  
More market failures might be successfully resolved under this paradigm. Once powerful 
policies are under consideration, the conditions by which political actors would agree to their 
terms can be uncovered. The regulatory stances concept points to the obvious consequences of 
improperly functioning markets. By focusing on that consequence and asking how best it can be 
remedied, the development of more effective markets that serve pro-social interests could follow. 
8.2 Regulatory Stances as a Critique of the Commercial Determinants of Health 
The commercial determinants of health (CDOH) are markets that form the direct interface 
between health and commerce.134 Taken together, tobacco smoking and alcohol use account for 
one in five deaths in high-income countries.135 Adding in the toll of exposures to asbestos, 
overdoses on legal prescription drugs, results of automobile accidents, unhealthy diets, and on 
and on yields a total cost of the downsides to consumer goods markets that is higher still. The 
death toll from the use of these products is not an inevitable consequence of the human 
condition. Instead, scholars of the commercial determinants of health make the case that market, 
and political forces produce and enable widespread consumption and the resultant morbidity and 
mortality that follows. In this way, they have diagnosed a problem, but the commercial 
determinants of health literature presents fewer effective solutions with less dexterity than the 
social determinants of health literature it seeks to emulate. Here, I argue that the regulatory 
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stances concept offers a useful critique and suggests a constructive path forwards that will 
improve this literature. 
In recent years, much more non-communicable disease scholarship and policymaker attention 
have been explicitly focused on the social rather than on the commercial determinants of 
health.136 The social determinants of health have risen to become a powerful cultural and pollical 
force in its own right, focusing attention on the issues that drive systemic inequalities across and 
within borders.137 The comparison in attention is not fair, as the commercial determinants of 
health is a much newer term (coined in 2013 instead of the first appearance in PubMed in 1961 
or the rise to prominence of the social determinants of health concept in the 1986 Ottawa 
Charter) and they were intended to evoke the social determinants of health in its nomenclature.138  
Scholars of the social determinants of health have focused their studies on the harms and benefits 
of structural societal conditions on populations and try to tease apart how these mechanisms 
cause preventable health inequities. They document gradients in health outcomes across gender, 
race, socioeconomic status, educational attainment, religion, social class, geography, and access 
to the essentials of life like food and health care.139 Further, they study the interventions that 
decrease these gaps in outcomes across groups and have worked to integrate their rhetoric and 
narrative into the political battles to implement their favored policy solutions.140 Most 
importantly, the social determinants of health as successfully introduced the idea that social 
policy is health policy and that such policies should be advanced to remedy health inequities.141 
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The commercial determinants of health literature starts from a similar rhetorical point as the 
social determinants literature – It points out that the existence of the health inequities it seeks to 
redress are preventable.142 The very existence of people living longer and healthier lives when 
they are at the lower end of exposure to toxic forces implies that the removal of said toxic forces 
should heal those who are sick.143 The commercial determinants of health literature then goes on 
to propose via analogy to tobacco control that unhealthy markets can be corralled and health 
inequities caused by said markets may be resolved. I argue that this view is impoverished in 
several ways and causing the commercial determinants of health to fall short of its potential as a 
rhetorical and political concept. Further, I propose that the regulatory stances concept advance 
din this study provides a healthy way to reframe the debate around the commercial determinants 
of health in a manner that is both constructive and potent. 
8.2.1 The Commercial Determinants of Health is falling short of realizing its potential 
In one of the first articles coining the commercial determinants of health concept, Ilona 
Kickbusch, a former head of Health Promotion at the WHO, claims she would rewrite one of 
global health’s foundational documents, the Ottawa Charter of 1986.144 Kickbusch would have 
the charter focus on five more precise determinants of health rather than the seven less precise 
factors highlighted in the original (political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, 
behavioral and biological factors) and proposed dividing the determinants of health into the 
political, commercial, social, environmental, and behavioral.145 By fusing the social and 
economic (along with a dose of the political) determinants of health, Kickbusch pushed for 
commercial determinants of health to be placed alongside these other factors as the modifiable 
targets for change. Hundreds of peer-reviewed research articles have since marshaled 
Kickbusch’s framing to useful ends and have focused attention on the role that, especially, 
unhealthy commodity industries play in contributing to morbidity and mortality around the 
world.146  
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The tenets of the Commercial Determinants of Health literature combines several loosely linked 
conclusions to push for policy changes that address the issues it highlights; that tobacco 
companies served as the vector to tobacco-caused disease, that the public health community had 
successfully fought back and defeated the tobacco, and that other commercial products were 
causing health harms in a manner similar to the tobacco industry. I argue that only this last clause 
is entirely true and that to re-evaluate the potential of the commercial determinants of health lens, 
the first two claims about tobacco must be reconsidered. As originally conceived the commercial 
determinants of health draws lessons from the experience of tobacco control that is at once too 
pollyannish and wholly lacking in ambition.  
8.2.2 The Commercial Determinants of Health Are a Rebuke to Tobacco Exceptionalism 
This push to elevate the commercial determinants of health as a target for concerted intervention 
stemmed from an implied consensus among the public health community that lessons from 
tobacco needed to be scaled up and cross-applied to other industries. Around the time of the 
development of the FCTC, a justification for writing a global health treaty that aimed to confront 
the harms of a single unhealthy commodity industry began to circulate. This justification, termed 
“tobacco exceptionalism” contended that the tobacco industry was so inherently harmful and its 
influence so insidious that tobacco companies should not be allowed to influence regulatory 
policy over their business.147 Memorably, a panel of WHO-convened experts quipped, 
“[T]obacco use is unlike other threats to global health… There are no front groups to promote 
the spread of cholera. Mosquitoes have no lobbyists.”148 This observation, while true in the 
specific cases of mosquitoes and cholera, does not hold up to scrutiny beyond the degree of 
severity of risk that tobacco poses to its users.  
Many unhealthy commodity industries, mentioned before, meet these same criteria.149 In that 
sense, the commercial determinants of health were spot on to diagnose a series of issues that 
sorely lack attention from policymakers, scholars, and the public; Why does the world not 
address other unhealthy commodity industries as it has done with tobacco? That is the right 
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question to ask, but after close examination of the goals, the track record, and the toolkits of 
tobacco control, I argue that this analogy is not as fully developed as it should be. Additionally, 
the regulatory stances concept can be invoked to understand why this is the case. 
8.2.2.1 The Goal of the Tobacco Control Movement Re-Examined 
The well-established public health goal of the tobacco control movement is to reduce the 
morbidity and mortality of tobacco use.150 Others invoke the goal is to create a tobacco-free 
society, where no one has to live as a nicotine addict against their will.151 Others still have sought 
to make the tobacco industry into a social and economic pariah. The first goal is the noblest, but 
that it is often justified in an excessively convoluted and roundabout manner. Some invoke the 
doctrine of tobacco exceptionalism. Others invoke economic models of addiction explaining that 
smokers are consuming more tobacco than they would ideally consume if they were not addicted 
to the product.152 The way the first goal ought to be justified is that morbidity and mortality will 
decline if tobacco consumption decreases and both will decline faster if tobacco consumption 
falls faster. This, of course, implies that the goal of tobacco control should be to promote 
contractionist regulatory stances that are as strong as possible. Policies that do not move 
expeditiously towards this goal should be re-considered as they do not serve the end goal of 
efficaciously reducing morbidity and mortality. Instead, policies that decrease tobacco 
consumption as fast as possible ought to be held up as top policy priorities and the political 
considerations that block their implementation must be confronted.  
8.2.2.2 The Progress of the Tobacco Control Movement Re-Examined 
The CDOH literature begins with an assumption that the tobacco control movement has been 
such a stunning success that the rest of the public health policy must emulate those policies and 
lessons which have been so successful in tobacco control to other policy areas. The CDOH 
literature and public health advocates fawn over the adoption of the FCTC and pine for a similar 
treaty to be established regulating their unhealthy commodity industry of choice.153 The CDOH 
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literature then names a laundry list of tobacco control policies that could be transposed to other 
policy arenas before saying these would be a good idea to use elsewhere including restrictions on 
lobbying, marketing, and the levying of excise taxes.154 
These adulations are based on a rosy interpretation of tobacco control’s progress as a movement. 
I do not go as far as others who propose that the tobacco control movement has been a failure.155 
But, if the goal of tobacco control was to turn the tobacco industry into an unprofitable vestigial 
pariah of a business, it has only succeeded in making tobacco companies into social pariahs. 
Table 7 demonstrates that in 2019 even after the effects of global tobacco control policy 
successes, tobacco companies were still highly profitable, even compared to peers selling 
consumer staples that are not subject to contractionist regulatory stances.156 Tobacco companies 
have thrived, even in what is perceived to be a declining market.  
Table 7: Earnings to Revenue Ratios by Large Consumer Staples Companies (Millions USD, 2019)157 
Industry Company EBITDA Revenue Ratio 
Tobacco British American 13443 33042 40.7% 
Alcohol AB InBev 20828 52329 39.8% 
Tobacco Philip Morris 11495 29805 38.6% 
Tobacco Japan Tobacco 6267 20016 31.3% 
Soft Drinks Coca-Cola 11451 37266 30.7% 
Food Nestle 22957 93469 24.6% 
Alcohol Heineken 6236 26845 23.2% 
Cleaning Unilever 11973 58218 20.6% 
Food Mondelez 4934 25868 19.1% 
Soft Drinks PepsiCo 12723 67161 18.9% 
Food Danone 5129 29113 17.6% 
Food Kraft Heinz 3758 24977 15.0% 
Cleaning Procter & Gamble 8311 67384 12.3% 
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Even in countries that are supposed tobacco control success stories, like the US, the peak of 
tobacco company power could be measured in different ways and tell different measures of 
success. Cigarette use prevalence among US adults peaked in 1965, cigarette sales per capita 
peaked in 1981, and cigarette sales by inflation-adjusted value did not peak until 2006.158 Sales 
in 2018 by real value are equivalent to sales in the late 1990s, an era hardly defined as a nadir of 
tobacco industry power and influence. There are indeed fewer smokers today, but the companies 
selling cigarettes are doing well despite the contractionist regulatory stance they have been 
subject to for the last five decades. The fact that tobacco companies are exploring selling nicotine 
in novel forms illustrates that they and their shareholders have not been dissuaded of the business 
case for selling the addictive drug. 
The reasons that tobacco companies have been able to squeeze the cigarette market for more and 
more money are multi-faceted. The products are addictive, contributing to an inelastic demand 
curve.159 Tobacco companies have over-shifted tax increases onto consumers, blunting the 
revenue sting from tax rises.160 Tobacco companies have managed to shift their marketing into 
whatever channels remain to replenish their dying consumer base.161 They have even stepped 
back from diversification strategies outside of their core business of selling nicotine.162 This was 
an entirely rational strategy on the part of tobacco companies and it illustrates the difficulty that 
controlling the CDOH presents. 
8.2.2.3 The Toolkit of the Tobacco Control Movement Re-Examined 
With this sobering realization of the impact that the tobacco control movement has made on the 
industry it sought to regulate, in hand, why is the tobacco control movement the pinnacle of what 
the burgeoning commercial determinants of health movement want to achieve? The reason may 
stem from the public perception that the tobacco control movement has been an unqualified 
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success, but it may also stem from the fact that tobacco control has proposed solutions to redress 
the harms caused by an unhealthy commodity industry. 163  These solutions from tobacco control 
may have found other problems that they can try to solve.164 But, this casts the aims of tobacco 
control and indeed of the entire regulatory apparatus far too narrowly. 
Attempts to re-use policies initially created for tobacco control in other unhealthy commodity 
industries are understandable because these policies have been tried and tested and arrive with a 
ready-made body of evidence behind them. The attraction of CDOH scholars towards efforts that 
seek to repeat what is perceived correctly as public health victories in other markets is entirely 
reasonable. But it may be thinking too small. Tobacco control has not wholly succeeded in 
stopping tobacco companies from trying to circumvent current contractionist regulatory policies.  
The continuing profitability of the tobacco cigarette business indicates that tobacco control has 
fallen short of its most ambitious goals. It also signals that a more severe contractionist policy is 
possible. A hypothetical regulatory framework based on a strongly contractionist stance could 
drive down the size of the cigarette market over a short period. If a government capped nicotine 
content at non-addictive levels in tobacco cigarettes while allowing companies to still sell 
addictive levels of the substance in e-cigarettes, we might see such a precipitous decline in 
tobacco cigarette sales as modelers have forecasted.165  
Is tobacco control then, the success story that the expanded CDOH campaign is trying to 
replicate? Is this the best-case scenario? Tobacco control has been a qualified success story 
because it has reversed what was a growing market for tobacco cigarettes and cornered said 
market into shrinking in size over an extended time horizon. Death and disease have been 
averted for sure, but changes in corporate economic fortunes have not followed.166 The reasons 
that tobacco companies have been able to squeeze the cigarette market for more and more money 
are multi-faceted. The products are addictive, contributing to an inelastic demand curve.167 
Tobacco companies have over-shifted tax increases onto consumers, blunting the revenue sting 
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from tax rises.168 Tobacco companies have managed to shift their marketing into whatever 
channels remain to replenish their dying consumer base.169 They have even stepped back from 
diversification strategies outside of their core business of selling nicotine.170 This was an entirely 
rational strategy on the part of tobacco companies and it illustrates the difficulty that controlling 
the CDOH presents. If CDOH scholars and public health advocates want to achieve strongly 
contractionist policies in tobacco or any other unhealthy commodity industry, then the study at 
hand offers lessons informed by the range of regulatory stances. These lessons require a 
rethinking of the regulatory policy toolkit to favor strongly contractionist policies that can carve 
out as wide a swath of political support as possible. 
8.2.3 The Missing Portion of the Commercial Determinants of Health  
The social determinants of health literature points to the importance of conditions that both 
improve and harm health inequities. For example, the provision of quality education, healthcare, 
as well as political and social rights heals the divides in outcomes. By contrast, the commercial 
determinants of health literature rarely mentions a positive role for corporate influence over 
health, when the case can easily be made that not all corporate involvement in markets harms our 
health. This has limited the concept of the commercial determinants of health to be almost 
exclusively applied to unhealthy commodity industries selling products that are inherently 
harmful to health like alcohol, soda, and junk food. But, other products without inherently 
negative health effects do not fit well into the commercial determinants of health, as currently 
conceived, like opioids, meat, and e-cigarettes. These products would be health-promoting if 
they reached certain people and health-harming if they reached others. Further, commercial 
products with inherently positive health effects like vaccines, renewable energy, and vegetables 
are almost orthogonally oriented to the commercial determinants of health framework. The 
underconsumption of beneficial goods causes great harm to societal welfare and public health. 
As currently conceived, the commercial determinants of health concept has little to offer 
discussions around how the growth of such markets might be accelerated. 
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The trick to understanding all the commercial determinants of health may, therefore, be not to 
want to eliminate all sources of health harms that stem from the sale of commodities but to 
understand what policies best control markets to obtain optimal health outcomes. This is where 
the utility of the regulatory stances concept comes in. If we recognize that every market is 
subject to a regulatory stance, then we can begin the debate over which markets should be 
subject to which stance to properly redress the commercial determinants of health. 
8.2.4 Regulatory Stances Set the Commercial Determinants of Health Right 
Integrating the regulatory stances concept into the conversation over the commercial 
determinants of health clarifies a useful concept by broadening its application and sharpening its 
purpose. The commercial determinants of health concept falters when it regards markets with the 
potential to produce positive or conditional outcomes for health. Therefore, we should assign 
classifications to various markets based on their effects on health to understand the utility of the 
commercial determinants of health concept more fully.  
I propose classifying markets as having a positive, negative, or conditional effect on health. The 
commercial determinants literature already points to alcohol and ultra-processed foods as 
candidates for designation as markets with a negative effect on health. Lencucha and Thow 
briefly tease their recognition of the role of “healthy commodity industries” in their response to a 
wide-ranging critique of their investigation into the effect of a neoliberal ideology’s relation to 
the commercial determinants of health.171 These healthy commodity industry markets like 
vaccines and vegetables that will produce better health outcomes as they grow in size. In 
between are conditional products like opioids and e-cigarettes that will produce positive or 
negative outcomes based on the conditions under which they are sold.  
Markets designated as having negative health outcomes require contractionist regulatory stances 
if public health is to be improved. Markets designated as having positive health outcomes require 
expansionist regulatory stances if health is to be improved. Markets with conditional health 
outcomes likely require something in between extremes if public health is to be improved. 
 
171 Raphael Lencucha and Anne Marie Thow, “Developing a Research Agenda for the Analysis of Product Supply: A Response 
to the Recent Commentaries,” International Journal of Health Policy and Management, February 19, 2020, 1, 
https://doi.org/10.34172/ijhpm.2020.25; Raphael Lencucha and Anne Marie Thow, “How Neoliberalism Is Shaping the Supply of 
Unhealthy Commodities and What This Means for NCD Prevention,” International Journal of Health Policy and Management 8, 
no. 9 (September 1, 2019): 514–20, https://doi.org/10.15171/ijhpm.2019.56. 
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Recognition of harms, benefits, and the relative costs of each can focus regulatory debates on the 
purpose of regulation. The utility of focusing on the intended size of a market is clarifying and 
opens up possibilities to advance policy in a manner that might have a broader appeal than the 
current rhetoric undergirding the commercial determinants of health literature. The regulatory 
stances concept highlights what necessary corrective action is needed in different markets rather 
than a blanket solution across markets. Once the goal is identified, we should then seek to apply 
what was learned from the case studies presented before to propose solutions to reaching 
political action on redressing the commercial determinants of health. 
8.2.5 Cross-Applying the Lessons of this Study 
This study found that regulatory stances changed when all actors involved agreed on the 
alternative regulatory stance. This stance shifted policy from prohibitionist to expansionist, 
which represented a business opportunity for corporate actors. In circumstances where a pro-
public health policy involves shifting towards the contractionist end of the range of regulatory 
stances, we may not expect to gain cooperation or agreement from business actors so easily.  
If we end up agreeing that such actors have a legitimate role at the policymaking table, then we 
must explore what regulatory stances can be cooperatively developed and adopted that enhance 
public health while gaining corporate support than opens policy windows to contract markets. 
Aneurin Bevan, the man charged with establishing the UK’s National Health Service, noted that, 
to broker a deal convincing private-sector physicians to effectively become nationalized, he had 
to “stuff their mouths with gold”.172 Bevan persuaded physicians that the loss of autonomy they 
would suffer would be compensated by enhancing their pocketbooks.173 He removed British 
doctors’ incentive to dissent. Lost harmful business opportunities may need to be replaced with 
new pro-social business opportunities if right-wing pro-business parties are to be co-opted into 
supporting a contractionist regulatory stance. 
Public health does not need to re-create an economic system to serve its image from the ground 
up to begin to address these issues. Public health, and truly, other interested actors need to 
understand how the tangled web of regulatory policy serves to contract and expand markets. 
 
172 Michael Williams, “A Brave New Paradigm?,” BMJ 329, no. 7461 (August 5, 2004): 357, 
https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.329.7461.357. 
173 Andrew Hindmoor, “The Importance of Being Trusted: Transaction Costs and Policy Network Theory,” Public 
Administration 76, no. 1 (1998): 25–43, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9299.00089. 
   
236 
 
Interested pro-social actors can learn how restricting access to capital markets, altering the terms 
for market entry, and so on affect the trajectory of markets. 
Although it offers useful core concepts that deserve to be expounded upon and engaged with 
seriously, the commercial determinants of health literature can come across as anti-corporate 
screed. On occasion, the CDOH literature questions the orientation of public policy, industry, 
capitalism, politics in a manner that could become antithetical to achieving a healthier society. 
This perspective is impoverished by the narrow view it takes towards the role of corporate 
influence on health, consistently positing that where corporate influence is involved, profits will 
win out over health and that public health advocates must convince policymakers that health is 
either fundamental to growing wealth or that health should outweigh marginal concerns about 
wealth. 
Much of the CDOH literature assumes that the solution to many of the world’s health issues is to 
diminish corporate power.174 This might be the case, but it might be an unnecessary step beyond 
the need to shape markets in the interest of health. The literature is often unhelpful to 
practitioners of politics because it concludes with recommendations that public health advocates 
essentially participate in the political process by “demanding a seat at the table” or learning how 
to “mobilize for political action” or asking politicians to “stand up to industry”175. Transposing 
advice that “corporate interests should not be involved in the formation of public health policy” 
into practice will be a tricky matter.176 These recommendations contain little practical advice to 
win converts to their side and may thus end up being ineffective. Adulations do not a strategy 
make.  
These debates often offer just three possible solutions to address the CDOH; voluntary self-
regulation, public-private partnership, or government regulation.177 If the idea is to decrease the 
 
174 Hastings, “Why Corporate Power Is a Public Health Priority”; William H. Wiist, “Public Health and the Anticorporate 
Movement: Rationale and Recommendations,” American Journal of Public Health 96, no. 8 (August 1, 2006): 1370–75, 
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175 Kent Buse and Sarah Hawkes, “Sitting on the FENSA: WHO Engagement with Industry,” The Lancet 388, no. 10043 (July 
30, 2016): 446–47, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(16)31141-2; Michael Thorn, “Addressing Power and Politics through 
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size of unhealthy commodity markets, this is a false choice between solutions. As so many have 
pointed out, government regulation is necessary to decrease the size of markets because 
corporations have every incentive to grow their profits.178 However, if our goal is to increase the 
size of a market, that does not mean the government must abdicate its role as regulator. 
Governments possess a great deal of power to alter the relative profitability of markets and to 
drive corporate behavior in the desired direction. Markets are not born free, rather they are 
crafted through institutions and policy and path dependence.179 Regulation makes markets and 
pointing that out must be added to the public health policy advocates’ toolkit. 
Seeking to dismantle the influence of corporate power on politics may be a noble goal and one 
that could pay dividends was it to succeed. But, focusing on the purpose of the regulation, might 
help policymakers, advocates, and citizens better recognize why we should care about regulatory 
policy. We should care because it alters what the economy is composed of. Politics involves 
setting up coalitions that can stick together to solve collective action problems. What 
practitioners may take from the study at hand instead is that industry can be co-opted to support 
contractionist policy if it is linked with an expansionist policy that they plan to support.180 What 
may be more consequential than curtailing corporate power writ large is determining how to 
adopt regulatory stances that serve the interest of public health, even when that redounds to 
private profit. Focusing on the purpose of regulation might enable us to move faster towards a 
healthier society.181  
8.3 What is still unknown? 
As this work centered on a close analysis of three high-income established democracies with a 
shared heritage of British colonial rule regulating the same novel market, extrapolation of these 
findings to other environments and cases must be done carefully. While a comparative 
qualitative research method can increase confidence in the internal validity of a study, there is 
much that we could not learn because the study design did not allow for it. The conclusions 
offered here must be explored and picked apart using other research methods and applied in 
 
178 David Stuckler and Marion Nestle, “Big Food, Food Systems, and Global Health,” PLOS Medicine 9, no. 6 (June 19, 2012): 
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other cases. First, there is the issue of political ideology and form of government, which does not 
vary enough across the cases at hand to be exploited as an explanatory variable. Second, we have 
learned very little about the conditions necessary to move towards the contractionist end of the 
range of regulatory stances. Finally, we know less than is comfortable about what the best 
practice regulatory stance towards e-cigarettes should be. These questions are the logical follow-
ons from this study and the importance of filling in these gaps is explained below. 
8.3.1 The Role of Political Ideology and Form of Government 
How does political ideology map on to the adoption of regulatory stances towards various 
markets beyond the current case study? What would have happened to e-cigarette regulation if 
the Canadian Liberals had not won in the 2015 federal elections? What would have changed in 
New Zealand had Labour not surged to victory in 2017? What would have happened in Australia 
had Labor won in 2019? How would a Democratic US President have reacted to the EVALI 
outbreak? These essential questions remain difficult to answer without a more thoroughgoing 
exploration of the factors that bound decisionmakers.  
The initial analysis suggests that in each case policy windows to change e-cigarette regulatory 
would have opened in a similar manner to what happened, but the policies that would have 
passed might have been slightly different. For example, a President Hillary Clinton might have 
imposed a stronger contractionist policy then did President Donald Trump. A follow-on 
Conservative Harper government might have passed an even more expansionist e-cigarette 
regulatory policy in Canada. The former Associate Minister of Health under the last New 
Zealand National Party government, even submitted what she claimed was the draft e-cigarette 
regulation bill developed under the old government as a private members bill.182 That bill was 
slightly more expansionist towards the e-cigarette market than the bill submitted to New 
Zealand’s Parliament by the Labour government in February 2020.  
These scenarios will remain counterfactuals for the time being until rigorous case studies of 
comparative regulation begin to tackle the conditions necessary for regulatory stances to move in 
either direction on the range of regulatory stances for e-cigarettes and other markets. Until we 
closely study right-wing governments passing laws trading prohibitionist for expansionist stances 
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towards e-cigarettes or left-wing governments exchanging expansionist for contractionist 
policies towards cannabis, we will be without the necessary data to make firms conclusions on 
these questions. 
Asking questions like these may end up creating a classification of different of markets that are 
subject to different regulatory stances under governments led by different ideologies. When the 
concept of regulatory stances is applied to markets beyond drugs, we could consider why a 
technocratic competitive authoritarian government in Singapore seeks to spur the development of 
public housing while crushing demand for cannabis and determine the conditions linking those 
policy choices. We can consider why the left-leaning government of the state of California 
chooses to pursue the inverse. Of course, the role of the form of government is an entirely 
separate issue for comparative regulation that extends well beyond ideology. 
Systematized studies of comparative regulation, possibly applied to the range of regulatory 
stances, holds a great deal of possibility to explain drivers of policy divergence and convergence 
at a global level. Such studies may point to the strategies that are used to overcome ideological 
and structural barriers to achieving pro-social or pro-health regulatory policy outcomes. 
Developing a better understanding of the drivers of change and stasis in regulatory across 
borders will help develop more effective policy advocates and scholars. 
8.3.2 How does a country move towards a prohibitionist or contractionist regulatory stance? 
This study focused on two countries who abandoned prohibitionist regulatory stances in favor of 
expansionist stances towards e-cigarettes. It further learned lessons about the conditions 
necessary for a country to maintain a prohibitionist regulatory stance. What it explored to a much 
lesser degree was the conditions necessary to move towards a prohibitionist or contractionist 
policy from an expansionist or permissive policy. This study did not address this question in the 
realm of e-cigarette regulation beyond the examples of the US and Canadian reactions to 
EVALI.183   
In some ways, this question is much more relevant to the studies of unhealthy commodity 
industries that comparative regulation has tackled before.184 When a commodity’s consumption 
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is too large, then this will be the practical question to study for scholars and advocates alike. The 
political dynamics, policy community consensus formation process, and problem definition will 
be entirely different when moving towards the opposite end of the range. Determining the 
conditions under which all parties would benefit from a policy change towards the contractionist 
end of the range of regulatory stances is likely to be a challenge and may even be non-existent. If 
such circumstances do not exist, then politics of conflict might prove to be more influential for 
these cases than the politics of consensus were for the case studies here. 
8.3.3 Who was right?  
This study did not attempt to determine which regulatory stance towards e-cigarettes should be 
considered best practice. While this question motivates many actors throughout these case 
studies, it is too early to reach conclusions about what regulatory policy choices will yield the 
best results in terms of the lowest smoking prevalence or the lowest tobacco-related morbidity 
and mortality rates. The world has not yet witnessed a country successfully turning back the tide 
against youth e-cigarette use once those rates began to rise significantly. 
Efforts to alter or maintain e-cigarette regulatory frameworks were constantly described as 
evidence-based policy by actors on all sides of the debate. Evidence around safety, dual use with 
tobacco cigarettes, youth initiation, clinical cessation trials, and addiction studies were constantly 
put forward to justify one position or another. Depending upon the local context and who was 
making the argument to a particular policymaker, it was possible for any number of different 
conclusions to be reached on the basis of the scientific evidence that was presented and on the 
identity of the policymakers who was listening. This study did not attempt to resolve the matter 
of which side was correct. 
Even computational modelling efforts that assess which e-cigarette regulatory policies are 
projected to maximize public health outcomes, do not provide clean answers.185 The findings of 
these studies are, of course, reliant on the inputs and assumptions baked into the models. Models 
 
Poikolainen, “The Weakness of Stern Alcohol Control Policies,” Alcohol and Alcoholism (Oxford, Oxfordshire), July 6, 2015, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/alcalc/agv081. 
185 Andrew Hill and Oscar M. Camacho, “A System Dynamics Modelling Approach to Assess the Impact of Launching a New 
Nicotine Product on Population Health Outcomes,” Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology 86 (June 1, 2017): 265–78, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.yrtph.2017.03.012; Hayden McRobbie, “Modelling the Population Health Effects of E-Cigarettes Use: 
Current Data Can Help Guide Future Policy Decisions,” Nicotine & Tobacco Research 19, no. 2 (February 1, 2017): 131–32, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ntr/ntw387. 
   
241 
 
may emphasize different endpoints as most indicative of success. Some will measure cigarette 
and e-cigarette sales volumes, others will measure changes in product use prevalence, and others 
will measure rates of morbidity and mortality. The most important endpoints will vary based on 
the audience they are being presented to and the values that the audience holds. However, until 
we observe substantial cross-national divergence in these outcomes and can pinpoint which sets 
of policies caused these figures to diverge, it will be disingenuous to describe any policy as “best 
practice”. 
A recent study pointed out that global tobacco control policy progress may have had only a 
mixed effect on tobacco cigarette consumption relative to the declines that would have been 
expected based on prior trends, with developed economies seeing faster declines after policies 
were passed while developing economies saw no or negative progress.186 While we are certain 
that well-implemented individual contractionist policies are effective at decreasing the size of a 
market, we know that poorly implemented policies achieve far fewer gains. Further, it is less 
well understood how contractionist policies being adopted in one jurisdiction may affect the 
strategy of transnational corporations seeking to profit maximize their behaviors in other 
jurisdictions subject to permissive regulations.187 No credible public health authority advises 
countries against adopting contractionist regulatory policies towards tobacco or any other 
harmful commodity because cross-national comparisons have difficulty finding positive policy 
outcomes. Instead, such authorities recommend that well-designed studies of policy intervention 
be conducted as an integrated part of policy implementation. 
This study did not begin to tackle the hairy questions about tradeoffs between outcomes, costs, 
benefits, values, and power that the dilemma of the e-cigarette market’s very existence poses. 
The questions of how to construct efficacious and just regulatory policy are ahead of us all. The 
best that studies of comparative regulation can offer in the interim is providing a full account and 
explanation of the drivers of and barriers to policy change. For now, we will leave it to future 
scholars to determine the effects of regulatory policy change or stasis. 
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8.4 Ending Thoughts 
This study closely followed the developments within a relatively small policy subsystem in three 
countries that combined, have fewer inhabitants than the United Kingdom. Their experiences 
regulating e-cigarettes reflect their individual histories, governing structures, and current political 
landscapes. By paying close attention to their experiences navigating a complex, constantly 
shifting, and contested subject, we learn more about good governance and effective advocacy. 
By keeping our judgements at bay, we come to understand the motives of actors in this story 
rather than castigating or lauding them on instinct.  
Canada and New Zealand have chosen to expand their e-cigarette markets while Australia has 
chosen to keep theirs on ice. Just as these countries were good choices for a comparative 
qualitative study of most similar cases of policy divergence, they will also serve as useful cases 
by which health and market outcomes can be compared. Continuing to pay attention to how 
countries with high capacity and expertise regulate markets that affect health can provide 
guidance to others seeking to learn from their example.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Semi-Structured Interview Protocol 
• Please tell me a bit of background about you and your current job. 
• What have been the effects of the introduction of the e-cigarette in your 
country/organization? 
o Probe if primarily listing negatives: What positive effects have e-cigarettes had? 
o Probe if primarily listing positives: What negative effects have e-cigarettes had? 
o Probe: Are there subpopulations where e-cigarettes are doing particular good (or 
harm)? 
o Probe: Is a smoker going to lower their risk for disease and death if they switch to an 
e-cigarette? 
• Probe: How should that risk be communicated? 
• Would NRT be permissible to use for harm reduction? 
• What are the similarities between the experience with e-cigarettes and light 
cigarettes? 
• Is tobacco control working in your country?  
• How were these issues brought to the attention of the public and policymakers? 
o Probe: Were these issues connected to particular solutions? Tell me more about 
those. 
• What issues does <key bill or regulation> try to address? 
o Probe: Are there some issues that were higher priorities than others? Why? 
• What political conditions enabled <the key bill or regulation> to come up for consideration? 
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o Probe if bill or regulation was stopped: What political conditions prevented the bill 
from coming up for considerations 
• Which actors were essential to getting <the key bill or regulation> adopted (or blocked)? 
o Probe: Why did those actors support (or block) <the key bill or regulation>? 
• From where did the idea of <the key bill or regulation> originate? 
o Probe: Explain more about the research or reasoning that underpins the idea of <the 
key bill or regulation>. 
• Do you believe that the government's policies regarding e-cigarettes slow down or speed up 
the growth of the market for e-cigarettes, or neither? Why? 
o Probe: <Re-phrase the prior question as a counterfactual to whether the key bill or 
regulation had not been adopted> 
Thank you for participating in this interview. I found our conversation to be informative and 
insightful to understanding the decision-making process around e-cigarette policy in <Country of 
residence>.  
Do you have any final thoughts on subjects we raised you would like to contribute before we 
finish? 
Whom would you recommend I speak to, so that I obtain a fuller picture of this topic? 
o Would you serve as a personal reference for me, to help me get in touch with them? 
If I need to clarify any information, can I reach out to you again?  
